Opinion...
Pakistan’s nuclear gamble: The new great game in the Middle East
Pakistan’s nuclear gamble: The new great game in the Middle East
J
Pakistan national flag. [Photo by Matt King-ICC/ICC via Getty Images]
by Jasim Al-Azzawi
Middle East Monitor
Pakistan national flag. [Photo by Matt King-ICC/ICC via Getty Images]
by Jasim Al-Azzawi
Middle East Monitor
September 25, 2025
Three capitals —Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran —are suddenly recalculating after a development that, on the surface, appeared to be routine defence cooperation. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s deepening strategic ties have carried whispers of something larger: a pathway, however tentative, toward Riyadh acquiring nuclear capability should it decide that Iran’s march toward enrichment leaves it no other choice.
The chessboard of global power politics has just been tilted on its side, and the pieces are sliding into new and dangerous positions. The shift is seismic. Pakistan has signalled its willingness to extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, an unprecedented declaration that reorders the strategic calculus from the Arabian Peninsula to the Indian Subcontinent.
The announcement, delivered by Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif in the wake of a newly minted Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia, is not just about a bilateral pact; it is the culmination of a half-century-old strategic bargain. Riyadh’s discreet financing of Pakistan’s nuclear program in the 1970s, a response to the twin shocks of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was an investment in a security future that is only now coming to fruition. It was a classic case of what the late Henry Kissinger called “the paradox of nuclear proliferation”: efforts to prevent it often create the very insecurities that accelerate it.
READ: Pakistan expands nuclear umbrella to cover Saudi Arabia
Pakistan’s history makes it the one country that could plausibly offer Riyadh more than vague assurances. Islamabad possesses not only the bomb but also the A.Q. Khan legacy — a reminder of how nuclear expertise was once traded across borders with little transparency. While Pakistan today insists on strict controls, its economic struggles and reliance on Gulf investment give Saudi Arabia leverage it has not had before. This creates the unsettling possibility that what begins as conventional military cooperation could evolve into something with nuclear undertones.
This new arrangement introduces a form of what might be called “entrepreneurial deterrence,” where a middle power like Pakistan leverages its nuclear capability not just for its own defense but as a tool for broader strategic influence. The language of the pact is deliberately NATO-like, asserting that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” But unlike the North Atlantic alliance, this is a partnership without decades of institutional safeguards, without the command and control mechanisms that have prevented miscalculation for seven decades.
The timing of the overture is not accidental. Pakistan’s recent spectacular military engagements with India have served as a tactical audition. In the May 2025 conflict, Pakistan’s air force demonstrated a new level of precision strikes and electronic warfare capabilities enhanced by its expanding relationship with China. These were not just operations; they were a strategic advertisement, an unambiguous message to Riyadh that Pakistan possesses the technical and military prowess to back up its nuclear promises. This sudden development will undoubtedly be closely studied by New Delhi, given its implications for India’s own national security.
To understand what is happening here, one must look not just to Islamabad and Riyadh, but to Beijing. China’s role is that of a quiet choreographer. Through its massive Belt and Road investments, particularly in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Beijing has cultivated Pakistan as a strategic client. By offering a nuclear security guarantee to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is, in effect, serving as a proxy extension of Chinese influence in the Gulf. This allows Beijing to offer Riyadh a security buffer against Iran—and a hedge against a potentially disengaging United States—without direct Chinese entanglement. It is a brilliant piece of grand strategy, straight out of the Zbigniew Brzezinski playbook: control the rimland of Eurasia through proxy relationships.
The implications for the region are a proliferation cascade waiting to happen. For Israel, long the region’s undeclared nuclear power, this is a fundamental challenge to its strategic ambiguity. The prospect of Pakistani nuclear weapons, or even command authority over them, in the hands of a regional rival fundamentally alters the balance of power. For Iran, the message is even more stark. Tehran will almost certainly interpret this pact as an existential threat, a final piece of evidence that the regional balance of power has shifted decisively against it, thus accelerating its own nuclear timeline. As one senior Saudi official told Reuters, “This is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means.” It is precisely that comprehensiveness that will unnerve Iran and could trigger a dangerous arms race.
READ: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the unmaking of an American order
This strategic realignment places the United States in a highly challenging position. For decades, Washington has been the ultimate guarantor of Gulf security. However, as America’s strategic focus shifts to Asia, and China strives to fill the void, a new reality is emerging. The Saudis, with their immense wealth and growing ambition, are no longer content to be a client state; they are actively seeking security. Pakistan’s offer of “entrepreneurial deterrence” is precisely the kind of alternative they are looking for.
