Poverty trap
Published September 26, 2025
DAWN
THE new World Bank report, Reclaiming Momentum Towards Prosperity, is a sobering reminder that Pakistan’s current growth and development model is no longer fit to sustain reduction in poverty and inequality.
The model, which supported initial gains in poverty alleviation before running aground, has already eroded two decades of progress as poverty trends reversed over the past three years. A new development trajectory is needed, one which prioritises inclusive growth, equity and sustained investment in human capital, the WB said.
The bank also called for the overhaul of the present development model at the report’s launch in Islamabad recently. “Reforms that expand access to quality services, protect households from shocks and create better jobs — especially for the bottom 40pc — are essential to break cycles of poverty and deliver durable, inclusive growth,” it said.
Poverty, which had declined from 64.3pc in 2001-02 to 21.9pc in 2018-19, has been climbing again.
It rose to 24.7pc in 2019-20, dipped briefly to 18.3pc in 2021-22, and then surged to 25.3pc in 2023-24 — a seven percentage point increase in just two years. If confirmed by the Household Integrated Economic Survey 2023-24, currently underway, it would represent a significant reversal.
The WB rightly identifies multiple shocks — Covid-19, inflation, floods, political instability, and macroeconomic stress, resulting in low and volatile growth — as important triggers. But it is equally clear that the deeper problem lies in a consumption-driven growth model, which has failed to deliver resilience, jobs or equitable progress. That “progress in poverty reduction is threatened by structural vulnerabilities” is a warning about the fragility of a system relying too heavily on unsustainable growth patterns.
The report acknowledges that Pakistan’s social protection programmes have shielded many families from destitution. But, as it makes clear, this cannot replace transformative reforms to remedy structural imbalances, improve service delivery and build resilience for long-term gains.
As rightly pointed out, education and health spending have hardly closed inequality gaps. Overreliance on indirect taxation continues to depress household incomes, hitting the poor the hardest while sparing the elites.
Structural imbalances — from elite capture and regressive fiscal policies to weak public service delivery and labour market constraints — will keep most Pakistanis trapped in poverty. Abysmal human development indicators make the picture even bleaker. Nearly 40pc of children are stunted. One in four primary school-age children is out of school, and three out of four who attend cannot write or read after five years of education.
Half the population lack safe drinking water; nearly a third lack safe sanitation. Over 85pc of jobs are informal, offering little security or upward mobility. Women and youth remain largely excluded from the workforce. How can a country expect to build a prosperous future on such shaky foundations?
Published in Dawn, September 26th, 2025
Lighting the way
Published September 25, 2025
DAWN
The writer is a business and economy journalist.
THE World Bank has issued a stark warning to Pakistan in a report released on Tuesday.
The country’s growth model has run its course, and over the past five years, the number of people living below the poverty line has begun to swell after two decades of shrinkage.
Not only that. Nearly 40 per cent of children are stunted, and this percentage has not changed much over a long period of time. One quarter of children of primary school age remain out of school. Of the ones that do go to school, 75pc of those who finish primary schooling cannot read, or follow a simple story.
One after another, the dismal state of the population as seen in the social indicators testifies to the fact that the economy is not delivering, whether or not it grows. The middle of the decade of the 2010s saw a high-growth spurt, yet between the years 2011 and 2021, “real wage growth in sectors employing the poor remained minimal at just 2-3pc” the report notes, “making the poor ill-equipped to convert economic growth into income-generating opportunities”.
The report is a strong reminder that Pakistan’s economic urgency is actually not about growth. It is about reform. This economy cannot lift people out of poverty even when it grows. It cannot reduce income disparities between urban and rural, or between geographical regions. It cannot create enough jobs for the youth, or furnish income-generating opportunities for women at a rate sufficiently fast to make any meaningful impact in the lives of the multitude.
One reason for this, the report points out, is that 95pc of all job growth for the poor in the early years of the 2000s, when poverty levels fell sharply, was due to opportunities in the informal sector, and the movement of labour from agriculture to low-quality jobs in services and construction. That drop in poverty was not brought about due to expanding opportunities in the formal sector.
The World Bank report is a strong reminder that Pakistan’s economic urgency is actually not about growth.
