Monday, July 22, 2024


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A study, published in Environmental Science & Technology Letters and selected by Nature as a Research Highlight, quantifies and tracks the evolution of this massive methane emission, thanks to the potential of combining satellite data from several missions such as TROPOMI, GHGSat, PRISMA, EnMAP and EMIT, together with Sentinel-2 and Landsat multispectral radiometer.


The research led by the LARS group (IIAMA-UPV) indicates that this accident, which caused a 10-metre-high fire and the formation of a 15-metre-wide crater, has significantly outperformed previous events such as Aliso Canyon in 2015, Ohio in 2018 and Louisiana in 2019.

The leak started on 9 June 2023 and has released approximately 131.00 tonnes of methane into the atmosphere during the 205-day incident. Thousands of tonnes of water were injected to seal the well. Finally, the gas flow was stopped on 25 December 2023 by injecting drilling mud,” explains Luis Guanter, a researcher at IIAMA

.Importance of the work done

Researchers from the LARS-IIAMA group, such as Javier Roger, Adriana Valverde, Itziar Irakulis and Javier GorroƱo, have participated in the study, together with experts from several international institutions such as SRON Netherlands Institute for Space Research, Kayrros, Environmental Defense Fund and United Nations Environment Programme.

This research has developed new data processing methods to improve the reporting and handling of the large, concentrated methane plumes detected.

“These optimised methods include the implementation of a tailored filter to detect plumes and specific methane quantification models for hyperspectral instruments,” explain the researchers from the LARS group.

As such, they stress that advanced satellite-based technologies are crucial for detecting and quantifying methane emissions, especially in remote locations where these events often go unnoticed.

“Our work demonstrates how advanced space-based tools are essential for discovering and managing these super-emission events, enabling accurate reconstruction and robust emissions quantification,” state the LARS group members.

Finally, the IIAMA researchers highlight the need for continuous and accurate monitoring to mitigate the environmental impacts of industrial activities such as oil and gas extraction.

“Natural gas, in addition to being an important energy source, is also a greenhouse gas responsible for almost a third of global warming, as it contains more than 90% methane. The difference with CO2 is that it has a greater impact in the short term, so it is necessary to act at source and reduce emissions,” they conclude.


Cuban Missile Crisis 2.0?: US Measure To Battle Russia’s Space-Based N-Brinkmanship – Analysis




July 22, 2024

By Girish Linganna

House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Turner from Ohio cautioned that the US could encounter a scenario like the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’—a tense 13-day confrontation in October 1962 between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union over Soviet nuclear missiles placed in Cuba—but in space, if Russia deploys a satellite equipped with nuclear weapons, according to Spacenews.com.

Root of the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis had cast the shadow of a nuclear war over the world. The crisis ended when the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles in exchange for the US promise of not to invade Cuba and secretly removing American intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) placed in Turkey during the Cold War to deter Soviet aggression. Turkey’s proximity to the Soviet Union allowed the US to launch nuclear strikes more effectively, reducing warning times.

Balancing Space Tensions Wisely

Russia today is more anxious and desperate than the former Soviet Union was in 1962. In 2024, the US has more at stake and fewer ways to counter Russia’s actions. In this new ‘Cuban Missile Crisis in space’, the US must balance deterring a reckless Russia with avoiding actions that could lead to disastrous consequences.

Considering the differences between these situations, it is clear that the US has fewer good options and Russia is more dangerous.

Desperate Russian: Key Difference #1

May 1960: The Soviet Union, worried over prospects of the US invading Cuba and toppling Fidel Castro, stationed medium- and intermediate-range N-missiles in that country. In that decade, the Soviet Union was a world superpower and saw the US as an increasing threat to its clout. Stationing missiles in Cuba was a defensive strategy.

In 2024, Russia is a weakening power trying to alter the current balance. If Russia were to put a nuclear weapon in space, it would be an aggressive move aimed at targeting US satellites and challenging the US-led world order.

In 1962, Russia was like a bear protecting its territory and had reasons to safeguard its domain.

