Sunday, January 04, 2026

LIBERTARIAN ANTI-IMPERIALISM
Trump’s National Insecurity Strategy – OpEd

January 4, 2026

MISES
By Vincent Cook

Trump’s latest National Security Strategy (NSS) document has predictably sent foreign policy pundits of all stripes into a tizzy, with globalists (both of the unilateralist-neoconservative variety and of the multilateralist “rules-based international order” variety) howling once again about Trump not being one of them, while “NatCons” celebrate the NSS’s assault on censorial Eurowokeness and the NSS’s dire warnings about a “stark prospect of civilizational erasure” in Europe.

In spite of the Euro-bashing orientation of the NSS, America’s militarist/imperialist lobby can take heart in the NSS’s endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine coupled to a “Trump Corollary” that sounds very much like the Roosevelt Corrollary and the Lodge Corrollary, as well as affirming a hodge-podge of other globalist doctrines (though not explicitly naming them) like the Carter Doctrine of keeping unfriendly powers out of the Persian Gulf (i.e., waging endless wars in the Middle East) and the Truman Doctrine of containing the spread of Communism, at least in Asia with respect to the Chinese and North Korean regimes. In terms of the overall spending commitment, the bottom line remains the “Hague Commitment” of increasing Pentagon spending to 5 percent of GDP.

Of course, massive increases in the demand for military goods and services will have to be matched by corresponding increases on the supply side if the Hague spending increases are to strengthen the Pentagon’s and its allies’ ability to enforce the witch’s brew of imperialistic doctrines with which the Pentagon has been tasked. This raises the thorny economic problem of how to increase the physical availability of cutting-edge weapons, munitions, and manpower at reasonable prices. A spending increase by itself doesn’t guarantee an increase in military might if an anemic, underperforming productive sector can’t respond well to the spending; instead, one merely drives up prices as higher spending confronts inelastic supply curves.

This supply problem is not a mere hypothetical concern—the Russo-Ukrainian War clearly demonstrates that modern missile and drone technologies have negated the kind of mechanized, mobile, combined-arms tactics that characterized the Second World War. The days of rapid blitzkrieg attacks and paralyzing “shock and awe” strikes are over. Instead, ground combat in Ukraine has largely degenerated into the brutal static trench warfare that characterized the First World War a little over a hundred years ago. What has been retained from the Second World War playbook unfortunately is the wanton destruction of civilians far from the front lines using long-range missiles and drones.

In this kind of war, combat can drag on for years and years with little to show for all the dreadful carnage and destruction as long as each side is able and willing to keep feeding warm bodies and vast quantities of basic munitions like artillery shells into the meatgrinder. However, the economic capacity of America and its NATO and East Asian allies to wage such old-fashioned prolonged wars of attrition successfully is highly doubtful these days. A temporary halt in munitions and missile deliveries to Ukraine last July out of fears of stockpile depletions flashed an ominous danger signal that Western economies are in no shape to undertake a major mobilization required for a conventional meatgrinder war.

The NSS does take notice of the munitions aspect of the supply problem. The section of the NSS that deals with economic security embraces the following goals:Balanced trade
Securing access to critical supply chains and minerals

Reindustrialization

Reviving our defense industrial base

Preserving and growing America’s financial sector dominance

One critical problem with these goals is that they are mutually incompatible with each other. Reducing trade deficits to zero to achieve “balanced trade” also means reducing net imports of savings from foreigners to zero. When foreigners earn more dollars from sales of their goods to Americans than they spend on purchases of goods made in America, they lend their surplus dollars to Americans. Cutting off vendor-financed imports means fewer inputs and less financing available for reindustrialization and for reviving the defense industrial base.

Balancing of trade is also incompatible with maximizing access to critical supply chains and minerals overseas. If, for example, America has a critical need for cobalt that is only available in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), why must the US government petulantly insist on the DRC balancing its sales of cobalt to America with purchases of American-made goods? Creating artificial restrictions on what the Congolese can do with their dollar earnings only discourages them from selling cobalt to Americans in the first place.

