Monday, October 20, 2025

Trump urged Zelenskiy to cut a deal with Putin or risk facing destruction, FT reports

PUTIN'S SOCK PUPPET

Reuters
Sun, October 19, 2025

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy meets with U.S. President Donald Trump (not pictured) over lunch in the Cabinet Room at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., October 17, 2025. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

(Reuters) -U.S. President Donald Trump urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to accept Russia's terms for ending the war between Russia and Ukraine in a White House meeting on Friday, warning that President Vladimir Putin threatened to "destroy" Ukraine if it didn't comply, the Financial Times reported on Sunday.

During the meeting, Trump insisted Zelenskiy surrender the entire eastern Donbas region to Russia, repeatedly echoing talking points the Russian president had made in their call a day earlier, the newspaper said, citing people familiar with the matter.

Ukraine ultimately managed to swing Trump back to endorsing a freeze of the current front lines, the FT said. Trump said after the meeting that the two sides should stop the war at the battle line; Zelenskiy said that was an important point.

The White House did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment on the FT report.

Zelenskiy arrived at the White House on Friday looking for weapons to keep fighting his country's war, but met an American president who appeared more intent on brokering a peace deal.

In Thursday's call with Trump, Putin had offered some small areas of the two southern frontline regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in exchange for the much larger parts of the Donbas now under Ukrainian control, the FT report added.

That is less than his original 2024 demand for Kyiv to cede the entirety of Donbas plus Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in the south, an area of nearly 20,000 square km.

Zelenskiy's spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent outside business hours on whether Trump had pressured Zelenskiy to accept peace on Russia's terms.

Trump and Putin agreed on Thursday to hold a second summit on the war in Ukraine within the next two weeks, provisionally in Budapest, following an August 15 meeting in Alaska that failed to produce a breakthrough.

(Reporting by Anusha Shah in Bengaluru; editing by Philippa Fletcher)

Trump’s Private Blow-Up With Zelensky Revealed

Laura Esposito
DAILY BEAST
Sun, October 19, 2025


Win McNamee / Getty Images


Another meeting between President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky has reportedly ended with a fiery shouting match—this time behind closed doors.

Trump was pressuring his Ukrainian counterpart to accept Russia’s terms for a ceasefire during an explosive White House meeting on Friday, according to the Financial Times, reportedly telling Zelensky that Russia would “destroy” Ukraine if he didn’t agree.

Multiple sources told the outlet that the meeting—where Zelensky was hoping, but ultimately failed, to secure long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles—quickly descended into a “shouting match” with “cursing all the time.”

Donald Trump hosted President Zelensky at the White House this summer to discuss a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. / Alex Wong / Getty Images

According to sources, the scene resembled that of Zelensky’s infamous Oval Office visit in February, where he was was berated by Vice President JD Vance for not voicing enough thanks for U.S. help in the war against Russia, before a shouting match ensued.


Zelensky was also accused of being “disrespectful” to the U.S. for not wearing a suit and tie and was reportedly all but forced out of the White House.

This time, Trump demanded that Zelensky surrender the entire Donbas region to Russian President Vladimir Putin, sources said.

European officials told the Financial Times that Trump repeated many of Putin’s talking points “verbatim” during the meeting, telling Zelensky he was losing the war and that “If [Putin] wants it, he will destroy you.”

The outlet reported that “Zelenskyy was very negative” after the meeting, according to one official, and that European leaders were “not optimistic but pragmatic with planning next steps.”

The tense encounter came after Trump reportedly spoke with Putin by phone and seemingly welcomed the Russian dictator back in his good graces.

On Truth Social, the dictator-curious Trump wrote Putin congratulated him on the “Great Accomplishment of Peace in the Middle East,” and suggested that his “Success in the Middle East will help in our negotiation in attaining an end to the War with Russia/Ukraine.”

He added that “High Level Advisors” from the United States and Russia would meet next week at an as-yet-undisclosed location, and that he would then meet personally with Putin in Budapest, Hungary, “to see if we can bring this ‘inglorious’ War, between Russia and Ukraine, to an end.”

Trump rolled out the red carper for Russian President Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, in August. / Contributor / Getty Images

Ironically, the talks are set to take place in the same city where Russia once signed an agreement promising it would never invade Ukraine.

When asked who chose to hold the meeting in Budapest, a location with great historical significance to both Russia and Ukraine, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt simply told HuffPost, “Your mom did.”

The Daily Beast has reached out to the White House for comment.


Trump says he expects Putin to keep some Ukrainian land in latest U-turn: ‘I mean, he’s won certain property’

John Bowden
Sun, October 19, 2025 
THE INDEPRNDENT

Donald Trump told a Fox anchor that he expected Ukraine to make territorial concessions in any peace agreement his administration could potentially orchestrate between Kyiv and Moscow to bring the nearly four-year war between Russia and Ukraine to an end.

In an interview that aired on Sunday Morning Futures with Maria Bartiromo, the U.S. president indicated that under the terms of a deal authored by the White House, Russia would likely be allowed to retain territory it has occupied since February of 2022.

Trump spoke with Russia’s Vladimir Putin by phone for two hours on Thursday, then met the following day with Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House where all public signs of the tension between the two men which had erupted at a meeting this spring had vanished. Privately, however, the Financial Times reported on Sunday that the conversation between Trump and Zelensky repeatedly devolved into a “shouting match” with the U.S. president warning his counterpart that Russia would “destroy” his country if he didn’t accept territorial concessions.

On Sunday, Bartiromo asked Trump whether he’d gotten a sense from Putin during that conversation that he was “open to ending this war without taking significant property from Ukraine?”

Cutting in, Trump responded, “I did, I did.” But his answer shifted as the Fox host finished her question and asked whether Putin would return Ukrainian territory.


Donald Trump told Fox News that Ukraine would likely need to recognize Russian territorial gains in a ceasefire (Sunday Morning Futures)

“Well, he's gonna take something. I mean, they fought and, he, uh, he has a lot of property. I mean, you know ... he's won certain property,” Trump said, before sarcastically quipping: “You know, we’re the only country that goes in, wins a war and then leaves.”

This is a sharp departure from the aggressive rhetoric the U.S. president was pushing in late September, when he was urging Ukraine to continue fighting until it had regained all of its lost territory. Ukraine hasn’t signalled a willingness to recognize Russian claims to the Crimean and Donbas regions, including the cities of Donetsk and Mariupol.

As peace talks with Russia stalled over the summer, Trump hardened his stance against Moscow and seemed to be coming around to an assumption that many in Washington’s foreign policy establishment have held since 2022 — that Vladimir Putin isn’t interested in peace without significant further Ukrainian concessions beyond what has played out on the battlefield. In the past week, however, Trump has renewed his efforts aimed at securing a peace agreement as he has become emboldened by the shaky truce struck by the White House between Israel on Gaza. On Sunday, that ceasefire seemed to be wavering as both sides traded accusations of violations.

In September, Trump wrote that Ukraine could “take back their country in its original form and, who knows, maybe even go further than that!” in a Truth Social posting. In other statements, he signaled interest in mounting further pressure on Moscow, including through a congressional sanctions package or the sale of further arms such as Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine.

The Tomahawk, much sought after by Mr Zelensky, has a range of about 1,600km (995 miles) but experts warned that it could take years to provide the equipment and training necessary for Ukraine to use them effectively. The Ukrainian leader made the request to Trump during his visit to the White House on Friday; Zelensky sees further U.S. military aid including the delivery of new weapons systems as the most effective course of action for putting pressure on Russia to return to the negotiating table.

“Yeah, I might tell him [Putin], if the war is not settled, we may very well do it. We may not, but we may do it,” the president said earlier in October. “Do they want to have Tomahawks going in their direction? I don’t think so.”

He backed off that latter idea after threats from Russia and his conversation with Putin on Thursday, and with his latest statement will likely leave many in Washington wondering whether his position truly evolved at all. Putin called the issue a red line for U.S.-Russia relations, while his close ally Aleksandr Lukashenko, president of Belarus, warned it would risk “nuclear war” in Europe.

After his conversation with the Russian leader Trump also agreed to meet with Putin in Budapest on an undisclosed upcoming date.

After Zelenskyy meeting, Trump says Ukraine, Russia should declare victory


Kathryn Watson
Sat, October 18, 2025 
CBS NEWS


Washington — After his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House Friday, President Trump said both Russia and Ukraine should declare victory and "let history decide!"

Zelenskyy told reporters after the meeting that he and Mr. Trump decided not to publicly discuss whether the U.S. will provide long-range weapons, including Tomahawks, citing the "escalation" that could bring in Russia's war on Ukraine. Zelenskyy's comment came mere hours after Mr. Trump expressed openness to trading U.S. Tomahawks for Ukrainian drones.

"We decided that we don't speak about it because nobody wants — the United States doesn't want escalation," Zelenskyy said.

Mr. Trump said in a Truth Social post Friday that his meeting with the Ukrainian leader was "very interesting, and cordial."

He continued, "I told him, as I likewise strongly suggested to President Putin, that it is time to stop the killing, and make a DEAL! Enough blood has been shed, with property lines being defined by War and Guts. They should stop where they are. Let both claim Victory, let History decide!"

Mr. Trump's meeting with Zelenskyy took place a day after the president spoke by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin and then announced that he and Putin would meet soon in Budapest.

The president expressed some reservations about reducing the number of Tomahawks that the U.S. possesses, though long-range weapons were expected to be a major point of discussion for Mr. Trump and Zelenskyy.

