Thursday, May 29, 2025


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The issue of communism in the United States, with a particular focus on the CPUSA (Communist Party of the United States of America), remains a contentious one, both as a historical subject and as a source of possible lessons for contemporary activists, especially for those of us in the United States.  Maurice Isserman has written a strong, wide-ranging and generally fair account of the CPUSA that I believe is meant to “wrap up” the issue historically, and while he gives it one hell of a try, I don’t think he has quite succeeded.

Isserman brings a lot to his subject; this is at least his fourth book on the “old” left:  this follows If I Had a Hammer:  The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left; California Red: A Life in the American Communist Party; and Which Side Were You On?  The American Communist Party During the Second World War, and he’s written several other books as well.  This immersion into the “old left”/CPUSA serves him well as he’s deeply engaged with the expansive literature on the subject over the years.  He certainly appears quite capable of wrapping up this issue.  And he also is aware of the strengths and weaknesses not only of the CPUSA (“the Party” hereafter), but of the larger left in general and the historical canvas on which he paints.

Most importantly, he emphasizes the necessity of being able to hold contradictory facts in one’s head at the same time and still be able to think and to understand:  the CPUSA was not all evil or all good but included aspects of both that have to be included in one’s analysis if one wants to understand the Party’s and its members’ efforts and experiences.  He argues, “The Communist movement helped win democratic reforms that benefitted millions of American citizens, at the same time that the movement championed a brutal, totalitarian state responsible for the imprisonment and deaths of millions of Soviet citizens” (emphasis in original).

Isserman covers a wide range of years:  from 1900 until 1991.  Although two “communist” parties emerged from the Socialist Party in 1919 and the unified party wasn’t founded until 1923, this means he grounds his study in the American radical tradition, and particularly that of the Socialist Party, from which many of the early communists emerged.  He examines the emergence of the two “workers’” parties and their effort to obtain the “franchise” (i.e., recognition) of support from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); a crucial, utterly crucial move that acknowledges the global status of Lenin’s Bolshevik Party, which in Russia led the first “workers’ revolution” to succeed in seizing state power anywhere, thereby subordinating themselves to the CPSU and its major spin-off, the Communist International or Comintern. 

So, he deftly leads readers through the complex interactions inside the Soviet Party—including discussions of the myriads of conflicts/splits/withdrawals/expulsions/and, ultimately, assassinations—and their various and sundry effects on the US party; by 1931, Stalin has achieved power unequivocally.  Isserman gets readers through the “third period” (1928-1935), now definitely considered an “ultra-leftist” period, where Stalin argued the conditions were closer for revolution than they actually were.  Nonetheless, I think Isserman tries and generally produces a fair accounting of this period, while not getting stuck within such machinations.

Importantly, it was during this period where the Party took on forthrightly the oppression of African Americans; interestingly, a position pushed by Stalin.  However, especially by fighting valiantly for the lives of the “Scottsboro Boys”—11 Black teenagers/young men unjustly charged with rape by two young white women—the Party gained increasing support from and membership by African Americans.  One of the greatest contributions by the Communist Party to US society, although not without problems or contradictions, was it became the largest and most active, white-populated organization in the country that challenged Black oppression in general.

The “Popular Front” period (1935-39) is next.  This is the period where the party made its greatest gains and won its greatest acceptance.  As Isserman notes, it was “an attempt on their part for the first time to build bridges between themselves and other Americans, whereas always before their inclination had been to build barricades.”  Isserman doesn’t spend much time discussing why the Party switched from an ultra-left program to a much more centrist one; it was its debacle within Germany, where Hitler gained power, destroying both the Social Democratic and the Communist left and the labor movement in the process and showing the Soviets they had to take a different tact.  In fact, the Communist International made a major political shift when it renounced revolution in the so-called “developed” countries; in reality, these were all imperialist countries, although it did not change its line in the colonized or formerly colonized countries.  Isserman downplayed that point.  This shift to the Popular Front, however, allowed American members to more enthusiastically embrace the Party and its’ political line.