By 2024, this Russian bear is injured and desperate. With little left to lose, it is willing to do whatever it takes to survive.

US Reliability : Key Difference #2

October 22, 1962: In a surprising 18-minute TV address, President John F Kennedy stunned Americans by sharing clear proof of a missile threat in Cuba. He was adamant that the Soviets remove their missiles, or else US would be compelled to blockade ships transporting weapons to Cuba.

In the 1960s, the US had more strategic missiles, giving Kennedy the confidence to challenge the Soviet Union in a high-stakes standoff. Today, the US has a strategic edge on Earth but not in space. Financial issues have weakened Russia’s space efforts, resulting in fewer launches, and allowed the US to take a lead in the space race. Given its greater assets to protect and fewer targets to strike, the US needs to carefully manage its actions to prevent a disastrous reaction from Russia.

US Strategic Choices: Key Difference #3

October 23, 1962: US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson briefed the UN Security Council while American ships took up positions around Cuba. President Kennedy created a blockade around Cuba and started talks with the Soviet Premier. They eventually agreed that the US would remove missiles from Turkey and promise not to invade Cuba, while the Soviet Union would take down its missiles in Cuba.

But unlike the Port of Havana—plays a crucial role in Cuba’s economy by facilitating trade, tourism, military and maritime operations—a spaceport cannot be blockaded. Unless there is a risky interception or an attack on the launch site, a nuclear satellite will reach its orbit.

Kennedy had evaluated various options, from taking no action (which could be ineffective or highly dangerous), to launching a full-scale invasion of Cuba (the riskiest choice), to implementing a naval blockade (the least unfavourable option). If Russia did launch nuclear-armed satellites, however, the US of today would have fewer alternatives to work on than it had in 1962.

Futility of Ignoring Soviet Missiles in Cuba

Do Nothing Option: Russia is a weakening country trying hard to reclaim its former glory. But its decline will not be fixed by threatening US space assets. If the US gives in to Russia, It will lead to a cycle of bad behaviour and giving in.

Summit Diplomacy: Due to the conflict in Ukraine and the forthcoming US presidential election in November, direct talks between presidents are probably not an option.

Economic Sanctions: Russia, possibly, considers sanctions to be a minor annoyance and perceives its geopolitical situation as a critical issue. Sanctions are unlikely to have a significant impact at best and, at worst, they could worsen Russia’s decline, possibly resulting in even more reckless actions.

The Most Dangerous Choice: Invasion of Cuba

Destroy the Satellite in Orbit: The US probably does not have the cyber abilities to disable the satellite in space. While a direct attack on the satellite is possible, it is very risky. Similar to how the Soviets might respond to a US invasion, Russia could choose to use the weapon rather than see it destroyed if they feel they have no other option.
The Least Harmful Choice: Naval Blockade

Low-Level Diplomacy: The US Administration is engaging with Moscow to find a solution before the satellite launch. Since Russia is a weakening power, the US has the advantage of time.

Global Diplomacy: China, India and the UK all have important satellites in the same orbit as Russia’s test satellite. By standing together, these countries might deter Russia more effectively than the US acting alone.

This is not the Cuban Missile Crisis of the past. Today’s Russia is a weaker, more anxious country and more likely to take risky actions that could affect global space assets. The US has fewer options now compared to the bold actions taken during the Cold War. Ultimately, it needs to prevent a disastrous escalation while keeping space safe and secure.



Girish Linganna
Girish Linganna is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. You can reach him at: girishlinganna@gmail.com

 THE LAST STALINIST

Nguyen Phu Trong Left Vietnam’s Communist Party Ripe For Strongman Rule – Analysis

President of Vietnam To Lam. Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru


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By David Hutt


On July 19, the Vietnamese Communist Party announced the death of its general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. The previous day, it announced that Trong, 80, ostensibly the most powerful politician in the country, had been relieved of his duties for health reasons. 

He had missed several key meetings in recent months, and even when he did attend, he appeared shaky and unwell. He suffered a stroke a few years ago but seemingly bounced back. 

