Drone incursions show Russia seeking to escalate war, Zelensky warns Europe

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned European leaders on Thursday that recent drone incursions signaled Russia’s intent to “escalate” its aggression, offering Ukraine’s battlefield experience to counter the threat at a Copenhagen summit attended by nearly 50 nations under tight security after Denmark’s mystery drone flights.


Issued on: 02/10/2025 - 
By: FRANCE 24

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky attends a ceremony marking Defenders Day, a holiday honoring veterans and fallen members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in Kyiv, October 1, 2025. © Handout / UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE/AFP

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky warned Europe on Thursday recent drone incursions showed Russia was looking to "escalate" its aggression, as he offered his country's war-honed expertise to help counter the threat.

The warning came at a summit of European leaders from just under 50 countries, who converged on a conference centre in Copenhagen under tight security after mystery drone flights rattled Denmark last month.

The drone sightings in Denmark and high-profile aerial incursions by Moscow in Estonia and Poland have heightened fears that Russia's assault on Ukraine could spill over Europe's borders.

"The recent drone incidents across Europe are a clear sign that Russia still feels bold enough to escalate this war," Zelensky said.


"It was never just about Ukraine, Russia has always aimed to break the West and Europe."

© France 24
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Russian President Vladimir Putin waived the accusations, but said Russia was "closely monitoring the rising militarisation of Europe", adding that Moscow's response will be timely and "significant".

Putin accused Europe of stoking "hysteria" to excuse rising military spending, and said Russia did not pose a threat.

"Just calm down," he said.

European leaders are keen to work with Ukraine's war-tested expertise as they seek to bolster their own defences, and are discussing plans for a "drone wall" to counter the menace from Moscow.

"If the Russians dare to launch drones against Poland, or violate the airspace of northern European countries, it means this can happen anywhere," Zelensky said.

"We are ready to share this experience with our partners."

French President Emmanuel Macron said Western countries should be willing to take a tougher line when confronted by Russian drones, to sow doubt in the Kremlin.

"It's very important to have a clear message. Drones which would violate our territories are just taking a big risk. They can be destroyed, full stop," Macron said.

Romanian Prime Minister Nicosur Dan, whose country has seen Russian drones crossing over from Ukraine, warned that his forces would shoot down the next one to violate their airspace.

Read moreRussian strikes cut power to Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl nuclear plants
'Kill' Russia's 'shadow fleet'

As Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine drags on through a fourth year, Europe is scrambling to keep up pressure on Moscow and secure funding for Kyiv.

Macron said it was key to step up efforts to counter the so-called shadow fleet of ageing oil tankers to "kill" the business model Russia uses to circumvent restrictions on exporting its oil.

"It is extremely important to increase the pressure on this shadow fleet, because it will clearly reduce the capacity to finance this war effort," said Macron -- pointing at France's move this week to hold a blacklisted tanker linked to Russia.

In a bid to ensure Ukraine has the financing it needs, the European Union is exploring a proposal to use frozen Russian assets to fund a new 140-billion-euro ($165-billion) loan.

Proponents say the move is needed to help Ukraine plug budget shortfalls -- and that Russia, not European taxpayers, should ultimately foot the bill.

But Belgium, where the vast majority of frozen assets are held, has deep reservations over the plan, which some leaders fear could spook other investors or draw Russian retaliation.

"We're going to move to uncharted waters. This is very, very risky," Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever said.

He insisted he wanted clear commitments from all EU leaders that they would share the potential liability with Belgium to shield it from any Russian retribution.

EU chief Ursula von der Leyen said Wednesday it was clear that risk should not fall only on Belgium's shoulders and that she would "intensify" talks on the proposal.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

Skybound Autonomy: Helsing’s CA-1 Europa And The Next Era Of European Warfare – Analysis

The CA-1 Europa, Germany’s autonomous combat drone, represents a potential shift in European aerial strategy. (Image courtesy of Helsing).