Meanwhile, the state as presently constituted cannot educate its children, reduce the incidence of stunting among them, build resilience to shocks (such as floods) at the local level — and on and on and on.
The report proposes a number of pathways forward. These include strengthened public service delivery, devolution to local governments and their empowerment via a fiscal model that provides them with the resources they need to discharge their responsibilities.
Other ways forward include what they call “building resilience” via social safety nets and improved targeting through the National Socio-Economic Registry, and finally developing better data systems “through a robust statistical infrastructure that produces accessible, high-frequency, and granular data” to drive evidence-based research, which can serve both as a feedback loop and an input in policy design.
Of all these, the last deserves particular mention. I have long argued for more legally mandated data release templates across government departments. This has many benefits that appear slowly, but reliably, and help focus attention on metrics against which to measure progress.
For now, the single most robust data dissemination template that operates in the country is the one that focuses on the health of the external sector. We get high-quality data on the balance of payments and trade, and multiple data points against which to measure the foreign exchange reserves, as well as the forward positions taken by the State Bank. The debt statistics are more thorough than any other, and a clear picture of Pakistan’s debt profile can be easily built very quickly.
Try finding out a few basic facts about education or health, however, and you’ll notice how woefully inadequate our data is. Try looking for more regular data on the power sector, and you will have to wade through unspeakably complex Nepra documents to piece the picture together yourself. Forget about employment. That data gets released once a year in a good year.
Maybe the World Bank can play a proactive role here in helping develop a data release template for the power sector, for starters. Maybe it would be a good idea for data on the accumulation of circular debt to be released officially, as per pre-defined protocols, on a fortnightly basis.
Maybe there should be a simple data page on the Nepra website, where we can see fuel consumption data broken down by power plant every month. Maybe units sent out can be shown on a map by coverage area, and next to it we can see recoveries made in the same area during the same period.
There is a lot of room for expansion here. The provincial governments should also be mandated to release key data relating to health and education on a regular basis. The template for this release should be standardised to enable comparisons across provinces, and ideally with other countries as well.
This sort of data release requirement helps bring some discipline in government departments. It enables outsiders to track performance. It helps identify those areas where policy needs to be strengthened. And it reduces the scope for discretionary decision-making. In short, an expansive and standardised data collection and disclosure requirement on government departments can help bring about the kinds of reforms the World Bank is saying Pakistan needs to undertake.
One big reason why change is so hard to bring about in this country is precisely because large swathes of it operate in the dark, in the sense that there is no transparency. Without transparency, it is hard to build accountability. And without accountability, there is no incentive to change, because continuing with business as usual is easier and risk-free.
Maybe a little daylight in the darker recesses of the state will help jolt a few civil servants out of their complacency. Maybe some evidence-based metrics will help light the way, away from the culture of idle complaining that has taken root among the elites.
Published in Dawn, September 25th, 2025
Producing poverty
Aasim Sajjad Akhtar
The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
FOR most of the Musharraf dictatorship, the World Bank, IMF and other lynchpins of the international financial architecture celebrated Pakistan’s economy. Real estate and stock market booms, the issuing of cheap credit to consumption-hungry middle classes by newly privatised commercial banks, and the opening up of a variety of sectors for mythical foreign investment were all seen as successes of the government’s ‘reform’ agenda.
From 2006 onwards, the gloss started to wear off as booms were replaced by busts, especially after the effects of the global financial crisis started kicking in. On the domestic front, loadshedding became endemic, as the inevitable fallouts of the World Bank-backed independent power producers policy of the mid-1990s reared their head. Meanwhile, the supply of electricity could not keep up with exponential increases in demand as the urban middle classes used cheap credit to buy refrigerators, ACs, washing machines and personal computers.
Twenty years later, the World Bank (WB) is now lamenting the alarming increase of poverty in Pakistan. Its recently released report suggests that millions have fallen below the poverty line in recent years, particularly during and after the pandemic. Conservatively, one quarter of the population is poor, and by some measures, almost half of Pakistan’s 250 million people live from hand to mouth.
The report goes on to suggest that there were many gains made in poverty reduction over the past 20 years, but that these have largely been reversed. But the WB stops short of acknowledging that a large part of the dire situation that it is now naming has its roots in the very policy matrices that it championed in the 2000s.