Intensifying the international dominance of America’s financial sector—that is, artificially propping up foreign demand for US Treasury securities, making foreigners pay a portion of America’s inflation tax, and facilitating discretionary confiscations of the assets of hostile powers—does benefit certain predatory American institutions (both governmental and privileged private sector actors) at the expense of foreigners, but it also thwarts the goals of reindustrialization and revival of the defense industrial base. American industries need more thrift (i.e., restraint of present consumption so that more labor and resources can be devoted to making more capital goods), not more Federal Reserve funny money and more boom/bust cycles spawned by fractional reserve credit. American financial predators gain at the expense of productive Americans too.

Apart from the raging contradictions among the NSS’s economic goals, another critical problem is the NSS’s eerie silence concerning the manpower issue, a problem the Russians and Ukrainians know all too well. If the Pentagon must resort to a meatgrinder strategy to wage more Ukrainian-style wars in East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America (and maybe in Europe too, if NATO behaves as Trump wishes), it is going to need a lot more meat. With falling birthrates, steeper immigration barriers, and now even mass deportations, the prospects of the Pentagon finding enough young Americans to populate future national cemeteries look rather dim. Moreover, increasing the Pentagon’s manpower requirements would make it more difficult to find the additional workers needed for reindustrializing and for reviving the defense industrial base.

The most critical problem of all is that the NSS doesn’t reverse the growth of welfare statism, which has been deindustrializing America and skewing federal spending priorities away from the Pentagon over the past sixty years. Figure one offers the long-run view of savings and government spending:

Figure 1: National Income Shares—Transfer Payments, Defense, Net Private Saving, and Net Saving


Source: FRED®

The two dashed lines track different categories of government spending as a fraction of National Income; the red line represents transfer payments for benefits like Social Security and Medicare, while the black line represents spending on the Pentagon. Since the late 1960s, the Pentagon has declined from about 10 percent of National Income to well under 5 percent today. Transfer payments, on the other hand, have soared from a little over 5 percent in the mid-1960s to nearly 20 percent today. The Department of Defense over the period has encountered a pair of peer competitors who pose a greater existential threat to it than even the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Russian Red Army do: the Department of Health and Human Services and the Social Security Administration.

The two solid lines track net domestic savings as a fraction of National Income. The green line represents net private savings; quantifying thrift by private individuals and businesses as a fraction of National Income. The blue line—representing net savings overall—shows how much of the share of National Income devoted to private savings remains for productive investments after government deficits have been subtracted from the green line.

As transfer spending soared and Americans came to rely increasingly on government promises of future economic security, they became less and less inclined to save, driving the green line down to about half of its 1960s/early-1970s values. Meanwhile, government budgets that were formerly balanced even at the height of the Vietnam War and the “Great Society” have sunk into chronic massive deficits, pushing the blue line further and further below the green line. The result is that the blue line is now at zero, meaning that in aggregate Americans are not setting aside any of their income to grow America’s stock of capital goods. Reindustrialization and revival of defense industries without massive borrowing from foreigners (and the massive trade deficits that accompany them) has become impossible; America can just barely maintain its depleted industries at current levels.

Without massive cuts to Social Security and Medicare, there will be neither reindustrialization nor significant increases in the Pentagon’s conventional military capabilities. The aggressive combination of “doctrines” in the NSS that seek to strategically encircle China and Russia are probably not viable over the long run in any event, but welfare state-induced capital consumption absolutely exposes the NSS’s vain pretense of America gearing up for conventional meatgrinder wars as sheer nonsense. There is no credible strategy for security to be found in this NSS.


About the author: Vincent Cook has a MA in Biophysics from the University of California, Berkeley. He worked as an analyst for thirty years in the University of California’s Office of the President, reporting statistics concerning technology transfers, research grants and expenditures, and faculty salaries on behalf of the ten campus UC system. He has been a supporter of the Mises Institute since its founding in 1982 and has hosted the Epicurus & Epicurean Philosophy website since 1996. Vincent is also a practitioner of the Filipino martial arts; in 2002 he competed in world championship matches, earning medals in sparring and forms divisions.


Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute


MISES

The Mises Institute, founded in 1982, teaches the scholarship of Austrian economics, freedom, and peace. The liberal intellectual tradition of Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) and Murray N. Rothbard (1926-1995) guides us. Accordingly, the Mises Institute seeks a profound and radical shift in the intellectual climate: away from statism and toward a private property order. The Mises Institute encourages critical historical research, and stands against political correctness.