 October 3, 2025 

By Scott N. Romaniuk and László Csicsmann

Amid rising geopolitical tensions and rapid technological evolution, Europe is accelerating its pursuit of autonomous military capabilities. German artificial intelligence (AI) defence firm Helsing recently unveiled its fully autonomous combat drone, the CA-1 Europa, with operational deployment targeted for 2029.

More than a single weapons platform, the CA-1 Europa could herald a strategic shift in how European forces plan, respond, and assert independence in aerial combat. It represents not merely technological innovation, but the potential reshaping of doctrine, ethics, and European defence autonomy.

Technological Ambitions and Operational Design

The CA-1 Europa is designed to position Europe at the forefront of modern warfare, where autonomy is increasingly shaping aerial operations. Unlike conventional unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the Europa is a four-tonne, high-speed drone with a V-tail design optimised for agility and low radar signature. Its Centaur AI enables dual-mode operations, allowing fully autonomous missions or coordinated ‘wingman’ deployments alongside crewed aircraft. This represents a significant advance over Europe’s current drone capabilities, though operational reliability under combat conditions remains untested.

Modular construction is a key feature. Sensors, avionics, software, and payloads can be upgraded rapidly, allowing the platform to adapt to new mission profiles, emerging threats, or evolving operational doctrines. This modularity also permits rapid deployment across European theatres of interest—from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean—supporting a vision of flexible, networked defence capable of responding to multiple contingencies simultaneously.

Strategically, the Europa is intended to reduce Europe’s reliance on foreign suppliers while enhancing operational autonomy. Its multi-role capability—ranging from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to precision strike missions—could offer tactical advantages that complement existing European air power. The drone’s effectiveness, however, will depend on interoperability with crewed aircraft, integrated air-defence systems, and allied platforms, as well as seamless integration into command-and-control structures that maintain operational coherence across national and coalition forces.

Ethical and Operational Considerations

High autonomy introduces profound ethical, technical, and operational challenges. When AI can select targets or respond independently to threats, questions of accountability and compliance with international humanitarian law become acute. Establishing robust human oversight protocols, kill-chain verification, and clear limitations on autonomous decision-making will be essential to prevent accidental escalation or violations of legal and ethical norms.

Scaling from semi-autonomous drones to a full-size, high-speed combat platform entails complex engineering and operational challenges. Maintaining reliability during high-speed manoeuvres, integrating AI with sensors and communications networks, and ensuring cybersecurity resilience are all non-trivial tasks. A single system failure could compromise mission integrity, while adversaries may attempt to exploit vulnerabilities through electronic warfare, cyberattacks, or GPS-denial environments. Balancing speed, mission complexity, and operational safety will therefore be critical to the platform’s success.

Moreover, autonomous weapons deployment raises normative and legal dilemmas. Questions about the threshold for lethal action, proportionality in engagement, and accountability for unintended civilian harm must be addressed transparently. Europe’s commitment to ethical AI and international law will shape both domestic approval and international reception of the Europa programme. Without clear norms and transparency, autonomous platforms risk becoming politically and diplomatically contentious, potentially undermining the strategic benefits they are intended to deliver.

Strategic Context and the European Defence Imperative

The CA-1 Europa emerges at a pivotal moment for European security. Rising Russian assertiveness, instability in the Middle East, and shifting Indo-Pacific dynamics underscore the importance of enhancing Europe’s indigenous military capabilities. Historically, European states have relied heavily on U.S. technological support, particularly in air combat and missile defence. Platforms like the Europa signal a deliberate move toward operational independence, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers while maintaining strategic interoperability with NATO allies.

The Europa’s strategic impact will hinge on deployment scale, operational doctrine, and transparency regarding capabilities, range, armaments, and cost. It may serve as both a force multiplier and a strategic deterrent, but only if integrated effectively into broader military planning. Its deployment could also trigger regional and global responses, including accelerated development of countermeasures, anti-drone technologies, or competing autonomous systems. As with any advanced weapons system, the pursuit of advantage carries the dual risks of escalation and proliferation.

