A UN expert called out the US government on Wednesday for its rollback of sanctions against entities supplying weapons and other support to the Myanmar military, the junta, finding the act “unconscionable.”
Special Rapporteur for Myanmar, Tom Andrews, explained in his statement that the military equipment delisted by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has been facilitating the junta’s arms trade, such as providing aircraft, naval guns, surveillance systems, and raw materials used to manufacture weapons domestically.
Andrews explained in his statement that this military and arms support had been deployed in attacks that “likely constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes.” Such attacks included the junta’s targeting of civilians, hospitals, schools, and places of worship. Andrews condemned the US’s withdrawal of sanctions: “This is a major step backward for international efforts to save lives by restricting the murderous junta’s access to weapons. It is unconscionable to undermine these efforts by rolling back sanctions on Myanmar arms dealers and junta cronies.”
According to Andrews, the sanctions previously imposed by the US, along with those brought on by other countries, were successful in limiting the junta’s access to military equipment. Between 2023-2024, the junta’s access had fallen by more than 30 percent. The sanctions were issued under an executive order signed by former President Joe Biden in early February 2021.
In the order, Biden had declared a national emergency due to the military coup started by the junta in Myanmar early that same month. The order granted the OFAC the ability to block the property and interests of any foreign person determined to be involved in supporting military functions or complicit in human rights abuses. The order also aimed to target the financial and logistical networks sustaining the military junta.
The US sanctions lift follows President Donald Trump’s letter to Myanmar’s military leader, Min Aung Hlaing, sent in early July, warning him of a 40 percent levy unless a new trade deal was finalized. The military chief praised Trump’s “strong leadership” and expressed his “sincere appreciation” in response while requesting reductions in US tariffs and sanctions.
Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has criticized the junta for recruiting child soldiers. HRW reported that children as young as 12 years old are being used as “porters, guides, and in combat roles.” According to the UN, human rights law requires children to be 18 to be recruited and used in conflict.
The Return Of ILO Article 33 And Myanmar’s Dilemma – Analysis
By Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre
By Aung Thet Paing Hmue
The reinvocation of ILO Article 33 in May 2025, while potentially delivering a significant blow to Myanmar’s military junta, has also raised serious concerns about further destabilizing the country’s already fragile economy amid its ongoing polycrisis.
Key Takeaways:
- Myanmar is the first country ever subjected to ILO Article 33 twice, reflecting global alarm over forced labour under military rule.
- While Article 33 aims to increase pressure on the junta, it risks worsening Myanmar’s fragile economy and humanitarian crisis.
- To avoid unintended harm, global actors must target military-linked businesses and support workers through responsible disengagement.
Myanmar and the ILO: The Historic First Invocation of Article 33
To understand the gravity of the ILO Article 33 decision, it is essential to revisit the historical context of the first invocation and its consequences. In 1997, the ILO established a Commission of Inquiry investigating Myanmar’s systematic violation of the Forced Labour Convention 1930. The Commission’s 1998 reportrevealed the widespread systematic use of forced labour imposed by the authorities for infrastructure, logging, and the use of civilians as porters. Women, children, and ethnic minorities were among the victims, subjected to harsh conditions under this forced labor system. In response, the ILO urged the Myanmar Military Government to enact legislative reform by May 1999 and abolish forced labour.
However, Myanmar failed to comply with the ILO’s recommendations despite the existence of penal code section 374, which prohibits forced labour. This action led the ILO to invoke Article 33 for the first time in 2000. Under Article 33, the ILO called on member countries to review their relations with Myanmar and consider appropriate measures.
While most Western countries supported the decision to use Article 33, ASEAN, China, Russia, and India opposed it against Myanmar. These countries favoreddialogue and advocated a cooperative approach instead due to their strategic interests and geopolitical relationships with Myanmar. This marked the first-ever use of this enforcement clause in ILO history, resulting in limited economic isolation, suspension of labour-led aid, reduced technical cooperation, and reputational damage that discouraged foreign investments.
In June 2013, the ILO lifted Article 33 measures against Myanmar following political reforms and legal changes implemented under a government led by former military generals. This helped attract foreign direct investment (FDI) until 2017 before the Rohingya humanitarian crisis, and supported Myanmar’s greater reintegration into the global economy.
What is ILO Article 33?
ILO Article 33 is part of the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Constitution. It is the most serious enforcement tool and is only used when a member state fails to comply with ILO recommendations regarding complaints of serious violations of international labor standards – Article 26.
ILO Article 33 states that if a member country fails to follow the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry (COI) or a decision made by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) within the given time, the ILO Governing Body can suggest to the leading conference what actions should be taken to ensure compliance. These actions are neither compulsory nor legally binding, but can impose various diplomatic pressure and economic restrictions on the violating country.
In contrast, the ILO 33 allows its member states to review and sever their relationship, suspend technical cooperation, and impose coordinated sanctions and restrictions. Although compliance is voluntary and follow-up depends on the political will of each member state, ILO Article 33 serves as a tool for collective pressure and international solidarity toward non-compliant countries.
The 2021 Coup and ILO actions
Following the 2021 military coup, the Myanmar military targeted trade unions and their associated members. These claims included the oppression of the freedom of association, rights to organise, and anti-union discrimination. Due to the rising concerns, the ILO takes various actions in response to Myanmar’s worsening mass repression –
- In June 2021, the ILO adopted a resolution rejecting the junta’s claims to represent the country at the 109th Conference.
- In June 2022, the ILO established the 14th ILO Commission of Inquiry (COI), the highest-level investigation body to examine Myanmar’s non-compliance with freedom of association and forced labor conventions.
- In October 2023, the COI found far-reaching violations and urged the junta to immediately cease violence against its own people, end forced labour, and release imprisoned unionists.
- In 2024, 352 sessions of the ILO Governing Body concluded that the junta had made no progress and proceeded to enforce ILC resolutions and COI’s recommendations.
- In June 2025, the ILO reinstated Article 33 on Myanmar at its 113th International Labour Conference.
Military Regimes’ feedback and actions
In November 1998, Myanmar responded to the Commission of Inquiry (COI) report by claiming that the information was politically motivated, highly biased, lacked objectivity, and was without any goodwill. On the other hand, the Myanmar Military Government formed a High-Level Coordination Committee and showed willingness to collaborate with the ILO.
For the second invocation of the ILO Article 33 on Myanmar again in 2025, the junta’s labor minister similarly rejected the invocation of Article 33 against Myanmar as “politically motivated” in June 2025. Conversely, the National Unity Government (NUG) issued a statement welcoming the resolution on the same day it was invoked. NUG stated that this action would lead Myanmar to restore democracy.
When ILO Article 33 was first invoked against Myanmar, the ILO was allowed to visit Myanmar to meet with the Myanmar junta’s ministers, various institutions, including the National League of Democracy (NLD), and many other agencies and organisations. This indicates that the Myanmar authorities at the time were more receptive to the ILO’s presence and actions than the current State Administrative Council (SAC) government.
Economic Implications of the Resolution
The ILO’s 2000 Article 33 resolution placed significant global pressure on the Myanmar Military Regime and resulted in diplomatic isolation and reputation damage. Several countries and corporations reconsidered or suspended their engagement with Myanmar, and development assistance was also reduced. The Military Regime allowed the opening of an ILO Liaison Office in Yangon in 2002, and had limited cooperation.
Article 33 aims to protect and help workers by putting a powerful resolution in place that will put pressure on military authorities responsible for systemic labour abuses. At the same time, this invocation caused economic harm to ordinary workers, especially in export sectors like garments, when brands withdraw or suspend operations without differentiating between civilian and military‑affiliated businesses.
Myanmar’s economy has already been fragile following the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 coup, and the 2025 Sagaing earthquakes, resulting in a contraction of 2.5 percent in real GDP. The reinstatement of Article 33 in 2025 is likely to bring renewed political and economic pressure and can hinder Myanmar’s already vulnerable communities. Many western countries, Japan, the EU, etc., can coordinate the ILO article 33 invocation, while some countries may hesitate due to their strategic or economic interest. Global brands may withdraw from Myanmar’s garment, agriculture, and mining sectors due to their reputation risks. Moreover, suspending technical cooperation and development aid would also lead to a humanitarian crisis for the grassroots people amid the ongoing polycrisis.
While the invocation aims to protect workers, it can backfire with severe unintended consequences to the workers it aimed to help. This harm is amplified because the Myanmar Military corporate empires and conglomerates (e.g., MEC, MEHL) systematically use complex webs of subsidiaries, shell companies, and obscured ownership structures to evade sanctions and continue accessing international markets and foreign exchange. These shadow networks make distinguishing between civilian and military linkage complicated for outsiders. Therefore, the disengagement by international brands should be driven by careful consideration so as not to cause collateral damage to ordinary workers.
Recommendations: Strategic Targeting of Military Ties to Maximise Impact
Article 33 does not mention or require sanctions and remains an option for the ILO members. However, there will surely be political isolation and economic sanctions followed by Western nations. Notably, they collaborate and coordinate to focus sanctions on military-related and their own conglomerates and high-level officials. Moreover, the countries should impose asset freezes, travel bans, and restrictions on the higher ranks, which will be more effective for Myanmar’s democratic movements. As the financial sanctions will cause unintended harm to Myanmar civilians, careful measures should be preceded by prior actions. Moreover, the ILO should support livelihoods and economic activity in the SAC uncontrolled areas. Lastly, the ILO should establish monitoring mechanisms to protect workers’ rights and adopt a labour dispute resolution system that applies to enterprises in international supply chains. This path requires precision, solidarity, and unwavering commitment to Myanmar’s workers.
Conclusion
The 2025 invocation of ILO Article 33 marks a critical turning point in global accountability for Myanmar’s ongoing repression. Although the tool lacks legal enforceability, the solution includes a powerful combination of diplomatic, reputational, and economic leverage designed to isolate the military regime by freezing its access to resources, investment, and legitimacy.
To avoid unintended harm to civilians, global actors must target sanctions smartly, distinguish between military and private-sector actors, and support worker-led structures for further implementations by following the different Guidance and Recommendations (UNGPs, OECD, MNE Declaration by ILO, BHRRC, and JFM). When combined with solidarity and multilateral coordination, these steps can raise pressure on the junta while preserving livelihoods and safeguarding the people of Myanmar. ILO Article 33 is a double-edged condition for the Myanmar economy, which directly affects the livelihood condition of normal workers, with precise obligations and solidarity.
- About the author: Aung Thet Paing Hmue is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) with over two years of experience in the humanitarian sector. Currently residing in Thailand, he navigates cross-border challenges while building his professional future.
- Source: This article was published by The Sabai Times
Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre
The Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) is a hybrid think tank and consultancy firm committed to advancing sustainable development and promoting sustainability literacy in Myanmar. Through its Sustainability Lab, SRIc conducts public policy research and analysis to promote Sustainable Development in Myanmar and guide the country toward a sustainable future. SRIc also offers consultation, CSR strategy development, and Sustainability roadmaps focused on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG). SRIc equips individuals and organizations with actionable strategies for sustainable growth through capacity-building programs, customized training, publications like Sabai Times, and outreach initiatives such as webinars and podcasts. By merging research insights with practical consultancy, SRIc fosters responsible business practices, develops CSR strategies, and creates sustainability roadmaps, contributing to local and global sustainability efforts.
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