AND THAT FOLKS IS WHAT IT'S ALL ABOUT

Lavrov: Russia Does Not Accept a US-led “Global Village”

FM Lavrov: US and its allies continue to aggressively impose on others the so-called “rules-based world order”. What this “order” means for human rights can be seen today in Ukraine. 

| Photo: Twitter @RussianEmbassy

TeleSUR
Published 19 March 2022


Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said he is open to negotiations with the West as long as they are based on mutual respect.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Friday that his country and the international community will not accept a "global village" led by the United States (U.S.).

In an interview granted to national media, Lavrov affirmed that: “there are actors who will never accept the existence of a global village led by an American sheriff”.

In this sense, he ratified that countries such as China, India, Brazil, or Mexico are opposed to unilateralism.

At the same time, he emphasized that “the U.S. seeks to create a global village”, and he explained this on the basis of the dependence on Washington shown by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

However, he affirmed that Russia is ready for a negotiation process based on mutual respect. In this regard, he said: “As always, we are open to cooperation with all those who are ready to do so on the basis of equality, mutual respect, the search for a balance of interests.”



He added that Russia does not close "the door before the West, it is they who do it. But when they realize [what they have done], when the door reopens, we will analyze the cooperation projects they offer us, but bearing in mind that they are not reliable long-term partners."

Similarly, he addressed the issue of the unilateral restrictive measures imposed by the U.S. and the EU; and assured that they are aimed at "marginalizing and containing Russia." However, he asserted that they have not had any effect and, on the contrary, "they have always only strengthened us".

The top representative of the Russian diplomacy said that "Western partners tried to turn Ukraine into an anti-Russia by means of different tools".

At the same time he referred to the Western military assistance to Kiev, and reiterated: "We have made it clear that any cargo entering the territory of Ukraine, which we believe to be carrying weapons, will become a legitimate target".

Guterres Asserts Financial System Impedes Global Equality

“Let’s tell it like it is: the global financial system is morally bankrupt. 

It favours the rich and punishes the poor.” UN Secretary-General 

António Guterres, UN General Assembly. Mar. 20, 2022.

| Photo: Twitter @RightsCorridor

TeleSUR
Published 20 March 2022

"The global financial system was designed by the rich and powerful to benefit the rich and powerful," said the secretary of the multilateral organization.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, António Guterres, asserted this Saturday that the model of the international financial system prevents the construction of a more equitable and egalitarian world.

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"The global financial system was designed by the rich and powerful to benefit the rich and powerful," said the secretary of the multilateral organization.

At the same time, Guterres detailed that this financial system is designed to maintain deep social inequalities, "it [the financial system] is not conducive to fostering development," he added.

"All countries deserve a leveled playing field to unlock their human potential and build strong economies," the Portuguese diplomat emphasized.



Alluding to the situation of migrants, Guterres also took aim at the hegemonic powers, pointing out that it was they who drew border lines to discriminate against human beings, "borders should not be redrawn at the whim of the great powers," he added.

"Territorial integrity and sovereignty are sacrosanct, both for small and large states," reiterated the UN Secretary General.

US Defense Secretary Trip to Bulgaria Met by Anti-NATO Rally

Ukraine war: US to send army contingent to Bulgaria as part of NATO battle group. 

| Photo: Twitter @SCMPNews  THE PRESIDENT OF BULGARIA IS A BULGARIAN AMERICAN

Published 20 March 2022

TeleSUR

Demonstrators gathered in front of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense where the US Secretary of Defense and the Bulgarian PM met, waving Bulgarian and Russian flags. They were heard chanting, "NATO Out."

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin traveled to Bulgaria on Saturday, where he met with Prime Minister Kiril Petkov to discuss the Ukrainian crisis and apparently asked Sofia to provide military aid to Kiev. The Bulgarian PM said no.

The meeting took place while Bulgarian citizens took to the streets, demonstrating against giving its "few remaining weapons" to Ukraine and demanding the withdrawal of NATO from the country.

Demonstrators and activists gathered in front of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, where Austin and Petkov met for a joint press conference, waving Bulgarian and Russian flags. They were heard chanting, “NATO Out.”

Similar protests took place in Rome and Piza, Italy, where activists of a major Italian trade union, USB, opposed sending weapons to Ukraine and called on the government to ditch NATO.

While many NATO members have pledged to pump Ukraine with weapons, the Bulgarian government has not been particularly supportive of the idea, with Petkov dismissing reports that Sofia discussed the topic as "fake news."

Bulgaria has been a member of NATO since 2004, when it along with several other Eastern European nations was welcomed into the alliance following the “Big Bang” enlargement round announced at the November 2002 Prague summit.

China Defends Its Diplomatic Stance on the Ukraine Crisis

Time will prove China’s stance on Ukraine is on the right side of history: Wang Yi 

| Photo: Twitter @RomanHayes10

TeleSUR
Published 21 March 2022 

Beijing's chief diplomat stated that China has always advocated peace and opposed war, which is not only a tradition rooted in the country's history and culture, but has also been its foreign policy.