However, his near-unprecedented third term in office has been cut short.  To Lam, the public security minister and promoted to state President last month, will now assume Trong’s duties.

Having led the party since 2011, Trong attempted to reinvigorate an institution that, by the early 2010s, had become bogged down by individual rivalries, profit-seeking, and self-advancement. 

Corruption was so rampant the public was mutinous. Ideology and morality had fallen by the wayside. Pro-democracy movements threatened its monopoly on power. The private sector was not just fantastically wealthy, but desired more political power.


But in what condition does Trong leave the institution he sought to fix? 

Externally, its monopoly on power is safer. It has increased repression of activists and democrats while appeasing the public through its high-profile takedown of the corrupt. 

The private sector has been constrained, too, so poses no threat to the party’s political authority. The economy has insulated the party from any meaningful repercussions from the West over human rights.

‘Blazing Furnace’

Within the Communist Party, however, Trong leaves behind a mess. 

Lam, as public security minister, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, artfully used Trong’s signature “Blazing Furnace” anti-corruption campaign to advance their own interests, effectively purging anyone who might rival them for Trong’s job in 2026. 

More Politburo members have been sacked than at any time in memory. Two presidents have “resigned” in as many years. The Politburo is now filled mostly with military personnel and securocrats, the only two factions – and sometimes rivals – left with power. 

Lam, if he does formally become acting general secretary, which the Politburo will have to vote on, is in a prime position to maintain the job in 2026. One imagines he has very different ideas about the nature of the Communist Party than Trong.

Early in the anti-corruption campaign, Trong remarked that he did not want to “break the vase to catch the mice.” That metaphor implied that tackling corruption should shield a delicate Communist Party, not smash it to pieces. 

However, in his quest to rid corruption from a corrupt institution, he eroded almost every check the Communist Party of Vietnam had to prevent a supreme leader figure from rising to the top.

Trong violated the three major “norms” that the party introduced in the early 1990s. 

Politburo members were expected to retire at 65, and individuals could only occupy the most senior positions for a maximum of two terms. More importantly, no one person could hold at the same time two of the four most powerful positions: General Secretary, State President, Prime Minister, and Chair of the National Assembly. 

This “four pillar” (tu tru) system  created a form of succession plan. Regular reshuffles and a separation of powers amongst the political elite would prevent the Communist Party from tilting towards dictatorship. 

Shattering the norms

The norms created a structure in which politicians could fight over policies, often brutally, but without the entire apparatus collapsing because of division. There could be a regular rotation between different factions and geographic networks, meaning no one group was ascendant for too long. 

Hanoi called this “democratic centralism.” Of course, it’s not democracy, but it’s a form of pluralism that, in theory, had prevented the party from descending into dictatorships like North Korea, Cuba, or China under Xi Jinping.

Trong broke every one of these rules. 

Between 2018 and 2021, he held the posts of party general secretary and state president simultaneously, the first person to do so since 1986. (Lam seems likely to repeat that.) 

Trong passed away during his third term as party chief, the first leader since Le Duan to have that record. He not only constantly had the party flout retirement-age limits for himself – he should have stepped down in 2021, if not earlier – but such exemptions have been handed out like confetti during his tenure.

At the same time, his anti-graft campaign has centralized power among an increasingly small number of Politburo members. Provincial party politics have been purged and constrained to give more power to the central party apparatus. The party dominates the government. The public security ministry is all-seeing. 

This was always going to happen. How else do you clean up an uncleanable organization in which power flows up and discipline is enforced only by those above you?  The campaign increases the necessity of one section of the party to maintain power indefinitely. 

Who designates what is the true morality and which cadres are truly moral? Well, a certain clique of the party running the anti-corruption campaign

In one speech on the theme, Trong urged the party to “strengthen supervision of the use of the power of leading cadres, especially the heads, push up internal supervision within the collective leadership; make public the process of power use according to law for cadres and people to supervise.” 

