Wednesday, July 01, 2026

Britain

Burnham - a left response

Monday 29 June 2026, by Dave Kellaway



Following Keir Starmer’s resignation as leader of the Labour Party, and thus as Prime Minister, it seems that Andy Burnham, former Mayor of Greater Manchester, will accede to these two posts without a contest, a procedure known as a "coronation".

Whatever people on the left are saying about Burnham one thing is clear. Activists in the labour movement are discussing issues today that were buried under the Starmer/McSweeney regime.

Darren Jones and the Labour Together tribute act are lobbying hard against Ed Miliband becoming Chancellor with his net zero agenda. Veteran peer, Alf Dubs, who came to Britain as a refugee from the Holocaust, has today called on Burnham to sack Shabana Mahmood and rip up her anti-migrant policies.

This is Labour’s reset moment when we can consign to the past some of the appalling language used by politicians to describe refugees: ‘invaders’, ‘an island of strangers’, ‘tearing our country apart’. We can’t reset by bringing with us policies that many in the PLP do not support, spearheaded by a home secretary who divides opinion. [1]

The Productive State

A policy document called The Productive State from Mainstream – the Labour ginger group that has helped drive Burnham’s rise to power – provides us with a devastating critique of the damage privatization has done to our society. It outlines a reformist framework for change that has been previously totally rejected by Starmer and his allies. For example Starmer’s ministers have consistently rejected taking water back into public ownership. A detailed analysis by Simon Pearson of the Mainstream/Commonwealth document and its limits is currently available on this website. Trade Union Congress leader Paul Novak has welcomed Burnham and called for a real reset in favour of working people.

The current heatwave is provoking a debate within and between major unions about further drilling in the North Sea. Unite leader Sharon Graham has attacked Miliband becoming chancellor going so far as talking of him as putting a ‘noose around job creation’. Of course the net zero economy is growing strongly and can easily replace jobs lost in the winding down of the North sea fossil fuel industry.

Yes, Burnham may pivot completely to some sort of continuity with the Starmer government but at least the political space in which we operate has changed.

The bosses and right wing press are piling in alongside the Labour right and its apparatus. For example they are backing Streeting for chancellor and smearing Ed Miliband. Rocco Forte, a hospitality magnate, has specifically called for a block on Miliband. If Burnham does adopt some or all of the proposals in Productive State he certainly would come under sustained attack from national and international capital which wants to restrict public spending and increased taxation. Already Burnham has floated changes to capital gains tax and some other proposals to raise money that Starmer’s team rejected.

Why is this discussion about Burnham important?

Many socialists see their mission as working with like-minded people to build a party that can lead and participate in a mass movement to build an eco socialist alternative to capitalism. But the conditions in which we do that change as social economic and political forces change. The people who may be attracted to our ideas may come from different currents and mobilize around various issues. We have no choice about who those radicalizing people are – we have to move to them. Our narrative needs to intersect with their discourse and language. We have to work with people generally to our right.

For ultra left sects with their timeless method and definitive programmes nothing ever changes – denounce everybody except yourselves and build yourparty.

Under Corbyn’s rise many of us joined Labour. The radicalisation in the Greens means we are relating to them in a way we did not five years ago. The end of Starmer and the beginning of a Burnham project is not a repeat of Corbyn but it means we have to adjust again. If he really proposes progressive taxes, proportional representation, new devolution or ending privatized utilities we have to respond. We have something to contribute.

WE engage with anything that improves the lives of working class people. At the same time – we denounce and campaign against any continuities with Starmer on Palestine, Trump, defence spending , migrants, dropping of green issues, democratic or trans rights
.

Two wrong positions on what Burnham represents:

• He is just the same as Starmer

Josh Simons’ Labour together is still really in control and nothing policy wise will change, the labour machine will absorb and manage Burnham who will further u turn on all his promises. Things will not materially improve one jot for working people and he will continue to open the door to a reform government. Our only task is to denounce his continuity with Starmer. As a Socialist Worker article stated Labour is swapping one centrist with another

• A new coherent soft left alternative has been born

We are going to see a massive increase in public ownership/control, a democratic revolution with a new electoral system, citizen assemblies and devolution including an Englsh parliament. The Labour party will be revitalized with a real political debate and the end to witchhunts. All this will stop Reform and return a Labour government for a second term. John McDonnell tears on Burnham’s victory expresses somewhat this view. Anthony Barnett has written an article in New Statesman along these lines.

As ecosocialists we disagree with the simplistic response of the both these positions. We need to be more nuanced and understand the complexity of the political shifts going on.