"Tomahawks are a big deal," Mr. Trump told reporters during the meeting with his Cabinet and Zelenskyy. "But one thing I have to say, we want Tomahawks, also. We don't want to be giving away things that we need to protect our country."

"Hopefully, we'll be able to get the war over without thinking about Tomahawks. I think we're fairly close to that," Mr. Trump said.
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After Zelenskyy suggested Ukraine might give the U.S. Ukrainian drones in exchange for the Tomahawk missiles, a reporter asked Mr. Trump if it was a trade that interested him.

"We are, yeah," the president responded. "They make a very good drone," he replied.

Zelenskyy and Mr. Trump shook hands when the Ukrainian president arrived at the White House, and a reporter asked the president if he believes he can persuade Putin to end the war. "Yup," Mr. Trump responded.

In their meeting, Mr. Trump was seated across from Zelenskyy, who wore a military-style jacket for the occasion. Mr. Trump complimented him, saying, "I think he looks beautiful in his jacket."

"It's an honor to be with a very strong leader, a man who has been through a lot," Mr. Trump said in the meeting, adding he thinks they're making "great progress" in ending the war.
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Zelenskyy congratulated Mr. Trump on the "successful ceasefire" in the Middle East, but he added that he thinks Putin is "not ready" to end the war with Ukraine.

Mr. Trump brought up the possibility that Zelenskyy could join his upcoming meeting with Putin in Budapest, but then added that the meetings "may be separated." A date has not yet been set for Mr. Trump's meeting with the Russian leader.

A reporter asked the president if he's concerned Putin may just be trying to buy more time with the Budapest meeting. "Yeah, I am," Mr. Trump said. "But you know, I've been played all my life by the best of them. And I came out really well. So, it's possible, yeah."

Mr. Trump had previously said the Tomahawks would be a "new step of aggression" in the Russia-Ukraine war. They'd enable Ukraine to strike deep within Russia.

"I might say 'Look: if this war is not going to get settled, I'm going to send the Tomahawks,'" Mr. Trump told reporters earlier this week. "We may not, but we may do it."

The last time the U.S. and Ukrainian presidents met in person was in late September, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York. Mr. Trump and Zelenskyy spoke twice over the weekend, on Saturday and Sunday, ahead of Mr. Trump's whirlwind Middle East trip to mark the Israel-Hamas peace deal.

Russia has given no indication it wants to end the war. And Ukrainian authorities said there had been another large-scale Russian strike hours before Mr. Trump spoke with Putin on the phone.

"The massive overnight strike — launched hours before the conversation between Putin and President Trump — exposes Moscow's real attitude toward peace," Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S. Olga Stefanishyna said in a statement Thursday. "While discussions about ending the war continue, Russia once again chose missiles over dialogue, turning this attack into a direct blow to ongoing peace efforts led by President Trump."

Mr. Trump in recent months has expressed frustration with Putin over the failure to end the war, though on a separate front, first lady Melania Trump said last week that she has worked with the Russian leader's team to return Ukrainian children to their families. Mr. Trump said the first lady took up that initiative on her own.

U.S. and Russian advisers will be meeting next week in a location that hasn't been disclosed yet ahead of the anticipated Trump-Putin meeting. The president indicated that initial meetings leading up to the meeting with the Russian leader would be led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio.



Trump pushes for fighting in Ukraine to stop - split Donbas for now

DPA
Mon, October 20, 2025 


US President Donald Trump (L) welcomes Ukrainian President Vladamir Zelensky ahead of their meeting at the White House. Andrew Leyden/ZUMA Press Wire/dpa


US President Donald Trump on Sunday said he thinks Ukraine and Russia should freeze the front line and end the conflict, which would include dividing the eastern Donbas region as a result.

"We think that what they should do is just stop at the lines where they are - the battle lines...go home, stop killing people, and be done," he told reporters aboard the presidential aircraft Air Force One.

When asked whether Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he should cede the Donbas to Russia, Trump said, "No. We never discussed it."

Zelensky met with Trump in Washington on Friday.

The Financial Times, citing unnamed sources, reported that Trump had allegedly urged Zelensky during their meeting on Friday to give up the entire Donbas to end the war.

Such a move would allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to achieve one of his key objectives in the war that Putin started in February 2022.

Stop now, negotiate later

Trump said he thought some 78% of the land had already been "taken by Russia," adding that he wants a halt on the battlefield and the two sides should deal with the details later.

"The rest is very tough to negotiate." Asked what he thought should be done with the Donbas region, Trump said "Let it be cut the way it is. It's cut up right now."

"They can negotiate something later on down the line."

Trump made his comments on his return flight from Florida to Washington.

Before 2014, the industrial region of Donbas had a population of approximately 6.5 million and was the core of Ukraine's heavy industry, rich in coal and iron. However, many mines and factories were already outdated at that time.


Trump pushed Zelenskyy in vulgar 'shouting match' to cede land or be 'destroyed': report


Alexander Willis
October 19, 2025 
RAW STORY



U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy during the 80th United Nations General Assembly, in New York City, New York, U.S., September 23, 2025. (REUTERS/Al Drago)

In a private meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Friday, President Donald Trump urged him to concede a significant amount of territory to Russia or face destruction, a meeting that devolved into a “shouting match” with Trump “cursing all the time,” according to insiders who spoke with the Financial Times in its report Sunday.

“If [Putin] wants it, he will destroy you,” Trump reportedly told Zelenskyy in the closed-door meeting, according to who the Financial Times described as a “European official with knowledge of the meeting,” speaking with the outlet on the condition of anonymity.

According to the insiders who spoke with the Financial Times, Trump “threw Ukraine’s maps of the battlefield” during the tense meeting, urging Zelenskyy to surrender parts of the eastern Donbas region which still remain under Ukrainian control. The concession Trump proposed would be in exchange for Russia ceding small regions near the southern and southeastern Ukrainian cities of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, respectively – the former now under Ukrainian control and the latter under Russian control.

But for some Ukrainian officials, surrendering the Donbas region was a nonstarter.

“To give [the Donbas] to Russia without a fight is unacceptable for Ukrainian society, and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin knows that,” said Oleksandr Merezhko, who chairs the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, speaking with the Financial Times.


An unnamed official told the outlet that Zelenskyy was “very negative” following the meeting, while noting that European leaders were “not optimistic but pragmatic with planning next step


CHUTZPAH

Zelenskyy Says He’s ‘Ready’ To Meet Trump, Putin In Budapest For Peace Talks



President Donald Trump participates in a bilateral meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City, Tuesday, September 23, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

October 20, 2025 
By RFE RL

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that he’s “ready” to sit down for peace talks in Budapest as he expressed doubts about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s willingness to end the more than three-year-long war in Ukraine.

“I’m not sure that Putin is ready just [yet] to finish this war,” Zelenskyy said during a pre-taped interview with NBC that aired on October 19. “I think that maybe he wants to come back with aggression.”

The Ukrainian president said that he believes Putin prefers to postpone “real peace negotiations” and is reluctant to meet with him because that would require agreeing to specific positions and potential concessions to end the war.

Zelenskyy then called for added pressure on the Russian leader, saying that Putin is “afraid of sanctions” and secondary sanctions that would squeeze the Russian economy.

The comments come after US President Donald Trump welcomed Zelenskyy to Washington on October 17 to discuss future peace negotiations.

Zelenskyy arrived for his third meeting at the White House this year prepared to discuss a potential arms deal in which Ukraine would supply the US military with drone technologies in return for long-range Tomahawk missiles, but Trump appeared to have cooled to the idea of providing Ukraine with the weapons.

Instead, the US president urged Russia and Ukraine to immediately cease fighting, saying enough blood had been shed, and announced he plans to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest in the coming weeks. No date has been set for the summit.

During his interview with NBC, Zelenskyy reiterated his openness to engage in bilateral or trilateral peace talks with the United States and Russia at the table.

He also said that fighting on the battlefield should stop along the current contact line between Russian and Ukrainian forces and a cease-fire should be in place to begin peace talks.

“If we want to stop this war and go to peace negotiations,” Zelenskyy said, “we need to stay where we stay and not give something additional to Putin because he wants it.”
What Comes Next As Negotiators Eye A Summit In Budapest?

The Washington Post reported on October 18 that Putin demanded that Kyiv surrender full control of the Donetsk region, a strategically vital area of eastern Ukraine that is partially occupied by Moscow, as a condition for ending the war during an October 16 phone call with Trump.

Trump has not publicly commented on Putin’s demand and appeared not to endorse it in his public statement after meeting with Zelenskyy at the White House.

“They should stop where they are. Let both claim Victory, let History decide!” Trump wrote on social media on October 17.

The Financial Times, citing people familiar with the matter, on October 19 reported that Trump told Zelenskyy during their White House meeting to accept Russia’s terms for ending the war, including ceding of the Donetsk region.

According to the report, Trump warned Zelenskyy that Putin had threatened to “destroy” Ukraine if it didn’t agree. The White House has not commented on the FT report.

Territorial concessions are expected to be part of any eventual peace deal for Ukraine, but it’s uncertain what Putin might agree to — or what Kyiv could legally offer. Ukraine’s constitution mandates a nationwide referendum to approve any change to the country’s territory, a vote that cannot be held under the martial law imposed since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.

A key reason for Zelenskyy’s trip to Washington was the possibility of Ukraine receiving Tomahawk missiles, which are capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 2,500 kilometers.

Trump appeared to have considered sending Tomahawks to Kyiv for weeks as he grew increasingly frustrated over Putin’s refusal to negotiate an end to the war but then appeared to rule out the possibility — at least for now — after his call with the Russian president.