It was the “Spanish situation” (1936-39) in which Isserman really recognized the Communist role and focused most attention upon.  Fascist army troops led by Francisco Franco rebelled against the Republic and sought to overthrow the government.  Literally thousands of Communists and other leftists (especially anarchists, although Isserman does not discuss their involvement) from around the world flocked to Spain to support the “Loyalist” government, making real the ideal of “proletarian internationalism” and among them were over 3,000 Americans.  Isserman honors them and their efforts, while recognizing the futility of many of them; without “Western” arms, which President Roosevelt refused to supply, and in face of Nazi, Italian and Spanish fascist forces, especially air support, they were all-but-doomed

At the same time, Communists were playing important roles in the US in helping build the CIO, the Congress for Industrial Organization (later, after expulsion from the hidebound American Federation of Labor in 1938, Congress of Industrial Organizations, an independent labor center, still with the initials CIO).  Much to my surprise—and I say more below—Isserman does not say much about this.

He performs a good sociological overview if the Party’s efforts during this period, and especially notes their electoral successes, particularly in New York City, which was their stronghold.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—more commonly known as the Soviet-Nazi Pact—was a disaster for the Party that I don’t think Isserman really fully explains; it was an incredible debacle for the Party.  Having won incredible respect for fighting fascism in Spain and in the workplaces of the US industry, the Party pissed away a lot of respect, especially among intellectuals and those who paid a lot of attention on foreign events, for blindly following the Soviets into supporting this pact with the Nazis; this would be used unmercifully by its enemies against it to great effect after World War II.  However, not only did the Soviet government under Stalin ally with the Nazis, but part of the deal included invading Eastern Poland (in congruence with the Nazi invasion in the west), invading Finland, and absorbing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Empire, each of which the CPUSA supported.

Once Hitler turned on his Soviet allies on June 22, 1941, and invaded the Soviet Union, the Party’s political line shifted 180 degrees; instead of arguing that the US should stay out of the war, as previously, they now wanted maximum production to aid the defense of the Soviet Union.  They supported the “no strike pledge” of CIO leaders without reservations, and on industry’s shop floors, they turned from activists to “restrainers,” seeking to maintain production even if face of workers’ demands limiting production.

Over time and interestingly aided by US government propaganda, the American public came to develop great respect for the Soviet peoples and their fight against the Nazis; after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in 1943, they cheered on the Soviet and Eastern European war on the Wehrmacht.  The Party gained increasing respect during this period and into the post-war period; in fact, as Victor Silverman argues, it took more than a couple of years for most Americans to accept the Cold War propaganda against the Soviet Union.  (Somehow, this initial public respect for the USSR has not been included in most post-World War II analyses.)

After the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945, the US government’s position shifted from being generally willing to work with Stalin and the Soviets to the anti-Soviet position of now-US President Harry S. Truman.  This scared Communist leaders, and the Smith Act arrests in July 1948 made the threat personally real; many of the top-level Communists went underground to keep from going to prison.  This was projected by the government as even more evidence of “evil” Soviet intentions, adding to Cold War fear.  Of course, this was compounded by Soviet actions in 1948, with the coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin airlift, and the tightening Soviet grip on Eastern Europe.  Isserman examines this period carefully and examines internal Party developments critically.

As the Party realized that fascism was not immediately relevant, it relaxed somewhat and made changes in its leadership:  it looked for a little while like it might overcome its Soviet anchor.  Stalin died in 1953.   However, in 1956, when his successor, Nikita Khruschev, revealed the true extent of Stalin’s crimes,  Party members were shaken.  Interestingly though, people mostly stayed in the Party after that, seeing that the Party and the Soviet Union could “rectify errors.”  However, it was the Soviet invasion of Hungary in later 1956, in response to loosening reforms by the Communist-led government, that really doomed the Party:  Party members could not see advancing “socialism” at the point of bayonets; after all, for many, advancing to socialism was felt to be a moral process.  By 1959, not only had the Party’s prestige collapsed, but its membership numbers had as well.

Subsequent political “advances” by the Communists really were due to the work of individual (usually former) Party members, and not by the organization itself.  This was especially true in the late 1960s-early ‘70s anti-Vietnam War era.