Contradictory indicators

Reading the runes is very difficult at the moment. There are contradictory indicators. The Burnham team says Reeves is out, but at same time their leader has been consulting with Jim O’Neill ex-Goldman Sachs manager. He has proposed dropping the triple lock and for orthodox neo-liberal economics. Other Bank of England economists have been brought on board too. Blairite, James Purnell, who has headed a big lobbying/consultancy company advising firms like Amazon, has been taken on as chief of staff. We have to await the full cabinet team sheet before a proper assessment is possible

We cannot define Burnham just from his past history as a minister in Blair and Brown’s governments or even as a leadership challenger to Corbyn. You also have to take into account his work in Manchester and the fact that politicians can and do change. Tony Benn started off in the centre of Labour politics under Wilson.

Burnham is not quite the empty vessel with no political base that Starmer was. The latter was easily controlled by Labour Together and the party machine. Burnham has a project in a way Starmer never did. It may be limited, contradictory and end up not changing much. The new leader has talked about the ‘politics of place,’ ‘Manchesterism’ and the Preston community wealth building model. This is different from Starmer’s junior partnership with corporate capital. Burnham built his base to win leadership through Mainstream and the soft left in a way that Starmer never did. Starmer was propelled by the McSweeeny/Mandelson matrix who did all the base building inside the apparatus. Burnham has kept himself largely outside that grouping.

Of course that does not mean that the ex Labour Together team will not try to get on board with Burnham and try to keep him under their control. Neither does it rule out Burnham bringing some of them into his team as evidence of a new ecumenical, broad church approach. He may even integrate somebody from the Socialist Campaign Group. The latter had brought out a good list of demands for Burnham to take up that would radicalize his project.

No Burnham surge

Currently there is no sign of any movement back to Labour similar to the Corbyn surge. However those socialists who have stayed in Labour will be encouraged to a degree by the Burnham victory. The demise of Your Party will further convince them of their position so a certain revitalisaton of inner party debate and activity may happen. Given Burnham’s bad positions on migrants, Palestine, defence spending, democratic rights to protest and a full green programme it is unlikely he will attract any of those thousands who have joined the Greens back to Labour.

A coronation now looks likely and it does mean the opportunity for a full discussion of Burnham’s ideas at this stage is still born. The Socialist Campaign Group started off by criticising the lack of debate but John McDonnell more or less accepted that there was nothing to be done and we had to get on with it. The Burnham movement is still very top down dominated by the leader and the MPs, there are no real democratic structures constraining his actions.

Can Burnham stop Reform at the next general election like he did in Makerfield? There were exceptional circumstances since you could vote for Burnham, stop Reform and get rid of Starmer. Greens and Liberal democrat voters did that and their parties did not campaign. Burnham did not confront Reform’s racism head on in the way the Greens did in Gorton. He knew he could win without doing that. Nevertheless you cannot clone Burnham in 600 seats and we will have 2 years of his government with his shine possibly being worn off.

Many people excited about Burnham are forgetting the far right still got 40% in the by-election. A poll shows 43 % of Britons felt no difference after Starmer going. Only 20 % were a bit or more optimistic. His northern schtick also may not run so well in London and the rest of the South. John Curtice, the elections specialist, has suggested that the Reform threat remains live. Another poll puts Labour 3 percentage points ahead of Reform when the leaders are referenced but Labour are still 4 points behind when people are asked Labour or Reform.

Reform could be stopped if Burnham really were to carry out the changes currently being discussed by some of his team. Taking control of utilities and some progressive taxation may enable his government to reduce energy costs for most families. If his radical talk about building more social houses were to be turned into reality that too could change voters’ minds. But will Burnham stand up to the bosses’ counterattack against any radical reforms. Just building a broad church cabinet of the right and left will not cut it.

Socialists will need to adapt our campaigns and demands to relate to the new political issues and debates that are emerging. We still need to build our eco-socialist alternative independent of the Labour Party and the Greens. A resurgence of even ‘soft left’ ideas provides us with an opportunity to engage with broader forces on questions that have only been discussed in much smaller circles since the end of the Corbyn project

28 June 2026

Source: Anti*Capitalist Resistance.

Popular revolt grows in Bolivia

Wednesday 1 July 2026, by Patrick Guillaudat



Bolivia has been experiencing a powerful social movement against President Rodrigo Paz’s austerity measures since the spring of 2026. Led by trade union, peasant and indigenous organizations, the mobilization is facing growing repression while maintaining its demands against the high cost of living and the grip of multinationals.

Elected with the support of some former Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) voters, around a program of "modernization" and "efficiency", Paz, in office since 8 November 2025, quickly adopted austerity measures, betting on the sluggishness of the social movement after the collapse of the left in the elections.

A plan of anti-social measures

As of 17 December 2025, a decree abolished subsidies for petrol and diesel, causing tariffs to rise by 86% and 160% respectively, with the immediate consequence of an increase in all consumer prices. This text also facilitated the establishment of multinationals in the exploitation of mineral resources, agro-industry and infrastructure. A first mobilization allowed a partial retreat. Then the law of 10 April 2026 was adopted, which, by reversing the 1953 agrarian reform, encouraged the grabbing of small farmers’ land by large landowners.

The largest social movement of the 21st century

The COB trade union federation, together with the Tupac Katari federation and the indigenous women’s organization Bartolina Sisa, resumed the mobilization at the end of April and called for the blocking of roads, thus isolating the country’s main cities, and multiplied calls for strikes. Faced with the vigour of this second movement, Paz revived the classic rhetoric by criminalizing social organizations, calling them terrorists, denouncing a pseudo-conspiracy instigated by Evo Morales, and issuing arrest warrants for the main leaders.
This social movement, uninterrupted since the end of April, is demanding wage increases to compensate for soaring prices, and the end of the country’s opening up to multinationals, under the slogan “Bolivia is not for sale”. Despite the repression, with at least seven deaths and many arrests, the movement is still holding. However, a law establishing a state of emergency has been passed, ensuring total impunity for the armed and repressive forces.

An uncertain outcome

The COB is divided between an executive secretary who called for Paz’s resignation while several CODs (departmental branches of the COB) rejected this slogan (such as the one in Santa Cruz). But for a few days now, the COB has presented an 8-point plan to the government as part of the opening of the “dialogue”. As for the Tupac Katari federation, which is very powerful in El Alto, and the Bartolina Sisa organization, they have taken the lead in mobilizing indigenous peoples and peasants.

The Paz government, divided on what to do, with a vice-president who has condemned the measures it has taken, is wielding the carrot by demanding to negotiate while repressing, imprisoning demonstrators and forcing the lifting of roadblocks. In order to divide the movement, it has succeeded in signing a number of separate agreements with a few local unions, such as on 18 June with the Colquiri miners’ union, or with transport companies in La Paz two days before.

The traditional right, taking advantage of the crisis, is raising the ante. Former president Jorge Quiroga called for the arrest of the movement’s leaders and activists, who were described as terrorists and even drug traffickers, and demanded the effective and immediate establishment of a state of emergency to “free the Bolivian people taken hostage”.

Solidarity is urgent

If the government is staking its survival on this social struggle, it benefits from a favourable international environment, supported by Trump and the far-right leaders of the continent who are pushing Paz to put down the revolt in order to turn the page on the years of the MAS. Moreover, as a sign of the United States’ interference, an agreement to combat delinquency and drug trafficking was signed between Bolivia and the United States on 16 April.

Our solidarity is all the more important because a social victory in Bolivia would be an encouragement to the struggle for the peoples and workers of the Latin American states, especially the neighbouring ones, plunged into the "libertarian" night.

23 June 2026

Translated by International Viewpoint from l’Anticapitaliste.

 

Armenia’s elections and the future of the left


Armenia graphic Posle

First published at Posle.

Elections in Armenia have never been dull. The 2018 election is a case in point: it was held just months after the Velvet Revolution, when mass protests led by opposition figure Nikol Pashinyan — a former journalist and political prisoner — toppled Serzh Sargsyan’s authoritarian regime. In the ensuing wave of revolutionary euphoria, Pashinyan’s My Step Alliance captured 70 percent of the vote. Or, take the 2021 election, when voters stood by Pashinyan even after a crushing defeat in the Karabakh war, handing him a smaller but decisive 54 percent victory. Because Armenia is a parliamentary republic, it is parliamentary elections that decide who rules. On both of these occasions, Pashinyan’s party formed a government, and he took the helm as prime minister.

Even so, the June 7, 2026, election was permeated by geopolitics to an unprecedented degree. It was essentially a referendum on the foreign policy of Pashinyan, who casts himself as a pro-European, pro-democracy leader fighting against corruption and oligarchy. As a post-Soviet state, Armenia spent most of its modern history within Russia’s sphere of influence. This dependence stemmed primarily from Armenia’s conflict with its neighbors, Azerbaijan and its key regional ally Turkey. The dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh left Armenia in a state of permanent anticipation of war, forcing it to seek protection from Russia as a security guarantor. Exploiting this role, Moscow steadily tightened its grip on the country. Yet during the 2020 war and subsequent clashes with Azerbaijan, Russia would not, or could not, come to Armenia’s aid. Now, Armenia is trying to break free from this dependence and pursue an independent foreign policy that looks towards Europe.