China's position on the Ukraine issue is objective and fair, and time will prove that it is on the right side of history, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reported.

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China Calls for Efforts to Avoid Larger Scale Crisis In Ukraine

Wang made the remarks while briefing reporters on the exchange of views between the Chinese and U.S. heads of state on the Ukraine issue during a video call that took place on March 18.

The foreign minister recalled that President Xi Jinping, in the March 18 video conference with his U.S. counterpart Joe Biden, clarified China's position on the Ukrainian crisis.

The minister clarified that Xi proposed a solution consisting of "promoting dialogue and negotiation between the parties, ceasing fire and fighting as soon as possible and avoiding civilian casualties, especially to prevent humanitarian crises.

Beijing's chief diplomat added that China has always advocated peace and opposed war, which is not only a tradition rooted in the country's history and culture, but has also been its foreign policy.



The Beijing government will continue to make its judgment independently, objectively and fairly based on the merits of the matter, Wang said, adding that China will never accept any external coercion or pressure, and opposes all baseless accusations and suspicions against China.

On the Ukraine crisis, Wang said the priority is that all sides should push for dialogue and negotiation between the immediate parties, cease hostilities as soon as possible, avoid civilian casualties and prevent a humanitarian crisis, the foreign minister stressed.

A lasting solution lies in rejecting the Cold War mentality, refraining from bloc confrontation and building a balanced, effective and sustainable regional security architecture to achieve long-term peace in Europe, he concluded.

GERMANS AWAKE: HOW THE BUNDESWEHR SHOULD SPEND ITS MONEY

MICHAEL SHURKIN
MARCH 21, 2022


German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s decision late last month to increase German defense spending to 2 percent of GDP and kick the increase off with a €100 billion (roughly $110 billion) spending spree marks a profound sea change in German defense thinking, which will have important consequences for European defense, the European Union, and NATO. It also raises immediate questions about how Germany will spend that money and what the post-splurge Bundeswehr will look like. This, too, matters a great deal for Germany’s allies: European defense is a team effort, meaning that if suddenly Europe’s sleeping giant decides to become a military powerhouse, the rest of the team might want to adjust their own spending and planning. Money on the scale that Germany is now committing to spending means not just fixing all the ways in which the Bundeswehr currently is broken, but also becoming something larger and more capable. But in what ways?

The priority for the Bundeswehr since 2014 ostensibly has been to reverse course from decisions made between roughly 2006 and 2014 to shrink the military while at the same time growing the number of deployable, expeditionary forces. The word one frequently encounters in documents from that period is einsatzfähig, basically “deployable.” (See, for example, the 2006 Weissbuch or defense white paper, published by the Ministry of Defense, the 2010 Weise Commission Report, and the various reforms proposed by Minister of Defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg.) This meant not just cutting the Bundeswehr but disproportionately cutting its heavier units and the major weapons systems that were not appropriate for operations such as those happening at the time in Afghanistan. It was in 2010 that Germany ended conscription and cut the size of the Heer, the army, from 100,000 to 70,000.

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Germany began incrementally to regrow the force while backing away from its tight focus on the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The 2016 Weissbuch, for example, articulated a real concern with the possibility of a state-on-state conflict in Europe and a commitment to strengthening the Bundeswehr’s conventional warfare capabilities. Even linguistically, there was a shift away from einsatzfähig or Einsatszfähigkeit (deployability) to concern with Einsatzbereitschaft (readiness). The German parliament and the German public, however, were not willing to pay for meaningful improvements and balked at spending anywhere near 2 percent of GDP. The Bundeswehr’s ambitions remained modest even to the point of renouncing in 2015 the goal of being fully equipped (Vollausstattung). Instead, according to Lt. Gen. Jörg Vollmer, at the time Germany’s highest-ranking officer, the Bundeswehr’s real objective was to have “enough” to meet the army’s current requirements. It was during that period that the German army played with a rotational, dynamic sustainment system (Dynamisches Verfügbarkeitsmanagement) designed in effect to enable the army to get by with low vehicle availability rates.

As a result, all Bundeswehr watchers agree that the Bundeswehr suffers from poor capacity and yawning readiness gaps. Germans were able to sustain their operations in Afghanistan and participate in major NATO exercises and deployments only by cannibalizing various units, often at the price of reducing significantly the availability of major equipment for training purposes. One concrete consequence was that, as I argued in a RAND report in 2017, Germany would struggle to marshal a heavy brigade for a (now not so) hypothetical confrontation in Eastern Europe and maintain it in the field. More recent reports indicate that the Bundeswehr has made modest improvements, but still is nowhere near where any observer believes it needs to be. It would not have a significantly easier time generating and sustaining that heavy brigade, for example. Some critics discount the Defense Ministry’s more upbeat reports altogether. In 2019, Deutsche Welle declared that the Bundeswehr was “in a crisis,” and truth be told there is little to suggest that the situation has changed since.

‘Artisanal’ Arms Production

According to a German Ministry of Defense paper released in December 2021, 71 major weapons systems had an average operational readiness rate of 77 percent, which constitutes a significant improvement over years past. However, 11 systems had ratings under 50 percent. Combat vehicles stood at 71 percent (if true, this is a major achievement given that in 2017 the German press was reporting that less than half of Germany’s Leopard 2 fleet was operational). The equipment for the “combat units of the navy” stood at a readiness rate of 72 percent; combat and transport aircraft were at 65 percent; support vehicles at 82 percent; and helicopters at 40 percent. A significant portion of Germany’s vehicle fleets across the board also are aging or obsolete, including many of its armored vehicles. The Ministry of Defense assessed that the problem was particularly bad for aging systems and items of which there were only a few. Examples include Germany’s CH-53 helicopters and P-3C patrol aircraft. But also struggling were the Bundeswehr’s new A400M strategic lift planes, and its NH90 and Tiger helicopters. Likewise, the German navy was struggling. Less than 30 percent of the navy’s fleet, the report observed, was fully operational in the sense that all of the ship’s major systems were functional and up to high-intensity operations.

These 2021 numbers seem mostly positive. However, the situation is less encouraging when one checks the denominators. Percentage of what? The ministry’s paper underlined the difference between what the Bundeswehr had in its inventory and what it deemed “available” (verfügbar). The latter term applies to items that are in Bundeswehr hands rather than with the manufacturer being upgraded or repaired. In other words, the readiness rates mentioned above apply only to “available” items. This brings the numbers down significantly. For example, the report says that only 183 out of the Bundeswehr’s fleet of 289 Leopard 2s are “available” (63 percent). Of those, the stated percentage of tanks that are “ready” is 75 percent, or roughly 137, which is less than half of the overall fleet.

Improving Germany’s readiness means increasing the denominator. It also means investing in and restructuring the entire defense industrial edifice and its relationship with the military: German arms manufacturers, like France’s, have been geared not for productivity but to cut costs for the military while also keeping production lines open despite the small scale of overall activity. This means that the Bundeswehr has relatively little capacity to repair and modernize its equipment (which would require, among other things, purchasing and stocking parts as well as maintaining repair facilities). Instead, it returns many major items to the manufacturer. These do their work slowly, by design. The basic idea is that if one only has a small number of orders per year, one must drag the work out lest one end up having to close the production line or repair facilities and let workers go. For this reason, in many ways modern arms production in Germany is artisanal rather than industrial. Costs are higher, and industrial plants cannot simply switch speeds to produce more, faster.

Another fundamental problem is manpower. Germany ended conscription in 2011 and has since discovered that recruiting and maintaining an all-volunteer force is both more difficult and more expensive than it had imagined. The military must compete with other employers, and Germany does not benefit nearly as much as France and the United States from broad cultural support for the idea of signing up. Germany might find it easier to build more weapons than to coax its own people to operate them. A number of reports identify low morale related to the neglect of the military as an impediment to recruitment and retention.

Looking to the Future of Ground Combat

Rebuilding the Bundeswehr to make it more ready will cost an enormous amount of money, but with the new planned spending, there will be enough left over to grow the force and cultivate certain new capabilities. A general idea of what the German military wants to become can be found in a 2019 report published by the German defense ministry, the title of which basically translates as “Essential Principles for the Bundeswehr of the Future.” (The new defense minister has called for a new study, but thus far nothing about what it might contain is known.) The document is typical of its kind and of its time: One finds lots of talk of “multi-dimensions,” for example, and a pre-occupation with adversaries’ “anti-access/area denial” capabilities. However, the report deals in generalities: The Bundeswehr should be better integrated, have more robust and agile command structures, be more digitalized, and, in sum, be a solid player in Team NATO. This is something that distinguishes Bundeswehr thinking from that of the French military: There’s relatively little emphasis on autonomy or being able to conduct operations alone or even simply being the leader of a coalition. In addition, the overall scale is modest, calling, for example, for the ability to field a full division.

In that spirit, the Bundeswehr initiated a modernization scheme known as Division 2027. The basic idea was to be able to have a fully manned and equipped brigade on standby for NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task force by 2023, a modernized mechanized division by 2027, and three combat-ready mechanized divisions by 2031.