Despite my comments here and there above, I think Isserman did a strong job in weaving the above periods together in a way that makes sense, is plausible, is understandable to non-experts, and is generally critical and fair.  He uses a lot of cultural examples, such as the movie “Casablanca,” which aids in understanding.  However, while not unfamiliar with this history, I do not claim to be an expert on the Communist Party—and I haven’t read a lot of the literature, although I think I have read some of the more important analyses—and it will be interesting to see how the “experts” respond to this review.

Two things that activists can learn from Isserman’s work:  (1) do not subordinate your organization to a foreign one, no matter how good or pure it may look or how heroic the leadership; take responsibility for your own decisions and actions.  And (2), following, do your own critical thinking and be willing to challenge others’ analysis and positions.  In other words, “democratic centralism,” no matter how “logical” it may look for the situation, leads ultimately to passive acquiescence, which is contrary to empowerment of self and others.  So, even if it might be necessary for tactical situations, it should never be the “guiding light” for organizations.

However, I think there are two areas in which Isserman really comes up short, keeping this book from “wrapping up” the Communist Party as a historical subject.  First, is the CIO.  He simply does not give it much attention in and of itself:  against strong efforts by industrial leaders of some of the most economically powerful corporations in the world to prevent unionization across the country, including armed violence by the police, such as in Chicago and a few other places, industrial workers had unionized some of the largest concentrations of economic wealth and power the world has ever seen between 1936-1942.  Then, in the first year after the war—from September 1945 to roughly that time in 1946—the US had the greatest strike wave in American history; Art Preis claims that over 116,000,000 production days were lost due to striking.  And by 1948, the CIO—and the AFL in response—had unionized about 80 percent of US industry.

That is such a phenomenal achievement that it deserves much more attention than Isserman gives in and of itself.  It was these strikes and this power that forced the US elites to “allow” many industrial workers to ultimately join the “working middle class”; this was not due to corporate or governmental beneficence, but due to the labor movement’s organized power.  It led to a 27 year period (1948-73) where family incomes across the sociological board doubled their real incomes, after inflation.  (It has fallen greatly since then.)  It was where the concept of “the American dream” emerged and had a material base to it.  He certainly does not appear to understand this.

However, his failure here is even greater in that this is a study of the Communist Party in the United States but ultimately includes commentary on the Communist movement globally in general.  And the base for the Communist movement, as is well known, is Marxism.  And Marx argued that it was the “class struggle” between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—more contemporaneously but less accurately, bosses and workers—in the workplace that was the basis for all economic and social development.  Now, you can argue that it was the peasantry in China and Vietnam and elsewhere that served as the base of revolutionary forces in those “undeveloped” countries (actually, they had been victimized by imperialism), but any study of grassroots-imposed social change in the imperial countries during this period requires the primary emphasis be on labor movements.  Isserman does not understand this.  The CIO was the most important social force in any study of US Communism covering the years between 1935 and 1949, and not merely a sociological development that he should refer to completely cover his subject, and he failed to appropriately understand this.

This leads to one more point.  And here Isserman is not being picked on; these comments refer to almost all studies of Communist/radical movements that are being studied internationally, much less globally, and especially during the existence of the Soviet Union, from 1917 to 1991:  they cannot use developments in the United States as the foundation on which their analysis depends.  What I mean by this is that it’s not acceptable, it is essentially biased from the start, to accept—consciously or unconsciously—the US as the source from which all studies begin. 

In other words, over the last 30 years, there has been the growing recognition that some US Communists—actually the total numbers, while real, seem quite small, and definitely are small in percentage of party membership—shared information with Soviet intelligence services and a few even committed espionage against the United States on behalf of the Soviet Union.  I am not contesting that.  What I am contesting, however, is that there never seems any question of how many people, say in the Soviet Union or elsewhere, shared information with US intelligence services such as the CIA or committed espionage on behalf of the United States?  If one focuses only on Soviet activities, it suggests the US is “pure,” and we know it was not.

For example, toward the end of World War II, we know that the US smuggled out hundreds if not thousands of Nazi intelligence operatives in Eastern Europe to the “Western” countries, and especially engineers and technicians involved with the Nazi rocketry operations, in advance of Soviet military operations in the USSR and Eastern European nations.  Does the name Werner von Braun mean anything???  There have been considerable others who have been named specifically and in general; these are not rare, individual cases.