I, for one, cannot get my head around the notion that an acutely class-divided society like Pakistan made ‘major gains’ in reducing poverty at any stage over the past 20 years. This is in part because many ‘experts’ play games with numbers, especially those with explicit political agendas like the WB and IMF. In parallel, the bureaucrats in finance, planning and other ministries who prepare economic reports for donors are very adept at fudging numbers.
Why were such ‘major gains’ wiped out in such a short period?
But let us take at face value the WB’s claims about ‘major gains’ in poverty reduction in the 2000s and at least part of the 2010s. Why and how, then, did such ‘major gains’ get wiped out in such a short period of time from around 2020 onwards?
The WB report notes that a majority of those who ostensibly extricated themselves from poverty shifted from agricultural work into ‘low-quality’ service sector occupations. In effect, this means that small and landless farmers alongside non-agriculturalists in the farm sector could no longer make ends meet, and thus either invested in some kind of self-employment in the non-farm sector, or moved to small and/or big urban centres to find waged work.
But the WB itself admits that these new income sources were not secure, permanent and certainly not sufficient to absorb a critical mass of a rapidly growing, youthful labour force. Only if a robust and holistic industrialisation strategy had been pursued during the ‘glory years’ of the 2000s would this structural crisis been ameliorated, if not averted.
A non-negligible percentage of working people who started earning income in what is conventionally called the informal economy may have done well enough to access cheap credit and move up the class ladder as a result. But it is quite clear from the WB’s own admission that this bubble of ‘growth’ was always likely to burst. And burst it most definitely has, even for those white-collar workers who once could boast permanent and secure employment but now find themselves increasingly vulnerable to the logic of ‘fre elancing’.
The truth is that the neoliberal capitalist binge that Musharraf oversaw was championed by the usual suspects around the globe because it benefited big business and investors at home and abroad. Geopolitical winds in the 2000s were such that the dictatorship was celebrated by Western officialdom as an ally in the ‘war on terror’. The neoliberal binge produced lots of profits for already fat cats, including Pakistan’s own militarised ruling class, while crowding working people into a precarious service sector, and accelerated the pillage of nature alongside.
Seen thus, poverty and inequality have, in fact, been produced by the very policies that only some years ago were being termed a success. The pandemic, floods, inflation and other factors that, according to the WB, eroded all of the ‘major gains’ in poverty reduction were simply the immediate triggers that showed the true, anti-people colours of Pakistani capitalism, and its imperialist backers.
The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
Published in Dawn, September 26th, 2025
Aasim Sajjad Akhtar
Published September 26, 2025
The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
FOR most of the Musharraf dictatorship, the World Bank, IMF and other lynchpins of the international financial architecture celebrated Pakistan’s economy. Real estate and stock market booms, the issuing of cheap credit to consumption-hungry middle classes by newly privatised commercial banks, and the opening up of a variety of sectors for mythical foreign investment were all seen as successes of the government’s ‘reform’ agenda.
From 2006 onwards, the gloss started to wear off as booms were replaced by busts, especially after the effects of the global financial crisis started kicking in. On the domestic front, loadshedding became endemic, as the inevitable fallouts of the World Bank-backed independent power producers policy of the mid-1990s reared their head. Meanwhile, the supply of electricity could not keep up with exponential increases in demand as the urban middle classes used cheap credit to buy refrigerators, ACs, washing machines and personal computers.
Twenty years later, the World Bank (WB) is now lamenting the alarming increase of poverty in Pakistan. Its recently released report suggests that millions have fallen below the poverty line in recent years, particularly during and after the pandemic. Conservatively, one quarter of the population is poor, and by some measures, almost half of Pakistan’s 250 million people live from hand to mouth.
The report goes on to suggest that there were many gains made in poverty reduction over the past 20 years, but that these have largely been reversed. But the WB stops short of acknowledging that a large part of the dire situation that it is now naming has its roots in the very policy matrices that it championed in the 2000s.
I, for one, cannot get my head around the notion that an acutely class-divided society like Pakistan made ‘major gains’ in reducing poverty at any stage over the past 20 years. This is in part because many ‘experts’ play games with numbers, especially those with explicit political agendas like the WB and IMF. In parallel, the bureaucrats in finance, planning and other ministries who prepare economic reports for donors are very adept at fudging numbers.
Why were such ‘major gains’ wiped out in such a short period?
But let us take at face value the WB’s claims about ‘major gains’ in poverty reduction in the 2000s and at least part of the 2010s. Why and how, then, did such ‘major gains’ get wiped out in such a short period of time from around 2020 onwards?
The WB report notes that a majority of those who ostensibly extricated themselves from poverty shifted from agricultural work into ‘low-quality’ service sector occupations. In effect, this means that small and landless farmers alongside non-agriculturalists in the farm sector could no longer make ends meet, and thus either invested in some kind of self-employment in the non-farm sector, or moved to small and/or big urban centres to find waged work.
But the WB itself admits that these new income sources were not secure, permanent and certainly not sufficient to absorb a critical mass of a rapidly growing, youthful labour force. Only if a robust and holistic industrialisation strategy had been pursued during the ‘glory years’ of the 2000s would this structural crisis been ameliorated, if not averted.
A non-negligible percentage of working people who started earning income in what is conventionally called the informal economy may have done well enough to access cheap credit and move up the class ladder as a result. But it is quite clear from the WB’s own admission that this bubble of ‘growth’ was always likely to burst. And burst it most definitely has, even for those white-collar workers who once could boast permanent and secure employment but now find themselves increasingly vulnerable to the logic of ‘fre elancing’.
The truth is that the neoliberal capitalist binge that Musharraf oversaw was championed by the usual suspects around the globe because it benefited big business and investors at home and abroad. Geopolitical winds in the 2000s were such that the dictatorship was celebrated by Western officialdom as an ally in the ‘war on terror’. The neoliberal binge produced lots of profits for already fat cats, including Pakistan’s own militarised ruling class, while crowding working people into a precarious service sector, and accelerated the pillage of nature alongside.
Seen thus, poverty and inequality have, in fact, been produced by the very policies that only some years ago were being termed a success. The pandemic, floods, inflation and other factors that, according to the WB, eroded all of the ‘major gains’ in poverty reduction were simply the immediate triggers that showed the true, anti-people colours of Pakistani capitalism, and its imperialist backers.
The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
Published in Dawn, September 26th, 2025
The understated debt burden
Published September 22, 2025
DAWN
Pakistan’s debt burden has become the defining constraint of its fiscal and economic future. According to data released by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the total government debt (excluding the International Monetary Fund) increased from Rs69 trillion in June 2024 to Rs78tr by June 2025. The public debt (including the IMF debt) increased to Rs80.5tr from Rs71.2tr in June 2024. Both the numbers understate the full level of the government’s indebtedness.
As per the SBP’s June 2025 summary, federal government debt stood at Rs80.5tr — up 13 per cent from the previous year. Yet this headline number understates reality.
Once external deposits, foreign currency swaps, Special Drawing Rights allocations, non-resident rupee deposits, and the debts of public sector enterprises are added — roughly Rs7.6tr in obligations — the figure rises to Rs88tr, or 77pc of GDP. Add to this the accumulated arrears of the power and gas sectors — together approaching Rs5tr — and the effective public debt load climbs to around Rs93tr, about 81pc of GDP.
The speed of this accumulation is striking. In FY25 alone, public debt grew by Rs9.4tr, with domestic borrowing swelling to Rs56.48tr and external debt increasing by $5.2 billion. The government’s external debt and liabilities now hover around $111bn, a stark indicator of reliance on foreign lenders.
Servicing these obligations consumed Rs8.9tr in FY25, over half of total federal revenues, but a staggering 82.7pc of net (after transfers to the provinces) federal revenues. This left the fiscal deficit still wide at 5.9pc of GDP despite the expenditure cuts.
Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio of 81pc (with circular debt) is above the emerging market average of 60–65pc, but the real stress lies in the servicing of it
Development spending was the first casualty, falling short of targets as funds were diverted to creditors. Economic growth limped at 2.7pc, stifled by high interest rates, chronic energy shortages compounded by circular debt, and external price shocks.