Zelenskyy claimed that issue of Tomahawk missiles is “very sensitive for the Russians” and that Putin is “afraid that the United States will deliver [them] to Ukraine” because it would allow Kyiv to strike strategic military sites and infrastructure that could derail Russia’s war effort.

“It’s good that President Trump didn’t say ‘no,’ but for today, he didn’t say ‘yes.’” Zelenskyy said.

Ahead of the potential summit in Budapest, US and Russian officials will reportedly be planning more lower-level meetings in advance than had taken place in preparation for the Alaska meeting between Trump and Putin in August.
What Is the Latest From Ukraine?

Ukrainian drones attacked a gas plant on October 19 in Russia’s Orenburg, the largest facility of its kind in the world, and forced it to suspend its intake of gas from nearby Kazakhstan, according to the Central Asian country’s energy ministry.

This marks the first reported strike on the plant, which forms part of the Orenburg gas chemical complex that is operated by the state energy giant Gazprom and handles intake from both the Orenburg oil and gas field and Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak field.

An oil refinery in the Samara-region city of Novokuibyshevsk, nearly 1,000 kilometers from the front line, was also hit by Ukrainian drone strikes, according to Ukraine’s General Staff.

“There has been an increase both in the range and in the accuracy of our long-range sanctions against Russia,” Zelenskyy said in a video address, referring to the recent strikes. “Practically every day or two, Russian oil refineries are being hit. And this contributes to bringing Russia back to reality.”

In recent months, Kyiv has intensified its attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, which appear to be causing fuel shortages and price increases inside Russia.

The oil depot in Novokuibyshevsk was also hit last month, with Ukraine’s General Staff reporting substantial damage to its infrastructure at the time.

Meanwhile, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhya were among the cities hit by guided bombs dropped by Russian jets late on October 18, according to Ukraine’s air defense forces.

Russian drones were also reported over the Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions. Ten people were injured in Dnipropetrovsk region, local authorities on the morning of October 19, while an energy facility was hit in Chernihiv region, causing a power outage for around 17,000 residents in the north of the country.

Russian forces on October 19 launched a massive strike on a coal mine in the Dnipropetrovsk region, the company and the regional press service of DTEK reported. The exact nature of the attack was not immediately described.

“On the eve of the start of the heating season, the enemy again hit the Ukrainian energy sector. During the attack, 192 employees of the mine were underground,” the mining company said in a statement, later adding that all workers were rescued without serious injuries.

Russia’s relentless nighttime strikes often focus on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, aiming to cut off heating and electricity for civilians as winter approaches in a bid to undermine morale.

RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.


Ukraine’s credibility crisis: corruption perception still haunts economic recovery

Ukraine’s credibility crisis: corruption perception still haunts economic recovery
The share of Ukrainians that think their country is "hopelessly corrupt" has risen to 56% according to a recent survey by KIIS. / bne IntelliNews
By Ben Aris in Berlin October 19, 2025

Despite an active reform narrative and growing international engagement, corruption remains the biggest drag on Ukraine’s economic credibility. A recent survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) found that 40% of Ukrainians still believe their country is “hopelessly corrupt,” down only slightly from 47% last year, according to Kyrylo Shevchenko, former Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine.

Shifting in perceptions on corruption are one of the core challenges facing Bankova (Ukraine’s equivalent of the Kremlin) and Ukraine’s reconstruction. On paper reforms have yet to translate into systemic change.

“Every dollar of aid is turned into a political risk,” says Shevchenko. “Until corruption is tackled systemically, the Ukrainian economy will keep bleeding credibility faster than it rebuilds.”

And perceived corruption has undermined US support for Bankova. As part of the emergency $61bn aid package released last April, a line item for some $25mn to cover auditing costs was included to check that US support was not being stolen.

A team of US accountants were sent to Ukraine earlier this year to check the books. And Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy further undermined confidence after he tried to ram through a controversial law that gives unlimited power to the General Prosecutor that civil rights groups say will gut Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms on July 22. The passage of the law sparked the first anti-government protests since the war with Russia began and Bankova was forced to rapidly back off and return the autonomy of the anti-corruption organs with another law within days.

Nevertheless, over the past year Ukraine has made some progress, says Shevchenko. The High Anti-Corruption Court (ACC)) has issued several high-profile rulings, and digital public procurement tools like ProZorro have improved transparency in some areas. Yet enforcement remains patchy, elite impunity persists, and corruption continues to shape everything from wartime logistics to reconstruction contracts, according to Shevchenko.

The gap between Western expectations and domestic implementation is growing harder to ignore. “Corruption continues to drain investments, block EU integration, and erode donor confidence,” he said. While Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in 2022, Brussels has repeatedly flagged insufficient progress on judicial independence, rule of law, and the de-oligarchizing agenda.

Even among Ukrainians, belief in reform is fragile. The same KIIS survey shows that nearly half the country doubts real change is happening, suggesting that years of unfulfilled promises and high-profile scandals have left a deep institutional scar.

“Public trust remains fragile, with only some improvements,” Shevchenko notes. “Talk of reform is not enough. Delivery is everything.”

The stakes could not be higher. The EU is finalising a multi-year €50bn aid package, while the International Monetary Fund is reviewing a $15.6bn Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Donors increasingly condition their support on measurable anti-corruption benchmarks, including independent audits and personnel reform in the judiciary, customs, and security services.

According to observers, the rationale for Law 21414 that would have gutted the anti-corruption bodies and put corruption investigations under the direct control of the General Prosecutor, a Zelenskiy appointee, was investigations by National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) were focusing on people inside Bankova’s inner circle that the president wanted to head off.

The law was suspended, but according to reports, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), which is also under Zelenskiy’s direct control, continued to pressure NABU offices with investigations and inspections.

Meanwhile, investor interest remains cautious. Ukraine is viewed as a high-risk frontier market, despite post-war rebuilding opportunities in energy, logistics, and defence-related industries. But without legal protections and institutional clarity, few are willing to commit long-term capital.

“Donornomics only works when credibility compounds,” Shevchenko said. “Ukraine needs a corruption-proof recovery—not just for the sake of its partners, but for the future of its own citizens.”

Until that happens, Ukraine’s economy will remain suspended between Western lifelines and domestic gridlock. Reform will need to outpace scepticism—for both markets and the millions of Ukrainians still waiting for real change.

Ukraine, European Leaders Anxiously Eye Trump-Putin Summit After White House Meeting – Analysis


Russia's President Vladimir Putin with US President Donald Trump. 

Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru

October 19, 2025 
RFE RL
By Zoriana Stepanenko and Reid Standish

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy came to Washington hoping to get a commitment on new weapons, but instead met an American president newly intent on brokering a peace deal to end the more than three-year war in Ukraine.

Zelenskyy left his October 17 meeting with US President Donald Trump withoutreceiving much-sought Tomahawk cruise missiles. He now finds himself preparing for a new phase of US-led diplomacy as American and Russian officials lay the groundwork for a potential agreement at an upcoming summit between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest.

“Let both claim Victory, let History decide!” Trump wrote on social media after his meeting with Zelenskyy, saying he had told both leaders this week that “it is time to stop the killing, and make a DEAL!”

After the meeting, which Zelenskyy described as productive, the Ukrainian president spoke by phone with European leaders — including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Finland’s president, and the prime ministers of Britain, Italy, Norway, and Poland — and said he was counting on Trump to pressure Putin “to stop this war.”

The European leaders reaffirmed their support for Kyiv on the call and said that they will continue work on developing a peace plan for Ukraine, as well as options to increase pressure on Moscow through sanctions and the use of frozen Russian state assets.

“The most important thing now is to protect as many lives as possible, ensure security for Ukraine, and strengthen us all in Europe. This is precisely what we are working towards,” Zelenskyy later said about the call on his Telegram channel.

But analysts and Ukrainian lawmakers told RFE/RL that the lack of a commitment on Tomahawk missiles, another summit between Putin and Trump, and the US president’s apparent softening rhetoric towards Putin after spending weeks threatening sanctions and potential weapons deliveries has raised anxiety levels in Kyiv.

While Volodymyr Dubovyk, associate professor of international relations at Odesa University, told RFE/RL that Trump’s softening tone towards Ukraine compared to earlier meetings with Zelenskyy this year reflects a “positive dynamic,” others do not share his optimism.

“I am surprised to hear that my colleagues have high hopes for this season of negotiations,” Solomiia Bobrovska, a Ukrainian lawmaker who sits on the parliament’s National Security Committee, told RFE/RL, referring to the White House meeting and a summit slated for the coming weeks in Budapest.

“If we can shift Trump’s complacency for Russia even a millimeter away and closer towards Ukraine, then that is will be good,” she added.

From Tomahawks To A Summit In Hungary

A similar unease is shared by Oleksandr Sushko, the executive director of the Kyiv-based International Renaissance Foundation.

“Trump appears to be only partially on [Ukraine’s] side,” he told RFE/RL. “Therefore, it is very important to remain sober and restrained here.”

In the weeks leading up to his meeting with Zelenskyy, Trump had mused about sending Kyiv Tomahawk missiles as he appeared to sour on Putin over his refusal to negotiate a deal to end the war.

A key reason for Zelenskyy’s hastily organized trip to Washington was the possibility of Ukraine receiving the missiles, which are capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 2,500 kilometers.

But an October 16 phone call between Putin and Trump, which occurred while the Ukrainian president was in transit to the United States, changed that with a future meeting between the two leaders set for the coming weeks in the Hungarian capital.

At a press conference after his White House meeting, Zelenskyy was asked about the missiles and what he had been told by US officials.

“We want [them] very much… we need them,” he said. “Nobody canceled this dialogue, this topic.”