We also know that the American Federation of Labor (AFL), under George Meany, set up operations in Europe in 1944 to challenge the Soviets, not the Nazis, working with the OSS (Office of Strategic Services, the organizational predecessor to the CIA), as well as working in France and Italy in 1947-48 to destroy leftist-led labor movements and undermine democratic elections.  These facts are unequivocal.  And these and related operations continued until recently, when Trump cut off funding to the National Endowment for Democracy and the US Agency for International Developments—providers of over 90 percent of all funding to the AFL-CIO’s “Solidarity Center”—in early 2025.  [See my AFL-CIO’s Secret War against Developing Country Workers:  Solidarity or Sabotage? (Lexington Books, 2010) or Jeff Schuhrke’s 2024 book, Blue Collar Empire:  The Untold Story of US Labor’s Global Anticommunist Crusade (Verso) for details.]

The point here is not that the Soviets were “good” and the Americans “bad,” or vice-versa, but to argue that we each need to be aware of our nationalist bias that effects our work, and consciously work to not replicate that, however unintentionally, in our work.

What this will do is add nuance to our work, making it better in most cases.  In this case, recognizing US perfidy along with that of the Soviets, allows us to consider why people might join the Communist movement.  In other words, few were duped or made a “mistake,” but consciously chose to join the Party because they thought the “socialism” being offered a better way forward than “capitalism,” and this seems extremely pertinent to the early- and mid-1930s.  (And many left the Party when it didn’t deliver on its promises and aspirations.)  And many stayed despite hearing stories of Stalin’s brutality because it was easy to believe that years of anti-communist rhetoric and reporting, the US media might be lying about what they were reporting!  Again, not excusing “deviant” behavior, but providing the groundwork for better analysis and understanding, enhancing the quality of researchers’ efforts.

In short, Maurice Isserman’s Reds is an impressive effort.  Clear and well-written, it deserves the attention of all interested in this subject over these time periods.  We still need to better understand the CIO—and my forthcoming book, tentatively titled Unions, Race and Popular Democracy:  Learning from the CIO to Build a Progressive Labor Movement in the Mid Twenty-first Century, will help in that—and we need to need to problematize US government operations in the US and around the world for a better understanding of the 20th Century.


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Kim Scipes, PhD, is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Purdue University Northwest in Westville, Indiana. He is a long-time labor and political activist who has been publishing on AFL-CIO foreign operations since 1989; his path-breaking book is "AFL-CIO’s Secret War against Developing Country Workers: Solidarity or Sabotage?" (Lexington Books, 2010, 2011 paperback). He is one of the founders of LEPAIO, the Labor Education Project on AFL-CIO International Operations (https://aflcio-int.education). A former Sergeant in the USMC, he “turned around” on active duty, and has been a political and labor activist for over 50 years. He has published several books and over 250 articles in the US and in 11 different countries. His writings, many with links to the original article, can be found at https://www.pnw.edu/faculty/kim-scipes-ph-d/publications/.

 

Source: Common Dreams

Has neoliberal globalization run its course? Should the Left be on the side of tariffs or protectionism? Can Left internationalism be revived? Political scientist, political economist, author, and journalist C. J. Polychroniou tackles these questions in an interview with the independent French-Greek journalist Alexandra Boutri.

Alexandra Boutri: In a recently published essay, you argue that the Left should endorse a new vision of globalization and fight accordingly for a new world order. Can you briefly spell out the pitfalls of neoliberal globalization and why the current world order is a failure?

C. J. Polychroniou: The first thing that stands out about neoliberal globalization is that it has led to an extremely high degree of economic inequality by altering patterns of income distribution and resource allocation while at the same time undermining economic and social rights. As Miatta Fahnbulleh put it a few years back in an essay that appeared in Foreign Affairs, the system “is not working in the interest of the majority of people.” The actual record of neoliberal globalization on economic growth has also been quite dismal, with postwar “managed capitalism” outperforming the neoliberal model on every count. On top of that, under the form of globalization prescribed by neoliberalism “the average global temperature has risen relentlessly,” as Robert Pollin has pointed out. Neoliberal globalization has been bad for people and the environment alike.