The purge is designed to enforce the view that no one has absolute power above the party. Anyone who uses the power must serve the party and be responsible before it. 

Ripe for strongman rule

Yet, not only does the anti-corruption campaign require moral individuals to maintain power at the top of the hierarchy if it is to be successful, it necessitates the permanent renewal of even more moral individuals to lead the party in the future. As such, the anti-corruption campaign is something which can only maintain itself if people with similar views stay in positions of power, which is improbable. 

Indeed, Trong was an ideologue, a committed Marxist, yet he is much more of a moralist than many of his comrades. Like Ho Chi Minh, he sees personal vice, not structures, as the root of all problems. 

Indeed, he’s a species of socialist, like Che Guevara, who believes that to change a system, you need to change human behavior; that you could perfect human nature and create a “new socialist man” by stripping people of their instincts for greed, self-advancement, and nepotism. 

Instead of changing the system, Trong tried to change people.To do so required concentrating power into the hands of a few “moral” apparatchiks. 

Trong found out, as most outsiders knew, that those at the pinnacle of the institution got there thanks in large part to the sort of greed, corruption, and nepotism he sought to cure. Opportunists came out of the woodwork knowing that they could get rid of their rivals by alleging corruption. 

Everyone of any importance within the party or bureaucracy has skeletons in the closet, so the accusations multiplied – as did the resignations and dismissals. It came down to who decided which skeletons to reveal. 

The military and the “securocrats,” security and police cadres, who wrestled control of the Politburo, knew best where to look.

Over the past 13 years, Trong has, to use his metaphor, caught some “mice.” Some big ones, in fact. But corruption remains rampant. And he made the “vase” even more fragile. 

In the past, some commentators suggested that Trong was becoming the “Xi Jinping of Vietnam.” He wasn’t. 

But his erosion of the Communist Party’s norms and the accumulation of power needed to fight his anti-graft crusade opens the door for a supreme leader, a strongman putsch, a less pluralistic and consensus-based Communist Party. 

David Hutt is a research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) and the Southeast Asia Columnist at the Diplomat. He writes the Watching Europe In Southeast Asia newsletter. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of RFA.



RFA

Radio Free Asia’s mission is to provide accurate and timely news and information to Asian countries whose governments prohibit access to a free press. Content used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.

China Needs To Prepare For Prolonged Strategic Competition In The Face Of Rising Trade Protectionism – Analysis

Trade China Shipping Line Cscl Star Container Ship


By 

By Chen Li


Amidst claims by the United States and Europe about China’s overcapacity, the European Union has recently decided to impose temporary tariffs on imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from the country. Additionally, the U.S. and Mexico have jointly announced that to strengthen the North American steel and aluminum supply chain, Mexico will impose 25% and 10% tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from China, respectively.

In recent years, various trade barriers against Chinese goods have been increasing. According to American media reports, other than the U.S. and the EU, some emerging economies such as Brazil, India, Mexico, and Indonesia have begun anti-dumping investigations into low-priced Chinese goods. Since early last year, governments worldwide have announced more than 70 import restriction measures targeting China.

Researchers at ANBOUND believe that these protectionist practices against China are a long-term trade phenomenon, driven by shifts in the global trade landscape. This change is universal and structural, affecting not only the relations between the U.S. or the EU with China, but also extending globally. As it stands, China will need to adapt to the changing world trade rules and prepare for long-term strategic competition.

The global trade landscape has undergone significant changes. The post-World War II momentum of global economic integration is waning, giving way to de-globalization and regional economic integration. Since the financial crisis, as consumer demand in developed countries has weakened and with technological advancements and supply chain de-risking, developed nations have actively pursued reshoring of manufacturing. At the same time, developing countries, especially China, have reduced their dependence on intermediate goods trade as they upgrade their industries, leading to the slowdown in global trade growth and the restructuring of global value chains. Before the financial crisis, the global average ratio of imports to GDP grew at about twice the rate of global GDP growth. However, since 2011, this ratio has dropped below 1. According to the European Central Bank’s analysis, global trade is unlikely to return to the growth trends seen before the financial crisis, and the slowdown in global trade post-2011 is expected to become the “new normal.” Based on the concept of “close produce” previously proposed by ANBOUND, the slowdown in global trade is accompanied by a restructuring of global value chains, breaking the previous model of international division of labor. At the same time, production is shifting closer to terminal markets. This indicates a shift from global economic integration to regional economic integration, inevitably giving rise to trade protectionism in the process.

