The current state of unpredictability and hostility in international affairs is forcing actors to modify their approaches to their neighbours. As the new international order, based on multi-polarity and regional cooperation continues to take shape, the Eurasian continent remains firmly at the heart of this transformation.
One of the key actors affected by this process is the European Union and its member states. In recent months, politicians in Brussels have looked ‘East’, re-engaging with Central Asia and the South Caucasus through separate cooperation initiatives but also through connectivity projects which facilitate interregional integration. However, over the last several years, a combination of both internal issues and an increasingly challenging geopolitical situation have weakened the EU’s grip in its neighbourhood.
The EU is confronted with new realities at both the regional level but also on a systemic, international level, a challenge which will test the ability of member states to act as ‘one’ in external engagements. This calls for a strategic re-evaluation and an acknowledgment that previous concepts and approaches are no longer sufficient, especially if the EU’s goal is to develop the strategic actorness necessary to maintain its influence beyond traditional European borders.
The new status-quo
Despite the heavy emphasis on military investment and the building of war-time readiness, the EU maintains normative and soft power tool mechanisms which, if applied fairly and reciprocally, can stimulate regional economic growth and promote mutually beneficial cooperation. This includes the Caspian region, with various projects linking the EU to the East via the region.
At the same time, significant commitments to boosting war-time readiness and improving member state coordination are underway and now inevitable, with various European states re-committing themselves to meeting what they believe is a “generational challenge” in the face of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. This is precisely what is echoed throughout the UK government’s recently published Strategic Defence Review, which argues that current levels of military readiness in Europe are insufficient for the current status-quo.
However, decision-makers in Brussels should not abandon alternative sources of influence in international affairs. This is particularly relevant in the context of the rapidly growing and widening geopolitical competition in regions like Central Asia, where China, the United States and Russia are actively working to maintain their influence through a range of initiatives. In Russia’s case, the over-extension of its resources in Ukraine has led to a weakening of its influence in regions like the South Caucasus. A new strategic reality following Azerbaijan’s restoration of its territorial integrity and the country’s growing role in transregional projects have weakened Russia’s previously assertive position in the region. Therefore, to take advantage of and keep up with newly emerging regional frameworks, the EU must ensure its neighbourhood policy is adequately equipped.
This requires the EU to ensure that the foreign policy identity and vision it stands for remains appealing enough for its neighbours, something which has proven to be a major challenge in recent years. This cannot be achieved by prioritising leadership in one specific element or sphere. Any effective ‘soft power’ must be recognized as a power with credibility. Hence, before directing attention to a specific region or project, the EU needs to address issues at the core of its ‘personality’ as an actor. However, the war in Ukraine has undoubtedly complicated this, with several of the EU’s bilateral neighbourhood projects stalling as a result. Member state division on Ukraine itself but also on how to proceed with the accession programme has presented the EU as a fragmented unit, a symptom which goes directly against the rapidly evolving cooperation spirit in the Eurasian (and Caspian) region.
Essentially, if the EU is to cooperate with Central Asian and South Caucasus countries, take a leading role in transregional projects such as the Middle Corridor and maintain its economic prestige, it must find a way to restore its appeal as a decisive, uniting and consistent actor. This challenge has, fortunately, been accepted in Brussels. The re-formatting of its approach to its neighbours has begun and serves as a crucial first step to boosting its soft power reputation.
The Eastern Neighbourhood
The tension at the heart of the EU’s weakening appeal and also influence is its largely inconsistent approach to relations with its neighbours. For better or worse, the EU systematically institutionalized its relationship with its immediate geographic neighbours. This includes the wide-reaching European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) concept, consisting of 16 countries, but also the narrowed down Eastern Partnership (EaP) which serves as the “Eastern dimension” of the ENP.
The goal of both programmes was to bring the EU closer to its “partners” which are non-members but are either striving to accede to the EU or are tied to Brussels through extensive economic and geopolitical cooperation. Based originally on the principle of conditionality and incentives in exchange for alignment with the EU’s vision and key values, the programmes were launched in pursuit of mutual interests which would, a priori, lead to economic development and security. The primary tool was political dialogue and the adoption of Agreements in the “Association Agreement” or “Partnership & Cooperation Agreement” format, which would serve as roadmaps for the relationship between the sides.
This format of institutionalized cooperation and financial assistance was designed to achieve more than just bringing close partners even ‘closer’. The EU was keen to expand the scope of its influence beyond its traditional borders. This, in a way, is a form of ‘soft power’, which ties closely with the normative power literature that in the early 2000s shaped the global understanding of the EU’s foreign policy identity. However, even if an actor’s soft power arsenal is extensive and supported by economic power, this does not always translate into the final objective of “getting others to want the outcomes you want”.
This, in the words of the late Joseph Nye, was the ultimate aim of any actor seeking to influence international affairs through non-military means, as was the case with the EU for many years. Essentially, effective soft power without credibility, which is measured by the extent of acceptance of the given actor’s normative stance and broader vision, is deemed to fail. There are numerous examples of countries that began widespread cooperation with the EU and even entered the complex accession ladder. However, more often than not, this momentum has cooled, diverting the essence of the relationship away from prioritising rapid approximation to pragmatic cooperation.
Even though some of these instances have originated from decisions made at the domestic level, the scope of the EU’s broader ‘pull’ factor has undoubtedly deteriorated. First, the EU has been unable to consolidate itself as a leader vis-Ã -vis Ukraine. Despite positioning itself at the heart of the effort to uphold Ukrainian territorial integrity through financial and military assistance, member states regularly show division on the scale and type of military support that should be provided. Moreover, it is a widely accepted fact that without American support, EU resources are insufficient if the objective is to force Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territories.
In the South Caucasus, the EU has, more often than not, acted in an inconsistent and highly divisive manner. Despite officially calling for and supporting peace and championing international law, the EU failed to adequately influence the reality on the ground and address the three-decade long Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory. In addition to the organization of military assistance for the country via the European Peace Facility, the deployment of a border mission has on several occasions destabilized the peace track and contributed to an increase in suspicion between the two actors.
The ‘Black Sea’ factor
Nevertheless, in recent months, one can detect a swift and assured attempt to address the rapidly changing geostrategic realities in the EU’s neighbourhood. With the war in Ukraine showing no signs of slowing down, the European Commission has made formal steps to upgrade and strengthen its influence in the Black Sea region. Surrounded by six countries and, most notably, from the perspective of geopolitical competition, Russia and Turkey, this region possesses vital importance for European security. It serves as a bridge between Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, precisely the two regions which have in recent months received special attention from the EU.
In late May, the European Commission’s Directorate for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood announced a new Black Sea Strategy. The aim of this newly prepared concept is to continue the challenge of bringing the EU closer with the region’s countries whilst taking into account new realities, underpinned by the war in Ukraine. The strategy makes a special emphasis on stability, security, and growth, with the first two being the most repeated terms in the concept. With armed conflict breaking out at an increasingly rapid pace and the dangers this poses, the EU has expressed a clear desire to increase the resilience of regional trade routes, protecting mutually beneficial interconnectedness from the potential of new and unpredictable conflicts. This reflects a growing sense of threat which specific EU members are feeling, with countries like Finland and Lithuania actively preparing their populations for the possibility of a Russian attack on their territory.
The EU’s plan to upgrade the role of the Black Sea in its strategic outlook is, therefore, a deliberate step. This, however, is not an isolated policy. As part of a broader campaign to increase the Union’s preparedness and crisis response coordination, the EU also announced a ‘preparedness union strategy’ in March 2025 which is expected to enhance civil-military cooperation and establish a European centre of expertise on research security.
Moreover, the EU also announced a new European Internal Security Strategy in April 2025, designed to institutionalize regular threat analyses, improve the ability of the Union to anticipate military threats and act as a platform for the coordination of a new EU “security culture” which would improve implementation procedures and strengthen collaboration. Described as a ‘common endeavour’ as opposed to the task of just one body or institution, politicians in Brussels are signalling that protection and security should be the mutual concern of member states but also the Union’s neighbours. The EU has accepted considerable responsibility in ensuring that in addition to its members, its neighbours are also sufficiently prepared and aligned with its vision.
The damage delivered to the credibility of the EU’s actorness in its neighbourhood required more than just ambitious pledges and commitments. It required a systematic and strategic change of tone, targeted at incorporating the interests of neighbouring countries into EU strategy in a way which aligned with their national interests. In addition to institutional factors, this change was made possible through political will and high-profile changes in the Union’s foreign policy leadership.
The arrival of Kaja Kallas to replace Josep Borrel at the position of the Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was followed by an assured approximation with both Central Asia, as evidenced by the hosting of the first EU-Central Asia summit and the mobilization of new resources through the EU’s Global Gateway, but also with the South Caucasus. In the case of the latter, the new High Representative has specifically focused on restoring trust and harmony in EU-Azerbaijan relations, a mutually beneficial partnership from a strategic and economic perspective but one which was for too long hijacked by individuals seeking to undermine Azerbaijan on the international stage.
Going forward: strategic actorness
An indispensable first step to restoring the EU’s credibility is the consolidation of mutual trust with its neighbours. By modifying its approach and correcting previous misconceptions, the EU can contribute to economic growth, prosperity and security in its neighbourhood, of which the Black Sea region is a key element. If the EU was to succeed in institutionalizing this change, one would notice a definitive shift away from previous practices to new ones – from excessive and selective intervention into regional affairs to building mutually beneficial cooperation which is reciprocal and considerate of the interests of the other side.
Uniting neighbours over common goals, as those outlined in the Black Sea Strategy, demonstrates acceptance on the EU’s behalf that reality ‘on the ground’ has changed. The era of imposition of views and ideals, which were implemented inconsistently by the EU itself, is in the past. The new and increasingly consolidated ‘mode’ of conduct is bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation in various formats which enables all sides in the relationship to have equal degree of agency. The growing influence of neighbouring regions like the South Caucasus has forced the EU into adapting its mindset, requiring the introduction of new visions which are directly “in synergy” and incorporate new trends and regional realities. If the EU manages to maintain this positive momentum and succeed in restoring trust, it can finally aspire for the strategic actorness and global leadership which has for so long evaded it.