Trump-brokered Ukraine deal could unsettle Balkans, analyst warns

Trump-brokered Ukraine deal could unsettle Balkans, analyst warns
Analyst warns any settlement that rewards Russia for using force would send a powerful signal far beyond Ukraine, including in the Western Balkans.
By bne IntelliNews January 4, 2026

A US-brokered peace deal in Ukraine that legitimises Russian territorial gains would risk reopening old fault lines in the Western Balkans, emboldening Serbia and weakening the European Union’s credibility as a guarantor of regional stability, according to a new report by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

The analysis, written by ECFR senior policy fellow Engjellushe Morina, argues that the outcome of the war in Ukraine is no longer just a question for Kyiv and Moscow but a test case for how borders are treated across Europe – including in fragile regions such as Kosovo, Bosnia & Herzegovina and the wider Balkans.

“A Russia-Ukraine peace deal that capitulates to Putin risks destabilising the Western Balkans, emboldening Serbian territorial claims and undermining EU credibility,” the report said.

With US-led diplomacy intensifying as 2025 draws to a close, Morina warns that any settlement that rewards Russia for using force would send a powerful signal far beyond Ukraine. “Any settlement that legitimises Russia’s use of force to alter its borders would further destabilise Ukraine and have negative repercussions in the Western Balkans,” she wrote.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has insisted that Kyiv will not give up more territory to Russia, a position Morina says is firmly rooted in international law, which holds that “borders cannot be changed by force”.

But she argues that the current US approach to negotiations risks sidelining those principles. The talks have “hardly mentioned multilateralism, or the rules and regulations which govern international order”, instead focusing on “handing Russia the territorial changes it has achieved by force”. (The paper was published before the US military operation in Venezuela, which sparked accusations that Washington had breached international law.)

Such an outcome, the report said, would have dangerous knock-on effects for Europe’s “eastern neighbourhood” – including Georgia and Moldova – as well as in unresolved disputes in the Western Balkans, particularly between Serbia and Kosovo.

“If Russia ‘wins’ in Ukraine, the Western Balkans will be in trouble,” Morina wrote. In that scenario, Serbia could be encouraged to revive territorial claims, urging countries that recognise Kosovo’s borders to instead see the Serb-dominated north as part of Serbia.

She added that Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vucic, might also be tempted to push for Bosnia’s Serb entity, Republika Srpska, to be folded into Serbia.

Kosovo in the crosshairs

At the centre of those concerns is northern Kosovo, a Serb-majority area that has long been a flashpoint. The EU is trying to broker a normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, but Morina warned that this delicate process could unravel if global norms on borders are weakened.

“If the US allows a peace deal that gives Russia more Ukrainian territory, or if the EU fails to stop US president Donald Trump from inflaming regional tensions, Vucic might be emboldened to pursue a land grab in Kosovo’s north,” the report said.

Such a move would “undermine Nato and weaken the EU” and would likely enjoy “Putin’s support”, Morina added.

The north of Kosovo remains “in limbo”, she wrote, with Serbia seeking to maintain influence over the local Serb population and Kosovo’s government insisting that the area must be governed under Pristina’s authority. That standoff has helped keep the region volatile, highlighted by a deadly Serb paramilitary attack in the village of Banjska in September 2023.

The report also takes aim at the changing role of the United States under President Donald Trump’s second term. Washington, once the main architect of peace in the Balkans through Nato and diplomacy, is now more focused on commercial interests, according to Morina.

The latest US National Security Strategy says “the United States will prioritise commercial diplomacy”, a shift that she argues puts economic gains ahead of geopolitical stability.

Trump, who has repeatedly portrayed himself as a global “peacekeeper”, has even claimed he “managed to stop the war between Kosovo and Serbia”, with US strategy documents listing the dispute among conflicts he has supposedly resolved.

Morina said this raised the risk that Trump could push for a quick, headline-grabbing deal in the Balkans, just as he did during his first term, when his envoy backed a controversial “land-swap” proposal between Kosovo and Serbia.

That plan, which would have traded Serb-majority areas in northern Kosovo for Albanian-majority areas in southern Serbia, ultimately failed. But Morina warned that similar ideas could resurface if Washington again prioritises speed and optics over long-term stability.