Trade protectionism is increasingly gaining momentum globally. Even before former U.S. President Donald Trump initiated the trade war with China, the Obama administration had imposed hefty tariffs that were five times the standard rate on Chinese steel imports and created obstacles in the Doha negotiations. This led to abandoning the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s global multilateral trade cooperation framework in favor of regional agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Among protectionist measures, anti-dumping duties and import tariffs are the most widely used, collectively accounting for about 30% of all measures. Additionally, there has been a rise in the use of export subsidies, licensing or restrictions on foreign direct investment, and domestic clauses in public procurement, leading to a surge in trade distortions. According to Global Trade Alert, harmful trade interventions by governments have steadily increased since 2008, with a sharp rise starting in 2018. Overall, the number of global harmful trade interventions surged from 199 in 2018 to 910 in 2023, a 357% increase. From 2009 to 2023, there were a total of 58,205 harmful trade interventions globally, with 1,752 targeting China, the highest number for any country.


Trade protectionism has undermined the rule-based multilateral trading system established under economic globalization, specifically the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO, created after World War II. Firstly, regional trade agreements are increasingly replacing the WTO’s global multilateral trade rules, accelerating the fragmentation of trade and industrial spaces. Secondly, the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) principle under the WTO multilateral trade system faces numerous challenges in the current international trade environment. Although MFN ensures equality, the principle of treating all equally may not be applicable to countries at different levels of development, leading to some fairness issues. The U.S. has previously questioned the MFN principle concerning China’s market access restrictions, trade imbalances, and intellectual property protection. Lastly, under the influence of the politicization of economic and trade issues, the WTO has been pushed to the margins of global economic governance, and its trade rules have fallen into an

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has heightened countries’ awareness of the importance of diversifying supply chain risks. At the same time, amid the global economic downturn, unilateralism and populism have surged, with geopolitical factors increasingly influencing economic and trade issues, even beginning to dominate them. This has led to the reshoring of manufacturing, strengthening of economic and trade ties within alliances, and weakening of economic and trade relationships outside these alliances. As a result, despite years of attempts, the Doha Round negotiations have failed, and the WTO’s appellate body has been paralyzed since December 2019.

Since the Age of Exploration, international trade rules have been evolving. Before the great maritime discoveries, global commercial trade was regional. Afterward, the world was connected through maritime trade, establishing a truly global trading system. This disrupted the tribute system and continental mindset of that era in China, and the international order shaped by maritime trade was dominated by the West for over three centuries. After World War II, the GATT and the WTO established a multilateral trading system based on mutual benefits. China’s entry into this trade system allowed it to deeply participate in the global value chain, benefiting from economic globalization and achieving an economic miracle. Today, the global trade landscape is undergoing another structural shift, which naturally introduces new orders and disciplines within the new trade system, and this is something that China should be prepared for.

Final analysis conclusion:

The surge in trade protectionism targeting China is a result of the structural shift in the global trade landscape. Amid the slowdown in global trade growth, the trade pattern is moving from global integration toward regional integration. In response, China needs to recognize the changes in the current trade environment and prepare for the challenge of long-term trade protectionism.

  • About the author: Chen Li is an Economic Research Fellow at ANBOUND, an independent think tank.



Anbound

Anbound Consulting (Anbound) is an independent Think Tank with the headquarter based in Beijing. Established in 1993, Anbound specializes in public policy research, and enjoys a professional reputation in the areas of strategic forecasting, policy solutions and risk analysis. Anbound's research findings are widely recognized and create a deep interest within public media, academics and experts who are also providing consulting service to the State Council of China.