This is the new great game in the Middle East, and America’s rules will not apply to it. As former Pakistani diplomat Maleeha Lodhi noted, “For Pakistan, the power projection into the Middle East is huge, even though it has inserted itself into a volatile region.” The question now is whether this new architecture leads to a new and more stable form of multipolar deterrence or, as many fear, descends into nuclear anarchy. The old era of informal alliances and gentlemen’s agreements is over. The Middle East is entering a new, more explicit, and potentially far more dangerous phase of deterrence, and Pakistan is at its very center.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
Three capitals —Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran —are suddenly recalculating after a development that, on the surface, appeared to be routine defence cooperation. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s deepening strategic ties have carried whispers of something larger: a pathway, however tentative, toward Riyadh acquiring nuclear capability should it decide that Iran’s march toward enrichment leaves it no other choice.
The chessboard of global power politics has just been tilted on its side, and the pieces are sliding into new and dangerous positions. The shift is seismic. Pakistan has signalled its willingness to extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, an unprecedented declaration that reorders the strategic calculus from the Arabian Peninsula to the Indian Subcontinent.
The announcement, delivered by Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif in the wake of a newly minted Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia, is not just about a bilateral pact; it is the culmination of a half-century-old strategic bargain. Riyadh’s discreet financing of Pakistan’s nuclear program in the 1970s, a response to the twin shocks of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was an investment in a security future that is only now coming to fruition. It was a classic case of what the late Henry Kissinger called “the paradox of nuclear proliferation”: efforts to prevent it often create the very insecurities that accelerate it.
READ: Pakistan expands nuclear umbrella to cover Saudi Arabia
Pakistan’s history makes it the one country that could plausibly offer Riyadh more than vague assurances. Islamabad possesses not only the bomb but also the A.Q. Khan legacy — a reminder of how nuclear expertise was once traded across borders with little transparency. While Pakistan today insists on strict controls, its economic struggles and reliance on Gulf investment give Saudi Arabia leverage it has not had before. This creates the unsettling possibility that what begins as conventional military cooperation could evolve into something with nuclear undertones.
This new arrangement introduces a form of what might be called “entrepreneurial deterrence,” where a middle power like Pakistan leverages its nuclear capability not just for its own defense but as a tool for broader strategic influence. The language of the pact is deliberately NATO-like, asserting that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” But unlike the North Atlantic alliance, this is a partnership without decades of institutional safeguards, without the command and control mechanisms that have prevented miscalculation for seven decades.
The timing of the overture is not accidental. Pakistan’s recent spectacular military engagements with India have served as a tactical audition. In the May 2025 conflict, Pakistan’s air force demonstrated a new level of precision strikes and electronic warfare capabilities enhanced by its expanding relationship with China. These were not just operations; they were a strategic advertisement, an unambiguous message to Riyadh that Pakistan possesses the technical and military prowess to back up its nuclear promises. This sudden development will undoubtedly be closely studied by New Delhi, given its implications for India’s own national security.
To understand what is happening here, one must look not just to Islamabad and Riyadh, but to Beijing. China’s role is that of a quiet choreographer. Through its massive Belt and Road investments, particularly in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Beijing has cultivated Pakistan as a strategic client. By offering a nuclear security guarantee to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is, in effect, serving as a proxy extension of Chinese influence in the Gulf. This allows Beijing to offer Riyadh a security buffer against Iran—and a hedge against a potentially disengaging United States—without direct Chinese entanglement. It is a brilliant piece of grand strategy, straight out of the Zbigniew Brzezinski playbook: control the rimland of Eurasia through proxy relationships.
The implications for the region are a proliferation cascade waiting to happen. For Israel, long the region’s undeclared nuclear power, this is a fundamental challenge to its strategic ambiguity. The prospect of Pakistani nuclear weapons, or even command authority over them, in the hands of a regional rival fundamentally alters the balance of power. For Iran, the message is even more stark. Tehran will almost certainly interpret this pact as an existential threat, a final piece of evidence that the regional balance of power has shifted decisively against it, thus accelerating its own nuclear timeline. As one senior Saudi official told Reuters, “This is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means.” It is precisely that comprehensiveness that will unnerve Iran and could trigger a dangerous arms race.
READ: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the unmaking of an American order
This strategic realignment places the United States in a highly challenging position. For decades, Washington has been the ultimate guarantor of Gulf security. However, as America’s strategic focus shifts to Asia, and China strives to fill the void, a new reality is emerging. The Saudis, with their immense wealth and growing ambition, are no longer content to be a client state; they are actively seeking security. Pakistan’s offer of “entrepreneurial deterrence” is precisely the kind of alternative they are looking for.
