The Illegal Attack on Iran
Smoke from Israeli airstrike on Iran. Screengrab from video posted to X.
Israel’s consistent attacks on Iran since 2023 have all been illegal, violations of the United Nations Charter (1945). Iran is a member state of the United Nations and is therefore a sovereign state in the international order. If Israel had a problem with Iran, there are many mechanisms mandated by international law that permit Israel to bring complaints against Iran.
Thus far, Israel has avoided these international forums because it is clear that it has no case against Iran. Allegations that Iran is building a nuclear weapon, which are constantly raised by the United States, the European Union, and Israel, have been fully investigated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and found to be unfounded. It is certainly true that Iran has a nuclear energy programme that is within the rules in place through the IAEA, and it is also true that Iran’s clerical establishment has a fatwa (religious edict) in place against the production of nuclear weapons. Despite the IAEA findings and the existence of this fatwa, the West – egged on by Israel – has accepted this irrational idea that Iran is building a nuclear weapon and that Iran is therefore a threat to the international order. Indeed, by its punctual and illegal attacks on Iran, it is Israel that is a threat to the international order.
Over the past decades, Iran has called for the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone, a strange idea coming from a country accused of wanting to build a nuclear weapon. But this idea of the nuclear free zone has been rejected by the West, largely to protect Israel, which has an illegal nuclear weapons programme. Israel is the only country in the Middle East with a nuclear weapon, although it has never tested it openly nor acknowledged its existence. If Israel was so keen on eliminating any nuclear threat, it should have taken the offer for the creation of a nuclear-free zone heartily.
Neither the Europeans, who so often posture as defenders of international law, nor the United Nations leadership have publicly pushed Israel to adopt this idea because both recognise that this would require Israel, not Iran, to denuclearise. That this is an improbable situation has meant that there has been no movement from the West or from the international institutions to take this idea forward and build an international consensus to develop a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
Israel does not want to build a nuclear-free zone in the region. What Israel wants is to be the sole nuclear power in the region, and therefore to be exactly what it is – namely, the largest United States military base in the world that happens to be the home to a large civilian population. Iran has no ambition to be a nuclear power. But it has an ambition to be a sovereign state that remains committed to justice for the Palestinians. Israel has no problem with the idea of sovereignty per se, but has a problem with any state in the region that commits itself to Palestinian emancipation. If Iran normalised relations with Israel and ceased its opposition to US dominion in the region, then it is likely that Israel would end its opposition to Iran.
Israel and the United States Prepared the Way
In January 2020, the United States conducted an illegal assassination at Iraq’s Baghdad Airport to kill General Qassim Soleimani, the leader of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Soleimani, through the Quds Force, had produced for Iran an insurance policy against further Israeli attacks on the country. The Quds Force is responsible for Iranian military operations outside the boundaries of the country, including building what is called the ‘Axis of Resistance’ that includes the various pro-Iranian governments and non-governmental military forces. These included: Hezbollah in Lebanon, various IRGC groups in Syria that worked with Syrian militia groups, the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, several Palestinian factions in Occupied Palestine, and the Ansar Allah government in Yemen. Without its own nuclear deterrent, Iran required some way to balance the military superiority of Israel and the United States. This deterrence was created by the ‘Axis of Resistance’, an insurance policy that allowed Iran to let Israel know that if Israel fired at Iran, these groups would rain missiles on Tel Aviv in retaliation.
The assassination of Soleimani began a determined new political and military campaign by the United States, Israel, and their European allies to weaken Iran. Israel and the United States began to punctually strike Iranian logistical bases in Syria and Iraq to weaken Iran’s forward posture and to demoralise the Syrian and Iraqi militia groups that operated against Israeli interests. Israel began to assassinate IRGC military officers in Syria, Iran, and Iraq, a campaign of murder that began to have an impact on the IRGC and the Quds Force.
Taking advantage of its genocidal war against the Palestinians in Gaza, Israel, with full support from the United States and Europe, began to damage the ‘Axis of Resistance’, Iran’s insurance policy. Israel took its war into Lebanon, with a ruthless bombing campaign that included the assassination of the Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah on 27 September 2024. This campaign, while it has not totally demolished Hezbollah, has certainly weakened it. Meanwhile, Israel began a regular bombing campaign against the Syrian military positions around Damascus and along the road to Idlib in the north. This bombing campaign, coordinated with the US military and with the US intelligence services, was designed to open the roadway for the entry of the former al-Qaeda fighters into Damascus and to overthrow the government of al-Assad on 8 December 2024. The fall of the al-Assad government dented Iran’s strength across the Levant region (from the Turkish border to the Occupied Palestinian Territory) as well as along the plains from southern Syria to the Iranian border. The consistent campaign by the United States to bomb Yemeni positions further resulted in the loss of Ansar Allah’s heavy equipment (including long-range missiles) that fundamentally threatened Israel.
