Protests in Iran are no longer episodic political turbulence — they represent a persistent structural crisis within the Islamic Republic. Since 2017, waves of unrest have periodically erupted: economic protests (2017–2019), the brutally repressed November 2019 uprising, the 2022 Mahsa Amini/“Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, labor and pension protests, and recurrent localized unrest over water shortages, ethnic marginalization, and social control. Each round reveals deepening societal discontent, widening social participation, and increasing delegitimization of the regime.
Reasons Behind the Protests
Socio-Economic Collapse
The economic foundation of the Islamic Republic is deteriorating. Key drivers include:High inflation and devaluation of the rial; Youth unemployment and shrinking middle class; Western sanctions impacting oil revenue, banking and technology access; Endemic corruption among political elites and IRGC-affiliated business networks; Unequal distribution of resources, particularly affecting peripheral regions.
For millions of Iranians, daily survival has replaced political loyalty. Economic injustice is now a structural rather than cyclical phenomenon.
Political Repression and Absence of Reform
Iran operates under an entrenched authoritarian structure:
Power monopolized by the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); Elections tightly controlled by the Guardian Council; Elimination of reformist/revisionist elites from decision-making; Systematic censorship and persecution of journalists, activists, and political opponents.
Citizens increasingly perceive that reform from within is impossible, forcing society toward direct confrontation.
Social and Cultural Grievances
Unlike earlier unrest primarily driven by economics, recent protests challenge identity and social order:
Compulsory hijab and gender control policies became a flashpoint; Desire for civil liberties, dignity, and personal autonomy; Youth rejection of ideological governance; Frustration with moral policing and intrusion into private life.
The slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom” transformed protests from single-issue mobilization into a civil rights uprising.
Governance Failure and Crisis Mismanagement
Iran faces recurring crises of:
Water shortages (Khuzestan, Isfahan, Sistan-Baluchistan); Environmental degradation
Mishandling of disasters (e.g., COVID-19 response);
Inadequate investment in infrastructure and public services;
Each crisis erodes state credibility and fuels localized protest movements that later converge into broader anti-regime sentiment.
Key Actors
Youth and Middle Class
Iran’s demographic reality is critical:
Majority of population under 35;
Digitally connected, globally aware;
Societal aspirations incompatible with theocratic governance;
They drive protest organization, narrative, and social mobilization.
Women
Women are the symbolic and operational center of protest activity:
Leading demonstrations Defying hijab regulations; Becoming visible public dissidents despite severe risks;
Women’s resistance transformed protests from economic pressure to civilizational rejection of patriarchal theocracy.
Ethnic and Regional Communities
Regions historically marginalized are protest hotspots:
Kurds (Mahsa Amini’s origin amplifies their activism)
Baluch in Sistan-Baluchistan; Arabs in Khuzestan; Azeris in the northwest.
These communities combine economic, ethnic, and political grievances, challenging Tehran’s Persian-centric governance model.
Labor, Teachers, and Pensioners
A powerful emerging actor group:
Organized labor strikes in oil and petrochemical sectors
Teachers’ nationwide protests for unpaid wages and rights
Pensioners protesting government mismanagement and poverty
Labor protests weaken the regime’s capacity to suppress by creating economic disruption.
The Regime Itself
Key pillars include:
IRGC: military enforcement, economic power, political control
Basij paramilitary: street repression Security services: surveillance, arrests, intimidation; State media apparatus: narrative construction
Their cohesion remains the regime’s survival guarantee — but cracks periodically appear.
Consequences
Increasing Delegitimization of the Regime
Each protest wave:
further erodes legitimacy,
expands public acceptance of defiance,
normalizes anti-regime discourse.
A psychological barrier has been broken: fear is no longer absolute.
Radicalization of Public Demands
Earlier protests called for reform. Now:
calls for regime change are explicit
slogans target the Supreme Leader personally
trust in reformists has collapsed
This shifts protests from reactive expressions to revolutionary opposition.
Militarization of Governance
As dissatisfaction grows, the regime increasingly relies on coercion:
broadened surveillance network; harsher policing; use of lethal force; sentencing of protesters to death.
Iran transitions further from hybrid authoritarianism toward militarized dictatorship.
Economic Decline and Capital Flight
Political instability worsens:
investment withdrawals; increased sanctions risk; brain drain as educated youth emigrate; The regime trades stability for control — and loses both.
Regional Security Implications
Iran’s internal instability impacts its external behavior:
Regime may escalate regional military activities to project strength; Use proxy warfare to distract domestic opinion; Increase reliance on Russia and China for economic lifelines and security partnerships.
Domestic unrest thus connects directly to Middle East geopolitics.
Foreign Influence: Reality vs Narrative
Regime Narrative: “Foreign Plot”
Tehran consistently blames:
United States, Israel, Gulf states, Western intelligence
for “engineering unrest” to destabilize Iran. This narrative:
justifies repression, rallies loyalists, delegitimizes legitimate grievances
However, there is no credible evidence that protests are externally orchestrated. They are indigenous, organic, and driven by real domestic conditions.
Real External Dynamics
Foreign factors influence protests indirectly, not as organizers:
Western sanctions worsen economic hardship — but the root cause is governance failure and IRGC economic monopolization.
Diaspora support networks amplify Iranian voices internationally, provide media exposure, and logistical coordination.
International human rights pressure increases reputational costs for Tehran.
Transnational digital networks allow mobilization, documentation, and organization.
Meanwhile, Russia and China support the regime diplomatically and economically — preferring an authoritarian ally to a democratic transition.
Iran’s protest movements reflect a deep societal rejection of authoritarian governance, social repression, and economic injustice. They are systemic, not episodic; political, not merely economic; and national, not foreign-engineered.
Although the regime maintains control through repression, Iran’s trajectory is unstable. Every cycle of unrest:
expands opposition participation,
delegitimizes power structures,
hardens confrontation lines between society and state.
The Islamic Republic faces a long-term legitimacy crisis with no credible path to reform. The question is no longer whether unrest will recur — but how far society is willing to push, and how far the regime is prepared to go to preserve power.
Best-Case Scenario — Managed Transition & Gradual Liberalization
Probability: Low, Timeframe: Medium–Long Term
Description
Sustained social pressure forces the Iranian leadership to pursue controlled reform rather than full repression. Elite factions recognize the unsustainability of the status quo; limited concessions evolve into structured internal change, preventing violent collapse.
Key Drivers
Sustained but disciplined nationwide protest waves;
Economic deterioration threatening regime survival more than reforms would;
Elite fractures within IRGC, political circles, and clerical establishment;
International diplomatic pressure + selective incentives for reform;
Succession uncertainty after Ali Khamenei accelerates political recalculation;
Indicators
Release of prisoners, reduction in hijab enforcement
Controlled political openings (municipal elections, limited media space)
Internal anti-corruption campaigns targeting regime insiders
Dialogue efforts with key social sectors (women, labor, teachers)
Economic stabilization steps with Western or regional partners
Domestic Consequences
De-escalation of violence
Gradual restoration of limited public trust
Economic stabilization efforts begin
Reduced likelihood of state collapse
Regional & International Implications
Lower risk of regional adventurism
Reduced proxy aggression to distract public
Potential diplomatic thaw with the West
Opportunity for structured engagement
Most Likely Scenario — Cyclical Protests, Hard Repression, No Structural Change
Probability: High
Timeframe: Short–Medium Term
Description
Iran enters a chronic protest-repression loop. The regime suppresses each wave harshly but without solving root causes. Society becomes increasingly hostile, regime increasingly securitized, and instability becomes routine.
Key Drivers
Continued economic decline & inflation
Social anger over hijab enforcement and daily repression
Environmental crises (water shortages, desertification)
Regime strategic doctrine prioritizing control over reform
Strong IRGC cohesion and loyalty
Indicators
Periodic nationwide protests every 6–18 months
High levels of arrests, executions, and intimidation
Strengthening of surveillance state
Tactical concessions without systemic reform
Intensified propaganda blaming “foreign enemies”
Domestic Consequences
Deepening legitimacy crisis; Brain drain and emigration of educated youth; Rising poverty and social fragmentation; Long-term weakening of state capacity
Regional & International Implications
- Regime uses external crises to divert attention (Iraq, Syria, Israel, Gulf)
- Continued proxy aggression
- Russia–China alignment strengthens as lifelines
- Persistent sanctions environment
Worst-Case Scenario — Violent Internal Breakdown or Militarized Regime Entrenchment
Probability: Moderate but Rising
Timeframe: Medium Term
Description
A trigger event (leadership crisis, disputed succession after Khamenei, mass killings, economic collapse) leads to uncontrolled escalation. Either Iran slides toward internal conflict or the IRGC converts the state into an overt military dictatorship.
Two sub-variants may occur:
Variant A: Internal Fragmentation / Unrest Escalates into Armed Resistance
Elite breakdown and regime infighting; Ethnic regions (Kurdish, Baluch, Khuzestan) become flashpoints; Possibility of localized armed resistance; Central authority weakens
Variant B: Total Militarization of the State
IRGC fully consolidates political control; National governance = security dictatorship ; Extreme repression replacing even symbolic political institutions
Key Drivers
- Succession crisis after Khamenei
- IRGC internal fractures or ambitious power grabs
- Mass protest casualties causing national revolt
- Economic shock (oil export collapse, financial system failure)
- External shock (major regional war or internal insurgency)
Indicators
Clashes inside regime factions; Widespread defections or full militarization orders; Communications shutdown nationwide; Emergency laws eliminating remaining civil rights.
Domestic Consequences
Severe instability, humanitarian risk; Potential internal displacement; Collapse of public services; Possible partial state failure.
Regional & International Implications
- Major escalation across Middle East
- Proxy groups become more aggressive or autonomous
- Nuclear risk increases — regime accelerates program as survival guarantee
- External powers (Russia, China) may intervene politically
- Western nations prepare containment strategies
Strategic Assessment
Iran is locked in a structural legitimacy crisis. Reform potential exists but is unlikely because the regime fears that even moderate concessions could unravel its power foundation. Therefore:
Most likely outcome: sustained repression + cyclical unrest;
Greatest strategic risk: succession crisis turning instability systemic;
Most stabilizing path: controlled reform — least probable without elite fracture.
Gulf and Israel Strategic Considerations
1. Gulf Monarchies: Between Opportunity and Fear of Collapse
For Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states, unrest in Iran is a strategic paradox:
they welcome pressure on a rival, but fear uncontrolled collapse on the opposite shore of the Gulf.
Strategic Opportunities
Weaker regional rival:
A regime consumed by domestic crises has fewer resources for:
expeditionary operations in Syria, Iraq, Yemen;
proxy-building in Bahrain, Saudi Eastern Province, or Kuwait;
missile and drone threats against Gulf infrastructure.
Narrative advantage:
Gulf leaderships can:
highlight their relative stability and prosperity;
use Iran’s repression as a counter-narrative to Tehran’s “Islamic governance model”;
appeal to Western partners as responsible, “order-preserving” actors.
Diplomatic leverage:
A pressured Iran is:
Strategic Risks
Refugees and cross-border instability:
Large-scale unrest or partial state failure in Iran could trigger:
refugee flows across the Gulf;
arms and criminal networks spilling into Gulf states;
smuggling and piracy upticks in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
Escapist external aggression:
A cornered regime may:
escalate against Saudi and Emirati targets (energy infrastructure, tankers, ports);
use proxies (Houthis, Iraqi militias) to signal it still controls escalation ladders.
Sectarian mobilization:
Tehran could lean more heavily on sectarian narratives, trying to stir Shi’a communities in the Gulf as leverage, forcing Gulf regimes to harden internal security measures.
Likely Gulf Policy Line
Officially:
Avoid public calls for regime change, emphasize “non-interference”;
Signal preference for a contained, weakened but intact Iran rather than sudden collapse.
Practically:
Tighten maritime and energy infrastructure security;
Expand intelligence on IRGC, proxies, and possible spillover networks;
Quietly coordinate with the U.S. and, in some cases, Israel on early-warning and deterrence.
Israel: Structural Adversary Watching for Openings
For Israel, internal unrest in Iran is directly linked to the core strategic threat:
the IRGC’s regional power projection and nuclear program.
. Strategic Opportunities
Operational distraction of the IRGC:
When security forces are consumed by internal control:
resources for Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Iraqi and Syrian militias are stretched;
command attention is focused inward, creating vulnerabilities in external networks.
Intelligence gains:
Periods of turmoil can:
generate more information flows (defections, leaks, exiled activists);
expose fissures inside the IRGC, political elite, or clerical establishment;
provide openings for cyber, psychological, and influence operations.
Erosion of ideological legitimacy:
Visible domestic resistance undermines the regime’s claim to represent “the oppressed” in the Islamic world, weakening its soft power among Arab populations and undermining its narrative around the Palestinian question.
Strategic Risks
Nuclear program under “siege mentality”:
The leadership may double down on the nuclear file as:
a survival guarantee;
a bargaining chip in any future internal or external crisis.
Dangerous external diversion:
To shift attention away from domestic unrest, Iran could:
open a more intense front via Hezbollah (northern Israel),
enable multi-front escalation (Gaza, West Bank, Syria, Lebanon) to rally domestic support and portray itself as “under attack.”
Post-collapse uncertainty:
Total regime collapse without a clear successor raises:
questions about command and control of the nuclear and missile program;
potential for localized warlordism or IRGC fragmentation;
risk of non-state actors gaining access to advanced weapons.
Likely Israeli Policy Line
Strategic posture:
Welcome sustained internal pressure on the regime;
Avoid public embrace of protests that could feed Tehran’s “foreign plot”narrative;
Maintain focus on capabilities, not rhetoric: nuclear, missile, and proxy threats.
Practical measures:
Intensify monitoring of nuclear sites and missile infrastructure for any “cover of chaos” acceleration;
Strengthen missile and air-defense readiness;
Deepen intelligence and covert capabilities aimed at:
IRGC logistics and command;
cyber and influence operations;
potential internal allies or informational channels.
Coordination with partners:
Work more closely with the U.S. and selected Gulf states on: shared early-warning; sanctions enforcement on IRGC-linked entities; contingency planning for worst-case scenarios (nuclear breakout under internal chaos).
Converging Gulf–Israel Interests
Despite different public narratives, the strategic overlap is clear:
Neither the Gulf nor Israel wants:
a fully victorious, emboldened Islamic Republic;
nor a completely failed Iranian state with uncontrolled weapons programs.
Both prefer:
A weakened but contained Iran, constrained by internal pressure yet still addressable in regional diplomacy.
Strong external security architecture — U.S. and, increasingly, minilateral Gulf–Israel coordination — to hedge against both escalation and collapse.
This overlap quietly drives:
growing intelligence contacts; defense-industrial and missile-defense discussions; shared interest in preventing Iran’s domestic crisis from turning into a regional strategic shock.