This is the new great game in the Middle East, and America’s rules will not apply to it. As former Pakistani diplomat Maleeha Lodhi noted, “For Pakistan, the power projection into the Middle East is huge, even though it has inserted itself into a volatile region.” The question now is whether this new architecture leads to a new and more stable form of multipolar deterrence or, as many fear, descends into nuclear anarchy. The old era of informal alliances and gentlemen’s agreements is over. The Middle East is entering a new, more explicit, and potentially far more dangerous phase of deterrence, and Pakistan is at its very center.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
Arifa Noor
Published September 23, 2025
DAWN
THERE is a new defence pact in town — or, shall one say, the region.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have signed a defence agreement with pomp and celebration and the announcement has caused much noise and buzz at home and abroad (in some places). Commentary, analyses, songs and discussions, applause — it is all there.
And while the discussion is far from over and one can find much praise and a little bit of criticism from the cheerleaders and doubting Thomases, there is a consensus that very little information is available at the moment. Serious and insightful comment, it seems, will have to wait.
Indeed, more details will need to be filled in and a fuller picture made available before a comprehensive analysis can be undertaken. No wonder then that at the moment, there are more questions than answers and more conjecture than information — questions about what this pact will mean operationally; what the two countries will commit to each other; whether or not this pact has been signed with a specific state in mind or not; and whether it will be expanded to include more countries or followed by more bilateral accords.
But even in the absence of answers, the euphoria in Pakistan is instructive. There is hope, conjecture and even belief that this pact will bring ‘good’ times for the country. And these hopes do not necessarily emanate from officialdom but are also being discussed privately.
Partly, this is understandable because Saudi Arabia has always come to Pakistan’s rescue in the past — with oil on deferred payments as well as loans that help with our forever crisis, ie, low foreign reserves. Even now, the country is one of the biggest contributors to our reserves, with a loan that will be rolled over (and over) whenever the moment arrives.
Domestically, the Pak-Saudi pact is being viewed exactly the same way as some past moments.
So now that there is a formal agreement in place for a bilateral defence pact, in which each promises to come to the aid of the one that is under attack, the conclusions everyone is jumping to are quick. Obviously, Pakistan will provide the muscle power in this relationship, with its well-known military prowess, and obviously, Riyadh will provide some financial concessions or assistance to Islamabad. The good times, they are a comin’.
But these assumptions reveal the elite consensus, shaped over decades, which continues to be in place. A consensus in which the elite want to use external funds to run the economy, wittingly or unwittingly accepting the primary role of the military in not just ensuring these funds but also being the main player domestically. And the politicians are willing to accept the role of the junior partner, in politics and in terms of the share of the money. Funds they too squirrel away while spending a wee bit on the populace.
Even though the past few years seemed to offer little to no chance of geostrategic rents, the ruling elite was and is reluctant to change its mad, bad ways. The previous PML-N government counted on CPEC; the PTI had hopes of investment from overseas Pakistanis; the 2022 floods led to talk of climate-related aid; then came the talk about investment from the Gulf. The common thread running through all this is the notion that some external flows would help end the crisis without the country having to go through the pain of reform and real adjustment.
It is noteworthy that this ‘hope’ was real even though it was accompanied by a public debate on critical economic challenges and problems, in terms of diagnosis and prescriptions — whether it was to increase the tax base or to reduce government spending at the centre or even amend the NFC. The detail with which these discussions took place was unprecedented. But for those in power, even as they took part in these discussions, the political will was missing. Bad habits formed over years are simply part of the explanation.
Another reason for this is also the challenge of legitimacy. Those in power, be it the PTI government in power or the present set-up, are so insecure they would rather offer immediate relief, however unsustainable, than go through the painful reform process.
It is this hope of immediate relief that led to the ‘chatter’ around the domestic implications of this pact. While much of this conversation was positive, there were also comments about the fear of Pakistan selling itself cheap. This stems no doubt from the view that post-9/11, Pervez Musharraf had been overly eager to join the US-led effort and had not bargained well enough. Whether or not one agrees with this view, there is no doubt that the decision allowed the general to successfully create the mirage of economic prosperity and buffer his regime.
Hence, it is no wonder that, however much the world and Pakistan’s place in it are changing, domestically, this pact is being viewed exactly the same way as some past moments — an opportunity to stabilise and sustain this set-up, along with the balance of power it has put in place.