Normative Dimensions and International Implications

Autonomous combat drones such as the Europa raise questions about norms of warfare and the regulation of AI in military operations. In addition to operational risks, the programme challenges existing legal frameworks governing the use of force, protection of civilians, and accountability for autonomous decision-making. Europe’s approach could set a benchmark for responsible deployment, but only if accompanied by rigorous transparency, multilateral dialogue, and codified operational standards.

The Europa’s development also has broader implications for strategic stability. By potentially altering the balance of air power, autonomous platforms may prompt adversaries to develop counter-autonomy measures, invest in electronic warfare capabilities, or pursue asymmetric deterrence strategies. Europe must therefore manage not only technological aspects but also the political, diplomatic, and strategic ripple effects such a transformative system generates.

Regional and Global Implications

The CA-1 Europa may influence security dynamics across multiple regions. Within Europe, the drone could reinforce Germany’s leadership in autonomous aerial warfare while encouraging other states to invest in similar technologies, creating a continent-wide shift in air combat doctrine. In NATO operations, the platform could provide enhanced flexibility and resilience, particularly where rapid deployment and autonomous coordination are essential.

Beyond Europe, the drone’s operational capabilities could reshape deterrence calculations in potential conflict zones. Its dual-use design—capable of ISR, precision strike, and electronic countermeasures—offers both defensive and offensive utility, potentially affecting the strategic calculations of regional actors in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the wider Indo-Pacific. Transparency and confidence-building measures will be crucial to mitigating the risk of misperception and escalation.

Transformative Potential and Constraints

If realised as intended, the CA-1 Europa could mark a turning point in European aerial autonomy. Its combination of AI sophistication, operational versatility, high-speed performance, and modular design represents a notable advance in military technology. Yet technical performance alone will not determine strategic impact. Ethical oversight, doctrinal integration, interoperability, and transparency are equally important to ensure the drone enhances European security without undermining international norms or stability.

Successfully managing these dimensions could position Germany—and potentially other European nations—at the forefront of a transformative shift in autonomous combat capabilities. The Europa programme illustrates the complex interplay of technological innovation, strategic planning, and normative responsibility, underscoring that the future of aerial warfare will be defined as much by governance and foresight as by engineering prowess.

By investing in autonomous platforms while embedding rigorous ethical, operational, and strategic frameworks, Europe may chart a new path in high-end aerial combat—one that blends technological sophistication with principled military conduct. The CA-1 Europa is therefore more than a drone; it is a statement of intent, signalling both the promise and the responsibility of autonomous warfare in the twenty-first century.

About the authors:

• Scott N. Romaniuk: Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary

• László Csicsmann: Full Professor and Head of the Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary; Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA)

Star Wars Reimagined: Golden Dome And The Geopolitics Of Missile Defence – Analysis

Stylised rendering of America’s ‘Golden Dome Missile Defense System’. (Visual concept by authors).

 October 3, 2025

By Scott N. Romaniuk and László Csicsmann

Golden Dome: Shield of Security or Spark of Instability?

The U.S. Golden Dome missile defence initiative has already begun generating ripple effects across the international system. Rival powers are exploring their own layered defence architectures, while experts warn this could trigger a new era of competitive missile development. What began as a homeland shield is evolving into a catalyst for a global arms race, with competitors striving to counter, replicate, or surpass U.S. capabilities.

Golden Dome is more than a defence programme; it symbolises technological ambition and strategic intent. Its conception has reignited debates among allies and adversaries alike about the future of deterrence, the militarisation of space, and the fragile equilibrium of strategic stability. Its implications are as political as they are technical—reshaping alliances, driving procurement priorities, and redefining doctrines of deterrence worldwide.

Yet the project carries significant risks. Technical hurdles, spiralling costs, and intensifying geopolitical rivalries may transform what is intended as a shield into a source of instability. Golden Dome therefore represents not only a defence initiative but also a statement of U.S. strategic reach and technological dominance in the global commons of space.

Ghosts of Star Wars: Continuities in U.S. Defence Strategy

Golden Dome does not stand alone; it is the latest chapter in decades of U.S. missile defence pursuits, a pattern of strategic ambition that began during the Cold War. The most famous precursor was President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s—dubbed ‘Star Wars’—which envisioned orbital lasers and kinetic interceptors capable of rendering nuclear weapons ‘impotent and obsolete’. Although much of SDI remained conceptual, its announcement dramatically shifted the strategic landscape, fuelling fears of imbalance and sparking an incipient space-based arms race.