It is worth noting that viewing the situation solely through the lens of a West-versus-Russia power struggle oversimplifies a complex reality. Pashinyan’s strategy rests on two pillars: a “peace agenda” and “diversifying foreign policy.” The peace agenda part is straightforward — it centers on normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, nations many Armenians still see as historical adversaries. Meanwhile, diversifying foreign policy does not mean, as many assume, simply pivoting away from Russia and toward the West (i.e., the EU and the United States); it means building up Armenia’s diplomatic agency and independence from Moscow. The trouble is that Moscow, by all appearances, still treats Armenia as a vassal state — but the harder it tries to assert control, the more reason Armenia has to look westward.

Ultimately, voters backed the agenda of peace and diversification championed by Pashinyan. His party, Civil Contract, captured roughly 50 percent of the vote — an amount sufficient, under Armenian electoral law, to form a single-party government. Also clearing the parliamentary threshold were Strong Armenia, led by Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan (23.3 percent), and the Armenia Alliance of former President Robert Kocharyan (9.9 percent). A third major pro-Russian party, led by local billionaire Gagik Tsarukyan, fell just short of the required 4 percent of the vote. Although pro-Russian opposition figures and one pro-Western party have petitioned the Constitutional Court to contest the results, the overall outcome is highly unlikely to change.

Never before in Armenian history, it seems, have Armenian elections been subject to such international scrutiny. Both Brussels and the Kremlin viewed them as the next geopolitical battleground after Moldova and Hungary. Moscow was eager to avenge its previous defeats, despite heavy spending on fake news and other subversive operations. That might have been easy enough, had Armenian public opinion on Russia not shifted dramatically in recent years. First of all, Russia dashed Armenian expectations of aid during the 2020 Karabakh war, whereas Turkey threw its full weight behind Azerbaijan. Russia did eventually step in as a peacemaker, brokering a ceasefire and deploying a peacekeeping contingent to Nagorno-Karabakh. But in the years that followed, Moscow again did nothing to protect Armenia or the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. A second factor was the invasion of Ukraine. In all likelihood, it was the war in Ukraine that motivated the Kremlin to avoid a fight with Ankara and Baku, effectively buying them off at Armenia’s expense. When Baku launched a military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Russian peacekeepers made no attempt to intervene, forcing the region’s entire Armenian population to flee to Armenia. After that exodus, Armenian public opinion toward Russia changed, perhaps irreversibly. Moscow has just now begun to realize that it could “lose” Armenia.

The Kremlin chafed at Yerevan hosting the European Political Community Summit in early May, and was particularly infuriated by Volodymyr Zelensky’s attendance and harsh words for Moscow. This triggered a wave of hostile rhetoric toward Yerevan — not just in state media, as expected, but from high-ranking officials as well. Vladimir Putin himself demanded that Yerevan hold a referendum to decide once and for all whether to remain in the Eurasian Economic Union or pursue European integration. This was quickly followed by Russian import bans on various Armenian products, ranging from Jermuk mineral water to flowers and apricots. Such punitive measures could potentially inflict serious damage on the Armenian economy. While trade between Yerevan and Moscow has been declining, Russia remains Armenia’s largest trading partner; in 2025, even after trade volumes dropped by nearly half compared to the previous year, Russia still accounted for 35.5 percent of Armenia’s total foreign trade.

Ultimately, however, this pressure not only failed to bolster pro-Russian forces within Armenia but actively backfired. Pashinyan’s victory was no landslide, but it was decisive — all the more impressive given the vast arsenal of hybrid interference the Kremlin deployed against him. Even so, it is worth remembering that this electoral outcome was not shaped by foreign policy factors alone.

Beyond foreign policy

When the first exit polls and initial results began trickling in on the evening of June 7, Pashinyan’s party appeared poised for a landslide victory of around 60 percent of the vote. This was because the vote count began in the countryside and smaller towns, where voters lean heavily toward Pashinyan. However, as data from Yerevan began rolling in, the margin narrowed noticeably. The fact that the pro-European Pashinyan performed better in the provinces, while pro-Russian parties running on nationalist rhetoric drew substantial support in major urban centers, was the central paradox of these elections. It demonstrates that framing the Armenian elections as a clash between the pro-Western Pashinyan and a pro-Russian opposition, while not completely inaccurate, is oversimplified, because it fails to account for their socioeconomic and domestic-policy dimensions.