Trump’s domestic agenda is the most neoliberal since the onset of neoliberalism.

As far as the current world order is concerned, it would be hilarious if it weren’t so tragic. We have a world in permanent crisis literally since the end of the Second World War, with the nuclear sword of Damocles hanging over humanity’s head. The Doomsday Clock is now closer than ever to midnight. The current war in Ukraine, the annihilation of Palestinians in Gaza and the seizing of land in the occupied West Bank by violent religious extremists under the protection of the Israeli army speak volumes of the dramatic failure of the United Nations and the so-called international community. There is no lawful world order. International law only applies when it suits the strong.

Alexandra Boutri: Has neoliberalism’s model of globalization run its course?

C. J. Polychroniou: The current system has been in a terminal state since the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2007-08. The resurgence of right-wing nationalism across the globe is interrelated to the profound contradictions built specifically into the neoliberal version of globalization. The backlash against globalism by the likes of U.S. President Donald Trump and his MAGA faction needs to be understood in connection with the changes that are occurring in the world economy. Trump is using protectionism as a means of altering the global supply chain in favor of U.S. production and imposing tariffs to reduce the U.S. trade deficit but is simultaneously unleashing the most vicious form of neoliberalism inside the country. He is attending to the mythology of American Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny by trying to reassert the dominance of the United States in the world economy while destroying functioning government as part of a plan to axe safety-net programs and letting corporations run roughshod over labor. Trump’s domestic agenda is the most neoliberal since the onset of neoliberalism. It constitutes an open war against working people and social rights, against the poor and the environment. It’s all about making the rich richer and the poor poorer. It’s a domestic agenda based on the politics of astonishing greed and shocking cruelty. Trump’s election therefore does not mean the end of neoliberalism or of globalism.

Alexandra Boutri: Free trade or protectionism? Is this an actual choice for the Left?

C. J. Polychroniou: It depends on what one means by the “left.” You have left-wing liberals, social democrats, left-wing socialists, communists, and anarchists. Left with capital L tends in some circles to refer to the anti-capitalist, socialist-communist-anarchist camp. Personally, I don’t consider the Democrats in the United States or the Social Democrats in Europe as part of the Left. Their loyalty is to capitalism. Hence, they are not agents of transformational change. They want to maintain the existing socioeconomic system but with some modifications in place to make it less disagreeable. The social democratic tale was about capitalism with a human face. It was a popular political program for the first few decades after the end of the Second World War, and it was of course an improvement over laisses faire capitalism and a bourgeois state that catered exclusively to the interests of the capitalist class. Nonetheless, we should be reminded of an old radical dictum: There cannot be democracy, social justice, and equality as long as power belongs to capital.

It may have taken voters quite a long time to realize that the parties of the establishment left had sold out to global capitalism, but when they did, the consequences were cataclysmic in their impact.

The debate regarding free trade versus protectionism is as old as political economy. For what it’s worth, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels confronted this issue back in the 1840s, in the struggles over the Corn Laws. Marx saw free trade for what it is—i.e., “freedom of capital,” and mocked the claim of free-traders that the absence of tariff barriers would abolish the antagonism among classes. But this does not mean that Marx took the side of protectionism, which he saw as a system to defend the status quo. Thus, as he put it, “One may declare oneself an enemy of the constitutional regime without declaring oneself a friend of the ancient regime.”

Interestingly enough, though, Marx ends up in the end endorsing free trade but purely on political grounds because he saw the free trade system as accelerating the prospects of radical change.

The goal of the Left is to move beyond capitalism by constructing an equitable and sustainable economy and a just world order. Rudolf Hilferding, in his book Finance Capital, published more than a century ago, wrote: “The proletariat avoids the bourgeois dilemma—protectionism or free trade—with a solution of its own; neither protectionism nor free trade, but socialism, the organization of production, the conscious control of the economy not by and for the benefit of the capitalist magnates but by and for society as a whole.”

Alexandra Boutri: Until recently, antiglobalization was exclusively associated with parties and movements of the Left. However, internationalism has historically been a core component of the Left’s ideological worldview. What happened to Left internationalism but also to social democratic parties whose collapse coincides with the collapse of the antiglobalization movement and the emergence of right-wing antiglobalism?

C. J. Polychroniou: The antiglobalization movement came to life in the 1990s and peaked during the early 2000s. It was inspired mainly by so-called far-left ideologies which saw free trade agreements, multinational corporations, and international economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank promoting a new version of colonialism. During those years, millions of people turned out across the world to raise their voice against global corporate power. Center-left and reformist left parties in general did not join the protests against global capitalist expansion for the simple reason that they had embraced neoliberalism and were being showered in turn by campaign cash from big corporations and the financial sector. In a word, they had betrayed the working class in the same manner that the socialist parties had betrayed internationalism in 1914 at the start of the First World War.

The history of European social democracy may be summarized as follows: a period of rather impressive achievements on the social, political, and economic fronts during the first few decades following the end of the Second World, which were made possible because of the role of different actors in the emergence of a social democratic consensus, and capitulation to neoliberal capitalism in the latter part of the 20th century, especially after the end of an era where you had leaders like Willy Brandt in Germany, Bruno Kreisky in Austria, and Olof Palme in Sweden who were undeniably dedicated to the struggle for social justice and economic democracy. The leaders that came after them across the European continent took the position that Keynesian economics no longer had applicability in the new world economic order that had emerged following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and that fiscal orthodoxy was the way to go. In the 1980s, the so-called socialist governments of Francois Mitterrand in France, Bettino Craxi in Italy, Felipe González in Spain, and Andreas Papandreou in Greece not only failed to carry out even the minimal set of promises they had made to voters during the pre-electoral period, but their economic programs followed the neoliberal prescriptions proposed by the IMF and the World Bank.

The antiglobalization movement of the 1990s was associated with far-left politics and was attacked as such by mainstream media and the establishment parties across the political spectrum. In the eyes of many citizens across Europe, the “left” was still represented by social democratic and socialist parties. It may have taken voters quite a long time to realize that the parties of the establishment left had sold out to global capitalism, but when they did, the consequences were cataclysmic in their impact.

In 2000, 10 out of 15 countries in the European Union still had social democratic or socialist parties in government even though they had abandoned all the traditional social democratic ideas and policies. Nearing the end of the second decade of the new millennium, we could find social democratic parties in government in only two countries in Europe. Even the euro crisis did not help the parties of the traditional left to make a comeback. What was happening instead is that far-right parties were gaining ground across Europe and around the world. The far-right was reinventing itself with a backlash against globalism. The European far-right even adapted the language of the left to its own ends. Of course, it succeeded in doing this by taking advantage of the betrayal of center-left parties as well as of the left’s fractiousness and disunity—issues that have long plagued the left worldwide. Defeating the far-right is, of course, of paramount importance for the future of democracy and of the Left.

The history of Left internationalism is too long and complex to discuss here. Suffice to say, though, that it has both positive and negative aspects. The Second International betrayed the cause of socialism. The Third International, which was created by Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky in 1919, was a powerful force toward world revolution, a major step toward world socialism. However, under Josef Stalin, it became purely an instrument of Soviet state policy to advance the Stalinist view of “socialism in one country.” And the Red Lord officially dissolved the Third International in 1943.

It’s hard to revive Left internationalism when the left is fractured and there is so much confusion about what the left even represents in today’s world. Of course, there is a plethora of progressive social movements at the forefront for social change, but the return of Left internationalism inspired by the vision of socialism needs a dramatic turnaround on the global ideological and political landscape.

In the postwar era, Cuban internationalism stands virtually alone as an alternative form of globalization. Still, the Left needs a new internationalism that combines solidarity and the quest for social justice and equality with a global climate change policy. The latter is by far the most important issue facing humanity in the 21st century, and nothing would be of greater importance than if the new Left internationalism was built around taking on the greatest challenge of our times—i.e., preventing Earth from becoming unlivable.



I Am Ra, Ruler of the All! a Glyph

May 28, 2025
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Ed Sanders is a poet, musician and writer. He founded Fuck You: a Magazine of the Arts, as well as the Fugs. He edits the Woodstock Journal. His books include: The FamilySharon Tate: a Life and the novel Tales of Beatnik Glory.

The US Dual Economy: Trending Toward the Periphery



 May 27, 2025

Image by Nohe Pereira.

Over the past forty-five years the United States has experienced deepening economic divisions between the rich and poor. The effects of this division are similar to those in developing nations. Economists such as, Jared Bernstein, Paul Krugman and Paul Stiglitz argue that the major cause of this division is the result of the United States becoming a debtor nation. This is directly linked to capital flight, deindustrialization, lack of infrastructure investment, and the militarization of the economy. The cause of the deepening economic crisis can be traced to neoliberal economics and the conservative Reagan revolution.

But here is another assessment that confirms the neoliberal disaster of the economy.

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 2014, addresses the precipitous decline of the US economy into Third World status. Piketty argues that the average workers’ wages in the United States have declined considerably from 2007 to 2012 to a level far below poverty wages on an individual basis. In the same period, over 90 percent of all new income went to the top 1 percent while approximately 46 million Americans remain in poverty. The gap between corporate profits and workers’ wages has never been greater. Piketty’s conclusion is that capitalism, if left unchecked, generates a concentration of wealth among a tiny minority and this has manifested itself in America. Piketty further argues that merit or hard work, the standard justification for inequality, has little to do with what has been defined as the “new gilded age.” It has more to do with the nature of capitalism itself in which capital precedes labor, and where profit maximization becomes the rational basis for human interaction and economic relationships. Piketty critiques the very structure and foundation of capitalism itself.

Piketty argues that an “invisibility” to the negative outcomes of capitalism is needed by capitalists for the same system to optimize for elites. But invisibility is not the only weapon in the ideological arsenal of capitalism. The first line of right-wing defense is denial, with some variation on the contention that the state of the economy is the best of all possible economic worlds and that “it works”. There may be inequalities, they argue, but the inequalities are not harmful since capitalism brought consumers innovations in technology such as cell phones, laptops, electric cars, etc. The tactic used by the capitalist class is to cajole the working class and poor into believing that inequality isn’t that bad since almost everyone can afford an i-pad. They draw on the ideological conviction that capitalism, left to its own devices, rewards the meritorious and is beneficial not just for capitalists but for everyone. What the apologists refuse to analyze is how inequality plays out on the “big ticket” items such as, living wage employment, housing, health care, education, transportation, food, clothing, energy, etc.

To this, Piketty argues that a permanent underclass has become unable to benefit economically from an economy based on capitalist formation. He concludes that the United States has slipped into a dual economy, one for the rich and one of increasing poverty for a growing majority. And this thesis is nothing new. Peter Temin, Professor Emeritus of Economics at MIT, argues that the ongoing decline of “Middle America” has created, in effect, two countries typical of developing nations in which a minority elite live in opulence while the majority live in poverty. Categorized as semi-peripheral and peripheral countries, these developing nations such as those of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, can be described in terms of structural dependence, subsistence economics vacillating between both relative and absolute poverty. This includes majority populations living at the margins of society experiencing “food insecurity” (hunger, malnutrition, and starvation). Temin argues that the United States is quickly approaching, if not already, a standard of living on par with those of Third World countries.

In the United States, the demise of the middle class has fueled the emergence of a minority power elite (the 1% ers). This can be assessed in terms of a bifurcated wealth distribution consisting of a fraction of a percent of elites controlling economic resources while the majority population keeps slipping into poverty. In arguing this point, Temin, in his book, The Vanishing Middle Class: Prejudice and Power in a Dual Economy, 2018, presents an economic description of the United States which is split into two distinct factions of rich and poor. One faction controls a bounty of resources and power and the other experiencing the “American Dream” slipping away, quickly.