In subsequent decades, successive administrations pursued more modest but tangible systems. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defence (GMD) programme, initiated under George W. Bush, stationed interceptors in Alaska and California to guard against limited ballistic threats. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system, expanded through Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland, extended coverage to Europe but provoked criticism from Moscow. More recently, layered approaches have included THAAD and Patriot PAC-3, combining regional and homeland defence into a flexible architecture.

Golden Dome revives the maximalist spirit of SDI but updates it for the 21-century through directed-energy weapons, hypersonic interceptors, and orbital kill vehicles. Conceptually, it reflects enduring debates in U.S. strategic doctrine: whether deterrence is best achieved by punishment—threatening devastating retaliation—or by denial—preventing adversaries from accomplishing their aims. While the latter reassures domestic audiences and allied states, adversaries often interpret it as destabilising. Golden Dome thus stands at the intersection of two enduring American impulses: the pursuit of technological invulnerability and the preservation of credible deterrence within a precarious balance of power.

Building the Shield: Technology, Integration, and Limits

Extending from the Earth into orbit, Golden Dome is designed to detect and intercept missile threats at the earliest stages of flight. Through an integrated network of satellites, radars, interceptors, and directed-energy weapons, the system aspires to construct a seamless shield over the homeland. Announced in May 2025, it targets a wide spectrum of threats ranging from ballistic and hypersonic missiles to cruise missiles and drone swarms. Its aim is all-domain interception—a holistic architecture linking space-based sensors with ground-based interceptors, radar systems, and high-energy lasers.

Preliminary Pentagon assessments suggest the basic design has been finalised, with Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing leading development. The system comprises four interlocking layers: orbital satellites and interceptors, long-range radars and THAAD batteries for midcourse defence, Aegis-launched Standard-6 missiles for high-altitude interception, and terminal-phase defences consisting of lasers and next-generation interceptors. In theory, redundancy between these layers enhances resilience and interception probability.

Integration, however, poses enormous challenges. Coordinating multiple subsystems into a coherent ‘kill chain’ requires split-second synchronisation; delays between sensors and interceptors could critically undermine effectiveness. Orbital interceptors must survive atmospheric re-entry and execute precise manoeuvres—capabilities that remain largely unproven. Financially, uncertainties are no less daunting. While initial estimates placed costs at US$175 billion, the space-based tier alone may exceed US$500 billion. Decisions regarding launchers, interceptor design, and basing infrastructure remain unresolved, raising the spectre of familiar cost spirals.

Golden Dome: Shield or Provocation?

Golden Dome represents Washington’s determination to maintain dominance in space and achieve near-absolute protection against missile threats. Yet this ambition risks fuelling instability. Undermining adversaries’ confidence in their nuclear deterrents, the system could spur a rush to develop countermeasures—hypersonic glide vehicles, penetration aids, and anti-satellite weapons—potentially driving the world back toward a level of strategic competition reminiscent of the Cold War.

Some U.S. allies, including Japan and Canada, have expressed interest in participation. While co-operation may strengthen capabilities and burden-sharing, it also reinforces perceptions of exclusive defence blocs. This risks deepening adversarial mistrust and undermining broader efforts at global stability. The system’s inspiration partly stems from Israel’s Iron Dome, which proved highly effective during Iran’s 2024 missile assault. Earlier this year, President Donald Trump stated that Canada would need to contribute US$61 billion to participate in the missile defence system ‘if they remain a separate, but unequal, Nation’. He further suggested that Canada should ‘become the 51st state’ to join Golden Dome without cost, underscoring how the programme raises complex questions of sovereignty, alliance obligations, and strategic dependence.