What this meant was that by early 2025, the Iranian insurance policy against Israel had collapsed. Israel began its march to war, suggesting an attack on Iran was imminent. Such an attack, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows, would help him in a domestic political fight with the ultra-orthodox parties over the question of a military exemption for their communities; this will prevent his government from falling. Cynical Netanyahu is using genocide and the possibility of a horrendous war with Iran for narrow political ends. But that is not what is motivating this attack. What is motivating this attack is that Israel smells an opportunity to try to overthrow the Iranian government by force.
Iran returned to the negotiations brokered by the IAEA to prevent such an attack. Its leadership knew full well that nothing would stop a scofflaw such as Israel from bombing Iran. And nothing did. Not even the fact that Iran is still at the negotiation table. Israel has taken advantage of Iran’s momentary weakness to strike. And that strike might escalate further.
Trump and Iran
Etezad: Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi recently announced that it is possible for American foreign companies to invest in Iran. Earlier, President Masoud Pezzekian stated that the Iranian leader has no problem with Americans investing in Iran. Will these statements be tempting for Trump and American investors? Why?
Fayazmanesh: Let me start answering your questions by adding a preamble. In dealing with Donald Trump, Iran faces some dilemmas, not unlike those that many Americans face. From the perspective of nearly half of the voting population in the US the head of the executive branch of the US government—the part that enforces laws—is a convicted felon. In addition to being a criminal, he is, as I pointed out in 2020, a “sociopath,” a “clown,” a “narcissist,” a “habitual liar,” “inept,” and a “cheater,” to use various traits mentioned by his own relatives. According to some of his former aids, he is also an “idiot,” a “dope,” a “moron,” “unhinged,” “erratic,” with the understanding of “a fifth- or sixth-grader,” etc. One can now add to these features old age and possible signs of dementia. Can such a person enforce the laws of the land? Can the presidency of such a man be taken seriously? Is there actually a choice here? These are some of the dilemmas that many Americans face. From the perspective of Iran there is an additional one: in his previous administration Trump showed a great deal of hostility toward Iran, such as leaving the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and ordering the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force. Can Iran set aside all these and “make a deal” with him? I am afraid I do not have a clear answer to resolving these dilemmas. But in any dealings with Trump one must not forget these predicaments and must keep them in perspective. Definitely, one should not appear overenthusiastic, as some Iranian officials appear to be.
Now let me get back to your question. Tempting Trump to reduce some sanctions on Iran—presumably those related to Iran’s nuclear program—by offering to open Iranian markets to American investors shows lack of sophistication on Iran’s part. Not only the quandaries that I mentioned are nowhere in perspective, but the Iranian diplomats seem to be trying to appeal to one of the worst instincts of Donald Trump: his shopkeeper mentality. They are trying to entice him to make a “deal.” But this master of the “art of the deal,” this real estate gambler, this crooked card player, this charlatan, as a judge called him, must be given something in return for making a deal: perhaps a $400 million luxury jet (not the old and rotten types that Iran has), or a Trump tower in Tehran, or maybe a golf resort on the Caspian Sea shore? Is Iran willing to oblige?
Setting all this aside, it is too premature to think about making financial deals with Donald Trump, when the negotiations between Iran and the US are still stuck at square one, i.e., whether Iran will be allowed to enrich any uranium. There have been more than forty years of sanctions on Iran. Only some of these sanctions are related to Iran’s nuclear enrichment. Even if these sanctions are removed, others, such as those related to weapons programs in general, missiles technology in particular, human rights violations, etc., will remain. Furthermore, even if Iran agrees to deal with all these issues, it will take years to negotiate the removal of all these sanctions and establish full diplomatic relations with the US. Only then one can talk about US corporations investing in Iran.
Etezad: Some analysts believe that if Iran and the United States reach an agreement, only American companies will be allowed to operate in Iran, including companies that can help produce clean electricity from non-carbon sources. What is your opinion? Is it possible for American companies to be present in this field in Iran? What are the major obstacles and challenges on this path?
Fayazmanesh: I believe that the analysts that you mention are engaged in wishful thinking. Which country would be allowed, or not allowed, to invest in Iran—if the US and Iran ever settle their disputes—is quite hypothetical at this point. In addition, the above-mentioned analysts appear to be very naïve in thinking that the US can help Iran produce clean energy and do away with fossil fuels. The United Stated is the second largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world (China being the first). It might, in a few years, have the great distinction of being the first polluter, if Trump has his way. Afterall the man ran on the slogan “drill, baby, drill.” He thinks that climate change is a hoax, hates wind power, took the US out of the Paris Agreement, has already rolled back much of the environmental regulations, etc. To put it succinctly, the president of the US is the enemy of the environment. Why do the analysts believe that Trump could help Iran with clean energy?
Etezad: Given the Russian investment in the Bushehr nuclear reactors and the strengthening of commercial cooperation between Iran and Russia in the fields of banking and trade, is it possible for American business activists and companies to expand their presence in Iran in the coming years, especially in the nuclear field? Why is Iran deepening its relations with Russia at the same time as negotiating with the United States? Does this indicate that Iran has no motivation or hope for fruitful negotiations with the United States?
Fayanmanesh: Once again, it is too premature to talk about US corporations expanding their business in Iran in competition with Russians.
As to why Iran has gotten closer to Russia, I think the answer is clear: 1) It has no other options. It is treated as a pariah in the West. So, it deals with some countries in the East that are themselves considered to be outcasts by the West, namely China and Russia. This is, of course, contrary to the 1979 revolutionary slogan of “neither East nor West.” 2) It follows the dictum of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” a dictum that can have negative consequences for Iran. Just remember that Russia and China, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, helped in passing six UN sanctions resolutions against Iran, paralyzing the Iranian economy. The two countries, of course, made deals with the US beforehand.
Etezad: Is it possible to lift sanctions on Iran similar to Trump’s decision on Syria? What are the obstacles to lifting sanctions on Iran? Especially given Trump’s unpredictability?
Fayazmanesh: Even though Syria was sanctioned by the US in 1979 for being a “State Sponsor of Terrorism,” and subsequently in 2004 and 2011, it never faced the kind of sanctions that Iran has faced and is facing. As you might know, I wrote two volumes on US sanctions on Iran through the first administration of Barak Obama. In my work I mentioned and analyzed almost all the US sanctions. But what I did then cannot be done today, since the number of sanctions is so enormous that such an analysis is almost impossible. Nowadays, sanctions are being levied against Iran every few days. Most of these sanctions are by executive order, which means the president of the US can remove them, if he wants. But some are congressional. These cannot be wiped clean by the president. Of course, we live in a time when the US congress appears to be just a rubber stamp for what Donald Trump wants to do. But if there is anything that would unify the congress against Trump is attempting to remove congressional sanctions against Iran. Why? Because Israel and its lobby groups in the US would not allow it.
Also, in comparing the removal of sanctions in Syria to Iran, one should not forget that in Syria there was a “regime change.” That is why Trump promised to remove the Syrian sanctions.
Etezad: Given that companies such as Total have already exited the Iranian market due to Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign and the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, will Europeans be willing to invest in Iran if Iran and the US reach an agreement? In what way will Europeans return to Iran to invest?
Fayazmanesh: My answer above about not jumping the gun and thinking about foreign investment still holds. But let me also add the following. As an economist who is conscious of the environmental damage of fossil fuels and believes in “degrowth,” I have a hard time thinking about opening the Iranian market to this or that oil company. The oil industry not only is the major contributor to the sixth mass extinction on this plant, it is, fortunately, a dying industry. Iran should have long ago tried to diversify its economy and move away from relying on oil as a major source of income. This not only would have been helpful to the environment but could have made Iran economically less vulnerable. Unfortunately, Iran is addicted to extraction of oil and does not appear to be able to think outside the box.
Etezad: Some say that until Iran’s approach to regional issues and other countries, especially Israel, changes, there is no possibility of American investment in Iran. What is your opinion? Given the recent deterioration of relations between Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and US President Trump, how do you assess this issue? Do private American companies generally make decisions based on their own corporate interests and US interests, or do they take Israel’s considerations into account?
Fayazmanesh: Iran has recently improved its relations with many of its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Azerbaijan. One country in the region that appears to be the eternal enemy of Iran is Israel. Why that is the case requires much analysis which is beyond the scope of this interview. You can find the reasons in my books and articles. Let me just say that after the Iraq-Iran War Israel turned its attention to containing Iran for its support of the Palestinians, effectively joining the “dual containment policy” of the US. It then became the underwriter of much of the sanctions policy of the US, and has, over the decades, tried to push the US to attack Iran. It is inconceivable to think that Israel’s policy toward Iran will change as long as Iran supports some Palestinian groups. As far as the reported spat between Netanyahu and Trump is concerned, I would not expect much change in the US policy toward Iran. As I said above, Israel and its powerful lobbies dominate the political scene in the US; just look at the Trump administration’s supposed concern with the bloodshed in Ukraine and compare it to the unconditional support for the slaughter and destruction in Gaza.
Etezad: What are the obstacles to foreign investment, especially American and European investment in Iran? Are the obstacles facing European investors different from those facing American investors?
Fayazmanesh: The main obstacles are obviously sanctions, not just US secondary sanctions, but the European Union sanctions themselves. As long as there is no agreement between Iran, the US and Europe over enriching uranium, there cannot be any talk of foreign investment. There are, of course, other points of contention between Iran and these countries, such as Iran’s missiles technology, its alleged support for “terrorist” organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as human rights violations. Another obstacle is Iran’s refusal to join agreements dealing with money laundering.
Etezad: Is it possible for Iran to integrate into the global financial and economic system? What are the preconditions for this? Could Iran’s recent approval of the FATF terms be a positive step in this direction?
Fayazmanesh: As I alluded to above, for years Iran had refused to join conventions dealing with money laundering and transfer of assets. These conventions are mostly Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Palermo Protocol. While the first is an intergovernmental body dealing with money laundering and support for terrorism, the second is a UN protocol dealing with transnational organized crime, such as human trafficking and trafficking in persons. As far as I know, Iran has not yet approved all the terms of the FATF. But a few weeks ago, after much wranglings, Iran’s Expediency Council “conditionally” approved the Palermo Convention. Subsequently, the speaker of Majlis sent the bill to the executive branch.
Etezad: What economic model or historical example do you propose to follow to normalize Iran-US relations and integrate Iran into the international system? The Chinese model or another example?
Fayazmanesh: Once again, we are getting ahead of ourselves and entering the realm of speculation. The US and Iran appear to be stuck at the level of enrichment of uranium in Iran. There is no sign of any grand bargain or rapprochement between Iran and the US. And if there is ever going to be such a bargain, I do not think it would be done by a character whose traits I mentioned above. I assume that by the Chinese model you are referring to the rapprochement between US and China in the early 1970s. That was a very different time and different situation. At the time, China and the US were both superpowers, entangled with another superpower, the Soviet Union. The US tried to lure away China from the Soviet Union, to create a wedge between them. The result was Nixon’s trip to China in 1972 and the grand bargain. Iran is neither a superpower, nor a very significant and close ally of any superpower that strategically needs to be separated.
Etezad: What do you think is Iran’s priority in negotiating with the US? Lifting sanctions and attracting foreign capital or maintaining uranium enrichment and security priorities and guarantees? What do you think is Trump’s priority in negotiating with Iran? Providing the opportunity for American companies to invest in Iran and help the US economy or focusing on Iran’s nuclear program and security issues?
Fayazmanesh: Iran’s enrichment program has become a vicious cycle. It enriches uranium, especially to high levels, in order to get out of sanctions and it faces more and more sanctions because it enriches uranium! How to get out of this cycle is beyond me. A country should have never gotten itself in such a problematic situation in the first place. And saying, as some do in Iran, that the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) gives Iran the right to enrich does not help. The NPT merely states: “All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Moreover, even if the NPT did give Iran the right to enrich uranium, we do not live in a just and rational world where rights are necessarily respected (look at the current situation in the US where Donald Trump is trampling on many rights unimpeded). Unfortunately, in this world the rich and the powerful decide what rights are.
Etezad: To what extent do you consider the pressure of groups in Iran that benefit from sanctions to sabotage the process of negotiations between Iran and the United States to be effective? To what extent do you think Israel can effectively sabotage this process and in what way?
Fayazmanesh: I know that there are many individuals and groups in Iran that do not support any negotiations with the West, particularly with the US. I read their writings and reasonings almost daily. Some probably represent those that profit from sanctions, such as those involved in various kinds of clandestine trade, particularly in oil, and currency markets. But some are sincere in their opposition to the West when it comes to “giving up Iran’s rights” that I alluded to above. But they don’t offer any solutions other than confrontation: enriching uranium to high levels, perhaps exiting the NPT, and even developing nuclear weapons. Following these recommendations could be suicidal, perhaps as suicidal as Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israeli settlers, which unleashed the long-awaited genocidal war by Israel on the people of Gaza. Israel would like nothing more than to see Iran follow these recommendations. It can then unite the entire Western imperial powers to wage a bloody war against Iran. These would be the same imperial powers who are not only silent on the carnage in Gaza but are helping Israel carry out its genocide. In such a war Iran can probably inflict some damage on its adversaries, but its devastation is certain.
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