Division 2027 now appears too modest. The truth, however, is that it might be best if the Bundeswehr aimed to make it a reality and not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. My argument is thus for Division 2027+, with some additional specific investments. Besides, there are also some key investments that are overdue for the Luftwaffe and the German navy, investments that do not come cheap. The largest is the decision just announced by the German Defense Ministry to purchase 35 F-35As and 15 electronic-warfare variants of the Eurofighter Typhoon to replace its aging Tornado fleet. The F-35s alone might cost €4 to €5 billion. The German press is citing a price figure of €80 million for each F-35. The navy needs more hulls and currently is developing new frigate types, the F126 and F127. The F126 program alone will cost more than the F-35s. This is all the more reason for sticking with a relatively modest plan for the German army.

Land warfare these days requires numbers, which Division 2027 increases. One example is the Heer’s crying need for more long-range fires, a capability that suffered considerably during the post-Cold War budget cuts, as was the case with the British and French armies. In the Heer, the number of artillery units went from 70 during the Cold War to four as of 2020. To put the decline in other terms, the ratio of artillery to combat units went from 1:2 in 1990 to 1:9. Division 2027 calls for re-growing the artillery units, expanding them to three regiments (one for each of the three divisions the Germans wanted by 2031) plus a Multiple Launch Rocket System battalion. The German military has also been planning to pair its excellent armored PzH 2000 howitzers with a more mobile wheeled version, something like France’s CAESAR self-propelled howitzer, although possibly on an armored Boxer chassis. This arguably is not nearly enough, but it is a start.

In the Air

A trickier addition would be something absent from the Division 2027 plan: armed drones and loitering munitions, including larger drones operated by the Luftwaffe and smaller ones operated by the Heer. The performance of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones in Ukraine appears to confirm their utility in a conventional conflict against a modern adversary. Germany would be wise to invest in them and can chose from a wide variety of American, Israeli, and Turkish options. (The Luftwaffe currently leases Israeli reconnaissance drones for long-range surveillance that also exist in armed variants.) Unique to Germany, however, is an almost visceral reluctance to do so, and the German parliament, which must sign off on such purchases, has for years put off decisions pending “further discussion.” However, Scholz declared as part of his defense spending announcement on Feb. 27 the intention, finally, to acquire armed drones, specifically Israeli Herons and eventually the Airbus “Eurodrone.”

The German military also needs to address its lack of short-range air-defense systems. It lost a useful air-defense capability in 2012 when it retired the Gepard Flakpanzer, an armored and tracked anti-aircraft system, which has twin automatic cannons mounted on a tank chassis. They are ideal for defending against certain classes of drones. Germany reportedly has some 50 Gepards in storage (Romania still operates some). Bringing them back might not be feasible, but making a new version based on a more modern chassis should not pose a major engineering challenge. Growing that capability also would be a meaningful way in which the Bundeswehr could complement its European coalition partners, who have been scrambling to come up with effective anti-drone capabilities. Generally speaking, all NATO militaries are weak on short-range air defense, a result of more than 20 years of operating in theaters without a serious airborne threat.

The old-school nature of the Flakpanzer underscores an important lesson provided by the Ukraine war. While Germany clearly has bought into the Western trend of buying the highest-quality items, as exemplified by the decision to purchase F-35s, this might be a miscalculation given, for example, Russia’s apparent inability to destroy Ukraine’s air force or its air defenses. It appears to be a question of skill — staff work, even. This lesson applies to all Western procurement efforts. Yes, F-35s make sense because of their ability to operate American-provided B-61 nuclear bombs, but they are not the only planes that are or could be certified to use those weapons. Meanwhile, the Ukraine war indicates that any of the current crop of Western combat aircraft (F-15/16/18, Rafale, Grippen) in skilled hands are more than adequate against Russia. How many of these planes can be had for the price of 35 F-35As? The answer is amazingly difficult to know, but one may presume the answer is “more.” Again, it might be a matter of not letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. Whether the Luftwaffe has the required skill is another question, but there’s a very good chance that it does, especially when operating within a NATO coalition. The same lesson holds true for ground combat vehicles and naval vessels.

Implications for Europe

The above discussion suggests that the Bundeswehr, once its $110 billion makeover is complete, will likely be more capable and have greater capacity. It will not, however, be so good overall that it obviates the need for any of Germany’s allies to invest in their own capacity and capabilities. Fortunately, it appears to be the case that many if not most NATO allies recently have resolved to spend more, not less, on defense, and all because of Ukraine. In terms of complementarities, they become evident on a larger strategic level: Clearly Germany is (and should be) focusing on land warfare (though it should add air defense), and it would make sense for Germany to concentrate on defending its NATO allies to the east on the air and ground, leaving to the United Kingdom and France the problem of arbitrating between European defense and the imperatives of their more global ambitions. Both countries will want to nurture their expeditionary capabilities to a degree that Germany need not match. A revived German army means that Poland and others to Germany’s east will want to be particularly attentive to interoperating with Germany. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, and other allies will want to do likewise. Large-scale exercises involving Germany’s planned divisions should be on everyone’s agenda.