EU under pressure

The report argues that the EU remains “indispensable” in stabilising the Western Balkans, largely because of its power to offer membership. But that leverage is weakening as enlargement stalls and public trust in Brussels erodes.

“Without delivering tangible benefits, the prospect of further European integration will lose its remaining credibility among candidate countries,” Morina wrote, pushing them to look instead to Washington or Moscow for support.

She said EU member states now face a strategic choice: either “retain ownership of Balkan geopolitics” or “stand by as Washington steps in”. Decisions taken in 2026, she argued, would be “decisive” for the future of Kosovo, Serbia and the wider region.

France and Germany, in particular, need to keep pressure on Belgrade and Pristina to implement the EU-brokered “Agreement on the path to normalisation”, while also demonstrating that Europe can still deliver on security and integration.

Suriname’s Oil Dreams Collide With Geological Reality

  • GranMorgu will deliver Suriname its first major offshore oil production, but years later and at a far smaller scale than Guyana’s Stabroek-led boom.

  • Recent drilling results suggest the most prolific petroleum fairway lies largely within Guyana’s waters, limiting Suriname’s upside.

  • High costs, mixed exploration outcomes, and decarbonization pressures may constrain future investment beyond GranMorgu.


Suriname’s government, in the capital Paramaribo, has been hungrily eyeing neighboring Guyana’s massive world-class oil boom since before the 2020 pandemic. Both impoverished South American nations of less than one million share the Guyana Suriname Basin. The offshore basin is delivering an oil boom that is exceeding all expectations, making Guyana, based on GDP per capita, one of the wealthiest nations in the world. Suriname, which is one of South America’s poorest countries and is experiencing a deep, long-running economic crisis, is hungering after the rapid economic growth such a hydrocarbon boom will deliver.

In a stunning development, neighboring Guyana went from first discovery to first oil in a mere four years in an industry where that can take a decade or more. The former British colony is after a decade South America’s third largest oil producer pumping around 900,000 barrels per day. This along with Guyana’s gross domestic product (GDP) soaring nearly nine-fold over the last decade caught the attention of Paramaribo. By 2021, President Chan Santokhi, who was under pressure from a deep economic crisis, was convinced a world class oil boom would lift Suriname out of poverty. This saw the president hopeful the Block 58 discoveries would be developed and operational by 2025.

There was, however, a moment when Suriname’s much-anticipated oil boom wavered. During 2022, TotalEnergies, the operator of Block 58, and 50% partner APA Corporation chose to delay the final investment decision (FID) for developing the Sapakara and Krabdagu oil discoveries. The energy companies made this decision due to poor drilling success, the high gas-to-oil ratio of some discoveries, and a mismatch between seismic data and drilling results. This delayed the prospect of first oil, and consequently Suriname’s urgently needed world-class oil boom, by years. Nonetheless, by October 2024, TotalEnergies announced the $10.5 billion FID had been approved.

The deepwater project, named GranMorgu, is targeting reservoirs containing nearly 760 million barrels of crude oil. The facility will be operated by an all-electric floating production, storage, and offloading unit (FPSO) with a capacity to lift 220,000 barrels per day. First oil from GranMorgu is expected in 2028. This is some years after 2025, which was the initial prediction, but the latest news from TotalEnergies confirms GranMorgu will be a groundbreaking energy project for Suriname. The project will be a model for low-carbon extraction of crude oil in an industry dogged by high emissions. 

You see, aside from the FPSO being all-electric, there will be no routine flaring with all associated gas produced injected into tanks on the vessel. As a result, less than 16 kilograms of carbon are produced per barrel of crude oil lifted. This is less than the global average of 60kg per barrel produced reported for 2015, with industry analysts claiming it has fallen to as low as 18 kg per barrel as big oil strives to become carbon neutral. For these reasons, GranMorgu is viewed with excitement by many in an industry under considerable pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 

The successful start-up of the TotalEnergies project will go a long way to boosting Suriname’s crisis-riven economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts the former Dutch colony’s GDP will grow by a stunning 55% during 2028 when production starts. Nonetheless, there is a long way to go before the former Dutch colony experiences the rapid growth experienced by Guyana. Overall drilling results were not particularly positive despite the view that the oil potential of the Guyana Suriname Basin is far greater than the United States Geological Survey (USGS) initially believed. While APA reported the discovery of oil with the Baja wildcat well in Block 53 offshore Suriname during late 2022, there have been very few such announcements since.

Malaysia’s state-controlled energy company Petronas made a series of hydrocarbon discoveries in offshore Block 52, which is contiguous to Block 58. These are the Sloanea, Roystonea, and Fusaea discoveries. Despite those discoveries, ExxonMobil, which was a 50% partner in Block 52, relinquished that interest, handing it over to Petronas in November 2024. Since then, only Sloanea, which is a natural gas discovery, has been declared commercially viable. The other two discoveries have yet to be fully appraised, with doubts existing as to whether they are commercially viable. Even if they are, it may take a decade or longer for them to be developed and brought online. 

The results of Petronas’ latest multi-well drilling campaign in Block 52 were not stellar. The Caiman-1 wildcat well, the first of four wells to be drilled in 2025 and 2026, was spudded on July 21, 2025, in the western portion of Block 52. The exploration well was plugged and abandoned on December 6, 2025. While Petronas described the results as encouraging, there were no announcements that the well found commercially viable hydrocarbon reservoirs for possible exploitation. Petronas will continue with its planned drilling campaign as it seeks to delineate resources in Block 52 and determine whether the Sloanea natural gas discovery can be developed and brought to production.

This news comes on the back of APA and its partners in Block 53 relinquishing most of the petroleum acreage to Staatsolie, Suriname’s national oil company and industry regulator. That is despite the August 2022 Baja-1 discovery, where oil was discovered in the same depositional system of the Krabdagu discovery in Block 58, seven miles (11.5 kilometers) to the west. Indeed, the Krabdagu discovery forms part of the GranMorgu project. During June 2025, TotalEnergies acquired a 25% working interest in the remaining area of Block 53 around the Baja-1 discovery from Moeve, formerly known as CEPSA.

The acreage relinquished by APA during February 2024 was repackaged by Staatsolie and offered as a new offshore oil block. During June 2025, Suriname’s petroleum regulator awarded that acreage to Petronas as Block 66. Malaysia’s national oil company signed a production sharing contract with Staatsolie, giving it an 80% working interest in the block, with Paradise Oil Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of the national oil company, acquiring the remaining 20%. That deepwater oil acreage is contiguous to Petronas’ 80% controlled Block 52, where the company is the operator, and Paradise Oil is also a 20% partner.

There are signs, as illustrated by recent drilling results, that the petroleum fairway passing through the prolific Stabroek Block in offshore Guyana does not extend as far into Suriname’s territorial waters as initially speculated. For some time, analysts reasoned that the hydrocarbon fairway extended through Block 58 into adjacent Blocks 52 and 53. Indeed, recent drilling results indicate the lion’s share of petroleum held in the Guyana Suriname Basin is primarily located in offshore Guyana rather than in the former Dutch colony.

Offshore Suriname may be the hottest frontier oil and gas exploration in South America, but there are signs that time is running out for the country to explore that vast offshore petroleum potential. While the development of GranMorgu will deliver an economic windfall, the facility’s successful operation may not be sufficient to attract the tremendous capital needed to develop the vast oil potential thought to exist in Suriname’s territorial waters. A combination of uncertain drilling results, high development costs, and pressures to curb carbon emissions, coupled with the threat of peak oil, is weighing heavily on investment in offshore frontier oil basins.

By Matthew Smith for Oilprice.com

 

Coronado’s Curragh mining suspension adds to financial woes

Coal mining across Coronado Global Resources Inc.’s Curragh complex in Australia’s Queensland state was halted after a worker was killed, adding to woes for the company that’s already dealing with slumping prices.

A roof collapse occurred at about 3 p.m. local time Friday at Curragh’s Mammoth Underground Mine. One worker was safely recovered while teams worked through the night to stabilize the site and access a second worker who was unable to be saved, the Queensland government said in a statement late Saturday.

Curragh, which opened in 1983 and spans about 256 square kilometers (63,260 acres), is one of Australia’s largest sources of metallurgical coal used in steelmaking. Mammoth, which began mining coal a year ago, was expected to add to production from the Curragh North and Curragh South open-cut mines.

“As a sign of respect, production activities will be paused in the Curragh North and Curragh South open-cut mines to remember our fallen colleague and to ensure necessary support is provided to those who require it,” Shaun Newberry, Curragh’s vice president of operations, said in a memo to staff.

‘Cross road’

The disruption at Curragh comes at a sensitive time for Coronado. The Mammoth underground project was one of the company’s key growth plans, targeting output of up to 2 million tons of high-grade metallurgical coal a year, even as the miner cuts spending to preserve cash amid weaker prices and higher costs.

Coronado’s balance sheet and liquidity was at “the cross road,” Jefferies analysts said in a report in October, adding that progress at Mammoth “remains critical to recovery.”

Total debt at the company has almost doubled and market value has fallen 80% over the past two years amid a slump in metallurgical, or coking, coal prices. Brisbane-based Coronado has total debt of about A$928.4 million ($621 million), compared with total debt of A$468.1 million at the end of 2023, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Fitch Ratings withdrew its CCC- long-term issuer default rating and CCC+ rating on Coronado’s US dollar senior secured notes in November after the mining company chose to stop participating in the rankings process. Fitch had cut its rating three times from an initial B+ in September 2024. Both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s have a “negative” outlook on Coronado’s debt.

Miner deaths

The death at Curragh is the third since Coronado bought the complex in 2018. One worker died from a crush injury in November 2021, while a man was killed by a fallen mine truck tire in January 2020, according to data from the Mine Safety Institute of Australia. An earlier fatality occurred in 2010 when a worker died after a vehicle overturned at the site.

Coronado reported the death of a worker on Dec. 18 at its Lower War Eagle mine in West Virginia, an incident that also led to a temporary suspension of its Logan operations.

Prices for seaborne steel-making coal have slid to near a four-year low, prompting shutdowns across Australia’s coal industry. BHP Group said in September it would close its Saraji South mine and curb further coal investment under Queensland’s royalty regime, a move followed by other producers.

(By Jason Gale and Paul-Alain Hunt)

 

Botswana to open embassy in Moscow, open up to Russia in rare earths and diamonds

Moscow, Russia. Stock image.

Botswana plans to open an embassy in Moscow soon and has invited Russian investors to cooperate on rare earths and diamonds, Russia’s TASS state news agency quoted Botswana’s foreign minister as saying on Sunday.

Russia is seeking to strengthen its foothold in Africa amid the wider confrontation with the West.

“We firmly believe that Botswana is the best place for investment, considering its political and economic stability. Therefore, we strongly encourage Russian investors to come to Botswana,” Botswana’s Phenyo Butale was quoted as saying by TASS.

Diamonds normally contribute around one-third of Botswana’s national revenues and three-quarters of its foreign exchange receipts.

Russia’s Norilsk Nickel, the world’s largest producer of palladium and high-grade nickel, settled its dispute with the government of Botswana and BCL Group in 2021 about a transaction for the sale of Nornickel’s assets in Africa to BCL Group.

(By Vladimir Soldatkin; Editing by Guy Faulconbridge)

Ganfeng Lithium says it may face insider-trading charges


Ganfeng Lithium Group Co., a major Chinese producer of the battery material, said it faces possible charges related to an ongoing insider-trading case.

The company’s operations, mainly in Jiangxi province, are continuing as normal and are not likely to be affected by the case, Ganfeng said in a filing to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on Monday evening. The company’s shares fell as much as 5.8% in Hong Kong on Tuesday.

A public prosecutor will review the charges after police in the city of Yichun – a major lithium-mining hub – transferred the case, according to the filing. In 2024, Ganfeng was fined 3.32 million yuan ($473,880) for insider trading by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.

The company, among the world’s biggest lithium producers, said it had rectified the issues raised last year. In a statement published in July 2024, Ganfeng said it had traded shares of Jiangxi Special Electric Motor Co. in 2020 using insider information, resulting in illegal gains of 1.1 million yuan.

 

Indonesia's Sea Lanes Give it Strategic Leverage Over China

USS Sampson transits the Strait of Malacca (USN file image)
USS Sampson transits the Strait of Malacca (USN file image)

Published Jan 4, 2026 2:02 PM by The Strategist

 

[By Alfin Febrian Basundoro and Trystanto Sanjaya]

The power dynamic between Indonesia and China is more complex than the one-way economic dependence that some experts assume, since China depends on Indonesian waters for ships carrying its exports and imports between the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.

If the United States blockaded China in response to an invasion of Taiwan, for example, continued access through the Malacca Strait and Indonesia’s archipelagic waters would be vital to the Chinese economy. To maintain this access, Beijing must preserve Jakarta’s goodwill.

This means Jakarta has considerable latitude in confronting Beijing’s intransigence in the part of the South China Sea where China’s nine-dash line intrudes on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Jakarta does not need to worry much about offending Beijing to preserve its economic relations with China.

This power dynamic has already been tested. In 2016 and 2017, Jakarta took a hard line on illegal fishing by Chinese fishing vessels, detaining and scuttling captured Chinese fishing vessels and, on one occasion, opening fire on a Chinese vessel. This all occurred in the part of the EEZ that China vaguely claims, waters that Indonesia calls the North Natuna Sea.

Despite this action, trade between the two countries kept rising. Indonesian exports to China were worth US$16.79 billion in 2016 and US$27.13 billion in 2018, while its imports from China increased by 50 percent in the same time period, from US$30.8 billion to US$45.84 billion.

The reason, clearly, was the unequivocal economic importance of continued access through Indonesian sea lanes. Ships going to Europe, the Middle East and Africa from China, and vice versa, need to pass through the Malacca Strait, between Indonesia and Malaysia, or the Sunda, Makassar and Lombok straits within the Indonesian archipelago. In 2023, 53 percent of China’s energy imports, those from the Middle East, passed through the Malacca Strait or wholly Indonesian waters. China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait alone is so severe that two-thirds of all Chinese maritime trade (by value) needs to passes through it, while shipping lines send other ships through the archipelago.

If these routes were blocked, vessels traveling to China from the Indian Ocean could only take a much longer route south and east of Australia and through the Pacific Ocean, or queue to get through the narrow Malaysian side of the Strait of Malacca, which they would congest. Both alternatives would disrupt China’s trade.

China’s dependence on Indonesian waters would become even more acute if it tried to invade or blockade Taiwan and the US responded with a counterblockade. The Strait of Malacca and Indonesian archipelagic waters would be the main arenas for US attempts to strangle China’s maritime trade in the hope of punishing it and convincing it to abandon its Taiwan invasion. In fact, a US military planner told journalist Gideon Rachman, ‘If there was a war, that’s where we’d get ’em’. There is every possibility that the counterblockade operation would extend into Indonesian waters to completely block ships bound for China.

In such a scenario, Beijing would become dependent on Jakarta and, to a lesser extent, on Kuala Lumpur, to make concrete foreign policy decisions to prevent US counterblockade operations in their waters and to allow Chinese-bound ships to continue passing through. China’s goodwill towards Indonesia is therefore vital also for improving the chance that Jakarta would consider Chinese interests in wartime. Peacetime animosity, on the other hand, would help push Jakarta into Washington’s orbit.

AI has contributed no ideas to this article. Alfin Febrian Basundoro is a junior lecturer of international relations at Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya, Indonesia. Trystanto Sanjaya is a visiting fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in Oslo.

This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

 

Indonesia's Sea Lanes Give it Strategic Leverage Over China

USS Sampson transits the Strait of Malacca (USN file image)
USS Sampson transits the Strait of Malacca (USN file image)

Published Jan 4, 2026 2:02 PM by The Strategist


[By Alfin Febrian Basundoro and Trystanto Sanjaya]

The power dynamic between Indonesia and China is more complex than the one-way economic dependence that some experts assume, since China depends on Indonesian waters for ships carrying its exports and imports between the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.

If the United States blockaded China in response to an invasion of Taiwan, for example, continued access through the Malacca Strait and Indonesia’s archipelagic waters would be vital to the Chinese economy. To maintain this access, Beijing must preserve Jakarta’s goodwill.

This means Jakarta has considerable latitude in confronting Beijing’s intransigence in the part of the South China Sea where China’s nine-dash line intrudes on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Jakarta does not need to worry much about offending Beijing to preserve its economic relations with China.

This power dynamic has already been tested. In 2016 and 2017, Jakarta took a hard line on illegal fishing by Chinese fishing vessels, detaining and scuttling captured Chinese fishing vessels and, on one occasion, opening fire on a Chinese vessel. This all occurred in the part of the EEZ that China vaguely claims, waters that Indonesia calls the North Natuna Sea.

Despite this action, trade between the two countries kept rising. Indonesian exports to China were worth US$16.79 billion in 2016 and US$27.13 billion in 2018, while its imports from China increased by 50 percent in the same time period, from US$30.8 billion to US$45.84 billion.

The reason, clearly, was the unequivocal economic importance of continued access through Indonesian sea lanes. Ships going to Europe, the Middle East and Africa from China, and vice versa, need to pass through the Malacca Strait, between Indonesia and Malaysia, or the Sunda, Makassar and Lombok straits within the Indonesian archipelago. In 2023, 53 percent of China’s energy imports, those from the Middle East, passed through the Malacca Strait or wholly Indonesian waters. China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait alone is so severe that two-thirds of all Chinese maritime trade (by value) needs to passes through it, while shipping lines send other ships through the archipelago.

If these routes were blocked, vessels traveling to China from the Indian Ocean could only take a much longer route south and east of Australia and through the Pacific Ocean, or queue to get through the narrow Malaysian side of the Strait of Malacca, which they would congest. Both alternatives would disrupt China’s trade.

China’s dependence on Indonesian waters would become even more acute if it tried to invade or blockade Taiwan and the US responded with a counterblockade. The Strait of Malacca and Indonesian archipelagic waters would be the main arenas for US attempts to strangle China’s maritime trade in the hope of punishing it and convincing it to abandon its Taiwan invasion. In fact, a US military planner told journalist Gideon Rachman, ‘If there was a war, that’s where we’d get ’em’. There is every possibility that the counterblockade operation would extend into Indonesian waters to completely block ships bound for China.

In such a scenario, Beijing would become dependent on Jakarta and, to a lesser extent, on Kuala Lumpur, to make concrete foreign policy decisions to prevent US counterblockade operations in their waters and to allow Chinese-bound ships to continue passing through. China’s goodwill towards Indonesia is therefore vital also for improving the chance that Jakarta would consider Chinese interests in wartime. Peacetime animosity, on the other hand, would help push Jakarta into Washington’s orbit.

AI has contributed no ideas to this article. Alfin Febrian Basundoro is a junior lecturer of international relations at Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya, Indonesia. Trystanto Sanjaya is a visiting fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in Oslo.

This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

 

Sanctioned Oil Tanker Goes Aground on the Rocks in Aegean

Qendil
Handout photo courtesy KEGM

Published Jan 4, 2026 2:50 PM by The Maritime Executive


A tanker has run aground off the coast of Bozcaada, Turkey, prompting a large-scale emergency response. 

According to Turkish maritime safety agency KEGM, the 250-meter tanker Qendil was en route from Aliaga to Yalova when it drifted onto a rocky shore at Bozcaada (Tenedos), a scenic island in the Aegean just south of the Dardanelles. The area is popular with tourists and filled with small islands, both Greek and Turkish-controlled. 

AIS data provided by Pole Star shows that Qendil went to anchor just southwest of the island on December 30, in about 40-50 meters of water. It held a relatively steady position at anchor through January 3. At approximately 1030 hours GMT on January 4, the ship departed her anchorage downwind for reasons as yet not known. She reached an unusual speed for a ship gone adrift - four knots - and came to rest about 100 meters offshore. Wind 

Two tugs, Kurtarma-10 and Kurtarma-16, have been dispatched to the scene to assist. 

No pollution or injuries have been reported. 

Qendil (IMO 9310525, ex names Spark, Oilstar, Ionia) is a 115,000 dwt oil tanker built in 2006. It is currently flagged in Oman, owned in India and managed by a firm in China.

Qendil's last PSC entry was made three years ago under previous long-term ownership. In the intervening three years, the vessel has changed owners three times and registered under six different flags. The vessel's age, management, operating route and registration pattern align with Russia-serving shadow fleet participation, and it has been sanctioned by some (but not all) allies of Ukraine. 

According to OpenSanctions,the ship was formerly part of the sanctioned Oceanix Management FZE fleet and the former Gatik Ship Management fleet. It has itself been sanctioned by Canada, Australia, Switzerland and New Zealand. Ukraine has sanctioned both the vessel and its master, identified by the GRU as Russian national Andrei Chumakov.