Later, Trump reiterated that he wants the United States to hold on to its weaponry. “We want Tomahawks also. We don’t want to be giving away things that we need to protect our country,” he said.

Zelenskyy also said he is open to bilateral or trilateral talks to end the war.

“I don’t rule out that [long-range weapons] will be used someday, but [they] will definitely not be used in the coming weeks,” Viktor Shlinchak, chairman of the board of the Institute of World Politics, told RFE/RL.
All Eyes On Budapest

Trump’s decision to organize another high-profile summit with Putin has somewhat changed the calculus for Kyiv, Heorhiy Chizhov, head of the Kyiv-based Center for Promoting Reforms, told RFE/RL.

“[Trump] thinks he can win, that he can get Putin to the negotiating table,” Chizhov said.

Asked by a reporter on October 17 if he thinks Putin is trying to buy time, Trump replied that he has been “played” all his life by “the best of them,” but said he thinks Putin wants to make a deal.

According to Russian foreign-policy advisor Yury Ushakov, Putin had warned Trump that allowing Ukraine to purchase the Tomahawks “won’t change the situation on the battlefield but would cause substantial damage to the relationship between our countries.”

US officials are reportedly planning more lower-level meetings with their Russian counterparts than had taken place ahead of the Alaska meeting between Trump and Putin in August.

The American side will be led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio instead of special envoy Steve Witkoff, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Trump has so far been cautious about ratcheting up pressure on Putin, but his administration also expanded intelligence sharing with Ukraine to help it strike targets inside Russia and imposed steep tariffs on one of Moscow’s top trading partners, India, over its purchases of Russian oil.

In early October, the Trump administration also sanctioned Serbia’s largest oil and gas supplier, which is majority-owned by Russian state energy giant Gazprom.

Russian officials also appear to be preparing their own offerings to present to the US side in talks.

Kirill Dmitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, revived the idea of building a tunnel under the Bering Sea to connect Russia and the United States though Alaska and suggested that Elon Musk’s Boring Company build it.

Zoriana Stepanenko is a correspondent for Current Time and RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service.

Reid Standish is RFE/RL’s China Global Affairs correspondent based in Prague and author of the China In Eurasia briefing. He focuses on Chinese foreign policy in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and has reported extensively about China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing’s internment camps in Xinjiang. Prior to joining RFE/RL, Reid was an editor at Foreign Policy magazine and its Moscow correspondent. He has also written for The Atlantic and The Washington Post.


RFE RL

RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.



Hungary offers Putin safe passage for Budapest summit despite ICC arrest warrant

Hungary offers Putin safe passage for Budapest summit despite ICC arrest warrant
Hungarian PM Viktor Orban with state news radio Kossuth Radio. / Viktor Orban (Facebook)
By bne IntelliNews October 20, 2025

WAIT, WHAT?!

Belarus asks for talks with Kyiv, as Lukashenko seeks to end Belarus’ isolation

Belarus asks for talks with Kyiv, as Lukashenko seeks to end Belarus’ isolation
Belarus President Lukashenko has opened the door to direct talks with Kyiv as he continues a drive to improve relations with the West and reduce his dependence on the Kremlin. / bne IntelliNews
By bne IntelliNews October 20, 2025

Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko has opened the door to direct dialogue with Kyiv as part of negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, as he launches a diplomatic drive to break the republic’s isolation and total dependence on Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The head of Belarus' State Security Committee (KGB), Ivan Tertel, told state television on October 19 that his agency is prepared to engage with Ukraine “to find a consensus” and prevent further escalation.

“Our president works as much as possible in order to stabilise the situation in the region,” Tertel said, referring to Lukashenko, the country’s long-serving and internationally ostracised leader. “And we’ve managed to balance the interests of the parties in this extremely complicated situation with a tendency towards escalation.”

“I am convinced that only via quiet and calm negotiations, by looking for a compromise, we will be able to resolve this situation,” Tertel added, pointedly noting that “a lot depends on the Ukrainian side”.

The call for talks comes after Minsk sent letters to various EU member states offering to open a dialogue last week. Belarus is bidding for better relations with the EU after making notable progress in improving ties with the Trump administration, according to diplomatic sources cited by Reuters.

The diplomatic olive branches come after ties with the US have dramatically improved in recent months. US mediation was instrumental in bringing off a number of political prisoner releases. The most high profile are the release of 16 prisoners, including Sergey Tikhanovsky (Siarhei Tsikhanouskiy), the husband of Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya (Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya), in June following a US-brokered pardon after envoy Keith Kellogg met with Lukashenko in Minsk. Another 52 prisoners were released in September after more US mediation. However, some 1,300 people remain in jail, according to human rights groups.

Nevertheless Belarus remains a key ally of Moscow and Lukashenko is a frequent visitor. Belarus has also hosted Russian military assets since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 including Russian missiles and nuclear weapons.

Kyiv has not officially responded to the offer.

Lukashenko walks a rhetorical tightrope

Earlier this month, Lukashenko lashed out at Ukraine’s refusal to negotiate with Moscow, warning that “Ukraine may cease to exist as a state” unless President Volodymyr Zelenskiy “sits down, negotiates, and acts urgently”.

At the same time Lukashenko has offered to host a potential bilateral or trilateral meeting between Putin, Zelenskiy and US President Donald Trump – an offer that Bankova has rejected out of hand.

Since the 2020 presidential election — widely condemned by the EU and US as fraudulent — Belarus has faced heavy sanctions and pariah status among democratic nations. The situation worsened after Belarus allowed Russian forces to use its territory to launch part of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

According to Reuters, Belarusian diplomats recently met with European officials. One European diplomat confirmed a meeting with former Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Ambrazevich, who reportedly suggested Belarus could be included in wider talks about European security architecture, Reuters reports.

Washington has taken the lead in the rapprochement, brokering several political prisoners released from Belarusian jails. In return, the Trump administration agreed to lift some sanctions on the Belarusian state airline, Belavia that will allow Minsk to buy US-made plane parts again.

Trump’s envoy, retired General Keith Kellogg, later confirmed that the aim of the renewed dialogue was “to ensure lines of communication” with Putin.

“The goal is not to rehabilitate Lukashenko, but to widen the channels through which we can pressure Moscow,” a US official familiar with the talks said privately, Reuters reports.

Despite these diplomatic stirrings, Belarus remains deeply entwined with Moscow’s strategic ambitions. Last month, Russia and Belarus conducted the joint quadrennial Zapad-2025 military exercises – a show of military strength, involving an estimated 100,000 troops in exercises to simulate a conflict with Nato forces.

“Belarus may be testing the waters to become a ‘neutral’ channel for negotiation—without ever actually changing sides,” one analyst said, reports The Kyiv Independent.

Tertel’s comments on Belarus One come just days after Belarusian diplomats were seen stepping up contact with EU envoys amid renewed speculation over a potential Russia-US summit in Budapest.

The Transparency Doctrine: How Democracies Learned To Pre-Bunk War – Analysis


"Little Green Men" soldiers in Crimea. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

October 20, 2025
By Aritra Banerjee

In 2014, when “little green men” appeared in Crimea, the world was caught off-guard. Russia’s denials, obfuscations, and media manipulation muddied the waters long enough to make annexation a fait accompli. Eight years later, in the winter of 2021-22, the same state prepared for another incursion — but this time, its opponent’s information playbook had changed.

Throughout January and February 2022, Washington and London released an extraordinary series of intelligence assessments detailing Russia’s build-up, likely pretexts, and even fake videos that Moscow intended to stage. The world knew the war was coming before it began. What seemed like a radical breach of intelligence culture — governments revealing secrets rather than guarding them — was a calculated act of strategic communication.

As Jānis Sārts, Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) in Riga, explained, the decision aimed “to alert the world and to make it more complicated for Russia to stage the pretext for war.” In effect, NATO allies decided to foretell the lie before it could be told.
From Secrecy to Strategic Disclosure

For decades, intelligence orthodoxy treated information as something to protect, not deploy. Secrecy implied control; revelation implied risk. But in the era of hybrid warfare, ambiguity itself became a weapon. Adversaries like Russia learned to operate in the grey zone — manipulating half-truths, manufacturing confusion, and eroding trust faster than democracies could verify facts.

By 2017, after Russian interference in the U.S. and European elections, NATO’s StratCom community had begun to rethink that equation. Sārts recalls testifying before the U.S. Senate that year, urging a new mindset: “In 21st-century information warfare, the traditional approach to intelligence — briefing leaders but keeping information classified — no longer works.”

That intellectual shift drew from the work of Dr Neville Bolt, Founder and Director of the Sympodium Institute for Strategic Communications, following two decades as Director of the King’s Centre for Strategic Communications (KCSC) and Reader in Strategic Communications at King’s College London.


Dr Bolt, who also serves as Editor-in-Chief of Defence Strategic Communications — NATO’s peer-reviewed academic journal — argues that strategic communication is not a collection of messaging tools but a “mindset — a way of understanding the world where politics now takes place inside the information environment.”

The Western intelligence community finally operationalised that theory in early 2022. Controlled transparency replaced quiet briefing. Truth became an instrument of manoeuvre.


Pre-Bunking in Action

Between late 2021 and mid-February 2022, the U.S. and U.K. issued near-daily warnings: Russia would stage atrocities, fabricate videos, or provoke border incidents. Each statement forced the Kremlin to rewrite its script in real time. When the invasion began on 24 February, Moscow’s justification — “genocide in Donbas” — looked hastily improvised and conspicuously hollow.

The pre-bunking strategy achieved three immediate effects:It stripped Russia of surprise. Every possible false flag had been publicised in advance.

It compressed global interpretation time. By the time Russian state television rolled out its storyline, audiences were already inoculated.

It accelerated alliance cohesion. Western capitals coalesced around a single, pre-validated narrative of aggression.

The risks were real. With limited evidence they could reveal, U.S. officials endured hostile questioning at press briefings. Yet that discomfort was a price worth paying. As Sārts observed, “It looked uncomfortable, but it worked.” The Kremlin’s vaunted information dominance failed at the opening whistle.

Information Timing, Audience Trust, Strategic Effect

Strategic communication often fails because it treats words as content rather than manoeuvre. Timing is the first variable: pre-bunking succeeds only when disclosure precedes the adversary’s narrative window. Audience trust is the second: the public must already believe the communicator’s integrity for transparency to carry weight. Strategic effect is the third: the goal is not merely to inform but to alter the adversary’s cost-benefit calculus.

In February 2022 all three aligned. By telling uncomfortable truths early, democracies generated cognitive shock in Moscow, narrative compression among Western audiences, and strategic synchronisation among allies. The manoeuvre turned openness into deterrence.

Russia’s Message Creep

Contrast this clarity with Russia’s performance. As Professor Bolt points out in another context, “mission creep breeds message creep.” The same pathology that undermined Western narratives in Afghanistan—constantly shifting goals—afflicted Russia’s information war. Its justifications shifted from protecting Russian speakers to denazification, then to resisting NATO expansion, then to fighting Western decadence. Each revision diluted credibility.

Worse, the Kremlin’s top-down propaganda machine proved incapable of adaptation. Its secrecy culture, once an advantage, trapped it in its own echo chamber. Deprived of honest feedback, the regime doubled down on delusion. In the language of StratCom, it lost the feedback loop that sustains narrative authority.
Ukraine’s Real-Time Counter-Narrative

If the U.S. and U.K. supplied intelligence, Ukraine supplied authenticity. Within hours of the invasion, President Volodymyr Zelensky recorded a short video outside his office: “We are here.” No polished lighting, no staging — just defiance. It cut through the fog of war faster than any press release could.

Sārts calls this the “humanisation of the war.” Ukrainians turned strategic communication into a whole-of-society effort. Every citizen with a smartphone became a sensor, witness, and messenger. Symbols emerged organically — the Snake Island defiance, the sunflower-seed grandmother, the blue-and-yellow memes that flooded timelines.

While Russia’s state-run television pushed sterile narratives, Ukraine’s lived imagery made its story emotionally incontestable. Each viral clip was a micro-pre-bunking act: reality broadcast before distortion could take root.

Leadership as Narrative Architecture

In Neville Bolt’s typology, strategic communication operates through words, images, and actions — but the action of leadership unites them all. Zelensky’s leadership was both message and medium. By staying in Kyiv, refusing evacuation, and addressing parliaments directly, he aligned policy, posture, and persona into a single story of resistance.

Even his informality — fatigue clothes, smartphone videos — served as semiotics of authenticity. It made Western leaders’ rehearsed statements look sterile. In contrast, Vladimir Putin’s long tables and pre-recorded meetings became symbols of isolation and paranoia. Both men performed strategy through imagery; only one resonated.


Pre-Bunking Beyond Europe

The logic of controlled transparency has wider relevance. Democracies in the Indo-Pacific face similar grey-zone pressures — from territorial incursions and cyber intrusions to information warfare that blurs peace and conflict.

For India, which operates in a complex information battlespace involving China and Pakistan, selective disclosure can serve as an instrument of deterrence. Early, credible publication of satellite data, intelligence summaries, or diplomatic assessments can pre-empt adversarial narratives during border crises or disinformation spikes.

The challenge is cultural as much as procedural. Bureaucracies accustomed to secrecy must learn to calibrate revelation. Public trust, already fragile, must be maintained by accuracy and consistency. Pre-bunking works only when audiences believe both the messenger and the motive.

Japan’s communication around the Fukushima disaster in 2011, for instance, demonstrated the cost of hesitation: delayed transparency eroded public trust for years. Conversely, New Zealand’s proactive crisis communication model — factual, timely, empathetic — shows how openness reinforces authority. The EurAsian takeaway: transparency, managed well, is power.

Toward a Doctrine of Strategic Openness

If democracies are to institutionalise what succeeded in 2022, they need doctrine. A national StratCom framework for “strategic openness” would set:Thresholds for disclosure — when classified information serves deterrence more than secrecy.

Inter-agency coordination — linking intelligence, defence, diplomacy, and media spokespeople.

Temporal sequencing — how early warnings transition into crisis communication without fatigue.

Ethical guardrails — ensuring truth, not propaganda, underpins disclosure.


Such doctrine would turn episodic success into sustained capability. It would also answer critics who fear that openness endangers sources: managed transparency is not recklessness; it is risk management for narrative dominance.

The Information Deterrent

Strategic communication’s power lies not in volume but in velocity and coherence. The 2022 pre-bunking campaign demonstrated that information, timed correctly, can alter the strategic environment before the first shot is fired.

In that sense, pre-bunking is deterrence by narration. It denies the enemy plausible stories, constrains their manoeuvre, and rallies allies faster than conventional diplomacy. It also reclaims moral ground: democracies no longer have to choose between truth and security — the two can reinforce each other.

Neville Bolt reminds us that every action, even inaction, communicates. By choosing to speak early, democracies finally acted strategically within the information environment rather than outside it.

The Age of Strategic Truth

The Cold War prized secrecy as power; the information age prizes credibility. In a battlespace where deception is constant and attention is scarce, truth — timely, contextual, and deliberate — becomes an instrument of statecraft.

For NATO in 2022, that truth denied Russia its narrative initiative. For democracies elsewhere, it offers a template: communicate first, communicate honestly, and communicate with purpose.

Transparency will not end wars, but it can shape how they begin — and, sometimes, prevent them from starting at all.



Aritra Banerjee is a Contributing Editor, South Asia at Eurasia Review with a focus on Defence, Strategic Affairs, and Indo-Pacific geopolitics. He is also the co-author of The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage. Having spent his formative years in the United States before returning to India, he brings a global perspective combined with on-the-ground insight to his reporting. He holds a Master's in International Relations, Security & Strategy from O.P. Jindal Global University, a Bachelor's in Mass Media from the University of Mumbai, and Professional Education in Strategic Communications from King's College London (King's Institute for Applied Security Studies).

 

‘In the Western European left, there’s a desire to put up a wall and ignore what’s happening in the east’


Denys Gorbach

First published in Spanish at Ctxt. Translation by Adam Novak from Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières.

Denys Gorbach (Kryvyi Rih, 1984) is a sociologist. The research from his doctoral thesis at Sciences Po (Paris) is contained in the book The Making and Unmaking of Ukrainian Working Class (Berghahn, 2024), which recounts how economic changes altered the values of the working class in Ukraine, focusing on his city, Kryvyi Rih, in the south-east of the country. Kryvyi Rih was considered the “iron heart of the USSR”. It has several mines and a large steelworks. It is the birthplace of President Zelensky.

Gorbach also became involved in helping Ukrainian refugees in France and studied their situation. He currently researches the social concept of conspiracy theories at Lund University (Sweden). He spoke to CTXT.es by video call to discuss Ukrainian politics and the war.

In the book you argue that post-Soviet Ukraine, in its privatisation process, did not fully integrate into the neoliberal economy and that “a socialist appearance wrapped capitalist practices”.

Well, it depends on what we understand by neoliberal. There wasn’t large-scale privatisation with foreign investors as occurred in Poland, Hungary or the Baltic countries, for example. The ruling class was afraid.

I was surprised to find a literal confirmation of this idea in the writings of those who participated in these events, such as an adviser to President Kuchma,1 who governed during the era of major privatisations. These people had been trained in Marxist political economy during the Soviet era and tried to use that knowledge to build the capitalist economy. This adviser wrote that their explicit objective was to create a Ukrainian national bourgeoisie before opening the market to foreign capitalists.

This ruling class, which was building itself, maintained the existing moral economy, a moral economy that we can call socialist, supposedly socialist, supposedly Soviet, which implied mutual obligations between rulers and ruled.

And some of these restrictions have been maintained until today, for example, there are still restrictions regarding land ownership, if I’m not mistaken.

The removal in 2020 of the moratorium on land purchase and sale (in force since 2001) was one of the major neoliberal steps that Zelensky took. Even Poroshenko,2 the president with the most neoliberal rhetoric, decided not to do this. And when Zelensky did it, Poroshenko opposed it and organised protests against it.

Land ownership was already privatised, but there exists this fear that, if you allow it to be bought and sold like any other good, large companies will be able to monopolise it.

It’s a taboo subject in popular consciousness. It’s also present in the popular imagination about the Second World War. Since my childhood I’ve heard stories that the Germans took the land of Ukraine away in trains to Germany. It’s probably not true, but it shows the value we give to land.

So yes, it was a very problematic issue. And Zelensky finally did it. But even with all the pressure from international financial institutions that pushed him to do it, he established a series of limitations. (According to the law, the acquisition of land by foreigners or entities with foreign capital must be approved by referendum.)

He also passed a harsh labour reform in the middle of the war, in 2022.

Yes, I think this can be explained within the framework of the shock doctrine, proposed by Naomi Klein.3

Zelensky and his team are part of a new generation of politicians who have already grown up under capitalist conditions. I get the impression that they are sincerely against the oligarchs and are also against the trade unions, because they see both institutions as obstacles to the development of the free market. So they’ve done some things to fight against the concentration of capital in the oligarchy, but they’ve also gone against the trade unions and the socialist regulation, so to speak, of labour relations.

In the midst of war, obviously this wasn’t Zelensky’s greatest concern, but Halyna Tretiakova, a parliamentarian from his party who chairs the Social Policy Committee, took advantage of the occasion to push through three terrible labour liberalisation laws in 2022.

There’s been much talk of the two different political identities that exist in Ukraine, linked to the western and eastern regions. In the book you call them “ethnic Ukrainian” and “Eastern Slavic” identity, but I think you’re somewhat critical of the way these identities are usually explained.

One of the criticisms I receive most is that I don’t nuance enough. You always have to put these terms in many inverted commas. The identity I call “ethnic Ukrainian” isn’t necessarily a matter of ethnic nationalism as such, it’s a set of vague political ideas that combines sympathy for the West, preference for a more liberal economic model and a more important role for the Ukrainian language. Opposed to this is another very, very complex set of ideas, what I call “Eastern Slavic”, which includes maintaining stronger ties with Russia and the post-Soviet world, being neutral on the language question or defending the status quo, which is the predominance of Russian, and perhaps greater regulation of the economy. I think it’s better not to call them “pro-Russian” because this isn’t necessarily true, especially since this war began. They often define themselves as non-nationalists, but I think it’s a form of nationalism that doesn’t recognise itself as such.

I keep looking for better words to describe this duality... It’s not a duality, it’s a spectrum, a continuum. It must be perceived with much scepticism.

Would you say this “Eastern Slavic” identity is closer to the left?

Again, it depends on what we understand by left.

Of course.

Of course, it’s closer to the left in terms of flags and symbols. The Soviet Union and all that. But this doesn’t always translate into support for equality policies. In Ukraine the left-wing parties moved very quickly to cultural politics.

You argue that those identities were exacerbated by the oligarchs for electoral purposes.

Yes, I try to explain that it’s not an ancient matter. In the 2000s, from the so-called Orange Revolution4 onwards, there were changes to the Constitution that gave more power to Parliament. So the capitalist class of oligarchs had to adapt. Before they went directly to the president. Now they had to invent parties to participate in politics. And those parties had to show some type of ideology. At first they tried to follow the typical European model with left and right, but they quickly realised it wasn’t worthwhile. It was easier to apply the lowest common denominator, which was national identities. Easy to convert into slogans, into television adverts. My argument is that this is how these two camps were formed. Then the more pro-Western, pro-Ukrainian language ones were called oranges.

You asked me if the more pro-Russian ones were more left-wing. Rhetorically yes, and they also defended the preservation of some welfare policies, but at the same time, in this camp was the most powerful fraction of the capitalists.

Because they were the ones who controlled the large industries?

Yes. The pro-Western fraction was like a second tier of the oligarchy.

When discussing these questions, the difference between the more industrial regions and the more agricultural ones is also usually mentioned.

Yes, in the south-east of Ukraine there’s a highly industrialised belt, very urban, with high population density. At macroeconomic level, these regions were the richest, the ones that produced most. Now we don’t know what’s going to happen, because they’re ageing industries and I can’t imagine capitalists queuing up to invest 50 kilometres from a front line, even if it weren’t active. So now the economic geography is changing, investments are concentrated in the west. I don’t know what’s going to happen to those millions of people who live from industry, who are somehow proud of it.

These regions where there was greater sympathy for Russia are the ones that the Russian invasion has most destroyed.

Yes, yes. Some people who are there, with whom I stay in contact, sympathised with Putin and feel it as a betrayal. The most “pro-Russian” said this wasn’t going to happen, that it was propaganda from Ukrainian nationalists.

And now they’re disappointed. Well, not only disappointed. They are victims. The greatest number of victims, the greatest destruction of infrastructure and housing, has occurred precisely in cities like Mariupol and Kharkiv.5

You yourself said you didn’t expect the Russian invasion.

Yes, I don’t mind admitting it. I’m one of those people who thought this wasn’t going to happen.

I’m still in a very large group chat with workers from the steelworks. In the book I talk a bit about that chat, about how politics invaded the conversations and many people felt rejection towards it.

The afternoon before the invasion there were still debates. They said things like “who do you take us for? Do you seriously think Putin is going to attack? Of course not”.

The next day, everyone moved on to talking about practical matters. What do we do? Where do we go? Very practical things about how to face something that twelve hours before they didn’t think was going to happen.

Sometimes journalists write that everyone has changed from the Russian language to Ukrainian. That’s only true, in part, amongst the intellectual middle classes in cities like Kyiv. In the army there are thousands of people speaking Russian. In a Russian-speaking region like mine, people reject this rhetoric.

In 2014, the government of Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign an economic association agreement with the European Union and to negotiate with Russia. Ukraine had trade relations of similar importance with both blocs.

At that moment, yes. Ukraine as an economy had managed to maintain itself in an intermediate space between the two blocs. Approximately half of exports went to the European Union and the other half to the former Soviet Union. Exports to Russia and the former Soviet Union were high-tech, like helicopters, engines or train locomotives. Exports to the European Union were raw materials, because Ukrainian industry couldn’t compete with companies like Alstom or Siemens, but both were important.

Today President Yanukovych is remembered as very pro-Russian, but in reality he spent most of his presidency under the European Union banner. Not because he was a convinced Europeanist, but because this was the consensus decision amongst the elites. The problem is that those elites also depended on energy, on cheap oil and gas from Russia.

I was an economic journalist at that time, so I remember it very clearly. Every week I wrote the same thing. Putin says Ukraine must pay more for gas. The International Monetary Fund says Ukraine must liberalise energy prices for households. The Ukrainian government says “my god, we can’t do this”. It says “we have to maintain our relationship with Russia, but Russia has to understand that we want to sign this treaty with the EU”.

From 2012 Russia started a sequence of trade wars. One month it was milk, the next locomotives. It was quite explicit. It was like saying “this is just the beginning of what awaits you if you sign that treaty”.

What did the Ukrainian government expect, the Ukrainian capitalist class, at that moment? They expected that the European Union would give them some type of economic support or compensation for what they were going to lose, for the rise in gas prices. And it never happened. There’s a video of Yanukovych talking with Merkel at the Vilnius summit.6 He tries to say with body language that he’s in a complicated situation. And the EU’s response was no, that they couldn’t do any of that. Then Yanukovych turned towards Russia. It was all much more fluid and contradictory than the story tells.

Then the revolt known as Euromaidan erupted and, subsequently, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the independence uprisings in Donetsk and Luhansk.

The official viewpoint in Ukraine is that everything was completely organised by Russia. There’s also the other viewpoint that it was completely organised by the CIA. If you’re a specialist in international relations, it’s normal that you see things that way. I’ve always been more interested in social processes. In Ukraine it’s totally taboo to speak of civil war, you get cancelled, but from an analytical viewpoint, I don’t see any problem in saying that yes, between 2014 and 2022 there was a conflict that had elements of civil war, with strong external influences. For anyone who wants to delve deeper, I recommend the book that Serhiy Kudelia has published. In that conflict some 14,000 people died in total, amongst combatants from both sides and civilians.

We tend to analyse the past from the knowledge of the present, so it’s normal to see the events of 2014 as precursors to those of 2022. But I don’t think it was so linear, there wasn’t a master plan from Putin or anyone.

Some analysts point to Russia’s concern for its security due to NATO’s eastward expansion as one of the explanations for the invasion. Do you think this factor played a role in the Russian government’s decision?

I think NATO has had excessive prominence in the analyses. Of course this eastward expansion occurred, but it was many years ago. I find the way people like Mélenchon7 talk about the 2008 Bucharest Summit striking. I covered it as a journalist and I have a totally different memory. The Ukrainian delegation arrived with great hopes of obtaining a Membership Action Plan8 for NATO. And they were rejected. They were told the typical polite phrases of yes, of course, later on, maybe if so, come on, goodbye.

Now those phrases are quoted as proof that NATO was very interested in Ukraine, but NATO supporters at that time were absolutely outraged. There had been public discussions, protests against it, but after that the debate was closed. Until 2014, when the war in Donbas began, with foreign troops present on the territory.

What has happened from 2022 onwards is that NATO has added thousands more kilometres of border with Russia because Finland has joined. And nobody in Russia seems very concerned, the troops aren’t there.

If I’m not mistaken, the far right has never obtained relevant representation in Ukraine’s Parliament, but they have made themselves noticed in the streets and it seems the war has strengthened them. What’s the situation?

Yes, it’s a paradox. In elections they usually obtain ridiculous results, 1% or 2% of the vote. The maximum they reached (the far-right nationalist party Svoboda9) was 10% in the 2012 elections, when Yanukovych considered that such an opposition suited him. But it’s not honest to cite those data and say that nothing’s happening with the far right.

As you’ve said, they’re strong in the streets. I call them “entrepreneurs of political violence”. They’ve accumulated resources and know how to deploy them.

We can go back to the Maidan or Euromaidan of 2014.10 There were hundreds of thousands of people gathered in that large square. The majority were like the people I describe in the book, without a very formed ideology. They rejected corruption and the oligarchs and wanted to live like Europeans, that is, with money. Only a small minority belonged to far-right organisations. But they were the most prepared, they weren’t afraid to attack the police, they had combat skills, they knew how to prepare Molotov cocktails.

They built political capital in Maidan and in the war in Donbas, where they were the most motivated fighters in a disorganised army. And now they reinforce their reputation in this new war, although this time the government has done a better job of limiting their influence.

Unfortunately, they’re over-represented in the media. To begin with, by themselves, who are the first interested in promoting themselves. But also by Russian media and those who sympathise with Putin in the West. And sometimes the Ukrainian government also does stupid things.

The war has already lasted three years. I get the impression it’s been longer than many people thought at the beginning. I know this question is impossible to answer rigorously, but, according to what you perceive, what do people want? Can it be different from what the government wants?

My direct experience is with refugees in France. In 2023, when we started working with them, they were all very optimistic, they thought victory was near. And at the beginning they must have been even more optimistic because many people left their homes in Ukraine thinking it would be a matter of two weeks, like a holiday. Obviously, this is no longer the case. Now they understand they are refugees.

The same has happened in Ukraine. The initial reaction was total mobilisation, for better and for worse. I think the government made a mistake in fostering exaggerated optimism, that idea that they were going to recover Crimea, well... By the end of 2023, spirits began to change, when the counter-offensive didn’t produce results.

Then Trump returned to the presidency of the United States. The government and intellectuals in Ukraine perceived it as a disaster. But amongst ordinary people, from what I’ve been told, there was that implicit hope that a bad ending would be better than this horrible situation without end. Even if concessions had to be made. However, when Trump announced his proposal, even people who were very unpatriotic, so to speak, found it too much. Leaving Russia territories it hasn’t occupied for now, ceding natural resources to Trump...

Now everyone wants the war to end. This doesn’t form part of the Ukrainian government’s official discourse, but I think they too would be willing to make territorial concessions, provided stable peace conditions were guaranteed.

This is what’s missing from all the proposals so far. Some guarantee that they won’t start again in a couple of years. This would be catastrophic because if you sign an agreement now and in two years the invasion starts again, it’s assumed you won’t be able to count on the same support from the United States and the European Union.

Then, if you look at the European elites, there are people who say they’re willing to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. It’s true that all parties have their own interests. It doesn’t seem to me that the European Union is guided by hatred of Russia or fanaticism in favour of Ukraine. I think they’re readjusting their policies, they want to increase their military capabilities for the next decade, they talk about a plan for 2030... and for that, meanwhile they sacrifice Ukraine, they let it bleed.

It looks bleak.

Yes. Bad outlook. I was a left-wing activist in Ukraine and I still consider myself a left-wing activist. When I talk with leftists here, in Western Europe, it strikes me as odd because they tend to reject the subject. They say it’s all propaganda. And yes, it is, which is why I miss more analysis from a socialist perspective. It’s all slogans. Right, you love peace. You hate war. Of course, we all love peace but...

Did you expect something different from the left?

The thing is I don’t have answers myself either. But it would be good to have a real debate about what to do beyond simple repetition of slogans. What I see most is a desire to put up a wall and ignore everything that’s happening in the east. And many people don’t realistically evaluate their own political positions.

If everything is already fascism, we don’t have to worry about it getting worse. Do you really think the political regimes in the European Union are exactly the same as Russia’s? Or would you prefer to live under a regime more like that one?

On the other hand, if you’re such an activist that you want everything to explode because then revolution will be possible, think about it a bit. Imagine a real scenario of war and chaos. Is it likely that your sector of the left will grow and obtain political power? Or might there be some fascist group in your country that’s better positioned? What will emerge from this chaos that you hope will arrive?

  • 1

    Leonid Kuchma, President of Ukraine 1994-2005

  • 2

    Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine 2014-2019

  • 3

    Canadian author and activist whose book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (2007) analyses how economic crises and disasters are exploited to implement free-market policies

  • 4

    Mass protests in Ukraine in 2004-2005 following disputed presidential elections, leading to a revote that brought Viktor Yushchenko to power.

  • 5

    Major industrial city in north-eastern Ukraine, the country’s second-largest city.

  • 6

    November 2013 EU Eastern Partnership summit in Lithuania where Ukraine was expected to sign the Association Agreement.

  • 7

    Jean-Luc Mélenchon, French left-wing politician and leader of La France Insoumise.

  • 8

    NATO programme designed to assist aspiring member countries.

  • 9

    Ukrainian nationalist party founded in 1991, originally called the Social-National Party of Ukraine.

  • 10

    Mass protests in Kyiv from November 2013 to February 2014, initially sparked by the government’s decision not to sign the EU Association Agreement, leading to President Yanukovych’s removal.


The courtroom rebels standing up to warmonger Putin

Voices against Putins war

First published at European Network for Solidarity with Ukraine.

At the heart of Voices Against Putin’s War are ten speeches made in court by people who opposed Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and were arrested and tried for doing so. Most of them are now serving long jail sentences, for “crimes” fabricated by Vladimir Putin’s repressive machine. Along with the speeches, we include: other public declarations — social media posts, letters and interviews — in which the protagonists made their case; statements by two more persecuted activists, made outside court; and a summary of 17 other anti-war speeches in court. We hope that, by publishing these translations in English, these resisters’ motivations will become known to a wider audience.

Chapters 1-10 are each devoted to one protester, are arranged chronologically by the date of the protester’s first conviction. United in their opposition to the Kremlin’s war, they divide roughly into four groups.

First is Bohdan Ziza (chapter 3), who lived not in Russia but in Ukraine — in Crimea, which has been occupied by Russian forces since 2014. In 2022 Ziza filmed himself splashing paint in the colours of the Ukrainian flag on to a municipal administration building. He was tried in a Russian military court and is serving a 15-year sentence.

Second are two young women from St Petersburg, Sasha Skochilenko (chapter 6, pictured above) and Darya Kozyreva (chapter 8), prosecuted for the most peaceful imaginable protests against the war. Skochilenko, who posted anti-war messages on labels in a supermarket, was freed after more than two years behind bars, in August 2024, as part of a prisoner swap between Russia, Belarus and several Western countries. Kozyreva is serving a two-and-a-half year sentence, essentially for quoting Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine’s national poet, in public.

Third are three young men who deliberately damaged property, but not persons, to draw their fellow Russians’ attention to the anti-war cause. Igor Paskar (chapter 2) firebombed an office of the Federal Security Service (FSB). Alexei Rozhkov (chapter 9) firebombed a military recruitment centre — a form of protest used dozens of times across Russia in 2022. He fled to Kyrgyzstan, was kidnapped, presumably by the Russian security forces, and returned to Russia for trial. Ruslan Siddiqi (chapter 10), a Russian and Italian citizen, derailed a train carrying munitions to the Ukrainian front. He has been sentenced to 29 years, and has said that he can be seen as a “partisan”, and “classified as a prisoner of war”, rather than a political prisoner.

The fourth group of protagonists, jailed for what they said rather than anything they did, have records of activism for social justice and democratic rights stretching back decades: Alexei Gorinov (chapter 1), a municipal councillor in Moscow who dared to refer to Russia’s war as a “war” in public; Mikhail Kriger, an outspoken opponent of Russia’s war on Ukraine since 2014 (chapter 4); Andrei Trofimov (chapter 5); and Aleksandr Skobov (chapter 7), who was first jailed for political dissent in 1978, in the Soviet Union, and who 47 years later in 2025 told the court: “Death to the Russian fascist invaders! Glory to Ukraine!”

Two activists prosecuted for anti-war action, who made their statements outside court, are featured in chapters 11 and 12. Kirill Butylin (chapter 11) was the first person arrested for firebombing a military recruitment office, in March 2022. No record of his court appearance is available, but his defiant message on social media is: “I will not go to kill my brothers!” Savelii Morozov (chapter 12) was fined for denouncing the war to a military recruitment commission in Stavropol, when applying to do alternative (non-military) service.

The ten anti-war speeches in court recorded in this book are by no means the only ones. Another 17 are summarised in chapter 13. These speeches, along with others by defendants who railed against the annihilation of free speech, or protested against grotesque frame-ups, have been collected and published by the “Poslednee Slovo” (“Last Word”) website.

High-profile Russian politicians jailed for standing up to the Kremlin also made anti-war speeches in court, including Ilya Yashin of the People’s Freedom Party, sentenced to eight-and-a-half years in December 2022 for denouncing the massacres of Ukrainian civilians at Bucha and Irpin, and Vladimir Kara-Murza, sentenced in April 2023 to 25 years for treason. Both of them were freed, along with Sasha Skochilenko, in the prisoner exchange of August 2024. Other prominent political figures remain in detention for opposing the war, including Boris Kagarlitsky, a sociologist and Marxist writer, sentenced in February 2024 to five years for “justifying terrorism”, and Grigory Melkonyants, co-chair of the Golos election monitoring group, sentenced in May 2025 to five years for working with an “undesirable organisation”. Dozens of journalists and bloggers are behind bars too.

These better-known, politically motivated people are only a fraction of the thousands persecuted by the Kremlin. The cases recorded by human rights organisations include thousands of Ukrainians detained in the occupied territories. In many cases their fate, and whereabouts, is unknown: they may be dead or imprisoned. Thousands more Russians who have spoken out against the war, or been caught in the merciless dragnet by accident, are behind bars. So are “railway partisans” who sabotaged military supply trains, and others who denounced their regime’s support for Putin’s war, in Belarus. In Chapter 14, we outline the resistance to the Kremlin’s war, the repression mobilised in response to it, and the scale of the twenty-first-century gulag that has been brought into being. Notes, giving sources for all the material in the book, are at the end.

People resisting injustice have for centuries, in many countries, made use of the courts as a public platform. Irish rebels against British colonial violence began doing so at the end of the eighteenth century. In Russia, the tradition goes back at least to the 1870s, when Narodniki (Populists), speaking to judges trying them for violent protests, denounced the autocratic dictatorship. The workers’ movements that culminated in the 1917 revolutions used courtroom propaganda widely. When Stalinist repression reached its peak in the 1930s, the major purge trials were designed to eliminate it: their format was prearranged, with abject, false confessions. The practice reappeared after the post-Stalinist “thaw”, in the 1965 trial of the dissident writers Andrei Siniavsky and Yulii Daniel.

Courtroom speeches have again become a powerful weapon under Putin — and the Kremlin dictatorship is finding ways to get its revenge. It added three years to Andrei Trofimov’s sentence (chapter 5) — for the fantastical, false “offences” of disseminating false information about the army and “condoning terrorism” — based solely on what he said at his first trial. Other anti-war prisoners, including Alexei Gorinov (chapter 1) have had years added on to their sentences, on the basis of false “evidence” provided by prison officers, or prisoners terrorised by those officers.

Why did they do it? Why did our protagonists make protests that carried the risk of many years in the hell of the Russian prison system? Why, when brought to court, did they choose to make these statements that carried further risk? They have weighed their words and spoken for themselves; no attempt will be made here to summarise. However it is noteworthy that all of them addressed their speeches to their fellow citizens, not to the government.

Andrei Trofimov told the court in his second trial that “Ukraine is my audience”, because “Russian society is dead and it is useless to try to talk to it” — but nevertheless went to extraordinary lengths to make sure that his short, sharp message from his first trial, ending “Putin is a dickhead”, was widely circulated in Russian media.

The others had greater hopes in Russian society, including the Ukrainian Bohdan Ziza, who, in the video for which he was jailed, underlined that: “I address myself, above all, to Crimeans and Russians.” In court he said his action was “a cry from the heart” to “those who were and are afraid — just as I was afraid” to speak out, but who did not want the war.

Alexei Rozhkov had no doubt that “millions of my fellow citizens, women and men, young and old, take an anti-war position”, but were deprived of any means to express it. Kirill Butylin appealed to others to make similar protests so that “Ukrainians will know, that people in Russia are fighting for them — that not everyone is scared and not everyone is indifferent.” As for the government, “let those fuckers know that their own people hate them”.

Aleksandr Skobov, now 67 and in failing health, explicitly addressed younger generations. In an open letter from jail, he recalled how as a socialist he had been a “black sheep” among Soviet-era dissidents, most of whom had now passed away. “The blows are falling on other people, most of them much younger.” While “sceptical about ‘pompous declarations about the passing-on of traditions and experience’”, nevertheless, “I want the young people who are taking the blows now to know: those few remaining Soviet dissidents stood side-by-side with them, have stayed with them and shared their journey.”

Given this unity of purpose, of seeking however unsuccessfully to connect with the population at large, we might see the protagonists as practising the “propaganda of the deed” — not in the sense that phrase was given in the early twentieth century by politicians and policemen, as acts of violence, but in its original, broader sense: as any action, violent or not, that stirred one’s fellow citizens to a just cause. For, while some of those whose words are in this book used violence against property, and some specifically justified Ukrainian military violence against Russian aggression, none used violence against people.

Here are two further observations. First: while all the anti-war resisters shared a common purpose, they started with a diverse range of world views. A profound moral sense of duty runs through some of their statements. “Do I regret what has happened?” Igor Paskar asked his judges. “Yes, perhaps I’d wanted my life to turn out differently — but I acted according to my conscience, and my conscience remains clear.” Or, as Alexei Rozhkov put it: “I have a conscience, and I preferred to hold on to it.” Andrei Trofimov, in a similar vein, said at his second trial that “writ large, it is a matter of self-preservation” — not “the preservation of the body per se, of its physical health” but the preservation of conscience in this difficult situation, “my ability to tell black from white, and lies from truth, and, quite importantly, my ability to say out loud what I believe to be true”.

Ruslan Siddiqi voiced his motivation differently, in terms of political ideas about changing society. In letters to Mediazona, an opposition media outlet, he described his path towards anarchism. Expressing dislike for the “rigidity” of some anarchists and communists, he nevertheless envisaged a transition “from a totalitarian state to other forms of government with greater freedoms and further evolution into communities with self-government”. The invasion of Ukraine changed things: anyone who opposed it was declared a traitor by the government. “In such a situation, it is not surprising that some would prefer to leave the country, whereas others would take up explosives. Realising that the war was going to be a long one, at the end of 2022 I decided to act militarily.”

By contrast, Alexei Gorinov founded his defence on pacifist principles, and quoted Lev Tolstoy on the “madness and criminality of war”. Being tried “for my opinion that we need to seek an end to the war”, he could “only say that violence and aggression breed nothing but reciprocal violence. This is the true cause of our troubles, our suffering, our senseless sacrifices, the destruction of civilian and industrial infrastructure and our homes.” Sasha Skochilenko was still more explicit: “Yes, I am a pacifist” she told the court. Pacifists “believe life to be the highest value of all”; they “believe that every conflict can be resolved by peaceful means. I can’t kill even a spider — I am scared to imagine that it is possible to take someone’s life. […] Wars don’t end thanks to warriors — they end thanks to pacifists. And when you imprison pacifists, you move the long-awaited day of the peace further away.”

Savelii Morozov told the military recruitment commission that he would not refuse to fight in all wars, but in this particular, unjust war. A war in defence of one’s homeland could be justified, but not the “crime” being perpetrated in Ukraine.

For Darya Kozyreva, the central issue is Ukraine’s right to self-determination, asserted by force of arms. The war is a “criminal intrusion on Ukraine’s sovereignty”, she told the court. While identifying herself in an interview as a Russian patriot — “a patriot in the real sense, not in the sense that the propagandists give that word” — Kozyreva justified Ukrainian military resistance. Ukraine does not need a “big brother”; it will fight anyone who tries to invade, she said. In Russia, even some of Putin’s political opponents “do not always realise that Ukraine, having paid for its sovereignty in blood, will determine its own future”. She wants to believe in “a beautiful future where Russia lets go of all imperial ambition”.

Aleksandr Skobov expressed the hope that Russia will be defeated militarily in still more categorical terms. He spelled out in court three principles of his political organisation, the Free Russia Forum: the “unconditional return to Ukraine of all its internationally recognised territories occupied by Russia, including Crimea”; support for all those fighting for this goal, including Russian citizens who joined the Ukrainian armed forces; and support for “any form of war against Putin’s tyranny inside Russia, including armed resistance”, but excluding “disgusting” terrorist attacks on civilians.

Second: these anti-war speeches have much to tell us not only about Russia and Ukraine, but about the increasingly dangerous world we live in, in which Putin’s slide to authoritarianism has been succeeded by right-wing, authoritarian turns in the USA and some European countries. Russia’s imperial war of aggression has been followed by Israel’s genocidal offensive in Gaza, in which multiple war crimes — mass murder of civilians, the use of starvation as a weapon, deliberate blocking of aid, and the targeting of journalists, aid workers and international agencies — have been facilitated by the same Western powers that offer lip service to Ukraine’s national rights.

The two aggressor nations, Israel and Russia, aligned with different geopolitical camps, are subject to analogous driving forces. Nationalist ideology supercedes rational economic management; expansionist violence supercedes democracy; the decline of Western neo-liberal hegemony paves the way for militarist thuggery. Capital’s need for social control underpins near-fascist methods of rule. Readers may recognise, in the Russian state’s dystopian efforts of 2022-23 to punish its dissenting citizens as “terrorists” and “traitors”, patterns that are retraced in the unhinged witch-hunts of 2024-25 in the USA and western Europe, against opponents of the Gaza slaughter.

The powers on both sides of the geopolitical divide are frightened of similar things: the defiance and resilience of the opponents of Putin’s war, and the anger that has brought millions of people on to the streets of north American and European cities, in protest at the Gaza genocide. They are frightened of beliefs that are taking shape, in varying forms, that humanity can and should strive for a better, richer life than that offered by the warmongers and dictators. Some of these beliefs are expressed in the chapters of this book.

Order the book online here.


'Beyond anybody's imagination': Foreign analyst slams proposed Trump-Putin tunnel project

Robert Davis
October 19, 2025 
RAW STORY


FILE PHOTO: U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hand with Russian President Vladimir Putin, as they meet to negotiate for an end to the war in Ukraine, at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, U.S., August 15, 2025. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque


A foreign analyst slammed a proposed tunnel project that could link the United States and Russia on Sunday, saying the proposed project "stretches the imagination to the breaking point."

On Friday, Reuters reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin's international investment envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, had proposed building an underground tunnel linking the U.S. and Russia. Dmitriev added that President Donald Trump's ally, Elon Musk and The Boring Company, could help facilitate the construction.

Dmitriev shared more details on his personal X account.

"@elonmusk, imagine connecting the US and Russia, the Americas and the Afro-Eurasia with the Putin-Trump Tunnel - a 70-mile link symbolizing unity. Traditional costs are $65B+, but @boringcompany's tech could reduce it to <$8B. Let's build a future together!" he posted.

Former Moscow Times journalist Charles Hecker slammed the idea during a new interview with Times Radio.

"It's [Dmitriev's] job to dangle really tantalizing business proposals in front of President Trump and in front of the American business community and say 'Look at all of the things that could be accomplished if the war would only come to an end,'" Hecker said. "That's an enormous 'if' at this point."

"This sort of project is beyond anybody's imagination," he continued.

He added that the project could face steep opposition from business owners in Russia.

"There are some Russian businesses that are saying, 'Look, all of these folks left when the going got tough. We don't want them back anymore,'" he said, referring to businesses that left Russia after the country invaded Ukraine. "We're doing this on our own. We're doing it without them. We have China. We have India. We have lots of other partners to do business with. We don't need the Americans."