However, it would be worth asking if the inflow that is being expected is going to be comparable to what came our way in the past — a question which requires the expertise of those more familiar with economic matters. But even if the sums are generous, what will this mean for the populace at large? For this elite consensus, for the most part, has also meant a complete disregard, if not wilful negligence, of the development of the people. And this neglect of the people will continue to pose the biggest challenge to the ruling elite, even if they are able to sustain the current set-up as well as successfully evade the criticism about the quality of democracy. It would be worth paying attention to this in the middle of celebrations.
The writer is a journalist.
Published in Dawn, September 23rd, 2025
DAWN
THERE is a new defence pact in town — or, shall one say, the region.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have signed a defence agreement with pomp and celebration and the announcement has caused much noise and buzz at home and abroad (in some places). Commentary, analyses, songs and discussions, applause — it is all there.
And while the discussion is far from over and one can find much praise and a little bit of criticism from the cheerleaders and doubting Thomases, there is a consensus that very little information is available at the moment. Serious and insightful comment, it seems, will have to wait.
Indeed, more details will need to be filled in and a fuller picture made available before a comprehensive analysis can be undertaken. No wonder then that at the moment, there are more questions than answers and more conjecture than information — questions about what this pact will mean operationally; what the two countries will commit to each other; whether or not this pact has been signed with a specific state in mind or not; and whether it will be expanded to include more countries or followed by more bilateral accords.
But even in the absence of answers, the euphoria in Pakistan is instructive. There is hope, conjecture and even belief that this pact will bring ‘good’ times for the country. And these hopes do not necessarily emanate from officialdom but are also being discussed privately.
Partly, this is understandable because Saudi Arabia has always come to Pakistan’s rescue in the past — with oil on deferred payments as well as loans that help with our forever crisis, ie, low foreign reserves. Even now, the country is one of the biggest contributors to our reserves, with a loan that will be rolled over (and over) whenever the moment arrives.
Domestically, the Pak-Saudi pact is being viewed exactly the same way as some past moments.
So now that there is a formal agreement in place for a bilateral defence pact, in which each promises to come to the aid of the one that is under attack, the conclusions everyone is jumping to are quick. Obviously, Pakistan will provide the muscle power in this relationship, with its well-known military prowess, and obviously, Riyadh will provide some financial concessions or assistance to Islamabad. The good times, they are a comin’.
But these assumptions reveal the elite consensus, shaped over decades, which continues to be in place. A consensus in which the elite want to use external funds to run the economy, wittingly or unwittingly accepting the primary role of the military in not just ensuring these funds but also being the main player domestically. And the politicians are willing to accept the role of the junior partner, in politics and in terms of the share of the money. Funds they too squirrel away while spending a wee bit on the populace.
Even though the past few years seemed to offer little to no chance of geostrategic rents, the ruling elite was and is reluctant to change its mad, bad ways. The previous PML-N government counted on CPEC; the PTI had hopes of investment from overseas Pakistanis; the 2022 floods led to talk of climate-related aid; then came the talk about investment from the Gulf. The common thread running through all this is the notion that some external flows would help end the crisis without the country having to go through the pain of reform and real adjustment.
It is noteworthy that this ‘hope’ was real even though it was accompanied by a public debate on critical economic challenges and problems, in terms of diagnosis and prescriptions — whether it was to increase the tax base or to reduce government spending at the centre or even amend the NFC. The detail with which these discussions took place was unprecedented. But for those in power, even as they took part in these discussions, the political will was missing. Bad habits formed over years are simply part of the explanation.
Another reason for this is also the challenge of legitimacy. Those in power, be it the PTI government in power or the present set-up, are so insecure they would rather offer immediate relief, however unsustainable, than go through the painful reform process.
It is this hope of immediate relief that led to the ‘chatter’ around the domestic implications of this pact. While much of this conversation was positive, there were also comments about the fear of Pakistan selling itself cheap. This stems no doubt from the view that post-9/11, Pervez Musharraf had been overly eager to join the US-led effort and had not bargained well enough. Whether or not one agrees with this view, there is no doubt that the decision allowed the general to successfully create the mirage of economic prosperity and buffer his regime.
Hence, it is no wonder that, however much the world and Pakistan’s place in it are changing, domestically, this pact is being viewed exactly the same way as some past moments — an opportunity to stabilise and sustain this set-up, along with the balance of power it has put in place.
However, it would be worth asking if the inflow that is being expected is going to be comparable to what came our way in the past — a question which requires the expertise of those more familiar with economic matters. But even if the sums are generous, what will this mean for the populace at large? For this elite consensus, for the most part, has also meant a complete disregard, if not wilful negligence, of the development of the people. And this neglect of the people will continue to pose the biggest challenge to the ruling elite, even if they are able to sustain the current set-up as well as successfully evade the criticism about the quality of democracy. It would be worth paying attention to this in the middle of celebrations.
The writer is a journalist.
Published in Dawn, September 23rd, 2025
Regional security
THE Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, is making an impact far beyond Islamabad and Riyadh.
While there is talk of extending the bilateral pact to other states, thus creating a larger regional security framework, there has also been unnecessary speculation about the use of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Indeed, the expansion of defence cooperation is a project worth pursuing as currently both the Middle East and South Asia are experiencing geopolitical volatility. But where questions about nuclear arms are concerned, Pakistan should reiterate that its atomic weapons are a deterrent, meant solely for self-defence.
Pakistan has joined military alliances earlier, including the Cold War-era Seato and Cento pacts, which put it squarely in the Western camp. In these US-led alliances, Pakistan was little more than a bit player. However, the defence pact with Riyadh is different, as Pakistan today has a combat-hardened military and much-improved defence capabilities. The country’s profile was strengthened following the military clash with India earlier this year, sending the message that Pakistan could defend itself against a much larger foe. All these factors, as well as the irresponsible Israeli attack on Qatar, likely convinced the Saudis that it was the right time to seal the deal.
Now, there are indications that the military partnership could expand. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif told an interviewer that “the doors are not closed” on other states. As we have argued, the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition could be repurposed for a larger defence role, bringing together Muslim states under one banner. Such an alliance, along the lines of Nato, would strengthen the security of all member states, and deter enemies from violating the sovereignty of Muslim and Arab countries. But the doors of membership should remain open to all Muslim states.
Meanwhile, all relevant circles should exercise caution in their words and actions. There is much speculation in the Western media that the Pakistan-Saudi deal would make this country’s nukes available to Riyadh — perhaps because some Saudi officials have been quoted as saying that the pact ‘encompasses all military means’. When asked about the nuclear issue, Khawaja Asif said that “our capabilities, will absolutely be available under this pact”, though he added that Pakistan remains a responsible nuclear power.
Any concerns on this front must be allayed immediately, and government officials in particular should unambiguously state that, as per Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, the atomic weapons are meant as a deterrent.
Meanwhile, Pakistan and the other Muslim states should pool their conventional defensive resources. Numerous Muslim states in the Middle East have been attacked by Israel, while Pakistan has increasingly faced Indian aggression. A defence pact could thus make adversaries think twice about launching strikes.
Published in Dawn, September 20th, 2025
Published September 20, 2025
DAWN
THE Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, is making an impact far beyond Islamabad and Riyadh.
While there is talk of extending the bilateral pact to other states, thus creating a larger regional security framework, there has also been unnecessary speculation about the use of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Indeed, the expansion of defence cooperation is a project worth pursuing as currently both the Middle East and South Asia are experiencing geopolitical volatility. But where questions about nuclear arms are concerned, Pakistan should reiterate that its atomic weapons are a deterrent, meant solely for self-defence.
Pakistan has joined military alliances earlier, including the Cold War-era Seato and Cento pacts, which put it squarely in the Western camp. In these US-led alliances, Pakistan was little more than a bit player. However, the defence pact with Riyadh is different, as Pakistan today has a combat-hardened military and much-improved defence capabilities. The country’s profile was strengthened following the military clash with India earlier this year, sending the message that Pakistan could defend itself against a much larger foe. All these factors, as well as the irresponsible Israeli attack on Qatar, likely convinced the Saudis that it was the right time to seal the deal.
Now, there are indications that the military partnership could expand. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif told an interviewer that “the doors are not closed” on other states. As we have argued, the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition could be repurposed for a larger defence role, bringing together Muslim states under one banner. Such an alliance, along the lines of Nato, would strengthen the security of all member states, and deter enemies from violating the sovereignty of Muslim and Arab countries. But the doors of membership should remain open to all Muslim states.
Meanwhile, all relevant circles should exercise caution in their words and actions. There is much speculation in the Western media that the Pakistan-Saudi deal would make this country’s nukes available to Riyadh — perhaps because some Saudi officials have been quoted as saying that the pact ‘encompasses all military means’. When asked about the nuclear issue, Khawaja Asif said that “our capabilities, will absolutely be available under this pact”, though he added that Pakistan remains a responsible nuclear power.
Any concerns on this front must be allayed immediately, and government officials in particular should unambiguously state that, as per Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, the atomic weapons are meant as a deterrent.
Meanwhile, Pakistan and the other Muslim states should pool their conventional defensive resources. Numerous Muslim states in the Middle East have been attacked by Israel, while Pakistan has increasingly faced Indian aggression. A defence pact could thus make adversaries think twice about launching strikes.
Published in Dawn, September 20th, 2025
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