According to Temin, the United States has become a nation of rich and poor, with a diminishing number of people falling out of the middle class to a substandard life on the margins of society. It is shifting toward an economic and political makeup similar to developing nations. Geographers Joel Kotkin in The Coming of Neo-Feudalism:A Warning to the Global Middle Class, 2020, and David Harvey in Marx, Capital and the Madness of Economic Reason, 2017, argue that the imminent disappearance of the middle class has already transformed society into a feudal system of rich elites living off an increasingly alienated work force stripped of any meaningful power to prevent its own demise. Jim Tankersley, in The Riches of This Land: The Untold Story of America’s Middle Class, 2020, addresses the stagnation of the American middle class, the decline of economic opportunity in wide swaths of the country and how conservative neoliberal economic policy changes in Washington, DC, have exacerbated those trends over the past few decades.

In analyzing this trend, Temin applied W. Arthur Lewis’s “dual economy” model, designed to understand the workings of developing countries in which the bulk of the economy was a labor-intensive agricultural sector producing primary products. Temin both replicated and applied this model to the United States to document how inequality has grown in America. In doing so, Temin identified some unsettling parallels which tended to structure predetermined winners and losers in economic matters. The primary issue in this research focused on the increasing lack of economic benefits distributed to those who contribute to the growth of the economy, specifically in stagnant wages and continued downward pressure on benefits such as paid time off, health care and retirement. This has been compounded, over the last forty-five years, by massive cuts in social spending in the areas of human services and infrastructure while massive increases in military spending syphon away scarce funding for vital social programs.

Temin’s research also indicates that the effects of racism and sexism, particularly the institution of slavery and its aftermath, have impacted the widening gap between rich and poor. Temin, nevertheless, outlines ways to work toward greater equality so that America will no longer have one economy for the rich and one for the poor, which is the underlying subtext of his research. As a result, Temin argues since many poorer Americans, most of whom are white, live in conditions resembling those of a developing country, (substandard education, dilapidated housing, homelessness, and few stable employment opportunities), massive public resources must be implemented on behalf of the poor and middle class. Not only as a matter of justice is Temin urging such a policy, but also as an effort to prevent social disintegration and the unforeseen problems this could present to a democracy.

Temin’s message is clear: the new American Third World status has given birth to a latent fascist takeover of the United States. While there is a current reprieve, and no economic revision … the same fascist movement may happen again in 2024. Conservative white politicians still appeal to the racism of poor white voters for their support for policies that harm low-income people, casting recipients of social programs as the “Other” – black, Latino, not like “us.” Politicians also use mass incarceration as a tool to keep black and Latino Americans from participating fully in society. Money goes to a vast entrenched prison system rather than to education and other human services. In the dual justice system, the rich pay fines and the poor go to jail. Not all lumpenproletariat become class conscious and join the leftist cause for social and economic justice. As Antonio Gramsci argues in Selections from Prison Notebooks, the rage of the exploited can just as easily transform into a fascist uprising.

Temin describes multiple contributing factors in the nation’s arrival at this place, from exchanging the War on Poverty for the War on Drugs to money in politics and effects of systemic racism, i.e., the 1994 Clinton Crime Bill (1994 Violent Crime Control Act) which targeted “superpredators.” He outlines the ways in which racial prejudice continues to lurk below the surface of society, allowing politicians to appeal to the age old “desire to preserve the inferior status of blacks,” encouraging white low-wage workers to accept their lesser place in society. All of this then combines for a volatile mix of class and race antagonism. The antidote, as prescribed by Temin, is likely a tough sell in today’s political climate. Expanding education, updating infrastructure, forgiving mortgage and student loan debt, and overall working to boost social mobility for all Americans, is bound to be interpreted as “too liberal” by many policy makers. Until the course is changed, Temin warns that the middle class will continue to struggle, and America will remain unsustainably divided. The reality is that the increasing gap between the rich and poor, and the poverty level of existence that has developed over the past forty years, has turned the United States into, what can be defined economically, as a Third World nation.

The “crime” of capitalism is that it forces the majority population to remain preoccupied with basic concerns of nutrition, housing, health, and skill acquisition. It leaves little time for fostering the community and creativity that humans crave. And the injustice of capitalism is that it does so in an era of plenty. There are enough resources to ensure basic material satisfaction for all, but capital mandates that those resources do not benefit the great majority. Further, those same resources have been generated by the hard work of the population that is denied its benefits.