Linking Technology and Strategy

Beyond engineering challenges, the capabilities envisioned for Golden Dome carry profound strategic consequences. The system’s potential to intercept missiles at multiple stages alters calculations of deterrence, both for allies and potential adversaries. Where traditional deterrence relied on the threat of retaliation, Golden Dome introduces the possibility of pre-emptive denial—an approach that reassures domestic audiences and partners but risks being perceived as destabilising by rival powers. Technical sophistication is thus inseparable from strategic impact: the architecture of the shield directly shapes the geopolitics it seeks to protect.

From Homeland Shield to Global Flashpoint

The reverberations of Golden Dome extend across regions and great-power rivalries. Russia and China jointly condemned the initiative as ‘deeply destabilising’, warning it undermines the principle of mutually assured destruction. China described it as having ‘strong offensive implications’, while both powers view it as an attempt to negate the balance between offensive and defensive arms.

In response, China is accelerating its anti-satellite and hypersonic programmes, with reports of a planned ‘Chinese Golden Dome’. Russia, perceiving its midcourse and terminal deterrent phases at risk, may expand the use of mobile launchers, decoys, and hypersonic glide systems. India, though not directly targeted, is advancing its Sudarshan Chakra initiative, which National Security Adviser Anil Chauhan described in August 2025 as ‘India’s own Iron Dome or Golden Dome’. European allies may welcome enhanced coverage yet face growing entanglement in U.S.–Russia and U.S.–China tensions.

The Space Dilemma

The militarisation of space presents profound risks for global security and long-term orbital sustainability. Absent robust governance frameworks, deploying armed systems in orbit erodes fragile norms, intensifies mistrust, and increases the danger of miscalculation. Dual-use technologies complicate verification, blurring the line between defensive and offensive deployments. Debris generated by weapons tests or intercepts threatens satellites vital to communications, navigation, and scientific research.

Mitigating these dangers requires co-operative governance, transparency measures, and new agreements on debris mitigation and rules of engagement. Without such measures, insecurity will fuel further militarisation, undermining both national security and the civilian benefits of space.

Strategic Risks and Operational Realism

Golden Dome confronts a host of risks. Adversaries may accelerate development of anti-satellite weapons, cyber capabilities, and countermeasures. Technology remains unproven at scale, and system integration may falter under the strain of complexity. Countermeasures such as manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, hypersonics, or saturation strikes could overwhelm defences. Electronic warfare and cyberattacks threaten communications, while the high cost of replenishing satellites undermines sustainability. Above all, the enormous budget could drain resources from nuclear modernisation, conventional readiness, or emerging priorities such as cyber defence.

Domestic and Political Dimensions

Domestically, Golden Dome’s trajectory will be shaped by politics as much as engineering. Major defence contractors—Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing—stand to benefit from lucrative long-term contracts, while congressional lobbying will influence funding allocations. Public opinion may prove fickle: enthusiasm for security could wane in the face of ballooning costs or perceptions that domestic priorities are being neglected. Partisan divides remain stark, with Democrats likely to emphasise arms control and norms, while Republicans frame Golden Dome as a symbol of U.S. technological strength.

International Security Architecture

Golden Dome sits uneasily within the broader arms control framework. The U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 paved the way for ambitious missile defence projects but weakened the principle of strategic balance. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits weapons of mass destruction in orbit but leaves conventional systems and missile defence platforms largely unregulated. Efforts such as the proposed Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) have stalled, leaving a dangerous governance vacuum. NATO allies may welcome enhanced protection yet remain wary of being drawn more deeply into U.S.–China and U.S.–Russia competition.

Escalation and Strategic Stability

Golden Dome could significantly undermine adversaries’ confidence in the survivability and effectiveness of their second-strike capabilities, a cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. By projecting the perception that U.S. missile defences could neutralise retaliatory forces, rivals may fear that their deterrent is vulnerable in a crisis, increasing the incentive to act pre-emptively to preserve strategic leverage. This mirrors classical security dilemmas: efforts to enhance one state’s defence can inadvertently intensify insecurity for others, raising the probability of miscalculation during tense standoffs.