As for specific capabilities, in truth we must wait and see. Given the peculiarities of German politics when it comes to defense spending, we cannot assume that the German government will spending anything like the €100 billion and 2 percent of GDP that Scholz has promised, and those F-35s and F126s alone, if the Ministry of Defense goes ahead with those programs, will eat up large sums of money. Will Germany beef up its long-range fires? Will it acquire armed drones or loitering munitions? Will it improve its air defense capabilities? Will it be able to sustain in the field the units it builds? Can it recruit enough people for its three divisions and new frigates? We do not know.

A far trickier question than “what should the Bundeswehr buy” is how Germany and its allies should manage European defense industries, and whether they should persist in trying for multinational, cooperative programs or national efforts. In doubt presently — for many political and policy-related reasons, which are not likely to be affected by Germany’s spending boom — is the future of the Franco-German-Spanish “Future Combat Air System” program, intended to replace Rafales and Eurofighters, and the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System, which is intended to replace both the Leclerc and the Leopard II tank. We can add to this list any number of ships, armored vehicles, howitzers, and missiles being offered by consortiums. Consolidating Europe’s defense industries might lower unit costs and therefore enable the purchase of greater numbers of items. It might also result in greater capacity to ramp up production in a crisis. Lastly, major solo efforts like the British Tempest sixth-generation fighter program (in competition with the Future Combat Air System) seem implausible because of the staggering cost.

All this being said, the need to steer new defense spending toward domestic industries is compelling. My own bet would be against the Future Combat Air System and Main Ground Combat System, not unless Germany allows French companies like Dassault and Nexter to dominate those programs and make them effectively French, but it is hard to imagine Germany’s vaunted Krauss-Maffei Wegmann et al ceding their expertise and their custom any more than Nexter. Besides, Germany’s flirtations with limiting arms exports to unsavory clients runs counter to long French practice.

Perhaps this is all a long-winded way of saying that the extra money that Scholz intends to spend on the Bundeswehr certainly will improve it but is unlikely to make it into a military juggernaut or radically change its portfolio of capabilities. That being said, a healthy Bundeswehr with three mechanized divisions would represent a significant upgrade to NATO’s defenses and make Europe less dependent on America for conventional deterrence. Compare that vision to the current situation, where cobbling together a single armored brigade, though possible, nonetheless would represent a major effort. A regrown Bundeswehr also would be welcome news to the United States, which would feel less pressure to compensate for Europeans’ small numbers, and would not necessarily need to rush reinforcements across the Atlantic.

Michael Shurkin is a former CIA analyst and RAND senior political scientist. Currently he is the director of Global Programs at 14 North Strategies — an Africa-focused consultancy — and the founder of Shurbros Global Strategies.

Image: U.S. Army (Photo by Michele Wiencek)

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 ‘Born in communism, I will die in communism’ Czech singer’s concert cancelled despite distancing himself from Putin

Despite condemning Putin and speaking out on behalf of Ukraine, the Czech singer still saw his concert canceled

March 21, 2022

editor: REMIX NEWS

author: ECHO24, JJK

via: ECHO24.CZ

Jaromír Nohavica in front of the Polish audience in Bielsko-Biala.

 (Jacek Proszyk/Wikimedia Commons)

Singer Jaromír Nohavica said that the cancellation of his concert had much in common with the cancellation of cultural events during the communist era in Czechoslovakia.

“Born in communism, I will die in communism,” Nohavica replied on his website to the event’s cancellation.

Nohavica’s concert was cancelled due to receiving a medal from Russian President Vladimir Putin in the past. However, Nohavica publicly spoke out against the war in Ukraine. On Mar. 2, he broadcasted a live concert from his apartment in which he explicitly condemned the war, sang in both Ukrainian and Russian, and claimed that he did not stand with Putin. Nevertheless, his concert was still canceled.

Nohavica mentioned several concert bans issued in the 1980s before the Velvet Revolution. The country’s communist leadership did not approve of his alleged anti-government texts, insults to socialist values, and a possible bad influence on the youth.

The musician compared the bans from 1984 and 1987 to the current cancellation of a concert in the Moravian town Uherský Brod. The event was sold out.

“The town council recommends that the cultural center’s director cancels Jaromír Nohavica’s concert due to the singer’s insufficient distance from the president of the Russian Federation,” local representatives stated in a resolution.

In 2018, the Russian president awarded the singer the Medal of Pushkin for Russian citizens and foreigners who significantly contributed to culture, literature, and other arts. Nohavica personally received the medal from Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. Shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the singer said he would keep the award because he received it “for songs and not for warfare.”

It is not the first time the singer has encountered an unfavorable reaction to Putin’s medal. For example, Palacký University Olomouc has decided not to rent the local sports hall to Nohavica’s May concert. All his spring concerts in Poland were also canceled. People in Need NGO rejected money from the proceeds of Nohavica’s upcoming gig in Ostrava. It is not yet clear where the proceeds will go now

There’s an easy way to help Ukraine without military escalation: cancel its foreign debt

A country battered and bruised by Russia’s invading forces needs space to breathe – not demands from hedge funds

‘Even before Vladimir Putin started bombing apartment blocks 

and maternity hospitals, Ukraine was Europe’s poorest country.’ 

Photograph: Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto/Rex/Shutterstock

Owen Jones
Mon 21 Mar 2022 

A bloodied man empties his wallet to his creditor while being mercilessly attacked by an unprovoked assailant. This is the plight of Ukraine, which recently made a scheduled interest payment to private lenders as tanks rolled over its land and missiles struck its cities. Even before Vladimir Putin started bombing apartment blocks and maternity hospitals, Ukraine was Europe’s poorest country as measured by GDP per capita – significantly poorer than Albania. Yet this war-ravaged country is saddled with unsustainable debt – and as the piles of rubble grow, so do the repayments. That’s debt for Ukraine, but profits for western hedge funds. War, for some, is the ultimate money-spinner.

Since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 – triggering a conflict in the east that had claimed thousands of lives before the current invasion – Ukraine has been forced to borrow $61bn (£46bn) from external lenders, according to calculations by the Jubilee Debt Campaign; a small sliver has been paid off, but what remains represents about a third of the country’s total economy. Ukraine was due to cough up $7.3bn this year alone – more than its annual education budget. For a rich country blessed with peace, that would be manageable, but Ukrainians are poorer today than when the Soviet Union collapsed three decades ago. At least $100bn worth of damage has already been inflicted to infrastructure – from roads to bridges, hospitals to schools – and, as you read this, that figure only mounts. Yet almost all of the financial assistance being given to Ukraine is in the form of loans. Precious funds will be diverted from rebuilding a shattered country, instead filling the coffers of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and private bondholders.

That’s why Ukrainian civil society organisations have launched a petition demanding Ukraine’s debt is cancelled. They note, too, that much of the supposed assistance given to the country has been accompanied by strict conditions: the IMF calls it “economic restructuring”, but it’s more honestly described as the imposition of free-market dogma, resulting, for instance, in a 650% surge in household gas prices since 2014. “Previous governments had two options: either to fairly tax the fat cats and bring them out of the shadows, or to borrow from the IMF and others,” Ukrainian economist Oleksandr Kravchuk told me. “They chose the latter.”

The Jubilee Debt Campaign has taken up this demand and begun to lobby MPs in Britain. Like millions of us, executive director Heidi Chow had that gnawing, helpless sense of “we’ve got to do something”. For some, that manifested itself in the demand for a no-fly zone. But in practice, she tells me, that’s a “shoot Russian military aircraft out of the sky” zone, which could easily escalate into nuclear war. In contrast, this is a tangible and hugely impactful proposal with no risk of military escalation.

So why hasn’t this commonsense demand been taken up by the powerful? In part, perhaps, it’s because Ukraine’s own government hasn’t officially called for it, although some high-ranking officials have. “They were quite keen before the war to pay debts and push forward their standing in Europe and the world,” suggests Chow. Applying for any form of debt relief is a complicated and drawn-out process. Any fears that their ability to borrow and their global reputation may be damaged clearly need alleviating.

Yet the grisly fact is that as yet more loans are granted – even though now without conditions – vast profits are to be made. Ukrainian bonds are trading at about 25 cents in a dollar, and so if repayments continue, hedge funds and banks are set to make profits of more than 300%. That the profit margins of the already obscenely rich are being inflated by the bloody slaughter of civilians should surely be a cause of universal revulsion – and sufficient impetus to action.
But if the IMF and World Bank cancel Ukraine’s debt, critics may ask, doesn’t that mean less money in the pot to lend to other poorer countries? But there’s a straightforward solution: richer countries, like our own, should contribute more to make up the shortfall. There is a precedent of sorts – the G20’s debt service suspension initiative suspended or cancelled nearly $11bn of poorer countries’ external debt because of Covid-19. If a pandemic is reason enough to write off debt, surely a war of aggression is too.

When this all ends – hopefully in failure for Putin – then Ukraine will need a modern-day Marshall plan, made up of grants, not a reconstruction financed by loans. In terms of the current moment, as the Jubilee Debt Campaign suggests, there should be a mechanism to automatically suspend debt repayments for countries suffering severe external shocks. Ukraine is in the midst of existential crisis – as the Ukrainian social scientist Volodymyr Ishchenko told me: “Personally, it feels like the country in which I was born may simply disappear.” A country battered and bruised by war needs space to breathe. That’s in our power: cancel the debt.

Owen Jones is a Guardian columnist

Will Ukraine be a death blow for Europe's far right?

WHITE, CHRISTIAN; Pro-Russia, anti-immigrant populists are in a precarious position on the continent these days

DAMIEN MCELROY

Italy's Lega Nord party leader Matteo Salvini was embarrassed on a recent visit to Poland. EPA

When the Italian right wing populist Matteo Salvini decided to show his concern for people fleeing Ukraine earlier this month, he failed to calculate that the trip would rebound on him.

Mr Salvini was giving a press conference with Wojciech Bakun, the mayor of Przemysl, a Polish town bordering Ukraine that has become a key entry point for Ukrainian refugees. Mr Bakun stood alongside Mr Salvini but chose to publicly criticise him for his past closeness to the Russian President Vladimir Putin. The mayor was blunt: “No respect for you,” he repeated in English.

Mr Salvini slunk away to jeers and hoots of derision from the crowd.

The supposedly hard men of the European Right and Left are having a difficult time and are certainly not used to open mockery – at least, not from live crowds. But the political calculus has swung against them. The ongoing rise in the number of people fleeing Ukraine, more than 3.5 million in less than four weeks, raises the stakes for the continent. So, too, does the enormous run up in fuel prices. As does the prospect of double-digit inflation for the rest of the year and beyond.

The contrast with the last generalised crisis could not be more stark. After the 2008 financial meltdown, which also saw prices rise and budgets squeezed, the populists on the fringes had a field day. Their growing popularity in Germany, France, Italy and elsewhere was only turbo charged by the events after 2014 when a human wave arrived on the continent as a result of the spread of ISIS in Syria.

The supposedly hard men of the European Right and Left are not used to open mockery

This time, there is a consolidation around the mainstream. There is a recognition that the politics of domestic escalation can have consequences both at home and abroad is suddenly dominating the political landscape.

Researchers are already revealing polling that shows there is united response around Europe, dispelling the kind of anti-EU moods that had dominated the narrative over the last decade. Sara Hobolt, from the London School of Economics, says there is a popular spillover effect stemming from the EU countries imposition of tough sanctions in response to the conflict.

The threat to Ukraine has acted to underline the threat to all countries in Europe and made not only governments but the populations focus on the need to come together to be stronger and more resilient. In line with the social identity theory of them and us, the crisis has provided a single focal point for the public to attribute stresses and anxieties. That again helps forge support for the established political system and nation.

A third point is that those countries that were pushing back from the European mainstream, particularly in central and eastern Europe are now finding that the solidarity and support of the 27 nations is a pillar of their own security. The combined wealth of the bloc and the rush to increase defence spending creates a sense of momentum for coming together to face the crisis. The kind of disarray and finger pointing from the populists has become a distraction in front of the public mood.

Anti-immigration sentiment and admiration for strongman politics were the prime movers of hostility to the EU. That is now a distinctly minority impulse because of the plight of the Ukrainians.

If this moment is to be a real turning point the next step must be to build sentiment into real gains for people. In the weeks ahead there willlikely be food shortages, even in Europe, since Russia and Ukraine export one quarter of all the traded wheat globally and three-quarters of sunflower oil used in cooking. These kitchen-based issues are going to test the leaderships of all European countries. Showing an effective and coherent plan for coping with the problems will be a real test for mainstream politicians. According to the think tank Chatham House, a financial crisis cannot be ruled out either. Its research note not only cited the energy and food crisis issues but also financial outflows. This not only stems from sanctions but also from insurance claims and any post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction. Among other reasons a rapid rebuild is needed because of the commodities that come from Ukraine and Russia.

The populists are on their heels. In France, Emmanuel Macron is coasting to victory in the presidential election because Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen are not only tarred with Russian links but unable to find traction on their anti-EU platforming.

As the costs of the crisis endures, including the loss of cheap energy and the end of the Cold War peace divide, there will be opportunists who cry a strong stance is a form of self harm.

The cycle has turned but a very rough period lies ahead in which the mainstream European leadership must demonstrate the region is led with both wisdom and vital resolve.

Published: March 20, 2022

Damien McElroy
Damien is a foreign correspondent who has covered politics and conflict across Europe, the Middle East, the US, Africa and Asia. Before joining The National in 2017, he worked for The Sunday Times and Telegraph titles as an editor and roving reporter. He started his career in China and has a degree in finance.

US official says Biden bolstered Saudi Patriot missile supply

Move comes amid strained relations between Riyadh and Washington, with the latter moving its air defense systems from kingdom and removing Iranian proxy Houthis from terror list

By AAMER MADHANI

A member of the US Air Force stands near a Patriot missile battery at the Prince Sultan air base in al-Kharj, central Saudi Arabia, on Feb. 20, 2020. (Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/Pool via AP, File)


WASHINGTON (AP) — The US has transferred a significant number of Patriot antimissile interceptors to Saudi Arabia in recent weeks as the Biden administration looks to ease what has been a point of tension in the increasingly complicated US-Saudi relationship.

A senior administration official confirmed Sunday night that the interceptors have been sent to Saudi Arabia. The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a move that has not been formally announced, said the decision was in line with President Joe Biden’s promise that “America will have the backs of our friends in the region.”