The FY26 budget tells the same story. Out of Rs17.4tr in projected outlays, nearly half — Rs7.5tr — is earmarked for debt servicing. That equals 77pc of net federal revenues despite the fall in interest rates, leaving almost no fiscal room for anything else: Rs2.8tr for defence, Rs1tr for pensions, Rs950bn for development, and token allocations for health, education, and social protection.
With $23bn in external repayments falling due this year, even this arithmetic rests on the assumption of IMF support and bilateral rollovers. The state’s fiscal sovereignty is being hollowed out by its obligations.
International comparisons lay bare the severity of the problem. Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio of 77pc (or 81pc with circular debt) is above the emerging market average of 60–65pc. But the real stress lies not in just the ratio, but in the cost of servicing. India, with debt around 82pc of GDP, devotes 25–30pc of central revenues to interest. Brazil, with debt near 88pc, spends roughly 20–25pc. Turkey and Indonesia, both with debt-to-GDP ratios below 40pc, commit less than 15pc.
Pakistan, by contrast, surrenders nearly half of its federal revenues to interest alone. In relative terms, its servicing burden rivals or even exceeds Argentina’s — a country synonymous with fiscal distress.
Unlike Japan, whose debt exceeds 200pc of GDP but is sustained by ultra-cheap domestic financing, Pakistan borrows at punishing costs and in currencies it cannot print, leaving it uniquely vulnerable to global interest rate and exchange-rate shocks.
This crisis has been years in the making. In 2015, Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio was about 63pc. By 2018 it had crossed 76pc, and by 2022, amid the crisis, it breached 82pc. Successive governments pledged discipline but chose expedience: expenditures ballooned, tax reform was avoided, and borrowing filled the gap.
What was once creeping drift is now systemic paralysis. Each year, more revenue is locked into debt service, leaving less for investment in growth. Today’s 77pc debt-service-to-net-revenue ratio is not merely unsustainable — it is the culmination of a decade of evasion.
For ordinary Pakistanis, these abstractions mean rising electricity tariffs, heavier indirect taxes, and stagnant job markets. With poverty affecting more than 40pc of the population and inequality deepening, underinvestment in health and education is eroding long-term productivity. Youth unemployment remains high, feeding frustration and narrowing the path to social mobility. Debt service has become not just a fiscal constraint, but a social crisis.
The issue is not only the size of the debt, but its structure and cost. Heavy reliance on short-term domestic paper, loss-making public enterprises, and foreign-currency borrowing means that every depreciation, every global rate hike, every delayed bailout is transmitted directly into fiscal instability. The circular debt in energy acts as a parallel fiscal deficit, compounding the structural weakness.
Avoiding outright solvency crisis will require more than IMF stopgaps. The tax base must be broadened beyond the narrow group of salaried classes and formal businesses, spending on government must be cut, public enterprises must be restructured rather than repeatedly bailed out. Above all, fiscal transparency is indispensable. Until the government discloses all liabilities — including contingent and quasi-fiscal obligations — policy will remain a patchwork of half-truths, and public trust will continue to fray.
Pakistan’s debt burden has already breached the threshold of sustainability. The choice now is stark: summon the political will for reform, or remain trapped in a cycle where yesterday’s borrowing consumes each new budget.
The writer is the former head of Citigroup’s emerging markets investments and author of ‘The Gathering Storm’
Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, September 22nd, 2025
Pakistan’s debt burden has become the defining constraint of its fiscal and economic future. According to data released by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the total government debt (excluding the International Monetary Fund) increased from Rs69 trillion in June 2024 to Rs78tr by June 2025. The public debt (including the IMF debt) increased to Rs80.5tr from Rs71.2tr in June 2024. Both the numbers understate the full level of the government’s indebtedness.
As per the SBP’s June 2025 summary, federal government debt stood at Rs80.5tr — up 13 per cent from the previous year. Yet this headline number understates reality.
Once external deposits, foreign currency swaps, Special Drawing Rights allocations, non-resident rupee deposits, and the debts of public sector enterprises are added — roughly Rs7.6tr in obligations — the figure rises to Rs88tr, or 77pc of GDP. Add to this the accumulated arrears of the power and gas sectors — together approaching Rs5tr — and the effective public debt load climbs to around Rs93tr, about 81pc of GDP.
The speed of this accumulation is striking. In FY25 alone, public debt grew by Rs9.4tr, with domestic borrowing swelling to Rs56.48tr and external debt increasing by $5.2 billion. The government’s external debt and liabilities now hover around $111bn, a stark indicator of reliance on foreign lenders.
Servicing these obligations consumed Rs8.9tr in FY25, over half of total federal revenues, but a staggering 82.7pc of net (after transfers to the provinces) federal revenues. This left the fiscal deficit still wide at 5.9pc of GDP despite the expenditure cuts.
Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio of 81pc (with circular debt) is above the emerging market average of 60–65pc, but the real stress lies in the servicing of it
Development spending was the first casualty, falling short of targets as funds were diverted to creditors. Economic growth limped at 2.7pc, stifled by high interest rates, chronic energy shortages compounded by circular debt, and external price shocks.
The FY26 budget tells the same story. Out of Rs17.4tr in projected outlays, nearly half — Rs7.5tr — is earmarked for debt servicing. That equals 77pc of net federal revenues despite the fall in interest rates, leaving almost no fiscal room for anything else: Rs2.8tr for defence, Rs1tr for pensions, Rs950bn for development, and token allocations for health, education, and social protection.
With $23bn in external repayments falling due this year, even this arithmetic rests on the assumption of IMF support and bilateral rollovers. The state’s fiscal sovereignty is being hollowed out by its obligations.
International comparisons lay bare the severity of the problem. Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio of 77pc (or 81pc with circular debt) is above the emerging market average of 60–65pc. But the real stress lies not in just the ratio, but in the cost of servicing. India, with debt around 82pc of GDP, devotes 25–30pc of central revenues to interest. Brazil, with debt near 88pc, spends roughly 20–25pc. Turkey and Indonesia, both with debt-to-GDP ratios below 40pc, commit less than 15pc.
Pakistan, by contrast, surrenders nearly half of its federal revenues to interest alone. In relative terms, its servicing burden rivals or even exceeds Argentina’s — a country synonymous with fiscal distress.
Unlike Japan, whose debt exceeds 200pc of GDP but is sustained by ultra-cheap domestic financing, Pakistan borrows at punishing costs and in currencies it cannot print, leaving it uniquely vulnerable to global interest rate and exchange-rate shocks.
This crisis has been years in the making. In 2015, Pakistan’s debt-to-GDP ratio was about 63pc. By 2018 it had crossed 76pc, and by 2022, amid the crisis, it breached 82pc. Successive governments pledged discipline but chose expedience: expenditures ballooned, tax reform was avoided, and borrowing filled the gap.
What was once creeping drift is now systemic paralysis. Each year, more revenue is locked into debt service, leaving less for investment in growth. Today’s 77pc debt-service-to-net-revenue ratio is not merely unsustainable — it is the culmination of a decade of evasion.
For ordinary Pakistanis, these abstractions mean rising electricity tariffs, heavier indirect taxes, and stagnant job markets. With poverty affecting more than 40pc of the population and inequality deepening, underinvestment in health and education is eroding long-term productivity. Youth unemployment remains high, feeding frustration and narrowing the path to social mobility. Debt service has become not just a fiscal constraint, but a social crisis.
The issue is not only the size of the debt, but its structure and cost. Heavy reliance on short-term domestic paper, loss-making public enterprises, and foreign-currency borrowing means that every depreciation, every global rate hike, every delayed bailout is transmitted directly into fiscal instability. The circular debt in energy acts as a parallel fiscal deficit, compounding the structural weakness.
Avoiding outright solvency crisis will require more than IMF stopgaps. The tax base must be broadened beyond the narrow group of salaried classes and formal businesses, spending on government must be cut, public enterprises must be restructured rather than repeatedly bailed out. Above all, fiscal transparency is indispensable. Until the government discloses all liabilities — including contingent and quasi-fiscal obligations — policy will remain a patchwork of half-truths, and public trust will continue to fray.
Pakistan’s debt burden has already breached the threshold of sustainability. The choice now is stark: summon the political will for reform, or remain trapped in a cycle where yesterday’s borrowing consumes each new budget.
The writer is the former head of Citigroup’s emerging markets investments and author of ‘The Gathering Storm’
Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, September 22nd, 2025
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