The dual-use character of space-based assets—where sensors, satellites, and orbital platforms serve both civilian and military functions—further magnifies escalation risks. Attacks targeting these systems, even if intended as limited or defensive strikes, could be interpreted as offensive moves, triggering rapid and unpredictable responses. Civilian infrastructure essential for communications, navigation, weather monitoring, and commercial activities may become entangled in military conflict, complicating crisis management. The opacity of space operations, combined with the speed of orbital engagement and difficulty of attribution, could accelerate decision-making under uncertainty, leaving little room for de-escalation.

Economic, Ethical, and Normative Dimensions

Golden Dome threatens to fundamentally reshape U.S. defence priorities. The sheer scale of the programme implies that vast resources would be dedicated to its development, testing, and deployment, potentially diverting attention and funding from other critical areas such as nuclear triad modernisation, cyber resilience, and the readiness of conventional forces. This raises difficult questions about strategic trade-offs: investing heavily in near-absolute missile defence may come at the expense of capabilities that underpin broader national security and deterrence.

Ethically, Golden Dome raises pressing questions about the militarisation of a shared global commons. The deployment of orbital weapons—even for ostensibly defensive purposes—sets dangerous precedents, normalising weaponisation of space and potentially triggering competitive escalation. Normatively, the initiative challenges existing international frameworks that govern responsible behaviour in space. Without sustained multilateral dialogue, codified rules of conduct, and confidence-building measures, Golden Dome risks eroding the principles that ensure space remains accessible, safe, and sustainable for all states and future generations. In effect, the project is as much a test of global governance and international responsibility as it is a demonstration of technological prowess.

Shifting Regional Balances and Global Dependencies

Golden Dome’s implications extend far beyond the immediate interests of the U.S., Russia, and China, reshaping regional security dynamics and influencing strategic calculations across the globe. Its announcement signals a shift in the balance of power, compelling allies and adversaries alike to reassess their defence postures and long-term security strategies.

In the Middle East, Israel may become integrated into Golden Dome, joining a broader U.S.-led missile defence network and enhancing its already advanced capabilities while signalling alignment with American strategic priorities. Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, may seek participation to counter Iran’s expanding missile and drone arsenal, deepening military interdependence with Washington. While such involvement could strengthen regional security for allies, it risks heightening tensions with adversaries and further entrenching competing security blocs.

On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea is likely to accelerate its missile and nuclear programmes, perceiving Golden Dome as a direct challenge to its deterrent and sovereignty, and as a destabilising initiative that could heighten the risk of nuclear confrontation extending into space. South Korea may consider closer integration with U.S. missile defence systems, including potential operational coordination with orbital sensors or joint deployments. This raises critical questions about strategic autonomy, alliance obligations, and entanglement in broader great-power rivalries.

Beyond these immediate theatres, states in the Global South confront profound asymmetries. Countries lacking the technological, economic, or industrial capacity to develop comparable missile defence systems may become increasingly dependent on U.S.-led protection arrangements. Such dependency could reinforce global hierarchies of security provision, amplifying debates over sovereignty, strategic reliance, and inequality. Perceptions of exclusion may also drive secondary effects, including regional arms buildups, pursuit of asymmetric deterrence strategies, or alignment with alternative security providers, further complicating the international strategic landscape.

Guardianship and Consequence

Golden Dome is both shield and spark: a testament to U.S. technological ambition and a potential catalyst for global instability. Its technical feasibility remains uncertain, yet its impact on strategic stability, arms control, and space governance is already profound. Whether the project stabilises or destabilises will depend on both engineering breakthroughs and deliberate political choices.

The U.S. and its allies must weigh the pursuit of near-absolute defence against the responsibility to preserve space as a stable, shared domain. Without genuine international engagement, Golden Dome risks repeating the historical cycle of ambitious, dazzling, but ultimately unsustainable missile defence schemes. The initiative underscores a broader lesson: in the high-stakes environment of space and advanced missile defence, technical brilliance cannot substitute for diplomacy, governance, or strategic foresight. Nations must balance the allure of invulnerability with the imperatives of stability, transparency, and collective responsibility in a domain that belongs to all.

About the authors:

• Scott N. Romaniuk: Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary

• László Csicsmann: Full Professor and Head of the Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary; Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA)