Political Instability In Japan Likely As Komeito Breaks Alliance With LDP – Analysis

October 11, 2025 
By Dr. Rajaram Panda


Japanese politics plunged into turbulent waters even before the country is to formally see a female Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in office who was elected as the head of the Liberal Democratic Party.

The LDP’s junior coalition partner, the Komeito, frustrated with the LDP’s opposition to reforms on funding announced on 10 October that it will withdraw from the ruling coalition, severing a quarter-century relationship and throwing the political world into further turmoil. Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito informed LDP President Takaichi, his party’s decision to part after a 90-mnute meeting.

Saito declared that Komeito will not only dissolve the coalition with the LDP, but it will also terminate future election cooperation with the party. Komeito’s complaint was that the LDP failed to provide a satisfactory response concerning political donations from companies and organisations and other issues. Saito informed Takaichi that his party would not vote for her in the upcoming extraordinary Diet session to designate the prime minister. Hereafter, for the Lower House single-seat districts, Komeito will not endorse LDP candidates or seek endorsements from the LDP for its candidates. In the interest of political stability, the decision of Komeito that ended a partnership that began in 1999 and helped stabilise Japanese politics for 26 years was rather unfortunate.

Komeito’s decision is a huge setback for the LDP as Komeito is supported by the Soka Gakkai, Japan’s largest Buddhist organisation known for its coordination skills in election campaigns. The LDP now loses this advantage. In the Lower House, the LDP hold 196 seats, 37 short of a majority, while Komeito has 24 seats. The main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) has 148 seats.

Komeito’s Saito felt that his party overcame numerous challenges by working with the LDP during the 26 long years of association. For Komeito, public trust in politics is paramount and now felt that this critical element was eroded, compelling it take this painful decision to sever ties with the LDP. There seemed to be some misunderstanding between Takaichi and Saito. Takaichi felt that Saito’s unilateral decision was rather hasty as she was keen to discuss Komeito’s political reform proposals for consideration within the LDP and felt that Saito should have waited for that to happen. She on her own could not unilaterally take the decision to enact changes in the Political Fund Control Law in a democratic set up. Saito had proposed tightening regulations on political donations from companies and organisations by limiting entities allowed to receive such funds but Takaichi wanted time to discuss within the LDP first before announcing any major change in policy. Saito did not see that to happen anytime soon.

Komeito seriously felt that because of LDP’s political funding scandal, the coalition parties faced defeats in last Lower House and Upper House elections. It was on 9 October, Komeito’s central executive committee authorised Saito and Secretary-General Makoto Nishida to take the final decision on whether to continue the coalition with the LDP. There was also demand within the Komeito that the party should sever ties unless the LDP made concessions. Takaichi found that her hands were tied as within her party there was resistance not to accept Komeito’s call for stricter rules on corporate and organisational donations.

It may be recalled that Komeito first formed a coalition government with the LDP and the Liberal Party in 1999. Including the period spent in the opposition under the DPJ administration, Komeito maintained its relationship with the LDP for a quarter of a century. The LDP-Komeito alliance was born of necessity. In the late 1990s, LDP’s electoral fortune was heading south. The party decided to partner with Komeito because it felt its Soka Gakkai-rooted voter base would help LDP to restore its declining fortune. The split among the coalition partners now threatens the centrality of the LDP in Japan’s governing order. Now that Komeito prioritises organisational networks over transparency, it now faces credibility and electoral tests ahead.

During the 26 years of staying together, it was a win-win situation for both the LDP and Komeito. By partnering with the largest political party, the LDP, Komeito enjoyed in terms of spreading its influence even with less number of seats, and by being a part of the government it could shape policy outcomes. It was able to protect its core principles such as social welfare and clean governance. When LDP’s electoral fortune was tested in early 2000s and Japan entered into a phase of political instability, Komeito stuck to the alliance. It was only when Shinzo Abe returned to power in 2012 for his second term (he had resigned in 2007 after staying in power for a year due to health reasons), the coalition’s health remained sound till 2022 when he was assassinated. The advantages were therefore reciprocal.

During the 26 years of alliance, Komeito was able to push through moré socially oriented measures. When the government responded with limited measures to mitigate the hardship of people and issued limited relief package during the Covid-19, Komeito forced the government to make universal cash payment of 100,000 Yen, including to foreigners residing in Japan during that time. Komeito also insisted on softening consumption tax and helped shape coalition’s fiscal choices. When the consumption tax rose to 10 per cent, Komeito successfully argued for exemptions and mitigations.

It was because of Komeito’s support that Abe remained in office for long eight years and enact many far-reaching reform measures. Abe was able to advance LDP’s leadership with his Abenomics stimulus and structural reforms agenda. When the security environment in Japan’s neighbourhood deteriorated considerably because of China’s aggressive posture and North Korea’s missile threats, Abe was able to deepen defence ties with the US as well as expand cooperation with India. His address in the Indian parliament in August 2007 heralded a new dawn in the Indo-Pacific when he spoke about the Confluence of the two Seas. Komeito cooperation during this time came handy.

Komeito showed its maturity when in 2015 it overcame successfully internal resistance and voter unease and voted with the LDP to pass security legislation enabling limited collective self-defence. It was a demonstration of Komeito’s commitment to maintain political stability despite that it tempered its principles somewhat. Abe was able to pass legislation in the parliament with Komeito’s support. However, when Abe tried to enact measures towards constitutional revision, the fault lines between the coalition partners made appearances.

The differences sharpened when Komeito questioned factional party-fund irregularities and demanded stricter caps, besides reporting on corporate and organizational donations. Since the LDP has long relied on party and factional fundraising networks, it resisted sweeping restrictions. The party felt that it would undercut political organization and campaign capacity. The disagreement reached the flashpoint in 2025 when Komeito demanded transparent accounting and tighter regulation, which collided with deep resistance inside the LDP. When mediations after Takaichi’s election as the LDP President, and the partners failed to bridge their positions, Saito notified Takaichi that Komeito would withdraw and would not back her in the upcoming vote for prime minister.

Komeito’s decision could impact its fate when elections take place next. Its parliamentary standing is already weak. In the July 2025 Upper House election, Komeito won just eight of its contested seats (down from 27 in the previous contest). This left it with 21 seats after the vote. It was a notable erosion of its cushion and bargaining power.

Would LDP’s future now be at stake after Komeito’s pullout? The LDP shall not have Komeito’s calming influence. The LDP still controls the largest share of seats and retains the country’s most extensive organisational apparatus. To maintain stability in the government, the LDP is likely to explore ad-hoc alliances with smaller parties, maintain internal discipline and negotiate issue-based cooperation where necessary. The biggest challenge before the LDP would be to convince the voters that stability need not collapse with the coalition’s end.

As regards Komeito, it needs to work hard to maintain its independent identity without the institutional levers of government. Being out of the government, it can no longer have any ministerial position and thus carve out its political future on its own. Takaichi could be hurt when Saito openly questioned her suitability as the leader of the coalition. That position was politically incorrect because the LDP had elected her by majority vote. Questioning her credibility was tantamount to questioning the democratic process itself. The LDP shall be under no obligation to adjust by making concession demands and likely to stick to its own party agenda while making legislation.

Earlier, Saito also had voiced concerns over Takaichi’s hard-line stance on immigration and her regular visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the controversial war memorial in Tokyo. Takaichi had expressed willingness to expand the coalition, and Saito felt that a broader alliance could dilute Komeito’s influence within the government. With the break of the coalition alliance, the spectre of another phase of political instability that Japan saw during the pre-Abe and post-Koizumi era looms large in Japan.

Dr. Rajaram Panda

Dr. Rajaram Panda is former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library (PMML). Earlier Dr Panda was Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA and ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, JAPAN. His latest book "India and Japan: Past, Present and Future" was published in 2024 by Knowledge World. E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com