Russia Officially Recognizes the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
On April 17, 2025, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation officially lifted the ban on the activities of the Taliban within Russian territory. This legal decision means that the Taliban is no longer formally designated as a terrorist organization in Russia.
Subsequently, on July 3, 2025, Russia became the first country in the world to officially recognize the Taliban as the legitimate governing authority of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. As a result, the Taliban now operates within the framework of political dialogue and cooperation in its relations with Russia. The normalization of relations with Afghanistan represents a significant element of Russia’s foreign policy agenda. With these actions, Moscow not only opens a new chapter in bilateral ties but also positions itself as a trendsetter and initiator of a new era in political and diplomatic affairs—an essential attribute of a great power.
Even before the Taliban’s victory, Russian analysts had anticipated the collapse of the pro-American regime led by Ashraf Ghani. Russian experts were deeply informed about the domestic situation in Afghanistan and recognized the failures of U.S. policy in the region. There was growing and acute dissatisfaction within Afghan provinces regarding the American-backed government in Kabul. Consequently, Moscow was among the first to initiate contact with the Taliban, engaging in dialogue with the movement well before its military success.
Russia accurately predicted the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces and foresaw a swift Taliban victory. From a strategic standpoint, it would have been unwise not to engage. Moscow’s internal rationale was both logical and pragmatic: to establish working relations with those in power in Afghanistan. After weighing all regional developments, Russia concluded that the Taliban’s ascension was inevitable and therefore moved early to build relations.
Other major and regional powers are expected to follow Russia’s lead, which could result in the normalization of Afghanistan’s international status, a boost in investment, and the country’s integration into multilateral cooperation frameworks. While the United States is likely to continue applying pressure to sustain a policy of non-recognition, the impact of this pressure is expected to be limited, especially against the backdrop of growing engagement from China, Turkey, Central Asian republics, and Middle Eastern countries. Washington is unlikely to prevent regional powers from recognizing the Taliban. At the same time, the U.S. may seek to destabilize the Eurasian geopolitical landscape.
Russia’s Objectives in Afghanistan
What does Russia seek from its engagement with Afghanistan? What are the goals of Russian diplomacy? Moscow seeks a stable regional environment in which Eurasian powers can negotiate independently—without external interference—on the basis of consensus and mutual interest. A stable Afghanistan is crucial to this vision: one free of foreign military bases and insulated from serving as a haven for international terrorist organizations. Accordingly, Moscow will seek to support and promote the political evolution of the Taliban regime towards a more restrained and moderate governance model.
The Taliban’s grip on power is expected to endure, and the movement has demonstrated growing political functionality and rationality. Therefore, Russia is prepared to engage in constructive cooperation with both the Taliban and Afghanistan’s governing institutions. The overarching aim is to stabilize Afghan society and counter terrorism within its borders through collaboration with the Taliban authorities. A particular threat to Russian interests is posed by the Islamic State’s Afghan affiliate, ISIS-Khorasan, which is also viewed as a hostile force by the Taliban. Russia and Afghanistan are expected to cooperate closely in efforts to dismantle this organization.
Economic Cooperation as a Cornerstone of Bilateral Relations
Economic cooperation is another key dimension of the Russian-Afghan relationship. One of Afghanistan’s top leaders, Abdul Ghani Baradar, has openly invited Russian companies—particularly from the private sector—to invest in Afghanistan. A notable example of ongoing infrastructure initiatives is the proposed construction of a second highway tunnel through the Salang Pass. The first tunnel, built between 1958 and 1964 with Soviet expertise, was crucial for strategic mobility during the Afghan War and remains one of the country’s most vital transportation arteries. In addition to transportation, the development of social infrastructure—such as residential buildings, schools, and healthcare institutions—remains a high priority across Afghanistan.
Improving Afghanistan’s economic conditions is a priority for rational actors in the international system. The Taliban has expressed intent to expand economic ties with countries across Eurasia. As a result of Russia’s engagement, more nations are beginning to explore the possibility of cooperating with Afghanistan. Member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are deepening bilateral ties with Kabul. Following Russia’s example, India has also begun efforts to normalize relations with the Taliban.
As of the end of 2024, the volume of bilateral trade between Russia and Afghanistan reached a modest USD 323 million. Russia imports limited quantities of Afghan vegetables and grapes, with future plans for pomegranate imports from the southern provinces. Afghanistan currently exports chromite, mineral concentrates, as well as precious and semi-precious stones such as rubies and emeralds to Russia. Additional imports include spices, non-alcoholic beverages (including energy drinks), and medicinal plants like lavender, thyme, and licorice.
Obstacles to Normalization and Regional Challenges
Several factors may hinder the normalization of Afghanistan’s political and diplomatic status. Chief among them is the desire of certain regional powers to maintain monopolistic influence over the Taliban. This especially concerns the Pakistani military, which historically served as both mentor and sponsor to the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. Pakistan’s doctrine of “strategic depth” has long relied on supporting radical Islamist factions to establish proxy networks throughout the region, particularly against its main strategic rival, India. Islamabad continues to back various militant groups that utilize terrorism as a political tool.
However, since their victory in 2021, the Taliban has increasingly distanced itself from Pakistani control. The movement now seeks to act as an independent and sovereign force, building equitable relations with all international actors. This aspiration has sparked tensions with the Pakistani military, leading to a rise in conflict and hostile rhetoric between the two neighbors. Another significant barrier to the Taliban’s international recognition is the persistent opposition from the United States, which continues to obstruct the normalization process.
In sum, the Taliban has successfully broken through its diplomatic isolation by securing its first official recognition. This marks a major milestone in the reconfiguration of Afghanistan’s international status. Russia, for its part, has demonstrated that it is a rational and ambitious global power, capable of shaping diplomatic and geopolitical realities in the Greater Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia
Dr. Georgi Asatryan
Dr. Georgi Asatryan is an Associate Professor at Moscow State University, and author of "Talibanland - Paradise Under the Shadow of Sabers in Afghanistan"