Put simply, the standard of living for most Armenians has steadily improved in the years since 2018. Armenia’s GDP per capita has more than doubled, climbing from $4,200 to nearly $9,500 in 2025. To be sure, much of this surge was driven by shifting economic conditions across the post-Soviet space after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine — but not all of it, as the country had been charting impressive growth even before then. The revolution successfully cleared away the structural barriers to socioeconomic development that characterized the presidencies of Kocharyan and Sargsyan: namely, systemic corruption and a network of monopolies controlled by pro-regime oligarchs.

Pashinyan’s ideological stance can broadly be classified as centrist. In many areas, his administration pursues distinctly neoliberal policies; shortly after the revolution, for instance, Armenia introduced a flat income tax. Pashinyan himself has, on multiple occasions, expressed views that sound like a defence of old-school capitalism with zero social guarantees — like, that “poverty only exists because people lack the skills to not be poor,” or that “living well means working hard, earning a lot, and spending a lot.” Behind this laissez-faire approach, however, lies a bleak reality for labor rights. Armenia does see occasional strikes, such as those at the Kajaran mines in 2025 and at Akhtala in 2026. Recently, the country even witnessed its first strike by Indian migrant workers at a garment factory in Ijevan. In these disputes, state authorities typically either remain passive or openly side with employers.

Perhaps the clearest example of the Pashinyan administration’s neoliberal bent is the controversy surrounding the gold deposit on Mount Amulsar, located near Jermuk, a resort town famous for its mineral water. A permit to develop a mine here, right next to one of Armenia’s best-known resorts, had been granted before the 2018 revolution, leading many to expect that Pashinyan’s government would rescind it. Yet despite fierce opposition from local residents and environmental activists — and even a rift within the ruling party — the government ultimately sided with the investors (who, for their part, handed a 12.5 percent stake in the company over to the state).

And yet, when compared to the pre-2018 era, Pashinyan’s socioeconomic policy looks almost social democratic. State spending on infrastructure — including the construction and repair of roads, schools, and day cares, particularly in the provinces — has risen sharply. Corruption significantly declined and ceased to be a fixture of the political system, creating a more favorable environment for small and medium-sized businesses. In the run-up to the election, Pashinyan took a series of steps that prompted some critics to label him a welfare populist. Chief among them was a healthcare reform that will phase in universal medical insurance for all citizens; for pensioners, it is already in effect and entirely free, with the state covering all costs. Another example of Pashinyan’s “left-wing” policies was nationalizing the Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA). The takeover of ENA, which had been owned by Samvel Karapetyan’s conglomerate, marked a major escalation in the ongoing feud between Pashinyan and Karapetyan.

The opposition forces arrayed against Pashinyan also attempted to win voters over with welfare promises. For instance, Karapetyan’s party pledged to exempt small businesses from taxes. Similarly, local billionaire Gagik Tsarukyan declared that “no one should have to choose between medicine and food,” promising free healthcare, free education, and high pensions if he won. Former President Robert Kocharyan was equally lavish with his promises. Even so, many Armenian voters remember the pre-revolutionary era all too well and are hesitant to trust the oligarchs. In fact, many are willing to vote for anyone at all just to prevent the return of the byvshie — “the exes,” as the pre-2018 ruling elite is commonly known in Armenia.

Furthermore, Pashinyan faces heavy criticism for failing to penalize these figures; despite his repeated campaign promises, men like Kocharyan and Tsarukyan were never held accountable for past corruption and vote-rigging, allowing them to retain the immense financial resources needed to run for office these days. Yet there are also plenty of those who view Pashinyan with such hostility — blaming him for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh — that they would back any candidate just to oust him. For voters of that stripe, though, the socioeconomic agenda is secondary to concerns over security and national identity.

Against this backdrop, a left could have capitalized on issues of inequality, but left-wing forces were virtually non-existent in this election cycle. That is, unless you count the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, one of Armenia’s oldest political parties, which was originally founded as a left-wing socialist and nationalist movement. However, it has long since mutated into a conservative — if not far-right — party that forms the backbone of Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance.

One could consider Hayk Marutyan’s New Force party a part of the left. Marutyan, the former mayor of Yerevan and a onetime ally of Pashinyan, has mentioned his social democratic values before; indeed, during his mayoral tenure, Sanitek — the private company handling the capital’s waste management — was nationalized. For the most part, however, Marutyan focused his campaign on attacking Pashinyan over the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and his concessions to Azerbaijan. Thus, on the rare occasions when a left-wing agenda surfaced in election discourse, it was rudimentary at best.

Socioeconomic promises that could be classified as left-wing also popped up in the platforms of various other parties that otherwise had little to do with the left. For instance, one party proposed nationalizing Armenia’s mineral resources while simultaneously vowing to preserve the country’s “mono-ethnic character” and to crack down on undocumented migrants (“supposedly from India, but actually from Pakistan”). Another faction, led by a retired general, advocated for rejoining the Collective Security Treaty Organization and restoring an alliance with Russia, while pairing those geopolitical stances with a call for progressive taxation.

The absence of a left in Armenian elections is nothing new; they were missing from the 2021 vote as well. Back in 2018, the Citizen’s Decision Social Democratic Party — founded by left-wing activists who had participated in the revolution — did run in the election. Their campaign is chiefly remembered for handing out tangerines to prospective voters. The tangerines did not work: the party captured less than 1 percent of the vote and quickly disbanded. In the current election cycle, several former members of that defunct party aligned themselves with the None of the Above Party. This fringe movement brought together a disparate coalition of people united solely by their rejection of mainstream politics, including leftists, libertarians, nationalists, and gun-legalization advocates. None of the Above ran a highly unconventional campaign, with party representatives frequently appearing in costume as Spider-Man and other superheroes. Ultimately, however, the superheroes failed to clear the 4 percent electoral barrier.

A brief history of the Armenian left

The left has been fairly marginal within the political landscape of post-Soviet Armenia. Yet it was not always so. The Armenian left boasts a rich history stretching back at least to the mid-nineteenth century. Its roots lie with the revolutionary democrat Mikayel Nalbandian, whose poetry would later form the lyrics of Armenia’s national anthem. Furthermore, of the three historic Armenian political parties founded in the late nineteenth century, two were left-wing: the aforementioned Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Hunchak party, whose name — meaning “The Bell” — was a deliberate nod to Alexander Herzen’s famous radical periodical of the same name.

Armenians, most notably Stepan Shahumyan, leader of the Baku Commune, were also well-represented among the Bolsheviks. When Armenia briefly gained independence as a republic from 1918 to 1920, it was governed by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. However, following the “Sovietization” of Armenia, the Bolsheviks branded the party bourgeois and systematically persecuted it. While the Armenian Revolutionary Federation survived within the Armenian diaspora, it essentially mutated into a right-wing, national conservative party, retaining its membership in the Socialist International purely out of inertia.

In the final years of the Soviet Union, the Armenian Communist Party was heavily tarred by its association with Moscow, and it never recovered from its defeat in the first free elections of 1990. Subsequent attempts to build a modern social democratic party from its ruins yielded little success; the Democratic Party, led by Aram Sargsyan, remained a marginal political force. Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s, a deep nostalgia for the relative prosperity and stability of the late Soviet era had taken root among the public. Consequently, the unreformed Communist Party of Armenia, led by Sergei Badalyan and ideologically similar to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, continued to stand in elections throughout the decade, even winning seats in parliament. However, after Badalyan’s death in 1999, the party’s electoral base rapidly eroded.

The primary beneficiary of this Soviet nostalgia was not the ideological left, but rather one of Armenia’s last Soviet-era leaders, Karen Demirchyan. He was widely viewed as a pragmatist and “capable manager.” In the 1998 presidential election — apparently rigged — Demirchyan narrowly lost to Robert Kocharyan. He subsequently went on to serve as speaker of parliament before being tragically assassinated in the 1999 parliament shooting.

When Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the “Armenian Yeltsin,” was forced to hand power to Kocharyan in 1998, it signaled that Armenia’s liberals had given way to the national conservatives. In the socioeconomic sphere, an oligarchic capitalism with neo-feudal elements became firmly institutionalized, while the ideological landscape shifted onto conservative, nationalist ground. Under the successive presidencies of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, the ruling elite cultivated a state-sponsored nationalist ideology that served both to neutralize the opposition and to legitimize the oligarchic system.

During Kocharyan’s tenure, the administration outsourced its ideological apparatus to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, giving it control over the ministries of education and culture. Under Serzh Sargsyan, the balance of power shifted toward the Republican Party — heir to the Soviet-era nationalist dissidents — and the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC). Public schools even introduced a mandatory course on “the history of the Armenian church,” which effectively amounted to religious indoctrination into AAC theology.

Following a brutal crackdown on protests in 2008, a wave of grassroots activist groups and civic initiatives emerged across Armenia. While they fiercely opposed the authorities, they deliberately avoided aligning themselves with any established opposition party. It was from this specific milieu that a new generation of left-wing activists began to surface. They made their presence felt most acutely in 2012 during the Mashtots Park protests. What began as local opposition to the city government’s plan to rezone part of the public park for commercial retail development quickly evolved into a broader struggle against authoritarianism and oligarchy, framing itself as a localized branch of the global Occupy movement. Later, these left-wing activists participated in the far larger Electric Yerevan movement — dubbed the “Electromaidan” in the Russian-language press — which erupted in protest against the rise in electricity tariffs.

During the 2018 revolution, activists — including leftists who had gained vital on-the-ground experience in previous demonstrations — played a pivotal role. Working alongside members of Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, they initiated the earliest acts of civil disobedience, which rapidly swelled into a mass nonviolent uprising. The Ilik Café in Yerevan, a traditional gathering spot for the left, served as one of the revolution’s headquarters during those days. In fact, it was left-wing activists who coined the slogan, “Long live the revolution of love and solidarity!” — a rallying cry soon adopted by Pashinyan and his fellow party members.

Yet, as the movement grew exponentially, it became obvious that a centralized political leader and an established party were required to wrest power from Sargsyan’s tottering regime. The left lacked the desire, coherent organizational structure, and the necessary public profile to lead the protests. So, while the demonstrations were still unfolding, Pashinyan and Civil Contract emerged as the undisputed leaders of the revolution.

Faced with this political vacuum, left-wing activists had three choices: some joined Pashinyan’s coalition, some returned to their old lives, and others set about building their own parties (Citizen’s Decision among them). Consequently, the left failed to coalesce into a unified political force capable of shaping national events. This fragmentation deepened following the devastating defeat in the 2020 war and the subsequent mass exodus of Karabakh Armenians in 2023, which opened fresh rifts within the movement. Today, while one faction of left-wing activists backs Pashinyan's “peace agenda,” others have pivoted toward nationalist positions, actively participating in the rallies of the national conservative opposition. This latest election cycle found Armenian leftists divided, with some absorbed into Pashinyan’s camp, others remaining on the sidelines, and the rest firmly entrenched in the opposition.

One final, symbolic player in these elections warrants mention: the pro-democracy Russian emigrant community, which includes a substantial number of left-wing activists. Since 2022, Armenia has taken in many political exiles; many have stayed and are working to integrate into Armenian society, while others have moved on to Europe while maintaining ties to Armenia. In the days leading up to the vote, Russian political émigrés even took to the streets of Yerevan to demonstrate against Russian interference in the Armenian election cycle. While the impact of Russian-speaking political exiles was largely symbolic, their support for free elections was noticed and appreciated across Armenia.

In place of a conclusion: What is to be done?

Demand still persists for a left-wing agenda in Armenia, at least within a segment of society. The evidence is visible in numerous activist campaigns — from labor strikes to environmental protests — and in the sheer volume of left-wing rhetoric and promises that filled the platforms of otherwise non-left parties during these elections. But, as of now, there is no political force capable of putting these demands forward. Instead, isolated components of the left-wing agenda are being co-opted by the centrist government, the oligarchic opposition, or the far right.

However, there is still time before the next election cycle. A political vacuum has emerged in which a significant portion of the electorate does not feel represented by any of the parties in parliament. That means that the left has the opportunity to regroup and put forward its own agenda. Doing so is vital: it must push back against the rising far-right sentiment that is basically inevitable as long as the right is the only alternative to Pashinyan.

The very logic of Armenia’s development points directly to what a left-wing agenda should look like. The forces of market capitalism unleashed by the 2018 revolution and championed by a business-oriented administration have brought a wave of new systemic challenges. These include pressing environmental issues, labor rights for both domestic and migrant workers, skyrocketing property prices and rents that threaten to spark a housing crisis, gender inequality, the rights of minorities and marginalized groups, and the widening economic chasm between an affluent greater Yerevan and the rest of the country. Mainstream political discourse glosses over these issues — meaning that the time is ripe for the left to champion them. Otherwise, the opposition will remain full of pro-Russian oligarchs and right-wing populists, an outcome that bodes ill for Armenia’s democratic future.

 

Malaysia: Why we need a progressive bloc


MUDA PSM

First published at Think Left.

Looking at all the major issues facing the country today — pig farming in Selangor, matriculation quotas, temples labelled as illegal, halal and non-halal controversies, the Rohingya question, and more — one thing is clear: almost all of these issues are rooted in racial and religious tensions. These tensions dominate social media discourse and create an atmosphere of insecurity and unease. This feeling is felt across the country, but more especially on the western coast of Peninsular Malaysia, where the population is more diverse and plural.

Major parties like DAP and PAS actually gain votes because they cater to their respective voter bases by creating fear of what happens if the other side governs. Using these fears, they both gain votes. That is why elections in Malaysia are about selling the same product to different ethnic groups, using different logic.

Legacy of divide and rule

What Barisan Nasional achieved over the decades was a form of unity built on a divide-and-rule framework. The Malays were taken care of by UMNO, the Indians by MIC, and the Chinese by MCA. This narrative was a direct rejection of the more progressive demands put forward by the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition in the 1947 People’s Constitution, which proposed that all born in Malaya be called “Malays” — without any religious identification. Had that narrative won, we would not be fighting over ethnic-based allocations and quotas today. These were the designs of the British, later continued by the Alliance Party and its successors. Even subsequent coalitions like PN were built to replicate BN by bringing in Gerakan and MIPP.

This race-based political alliance — first under the Alliance, then Barisan Nasional — eventually found its antithesis in the emergence of PAS to counter UMNO, which propagated an Islamic state, and DAP, which championed a “Malaysian Malaysia” concept. Later, PKR came in with a reform agenda, and that narrative of institutional reform, combined with an effective campaign against corruption among the ruling elites, brought about political change. But that change did not last long. It was rolled back under the Sheraton Move, and today we have a government where both opposing parties now work hand in hand in a coalition. When they fight, all the old issues resurface.

Enter Bersama – A new hope?

Now we have Bersama offering new hope, claiming that PKR and PH have failed to deliver real reform. Malaysian voters get angry quickly and are constantly looking for a new saviour to latch onto to quench their thirst.

Take Mahathir, once known as the “Maha Firaun.” When he retired as Prime Minister, it was celebrated as a victory against dictatorship and draconian rule. Who can forget how he used the ISA, shut down major newspapers, and sacked the Lord President just to stay in power? Yet later, the same people who condemned him hailed him as a democrat when he led the opposition under PH. From zero to hero. Then Mahathir was blamed again during the Sheraton Move. Some said he masterminded the collapse of PH. Now the hero is back to zero.

Anwar replaced him and was seen as the new hope. There was so much hype and hope. But now, even his supporters accuse him of being more draconian than Mahathir — weaponising MACC against his opponents and failing to deal with racial tensions.

So, in this climate of constant change, what kind of policies does the nation actually need?

This is precisely why we need a party that speaks about building a Malaysian nation through a multiracial platform — policies that address the needs of all people, rather than feeding into toxic racialised politics. We need to have proper dialogue to get everyone talking and thinking. We need to build the space and atmosphere for that. Not divide and talk.

We need to tackle climate change, not just hand out aid during floods. We need sound policies on migrant workers and refugees — issues that current political parties refuse to address substantively, as they prefer to use them for local votes while simultaneously demanding more migrant labour to serve corporate interests. Every government when in power kowtows to corporate interests, while having another agenda during the campaign period.

We need to address public transportation and forest management, rather than building more roads to cater for more private cars while selling our cars.

We need to prioritise public healthcare over building more private hospitals to cater for those who can pay. We cannot keep our farmers poor while arguing about food security.

We need progressive taxation and wage policies. Only a progressive bloc can address this and will have the desire to tackle these issues for the many.

A progressive bloc is a long-term project — but it must start now

Many political parties keep saying that if we stop corruption and ensure good governance, everything will be fine. This is naive. The system itself is built on corruption structurally. It is built on divide and rule. It is built on feudal conceptions of how a nation should be governed. It is structured to make the bottom 90% to look for scapegoats.

To fight this — and to address all the issues raised above — we need progressive politics. We need to put things on track, not just offer a new package with new labels. We need participatory spaces where every community in the nation is activated — from kampungs, to housing estates, to towns, to cities. We need allocation based on needs. We need a proper balance between government, GLCs, and privatisation. GLCs should cater for the rakyat (people) as they were originally designed to.

Why does PSM stand in elections?

That is why it is our role to bring together progressive voices and civil society movements to build on these policies. Tying up with MUDA in the upcoming state election and the previous year was a project in progress. Two political parties may not agree on everything, but together we can agree on something and that is the concept of the progressive bloc. We need to progress, and we need to fight conservative and regressive policies.

That is why when people ask PSM: Why do you stand in elections? Why do you want to lose your deposits? Why not just be an NGO? — our answer is simple.

We need to stand to put our policies forward. We need to show that we are talking about systemic change, not just changing leaders or parties. We need to build empowerment at the grassroots; the very work that PSM has consistently done. We need to argue for controversial policies on issues like privatisation of healthcare, Rohingya refugees, the LGBTQ+ community, and other issues that mainstream parties will not touch. That is why our voice is needed.

The future belongs to the many

The future does not belong to a few rich individuals running the country for their own benefit. The future must be built by the many, for the many — with the many involved in running the country. The road will be thorny and long. While it took us ten years to be registered as a political party, and yet it may take us longer to fight for our ideals, it will be a fight worth fighting and worth waiting for.

S. Arutchelvan is Deputy Chairperson of Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM)