Dragon-Slaying Saints Performed Green-Fingered Medieval Miracles

A Holy hermit, possibly Guglielmo of Malavalle (wall painting, 1330–1337), Sant’ Agostino chapter house, Siena, Italy. 

CREDIT: Krisztina Ilko

December 28, 2025
By Eurasia Review

The Vatican’s eco-friendly farm, recently inaugurated by the first ever Augustinian pope, echoes his order’s forgotten early history, new research argues. Dr Krisztina Ilko challenges major assumptions about the medieval Catholic Church and early Renaissance.

A scorched cherry twig miraculously sprouting; a diseased swamp restored to ‘peak fertility’; healing the broken leg of an ox; and multiplying cabbages. These are just some of the forgotten medieval miracles brought to light by Cambridge University historian Dr Krisztina Ilko.

“Bleeding hosts and stigmatisations are the best-known medieval miracles,” says Dr Ilko, author of The Sons of St Augustine, a major new study published by OUP.

“The Augustinians get very little credit for miraculously making land fertile, healing livestock and bringing fruit trees back to life,” says Ilko, a medieval historian from Queens’ College, Cambridge.

“With Leo XIV becoming the first Augustinian Pope, it’s the perfect time to make the order’s astonishing history better known. There has been so much focus on Italian cities, we’ve lost sight of how important the countryside was to the Church and to the Renaissance.”


Dragons and fertility miracles

Saint George, the most famous Christian dragon slayer, appears in countless paintings as a lance-wielding military saint. Far less famous is the twelfth-century hermit Guglielmo of Malavalle who was venerated by the Augustinians for killing a dragon with a humble wooden staff shaped like a pitchfork.

In medieval Europe, disease suffered by livestock, crops and people was often blamed on dragons, and more specifically on their toxic breath which, it was thought, suffocated the countryside and those who lived there. Dragons were particularly associated with swampy areas.

After hearing a voice from the sky, Guglielmo settled in Malavalle, ‘the bad valley’, in Tuscany’s swampy Maremma region. Toxic air and terrible storms were thought to have left the valley barren, so ‘dark, and terrible’ that not even hunters dared to enter.

Dr Ilko argues that Guglielmo was venerated for ‘defeating the dragon’ because he purified the putrid air and restored the valley to ‘peak fertility’.

“These achievements weren’t symbolic, Guglielmo provided a crucial public service, he helped country people survive in a really harsh natural environment,” Dr Ilko says.

“Guglielmo was a pitchfork-wielding dragon slayer and divine gardener all at once. Commanding the weather, securing a good harvest, and restoring the health of livestock must have seemed the most desirable divine interventions in the late medieval countryside. They were matters of life and death.”
Miraculous discoveries

A decade of research took Dr Ilko to two dozen archives and she trekked to more than sixty Augustinian sites, including some of the most inaccessible ruins. She made discoveries in frescoes, illuminated manuscripts, hagiographies and letters. Some of the ancient documents she studied had been misdated and wrongly attributed, further denying the Augustinians of miraculous limelight.

The earliest collection of Augustinian life stories Dr Ilko studied was written by a Florentine friar in the 1320s and has been largely overlooked until now because, she believes, scholars deemed its miracles too rural. Housed in Florence’s Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, the manuscript opens with the life of Giovanni of Florence who built the Augustinian hermitage of Santa Lucia in Larniano with the help of local farmers. One of his greatest miracles was healing the broken leg of an ox. Another life story describes Jacopo of Rosia commanding an unreliable apple tree to produce fruit every year, as well as him multiplying cabbages.

“When people think about religious orders and their massive role in the Renaissance, they usually turn their attention to cities like Rome, Florence and Siena,” Dr Ilko says.

“The Franciscans and Dominicans, in particular, are credited for Italy’s rapid urban renewal from the 1200s onwards. Not many people realise that the Augustinians drew most of their power from the countryside. Their miracles were very green-fingered, agricultural.”

“St Francis of Assisi remains the most famous ‘nature saint’, best known for preaching to birds. In a more eco-conscious world, the Augustinians deserve much more attention.”
Augustinian survival strategy

Dr Ilko argues that positioning themselves in forests or by the sea was crucial to the survival of the Augustinians as a religious group.

The Order of the Hermits of St Augustine was founded by the papacy as a mendicant order through the amalgamation of various central Italian hermit groups in 1256. Then, in 1274, the Roman Catholic Church put the Augustinians on notice because they were founded after 1215 and lacked continuous existence since late antiquity. The papacy only re-confirmed their order’s existence in 1298. During this 25-year period of uncertainty, the Augustinian friars worked hard to prove their legitimacy.

Lacking a single, charismatic founding father, the friars developed a compelling origin story in which they claimed to have been founded directly by St Augustine. But, Dr Ilko argues, the Augustinians also drew heavily on their wild power-bases – forests, mountains and the sea – to prove their antiquity and authority. “Direct contact with nature gave the friars legitimacy, special spiritual powers and access to valuable natural resources including timber, crops and wild animals,” Dr Ilko says.

The Augustinians went on to found urban convents but carefully selected locations that bordered the countryside. In Rome, they founded the convent of Santa Maria del Popolo at one of the major entrances to the city, framed by trees and gardens on one side. The Franciscans had earlier rejected the spot because it was too remote and difficult ‘to sustain the body’ there. The site had been a sinister place: an ancient walnut tree plagued with demons towered over the supposed burial site of the Emperor Nero until Pope Paschall II had them removed in 1099.

In addition to raising public awareness about the Augustinians, Dr Ilko argues that the ruins of Augustinian hermitages should be better cared for and access improved so that that more people can visit them.

Researchers Revive Old Pea Varieties In Huge Seed Collection: ‘An Untapped Gold Mine For The Future’

Peas from Nordgen.

 CREDIT: Nordgen / University of Copenhagen

December 28, 2025 
By Eurasia Review


The demand for plant-based foods is increasing worldwide. Peas in particular are a burgeoning source of high protein content as a substitute for meat. With their small climate footprint, peas are sustainable to grow and provide a high yield. However, the pea varieties we grow today require intensive industrial processing.

“Today, we use very few pea varieties in agriculture, which are primarily produced for their properties as pig feed, but are not intended as protein in a plant-based burger. Just as an apple is not just an apple, a pea is not just a pea, even though it may seem that way in the supermarket,” says Associate Professor René Lametsch from the Department of Food Science.

In the quest to find suitable pea varieties, researchers from the Department of Food Science at the University of Copenhagen have developed a new AI method. They have unleashed it on the Nordic gene bank NordGen, which contains almost 2,000 different types of peas, in order to identify old pea varieties that are well suited as plant protein for humans.

“The gene banks contain an enormous variety that is largely untapped today. Our method makes it possible to utilise the plant resources in the gene bank and quickly find the most interesting types,” says René Lametsch.
Smooth or wrinkled? 51 promising pea varieties found

Using the new AI method, the researchers have found 51 old pea varieties that are no longer used in agriculture but appear to have promising properties as plant food, including high starch and protein content.

The method can automatically measure the shape, colour, size and surface of the seeds from ordinary photographs. The combination of image data and information about protein content makes it possible for the AI to select a small but
About NordGen

NordGen serves as the Nordic countries’ joint gene bank for plants and as a knowledge centre for genetic resources. The gene bank contains over 33,000 seed samples from approximately 450 plant species and 95 potato varieties, which are preserved as living cuttings. NordGen’s primary task is to ensure the conservation and promotion of the sustainable use of genetic resources in plants, livestock and forestry throughout the Nordic region representative sample of peas, which can then be analysed in depth.

“There are widely varying characteristics from variety to variety, especially in terms of starch and protein content, so it can make a lot of sense to revive some of the old varieties in our search for good ingredients for new types of plant-based foods,” says René Lametsch.

The study shows that the appearance of the seeds is closely related to their chemical composition. One feature in particular – how smooth or wrinkled the seed is – is closely linked to the type of starch the pea contains. This means that, for the first time, researchers can partially predict chemical properties based on images alone.

“We see a surprisingly large variation in the balance between the two key proteins in peas, legumin and vicilin – far greater than in today’s commercial varieties. This makes the gene bank’s old peas an untapped gold mine for the development of future plant-based foods,” concludes René Lametsch.

Ubiquitin Switch Reveals How Grapevines Survive The Cold

December 28, 2025 
By Eurasia Review



Cold temperatures can severely damage perennial crops such as grapevine, limiting growth, fruit quality, and regional distribution. Plants respond to cold through complex signaling networks that coordinate transcriptional activation, protein turnover, and oxidative stress detoxification. Central among these systems is the ubiquitin–proteasome pathway, which selectively removes regulatory proteins to fine-tune stress responses. Transcription factors like MYB proteins and CBF regulators are essential for activating COR genes, but their stability is tightly controlled by E3 ubiquitin ligases. Yet, in grapevine, the mechanisms linking ubiquitination to cold-response transcriptional programs and ROS homeostasis remain unclear. Due to these challenges, deeper investigation into grapevine cold-tolerance mechanisms is urgently needed.

A research team from Ningxia University reported a new regulatory mechanism underlying grapevine cold tolerance in a study published in Horticulture Research. The researchers identified VaMIEL1, a RING-type E3 ubiquitin ligase, as a key negative regulator that promotes degradation of the transcription factor VaMYB4a under normal temperatures. Cold stress suppresses VaMIEL1 expression, allowing VaMYB4a to activate the CBF–COR pathway and antioxidant defenses. The study combines biochemical analysis, Arabidopsis genetics, and grapevine callus experiments to map this cold-response module.

The researchers first demonstrated that VaMIEL1 physically interacts with VaMYB4a through yeast two-hybrid, BiFC, and co-immunoprecipitation assays, with the C-terminal regulatory domain of VaMYB4a responsible for binding. Promoter analysis revealed a low-temperature-responsive element, and reporter assays confirmed that VaMIEL1 expression decreases dynamically during cold exposure. In Arabidopsis, overexpression of VaMIEL1 increased cold sensitivity, leading to elevated ROS accumulation, reduced proline levels, impaired antioxidant enzyme activity, and strong suppression of CBF and COR gene expression. Conversely, the AtMIEL1 loss-of-function mutant showed improved cold tolerance and enhanced redox balance.

In grapevine calli, VaMIEL1 overexpression caused browning, reduced biomass, high ROS buildup, and lower SOD/POD activity under cold conditions. RNAi silencing of VaMIEL1 produced the opposite effects, elevating antioxidant capacity and restoring expression of VaCBF1 and VaCBF3. In vitro and in vivo ubiquitination assays confirmed that VaMIEL1 directly ubiquitinates VaMYB4a, accelerating its proteasomal degradation. Co-expression experiments further demonstrated that VaMIEL1 partially suppresses VaMYB4a-mediated cold tolerance, highlighting their opposing roles in modulating the CBF–COR pathway. Together, these results reveal an integrated mechanism linking ubiquitination, transcriptional activation, and oxidative stress mitigation during cold adaptation.

“Our findings demonstrate that cold tolerance in grapevine is not governed by a single pathway but instead by a coordinated system integrating transcriptional control and redox balance,” said the study’s corresponding author. “By identifying VaMIEL1 as a key regulator that destabilizes VaMYB4a, we show how the plant fine-tunes CBF–COR signaling and antioxidant activity in response to cold. This dual regulatory role expands our understanding of how perennial species survive harsh environments and provides a promising molecular handle for future crop improvement.”

The newly uncovered VaMIEL1–VaMYB4a module provides a valuable framework for breeding and engineering cold-resistant grapevine cultivars. Targeted suppression of VaMIEL1 or enhancement of VaMYB4a stability could improve CBF–COR activation and ROS detoxification, supporting plant survival during early-season frosts or extreme climate events. Because many crops rely on similar MYB- and ubiquitination-based regulatory networks, the findings may extend beyond grapevine, offering potential applications in apples, pears, and other temperate fruit species. This work opens new avenues for developing climate-adaptive crops that can sustain yield and quality under increasing environmental variability.

Venezuela Is Not About Drugs Or Migration: It Is Trump’s ‘Ukraine Moment’ – OpEd

December 28, 2025 
By M.K. Bhadrakumar

The Pentagon has deployed special operations aircraft, troops and equipment to the Caribbean region near Venezuela, The Wall Street Journal and other media reported on December 23. A significant force amassed in Puerto Rico, which has traditionally served as critical hub for refuelling, resupply and surveillance operations.

The 27th Special Operations Wing and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment deployed in the Caribbean specialise in supporting high-risk infiltration and extraction missions and providing close air support while the Army Rangers are tasked with seizing airfields and protecting special operations units such as Delta Force during precision kill or capture missions.

A satellite photo released this week by the Chinese private aerospace intelligence firm Mizar Vision showed the US Air Force F-35 fleet. The roughly 20 combat jets include a mix of F-35As and US Marine Corps F-35Bs. The deployments suggest forces are being pre-positioned for potential action.

The Trump administration is disregarding the vehemence of world opinion against any violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty, which was truly reflected in the UN Security Council meeting last week to discuss the increased US military presence in the Caribbean Sea and the enforcement of a de facto maritime blockade of Venezuela.

The Trump administration has read the tea leaves that neither Russia nor China will offer Venezuela anything beyond rhetoric to counter any US aggression. The Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova at a press briefing on Thursday sought to show restraint to “prevent the events from sliding towards a destructive scenario,” while voicing support for Caracas.

As for China, despite being South America’s top trading partner and although a regime change in Caracas would certainly hurt China’s vital interests, Beijing is wary of falling into a geopolitical trap.

Both Moscow and Beijing keep the larger context of US global power projection in view. For Russia, the US role in the coming year or two becomes very crucial for reaching a durable settlement in Ukraine. As for China, the matrix is more complicated.

In December, Beijing issued yet another Policy Paper on Latin America and the Carribean, third in a series, projecting an affirmative agenda for an institutionalised, expanded, and elevated relationship with LAC countries, reflecting China’s growing engagement with the Western Hemisphere and its increasingly comprehensive approach affirming China’s intent to continue building an alternative world order. This needs explaining.

The recent National Security Strategy document issued by the White House does not designate China as the greatest threat to the US, but it nonetheless states that the US government will maintain a military capable of deterring Chinese ambitions on Taiwan by military means. Put differently, it sent mixed signals to China.

On the one hand, the US appears to downgrade competition with China but on the other hand, the Trump administration has not made any significant steps to indicate disengagement in Asia.

Again, on the one hand, there is a colossal recklessness in Trump’s China policy by imposing tariffs on China which has a powerful economy that is capable of harsh retaliation; he has also approved a huge arms sale worth around $11 billion to Taiwan, which includes advanced rocket launchers, self-propelled howitzers and a variety of missiles — a deal that, according to Taiwan’s defence ministry, helps the island in “rapidly building robust deterrence capabilities”.

On the other hand, there is also a stupefying obsequiousness on the part of President Trump, as the bragging of a ‘G2’, exports of advanced chips to China and a permissiveness to allow Tik-Tok to stay open on favourable terms, etc. would signify.

Beijing fears that Washington might be trying to lure it into a false sense of security with its rhetoric and an ostensible geopolitical shift, so it remains cautious.

However, Beijing cannot but factor in the ‘big picture’ as well, which is that Trump is pushing the Americas toward a zero-sum geo-economic order in which the US expects the world to recognise what is being tested here — a blatantly coercive attempt to reorder the region’s resources and financial alignment.

The region’s heavyweights – Brazil and Mexico – stand in open opposition. President Lula da Silva of Brazil warned that an armed intervention would be a “humanitarian catastrophe” and a “dangerous precedent for the world.” Similarly, Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum has offered to mediate, seeking to prevent a return to the era of “gunboat diplomacy.”

This tension threatens to transform the South American continent into a theatre of the New Cold War. Specifically, Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven oil reserves, and it has utilised them to build a financial fortress in partnership with Beijing. Under the “Loans-for-Oil” model, China injected over $60 billion into Venezuela while the latter paid this debt not in dollars, but in physical barrels of crude.

Through a naval blockade, the US is attempting to dismantle this deal and the non-dollar payment system built around it. It is another story that Washington may also be trying to pressure global prices and squeeze petro-rivals like Russia and Iran.

What is often overlooked is that the US’ current conflict with Venezuela — like Ukraine or Taiwan problems — did not come out of nowhere. To understand the current conflict, we need to go beyond the geopolitics of oil or libertarian political philosophy or drug trafficking.

Things began changing when an anti-American shift began to be noticed in Caracas during Barack Obama’s presidency when most Republicans with a strong political base among Venezuelan migrants and their descendants in Florida — an important political constituency for Trump, by the way — began sensing that Venezuela was on a path to become a strongly anti-American country and a centre of influence for China, among others, in the region.

Nicolas Maduro’s rise to power only reinforced this belief. Suffice to say, neither drug trafficking nor migration can explain the current deterioration in US’ attitude. Only 10-20% of illegal substances smuggled into the US actually come from Venezuela; main migration routes do not even run through Venezuela.

The threat perception is primarily about Maduro’s anti-American stance, as well as his growing cooperation with Iran, Russia, and China. Things have come to a point that the only option left to Washington is to use military force — somewhat like the Kremlin’s 22nd February moment in 2022.

What emboldens the Trump administration is a clear shift in the Western Hemisphere, a continent that had been painted in red in political maps for much of the past two decades. Left-wing forces have not won a single presidential election in Latin America this year. Conservative ideas and policy priorities are gaining ground. Trump has encouraged this trend and in turn feels elated that one after another, those who admire, flatter and even emulate him are being elected.

Another factor is the collapse of Venezuela. The paradox is that traditional definitions of left and right are becoming outdated. If Venezuela is far from socialism, El Salvador is far from pure capitalism. In both cases, the state is operating under a form of kleptocratic, rent-seeking authoritarianism.

That said, while the overthrow of Maduro government is Trump’s stated goal, he is also apprehensive — and, rightly so — that a military confrontation may spiral out of control and that failure may stick to him just as the withdrawal from Afghanistan stuck to Joe Biden. Trump’s best hope was that Maduro would simply roll over.

But Maduro isn’t obliging. And Venezuela is 2.75 times bigger than Vietnam, and more than half of its landmass is covered by forests. Suffice to say, the Kremlin’s advice was empathetic when it made an extraordinary personal appeal to Trump:

“Russia expects the President of the United States Donald Trump to demonstrate his signature sense of pragmatism and reason for finding mutually acceptable solutions in keeping with the international law and norms.”

But then, geopolitics is hard ball and at times it becomes necessary to unleash the dogs of war. Which was what the Kremlin did in Ukraine, after all. 

This article was published at Indian Punchline

M.K. Bhadrakumar

M.K. Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.

 

COMMENT: Lukashenko plays the Trump card in bid to end Belarus’s isolation

Belarusian president Lukashenko is trying to lift sanctions by flattering US president Trump and its working. / bne IntelliNews

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By bne IntelliNews December 23, 2025

Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko has launched a calculated charm offensive towards Washington, using a mix of political prisoner releases, diplomatic gestures and strategic flattery aimed at aligning with US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy instincts. In the process, he is borrowing directly from the playbook he has long used with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

On December 13 after a US-brokered deal, Lukashenko released 123 political prisoners, including some of the most famous: presidential candidate Viktor Babariko, protest leader Maria Kolesnikova, Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski, and Tut.by editor Maryna Zolatava. In return, the US lifted sanctions on Belarus’s potash industry—its biggest cash cow—and hinted at broader concessions to come.

“Lukashenko is using the same approach in his dealings with Trump that has long proven successful with Putin,” political analyst Artyom Shraibman wrote in a commentary for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “That consists of identifying the senior partner’s soft spots and then massaging them with flattery, demonstrative loyalty, and unexpected offers of crisis management services.”

Relations between Belarus and the US have been warming in the last year, but it is still not clear if this a fundamental change in the relations or just a tactical play by Lukashenko. If Trump successfully concludes his transactional peace deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the US goes into business with Russia then the relationship with Minsk can be deepened, but if the war continues, Lukashenko will remain heavily dependent on Moscow which will limit any split.

In the meantime, the White House has been keen to engage in an attempt to peel Belarus away from Putin’s sphere of influence and Lukashenko has been a willing participant as he looks for leverage to balance his almost total dependence on Moscow. The Trump administration also believes Lukashenko provides a useful channel for influencing Putin. And this comes at very little cost to Washington.

“The US side has delegated the actual diplomacy to professionals. All Donald Trump is required to do is periodically pat Lukashenko on the shoulder via the US president’s social media posts, sign whatever his aides put on his desk when they talk to Minsk and bask in the glory of becoming the first Western leader to have secured the release of several hundred Belarusian political prisoners," says Shraibman.

Trump has appointed his former lawyer, John Coale, as special envoy to Belarus in November. Washington now appears willing to deepen ties, despite the limited strategic significance of Belarus compared to Ukraine or Russia. For Lukashenko, the shift presents a rare chance to escape years of diplomatic isolation.

“Trump may well get the credit for having rescued hundreds of hostages in support of his Nobel Peace Prize bid,” Shraibman noted, adding that Lukashenko is trying to capitalise on “Trump’s approach to the region,” which favours symbolic victories and transactional diplomacy.

Lukashenko has already played several of his aces. The release of 16 prisoners, including Sergey Tikhanovsky (Siarhei Tsikhanouskiy), this summer, the husband of Belarusian opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya (Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya), and now Bialiatski, Babariko, and Kolesnikova—shows that Minsk sees Trump’s policies as a rare opportunity to end what had looked set to be lifelong isolation.

 

Domestically, the opposition faces renewed pressure to reorganise. With several 2020-era leaders now free, the previously central figure in exile of Tikhanovskaya may see her position as de facto leader contested. Babariko and Kolesnikova have already taken more moderate stances, calling for dialogue with Minsk and for Europe to reassess its sanctions stance—contrasting with Tikhanovskaya’s harder line. As bne IntelliNews reported, the opposition in exile has already been riven by disputes over the best policy direction and a leadership struggle. After Tikhanovsky’s release, his blunt style and ambition have reportedly already led to several conflicts with his wife’s inner circle.

“The structure of the opposition must inevitably become more polyphonic,” Shraibman says. “Personal capital in the West is not easy to pass on, even if Tikhanovskaya wanted to do so.”

On the economic front, logistical constraints remain a key obstacle to restoring Belarusian potash exports. Despite US sanction relief, viable export routes through the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda remain blocked due to deteriorating relationships driven by a balloon smuggling scandal. While some in Vilnius have floated conditional cooperation—such as allowing potash transit in exchange for US troop deployments— the government has been lobbying the EU for increased sanctions on Minsk.

There are few alternative ports to handle the potash exports. There is a corridor to Russia’s northern ports, but the distances involved mean it is too expensive to transport the potash to them by rail. Poland’s Gdansk port remains politically off limits, as Lukashenko has refused to release Polish citizens in Minsk’s jails. A more radical option of exporting via Ukraine’s port of Odesa has been floated. But that is also unlikely as Kyiv considers Lukashenko complicit in Russia’s invasion after he allowed Russian troops to cross the northern border and attack Kyiv from Belarussian territory at the start of the Russian invasion.

One option for circumventing the remaining EU sanctions is if US companies buy Belarusian potash and then export it as their own. But it’s not clear whether such a scheme would be in keeping with the letter and spirit of EU sanctions.

“But that is precisely what could make it a tempting option for the United States,” said Shraibman. “The economic entanglement of former enemies after the war… fits perfectly with Trump’s approach to the region.”

In a surprise move, most of the released political prisoners were transferred not to Lithuania, but to Ukraine, signalling a shift in diplomatic positioning. According to Shraibman, the aim is twofold: “to exclude Lithuania and the Belarusian opposition-in-exile from the proceedings” and “to insert itself into the Russia–Ukraine peace process.”

“By framing his negotiations with the United States within the context of the Russia–Ukraine talks, Lukashenko is demonstrating his full support for Washington’s peace initiatives and his willingness to contribute as much as possible to them. Lukashenko also began his meeting with Coale on December 12 by praising Trump’s latest efforts to end the war and expressing his support for them.”3

Lukashenko has even offered Belarus as a safe haven for Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro—another authoritarian leader Trump is seeking to dislodge. This overture, combined with a media interview given to pro-Trump outlet Newsmax, marks a full-scale attempt to present Minsk as a useful partner in Washington’s geopolitical goals.

“Even if some ideas are not ultimately needed, the enthusiasm and desire to be helpful will not be forgotten,” Shraibman concluded.

Oreshnik in Belarus?

Oreshnik is an elusive missile. It shows up in various statements and there are some pretty tangible signs of its existence, but it is still not quite clear what the actual status of the missile is.

The most notable recent appearance of Oreshnik was in the Belarusian leader's 18 December 2025 address, in which he announced that Oreshnik was delivered to Belarus on 17 December 2025 and that it is "being placed on combat duty." Is it really?

My take is that there are reasons to be skeptical. Yes, there is strong evidence of preparations for the deployment, such as the potential deployment site found by Jeffrey Lewis' team (and confirmed by US intelligence). But there are also reasons not to read this evidence too literally, at least at this point in time.

This post is an attempt to collect what we know about Oreshnik to see how various pieces of the story fit together.

The name Oreshnik first appeared on 21 November 2024, when Russia used this missile to strike the Yuzhmash plant in Ukraine. (Here is a video of warheads hitting their targets.) In a special televised address the president of Russia described the strike as a test of a medium-range "non-nuclear hypersonic ballistic missile."

The missile was launched from Kapustin Yar, which is about 800 km away from Yuzhmash. This means that it is indeed a medium-range missile. Note that the reason it was described as a test is that technically the Russian INF moratorium proposal was still on the table. Apparently, the (not quite convincing) logic was that a test is different from deployment, so it would not violate the moratorium. Speaking at a meeting with designers on 22 November 2024, the Russian president confirmed the very narrow reading of the moratorium when he said that Oreshnik is only one of "a whole line of medium- and shorter-range systems." Nevertheless, the framing of the launch as a test was an interesting detail.

According to the report of the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces at the 22 November 2024 meeting, the missile was developed in accordance with the presidential decision of July 2023. It appears that the missile was tested at least twice before November 2024 - in October 2023 and June 2024 (MilitaryRussia.ru citing a report by the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate).

The Pentagon assessed that the missile was based on RS-26 Rubezh. The Pentagon spokesperson also said that "the United States was pre-notified briefly before the launch through nuclear risk reduction channels." Technically, since the missile was not a true ICBM, Russia was not under an obligation to send a notification, but it apparently decided to do so to avoid potential misunderstanding. If the missile is indeed based on RS-26, its signature during the boost phase would be very similar to Yars (since RS-26 was said to be based on RS-24 Yars). One can never be too careful. The Kremlin spokesman later said that the notification was "an automated warning [that] was sent 30 minutes before the launch." This is most certainly an error - these notifications are not automatic, and by all indications the warning was sent about 24 hours in advance, as required by the US-Russian agreement. We know that rumors of an upcoming ICBM launch were circulating in Ukraine the day before the strike.

The Belarusian involvement in the Oreshnik story started in December 2024. After a bilateral meeting on 6 December 2024, the president of Belarus asked for the missile to be deployed in Belarus (with a condition, though - that "the targets for these weapons" be determined by Belarus). The Russian president responded that such a deployment "is feasible." He also noted that it would be possible after the serial production of these missiles "is ratcheted up" and they are deployed with Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN). Moreover, the Russian president suggested that even though the missiles will be operated by RVSN, it would be up to Belarus "to identify the targets."

This kind of targeting arrangement does not look particularly realistic and suggests that something different is going on here. The exchange clearly followed the pattern that had been established earlier regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. The Belarusian leader makes bold statements and Russia plays along, especially during joint appearances.

A few days after this exchange, on 16 December 2024, the president of Russia said in an address to the Ministry of Defense that the serial production of Oreshnik "should begin in the near future." It's notable, though, that the Russian president did not mention the plan to deploy these missiles in Belarus (although he did say that these systems will be used "to protect Russia and our allies' security").

This pattern will persist through the entire year. While the president of Belarus has been constantly mentioning the deployment plan, his Russian counterpart has been more reserved. With the notable exception of joint appearances. Note, though, that he never seems to volunteer any details, opting to confirm the words of the Belarusian president. For example, at a meeting in August 2025, the Russian president confirmed that the site for the deployment in Belarus had been selected and that the missiles would be delivered by the end of the year.

At the same August meeting, the Russian president said that the industry had produced the first serial production system, which "has already been delivered to the troops." A few days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that formally withdrew the INF moratorium proposal made in October 2020. The statement, however, did not mention Oreshnik or any other specific system, noting instead that "decisions on the specific parameters of response measures will be made by the leadership of the Russian Federation" based on the analysis of the situation.

News about Oreshnik continued to come mostly from Belarus. However, the deployment announcement on 18 December 2025 came after the president of Russia said at a meeting at the Ministry of Defense on 17 December 2025 that "[b]y the end of the year, the medium-range missile system armed with the Oreshnik hypersonic missile will be placed on combat duty." Notably, he said nothing that would suggest that the missiles would be deployed in Belarus. Neither did he mention Oreshnik in Belarus when asked directly during the end-of-the-year press conference. The Minister of Defense, who spoke after the president, also said nothing about Belarus when mentioning Oreshnik. The Chief of the General Staff, who spoke the next day at a meeting with military attachés, told them that "a brigade has been formed equipped with a new medium-range missile system, Oreshnik."

I would say that "a brigade has been formed" is pretty far from "missiles have been delivered to Belarus where they are entering combat duty." I am far from suggesting that Oreshnik is a phantom missile - the evidence suggests that it is not. But at the same time, I do believe that we should be very skeptical about reports of its deployment in Belarus. I find it very hard to believe that the Strategic Rocket Forces, which are expected to operate the missile, will be happy about being stationed outside Russia. Besides, the case for the military utility of the deployment is virtually non-existent. Note that the Krichev-6 site is literally seven kilometers from the Russian border (see the image above).

The "division of labor" between Russia and Belarus regarding virtually all news about Oreshnik also makes me suspicious. We have seen a similar pattern with nuclear weapons - Russia lets Belarus make all kinds of statements about them and even builds a storage facility that should be capable of accepting these weapons if necessary. But there has been no confirmation of the deployment from the Russian side and there are no signs of weapons being actually delivered to Belarus (I believe they will never be deployed there, but that's a topic for another post). The same seems to be the case with the missile base. The infrastructure, of course, could become useful someday, but we are not there yet. For the moment, it appears that both sides are involved in a rather strange political spectacle. I still hope that it will not involve actual movements of missiles (not to mention nuclear weapons), but we cannot exclude that it will.

[Rocket Forces] [December 27, 2025] [#]

TrackBack

TrackBack URL for this entry: https://russianforces.org/cgi-bin/mt/mt-tb.cgi/1632

COMMENT: Myanmar’s 2025 vote - an election with the ending already written

A young child in Shan State, Myanmar / Jesse Schoff - Unsplash

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By Mark Buckton - Taipei December 28, 2025

Myanmar’s generals have finally produced the ballot box they have been promising since their 2021 coup. After five years of civil war, mass displacement of entire towns and villages and systematic repression across the country, the junta has staged the first part of what it calls a return to democratic rule.

However, as was reported by the Hindustan Times across the 1,640km border with India - the world’s largest democracy - what appears to be unfolding on election day, Sunday December 28, looks less like an election than a carefully managed performance; one designed to legitimise continued military control while excluding any genuine or effective political competition.

It is a play being staged without many of the actors though, as across junta-held parts of the country, polling stations opened to sparse crowds. In some locations, officials and journalists have reportedly outnumbered voters, reports say. This is a striking contrast to the long queues seen in the last nationwide election in 2020. That was a vote the military annulled before overthrowing the elected government and arresting its leaders the following year.

Under cover of COVID and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the generals have spent the intervening years insisting that a new election would restore stability. What is unfolding on the ground, however, bears little resemblance to that narrative.

The sham in action

As is, Myanmar, a nation of around 50mn, remains fractured by conflict, with large swathes of territory outside the military’s control. Voting is not taking place in rebel-held areas, in effect disenfranchising tens of millions of citizens. Even in cities such as Yangon and Mandalay, where polling stations are open, the atmosphere was largely subdued and tightly policed, the Hindustan Times says.

Added to this, the most popular political force in the country is absent altogether. Aung San Suu Kyi, the former civilian leader and enduring symbol of Myanmar’s democratic movement, remains behind bars and ageing. Now 80-years-old and from time to time reported as being in ill-health, her party, which won a landslide victory in 2020, has been dissolved and barred from contesting the vote. In its place, a field of military-aligned ‘parties’ and approved candidates are competing in a process widely criticised as being rigged from the outset.

As a result, international reaction has been scathing. Human rights groups, Western governments and the United Nations have all dismissed the election as a sham. Think Tank at the European Parliament ran a piece earlier in the month to this end, titled in part “Myanmar: Towards a 'sham' election”.

Efforts to shame the junta’s sweeping restrictions on free speech, assembly and the press, in addition to the ongoing imprisonment of thousands of political opponents is well known.

To this end, the only real beneficiary of the process is the Union Solidarity and Development Party, a pro-military vehicle widely seen as a civilian façade for continued martial rule. Victory for the party will - not would - allow the generals to claim constitutional legitimacy without surrendering real power, thus for Myanmar’s military leadership, the election is not a risk but an insurance policy.

Continued trade with regional partners

On the ground in Myanmar, the junta has long argued that restoring order must come before political freedoms. Yet, as its regional neighbours and the wider world know, it was the coup itself that plunged the country into chaos. Many leaders in the region though opt to turn a blind eye and have to some extent chosen to ignore the internal crisis and oppression of the populace in order to maintain business and trade ties.

These include China, a long time partner pushing the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative and Thailand for whom cross-border commerce includes agricultural products and consumer goods. India too, as well as Singapore and to a lesser extent Malaysia and Indonesia continue to trade with the junta. This is despite the fact that within Myanmar’s borders, air strikes on civilian areas and village burnings coupled to mass arrests continue and have become routine. More than 1mn people have been displaced and humanitarian needs continue to rise. This was only exacerbated by the magnitude 7.7, March 28 earthquake in the region which killed over 3,600.

In this context, the ‘election’ looks less like a step towards any form of effective stability and peace and more like an attempt to rewrite the historical and political narrative - with the tacit help of trade partners across South and Southeast Asia.

By pointing to ballot boxes and polling stations, the generals hope to persuade the wider world to accept the status-quo as it is recognised by China, Thailand India et al, albeit without looking too closely.

For many living in Myanmar, with nowhere else to go, however, staying away from the polls is the only form of protest still open to them.

How Myanmar's junta-run vote works, and why it might not

Yangon (Myanmar) (AFP) – Myanmar's junta presides over elections starting on Sunday, advertising the vote as a return to democratic normality five years after it mounted a coup that triggered civil war.


Issued on: 27/12/2025 - RFI

Myanmar's general elections have been widely slated as a charade to rebrand military rule © Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP/File

The vote has been widely slated as a charade to rebrand the rule of the military, which voided the results of the last elections in 2020, alleging massive voter fraud.

Here are some key questions surrounding the heavily restricted polls:

- Who is running? -

The pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party is by far the biggest participant, providing more than a fifth of all candidates, according to the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL).

Former democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her massively popular National League for Democracy party, which won a landslide in the last vote, are not taking part.

After the 2021 coup, Suu Kyi was jailed on charges rights groups say were politically motivated.

According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners advocacy group, some 22,000 political prisoners are languishing in junta jails.

The National League for Democracy and most of the parties that took part in the 2020 vote have been dissolved. ANFREL says organisations that won 90 percent of seats then will not be on Sunday's ballot.

Polling is taking place in three phases spread over a month, using new electronic voting machines which do not allow write-in candidates or spoiled ballots.

Who can and cannot vote?

Myanmar's civil war has seen the military lose swathes of the country to rebel forces -- a mix of pro-democracy guerillas and ethnic minority armies which have long resisted central rule -- and the vote will not take place in the areas they control.

A military-run census last year admitted it could not collect data from an estimated 19 million of the country's 50 million-odd inhabitants, citing "security constraints".

Amid the conflict, authorities have cancelled voting in 65 of the 330 elected seats of the lower house -- nearly one in five of the total.

More than one million stateless Rohingya refugees, who fled a military crackdown beginning in 2017 and now live in exile in Bangladesh, will also have no say.
How is a winner decided?

Seats in parliament will be allocated under a combined first-past-the-post and proportional representation system which ANFREL says heavily favours larger parties.

The criteria to register as a nationwide party able to contest seats in multiple areas have been tightened, according to the Asian election watchdog, and only six of the 57 parties standing have qualified.

Results are expected in late January.

Regardless of the outcome of the vote, a military-drafted constitution dictates a quarter of parliamentary seats be reserved for the armed forces.

The lower house, upper house, and military members each elect a vice president from among their ranks, and the combined parliament votes on which of the three will be elevated to president.

What happened in the run-up?

Myanmar's military-drafted constitution dictates a quarter of parliamentary seats be reserved for the armed forces © NHAC NGUYEN / AFP


ANFREL says the Union Election Commission overseeing the vote is an organ of the Myanmar military, rather than an independent body.

The head of the commission, Than Soe, was installed after Suu Kyi's government was toppled and is subject to an EU travel ban and sanctions for "undermining democracy" in Myanmar.

Social media sites including Facebook, Instagram and X have all been blocked since the coup, curtailing the spread of information.

The junta has introduced stark legislation punishing public protest or criticism of the poll with up to a decade behind bars, pursuing more than 200 people for prosecution under the new law.

Cases have been brought over private Facebook messages, flash mob protests scattering anti-election leaflets, and vandalism of candidate placards.

Myanmar has invited international monitors to witness the poll, but few countries have answered.

On Friday, state media reported a monitoring delegation had arrived from Belarus -- a country that has been ruled since 1994 by strongman President Alexander Lukashenko, who put down pro-democracy protests six years ago.

© 2025 AFP



Myanmar junta stages election after five years of civil war

Yangon (Myanmar) (AFP) – Voters trickled to Myanmar's heavily restricted polls on Sunday, with the ruling junta touting the exercise as a return to democracy five years after it ousted the last elected government and triggered a civil war.


Issued on: 27/12/2025 - RFI

The pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party is widely expected to emerge as the largest bloc © Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP

Former civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi remains jailed, while her hugely popular party has been dissolved and was not taking part.

Campaigners, Western diplomats and the United Nations' rights chief have all condemned the phased month-long vote, citing a ballot stacked with military allies and a stark crackdown on dissent.

The pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party is widely expected to emerge as the largest bloc, in what critics say would be a rebranding of martial rule.

Myanmar: where will elections take place © Nicholas SHEARMAN / AFP


"We guarantee it to be a free and fair election," junta chief Min Aung Hlaing told reporters after casting his ballot in the capital Naypyidaw.

"It's organised by the military, we can't let our name be tarnished."

The Southeast Asian nation of around 50 million people is riven by civil war and there will be no voting in areas controlled by rebel factions that have risen up to challenge military rule.

While opposition factions threatened to attack the election, there were no reports of violence against polling day activities by the time voting ended at 4:00 pm (0930 GMT).
Limited turnout

Snaking queues of voters formed for the previous election in 2020, which the military declared void a few months later when it ousted Aung San Suu Kyi and seized power.

But when a polling station near her vacant home closed on Sunday, only around 470 of its roughly 1,700 registered voters had cast ballots, an election official said -- a turnout of less than 28 percent.

Its first voter, Bo Saw, 63, said the election "will bring the best for the country".

"The first priority should be restoring a safe and peaceful situation," he told AFP.

At a downtown Yangon station near the gleaming Sule Pagoda -- the site of huge pro-democracy protests after the 2021 coup -- 45-year-old Swe Maw dismissed international criticism.

"There are always people who like and dislike," he said at a polling station that later reported a turnout of below 37 percent.

The Southeast Asian nation of around 50 million is riven by civil war and there will be no voting in areas controlled by rebel factions © Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP

The run-up saw none of the feverish public rallies that Aung San Suu Kyi once commanded, and the junta has waged a withering pre-vote offensive to claw back territory.

"I don't think this election will change or improve the political situation in this country," said 23-year-old Hman Thit, displaced by the post-coup conflict.

"I think the air strikes and atrocities on our hometowns will continue," he said in a rebel-held area of Pekon township in Shan state.

The run-up to the election saw none of the feverish public rallies that former civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi once commanded © Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP


The military ruled Myanmar for most of its post-independence history, before a 10-year interlude saw a civilian government take the reins in a burst of optimism and reform.

However, Min Aung Hlaing snatched power in a coup, alleging widespread voter fraud, after Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy party trounced pro-military opponents in the 2020 elections.

The military put down pro-democracy protests and many activists quit the cities to fight as guerrillas alongside ethnic minority armies that have long held sway in Myanmar's fringes.

There is no official death toll for Myanmar's civil war and estimates vary widely, but global conflict monitoring group ACLED tallies media reports of violence and estimates that 90,000 people have been killed on all sides since the coup.

Aung San Suu Kyi is serving a 27-year sentence on charges that rights groups dismiss as politically motivated.

"I don't think she would consider these elections to be meaningful in any way," her son Kim Aris said from his home in Britain.
Vote 'disruption' banned

Most parties from the 2020 vote, including Aung San Suu Kyi's, have since been dissolved.

The Asian Network for Free Elections says 90 percent of the seats in the previous election went to organisations that did not appear on Sunday's ballots.

New electronic voting machines did not allow write-in candidates or spoiled ballots.

A voter shows an inked finger after casting a ballot © NHAC NGUYEN / AFP


The junta is pursuing prosecutions against more than 200 people for violating draconian legislation forbidding "disruption" of the poll, including protest or criticism.

The United Nations in Myanmar said it was "critical that the future of Myanmar is determined through a free, fair, inclusive and credible process that reflects the will of its people".

The second round of polling will take place in two weeks before the third and final round on January 25, but the junta has acknowledged that elections cannot happen in almost one in five lower house constituencies.

© 2025 AFP

Pope Leo XIV has 'his work cut out for him' in battling Catholic antisemitism: analysis

Pope Leo XIV gestures after delivering the traditional Christmas Day Urbi et Orbi speech to the city and the world from the main balcony of St. Peter's Basilica at the Vatican, December 25, 2025. REUTERS/Yara Nardi

Adam Lynch

December 25, 2025 

ALTERNET

Author Lev Golinkin recently described an old-timey minstrel show at a Ukrainian Catholic church in Orlando, Florida, complete with hateful caricatures of a minority target, only now paraded before a modern audience and couched in Christmas celebration.

“The pageant isn’t short on spectacle,” Golinkin writes in the Washington Post. “The Holy Family, richly robed wise men, armored Roman soldiers and peasants dressed in bright Ukrainian embroidery all catch the eye. But even amid that explosion of color, the Jew is easy to spot. He appears on stage as a caricature of a Hasidic innkeep, including payot sidelocks. The character’s name is Moshko the zhyd — a slur for 'Jew' — and he is there to remind audience members of the evil in their midst.”

He parades about with promises to lend money and antics to distract revelry away from baby Jesus laying in his crib. And if he fails to catch your attention, he’ll call up a bunch of Roma (the slur name is “Gypsies”) to cavort and distract. He’ll even summon Satan himself to pull eyes away from the little marvel in a manger. Both pledge to keep the peasants ignorant of Jesus and wallowing in sin.

“This vestige of medieval antisemitism was just publicly live-streamed by St. Mary Protectress Ukrainian Catholic Church in Orlando, Florida, whose Facebook page invites viewers to ‘immerse yourselves in the magic of Christmas.’ But I don’t mean to single out this church; its pageant is not unusual,” said Golinkin. “Every winter, hundreds of Moshkos don the Jewish equivalent of blackface and scuffle onto stages in churches and community centers from New York to Chicago, Connecticut to Ohio, Dublin to Dubai. And many of the pageants, called verteps, are propagated by a branch of the Roman Catholic Church.”

The most jarring aspect of some of these spectacles, said Golinkin, is seeing children scream for the zhyd to ‘get out,’ or dress up as Moshko and his wife, “Sarah,” themselves, proclaiming their wickedness to the encouragement of parents, teachers and priests in the audience.

The scene is unnerving to Golinkin, who fled Russia with his family when the Russians similarly ordered them to “get out.”

“I’m certainly not the first immigrant to discover Old World darkness lurking in the U.S. But there was something obscenely mesmerizing about scrolling through social media and coming across little children — kids for whom Hasidic innkeeps might as well be Ottoman padishahs — being coaxed into shouting an antisemitic slur in churches and credit unions tucked amid strip malls,” said Golinkin. “Old hatreds have been lovingly packed and replanted. My nightmare was another’s nostalgia.”

At the end of the show, after King Herod is thwarted and Jesus manages to survives, Moshko comes out to collect donations from the audience.

“You could teach a course on antisemitism based on vertep tropes,” said Golinkin. And while Pope Leo XIV recently proclaimed in a speech that “The Church does not tolerate antisemitism,” the pontiff clearly has “his work cut out for him” with Antisemitic pageants legitimized at Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and splashed across Facebook pages.

“The reality is that right now bishops and priests across the globe, including in Pope Leo’s hometown of Chicago, are carrying out an annual tradition of teaching children to hate Jews and Roma,” Golinkin said.

The question with whether the church will continue to tolerate it.

Read Golinkin's Washington Post report at this link.