White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan on Sunday condemned Houthi forces in Yemen after they unleashed one of their most intense barrages of drone and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia’s critical energy facilities, sparking a fire at one site and temporarily cutting oil production at another.

The Associated Press reported in September that the US had moved its own Patriot defense system from Prince Sultan Air Base outside of Riyadh even as the kingdom faced continued to face air attacks from Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

The kingdom has insisted that the interceptors are critical to its defense against Houthi attacks. The Saudis have been locked in a stalemate war with the Houthis since March 2015.
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At the time the US Patriot systems were moved out of the kingdom, administration officials said the shift in defense capabilities was made in part due to a desire to face what American officials see as the looming “great powers conflict” with China and Russia.

Houthi fighters chant slogans as they take off to a battlefront following a gathering aimed at mobilizing more fighters for the Houthi movement, in Sanaa, Yemen, August 1, 2019. (AP Photo/Hani Mohammed)

Pentagon officials noted that the US maintained tens of thousands of forces and a robust force posture in the Middle East representing “some of our most advanced air power and maritime capabilities.”

The decision to fortify Saudi Arabia’s supply of interceptors was first reported by The Wall Street Journal.

The US-Saudi relationship has been strained since Biden took office. The president has refused to deal directly with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and has removed the Houthis from a list of designated terrorist groups.

The Biden administration last year released a declassified intelligence report concluding that the crown prince, son of the aging King Salman and known as MBS, had authorized the team of Saudi security and intelligence officials that killed journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

The killing of Khashoggi, a critic of MBS, drew global condemnation. The crown prince insists he was not involved in the operation carried out by Saudi operatives.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, speaks during the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on Tuesday, December 14, 2021. (Bandar Aljaloud/Saudi Royal Palace via AP)

In a recent interview with The Atlantic, the crown prince was asked whether Biden misunderstands something about him. He responded, “Simply, I do not care” and that it was up to Biden to think “about the interests of America” when weighing his dealings with the Saudi monarchy.

The White House dispatched Brett McGurk, the National Security Council’s Middle East coordinator, and the State Department’s energy envoy, Amos Hochstein, to Riyadh last month to talk to Saudi officials about a range of issues — chief among them the ongoing war in Yemen and global energy supplies.

The Saudis have thus far declined to pump more crude to alleviate a spike in global oil prices that’s been spurred by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

SEE LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for PERMANENT ARMS ECONOMY 

 'We are human too': Congolese student who fled Ukraine recounts racism 

By Méabh Mc Mahon  •  Updated: 21/03/2022 - 

VIDEO Axel had to flee Ukraine after the Russian invasion.   -   

Copyright  Euronews

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This time last month, Axel was an ordinary 20-year-old, studying computer science at a university in Kyiv, Ukraine.

Today in Brussels, Belgium, he is a refugee, and effectively stateless. He is also scarred from a harrowing journey from war torn Ukraine.

He told Euronews how he and his friends had to wait for hours to catch a train out of Kyiv because of the colour of their skin. When they reached the border, they faced abuse and exploitation.

"We were told to wait. He spoke aggressively, brutally with crazy gestures," Axel said.

Videos shared on social showed black people being pushed off trains and animals being prioritised before people.

European countries, particularly those neighbouring Ukraine, have been praised for welcoming refugees but African nationals have detailed racism they've encountered as they too fled Ukraine.

"We are human beings too, our lives count," Axel said.

More than 3.1 million people have now left Ukraine since Russia launched its military assault on 24 February, according to the UN Human Rights Office. It described it as the fastest-growing refugee crisis in Europe since World War II.

Change is a local Afro-Belgian association supporting Axel and 47 other students in limbo. They organised their transport from the Polish border and are helping gather clothes, shelter, set up language courses and also counselling to address the racism encountered.

• ‘Ukrainians go first’: How black and brown people are struggling to escape the Russian invasion
• Does the Ukraine exodus reveal a ‘shocking distinction’ on refugees in some parts of the EU?

"When these young people show their situation, I am very sad and I say to myself OK, it also motivates me to continue this fight that we are trying to do," Dido Lakama, co-founder of Change, told Euronews.

It is a fight that continues here in Belgium.

The European Commission has activated the Temporary Protection Directive which grants people who were permanently residing in Ukraine before the eruption of the war the rights to a residence permit, access to the labour market and housing, medical assistance, and access to education for children in EU member states for at least one year.

This applies to stateless persons and nationals of other third countries who benefited from international protection in Ukraine as well as those who cannot return in safe and durable conditions to their country of origin.

Dido wants Brussels to register, welcome and give access to Belgian universities to the Congolese students who fled Ukraine – just like Ukrainian refugees.

"We want to be able to finish our studies like the Ukrainians," Ruth, a Congolese medical student who had to flee Ukraine told Euronews.

The decision now lies with the Belgian government.