Sunday, September 25, 2022

The SKELP Directives: U.S. Secret Financing of Germ Warfare during the Korean War


  SEPTEMBER 23, 2022
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Picture of “bacterial bombs” modified from U.S. psychological warfare leaflet bombs, from the September 1952 “Report of International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China,” pg. 357 (For history of this report, click here.)

The General was irritated. It was mid-January 1952, and from accounts subsequently released by China, North Korea, and international investigators, a campaign of aerial bombardment with biological weapons (BW) was taking place over both China and North Korea.

The germ weapons attacks allegedly were aimed at both military personnel and civilians, and included the dissemination of plant diseases. Now, suddenly, the bureaucrats in the Pentagon were turning off the secret money spigot for some of the most classified projects of the war!

What happened?

This essay is the first historical account of the secret funding used for the research into and production of chemical and biological weapons during the Korean War. It is based largely on declassified documents available in the U.S. National Archives, many of which are available at the “Weapons of Mass Destruction” collection at brillonline.com.

Besides clandestine forms of funding their secret weapons, this article will also look at other ways in which the BW program was kept secret, including the use of unwritten orders, the false labeling of weapons during shipment, and extraordinary security procedures taken during the movement of such materials.

The Korean War-era BW allegations have remained controversial for decades. A few years ago, this author postedonline a few dozen declassified CIA communications intelligence (COMINT) reports documenting the fact that various Communist military units were indeed reporting, in encrypted dispatches with authorities and other military units, U.S. attacks by biological weapons in the early months of 1952.

Units from China’s People’s Volunteer Army and the DPRK Korean People’s Army continued making such internal reports at least through the end of the year, and existing evidence argues these reports continued until nearly the armistice agreement in July 1953.

Despite such clear evidence of BW attack by U.S. forces, Western historians and commentators have ignored the CIA COMINT reports, relying on dubious documentation from “experts.” At the same time, historians have been unable to ignore the fact that the U.S. military, with assistance from the CIA, vastly accelerated its BW research program during the Korean War. Even as hundreds of anti-crop biological bombs were forward positioned in England and North Africa against the USSR as early as 1951 (as will be described below), Western scholars today insist that the U.S. did not implement actual offensive BW operations during this period.

In December 1958, as part of the sedition trial of John and Sylvia Powell, who reported on U.S. use of germ warfare in China and Korea, Ft. Detrick official John L. Schwab, stated under oath in an affidavit to the federal court that from the period 1 January 1949 through 27 July 1953, “the U.S. Army had a capability to wage both chemical and biological warfare, offensively and defensively.” Schwab had been at one point Chief of Ft. Detrick’s Special Operations Division, which worked closely with CIA on concocting BW and chemical weapons for use in sabotage and assassination operations.

View of the main entrance to Fort Detrick in 1956, west of current main gate on West 7th Street. Prior to 1956, the site was known as Camp Detrick (Source: Ch. 3, “Cutting Edge: The History of Ft. Detrick,” Public Domain)

Schwab then added that “during the aforesaid period, the biological warfare capability was based upon resources available and retrained only within the continental limits of the United States.”

As we shall see, biological munitions were indeed sent overseas as early as 1951. Declassified documents from the Department of Defense show that Schwab apparently committed perjury on this point.

Screenshot from the Pentagon’s 15 July 1952 Weapons System Evaluation Group report, “An Evaluation of Offensive Biological Warfare Weapons Systems Employing Manned Aircraft,” Enclosure “E”: “Characteristics of Anti-crop Agents, Munitions, and Weapons Systems”, p. E-59 — The “two overseas installations” were in England and Libya, as discussed elsewhere in this article. “ZI” is the “Interior Zone” of the U.S., aka the continental United States.

In any case, if there were any covert BW campaign — one that operated on a strict need-to-know basis— we would expect its funding would also be highly classified, and directions regarding its operations deliberately muddled or unrecorded. That is exactly what we do find, as attempts were made to keep such evidence as secret as possible.

Verbal instructions only

A declassified Summary History of the U.S. Chemical Corps, dated 30 October 1951, and covering the period 25 June 1950 through 8 September 1951, revealed that under the pressures of intense warfare and U.S./UN military setbacks on the Korean peninsula, the Chemical Corps gave a “terrific push” to the development and creation of new biological and chemical agents. The relevant secret orders were delivered orally. There was no mistaking the urgency behind these orders.

Screenshot from pg. 11, “Summary History of the U.S. Chemical Corps, 25 June 1950 through 8 September 1951″

According to this previously top secret internal history, the Chief Chemical Officer of the Chemical Corps at the time, Major General Anthony C. McAuliffe, “issued verbal instructions that, regardless of previous plans,” both chemical weapons (CW) and “a BW interim weapon” “were to be rushed to completion.”

The use of “verbal instuctions” implied that aspects of this program were too secret or sensitive to be written down. The operations of portions of the BW program were covert, subject to deniability by the President and other top U.S. officials. Indeed, President Truman always maintained that he never ordered their use, or a change from a supposed policy of using such weapons in retaliation only.

The use of verbal orders to maintain secrecy is hardly unknown. According to OSS documents dating from the close of World War II, verbal instructions were used to authorize field commanders to use anti-crop biological weapons. Turning to a different era, the Vietnam War, Congressional investigations documented that the orders and instructions for the U.S. Air Force to secretly bomb Cambodia were delivered orally.

Similarly, Canadian scholars Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman documented in their 1998 book, The U.S. and Biological Warfare (University of Indiana Press, p. 11), that in 1949, “preparations… for ready implementation” of biological warfare plans were in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bypassing the National Security Council. “These plans were so secret that they were presented orally to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal and Secretary of State George Marshall.” When such plans were discussed again in 1952, “it was decided that only the secretary of defense” — and not the secretary of state — would be notified. (1)

Whatever the level of secrecy involved, war plans costs money. Secret operations must leave some kind of trail. Newbie journalists are advised in their investigations to “follow the money.” And so we shall.

So let’s return to our irritated general. He was Major General Egbert G. Bullene, who left his post as head of Edgewood Arsenal to succeed McAuliffe as Chief Chemical Officer of the Chemical Corps in mid-1951. In January 1952, he and the Chemical Corps were in the very sensitive first operational stages of implementing their “stop-gap,” “interim” biological warfare plans against North Korea and China.

The plans utilized a combination of BW weapons, many apparently based upon designs from Japan’s old biowar Unit 731, which heavily relied on traditional forms of sabotage, as well as the unique use of insect vectors to deliver bacterial agents such as bubonic plague. Other BW munitions designed by Ft. Detrick and/or the U.S. Air Force, such as experimental use of aerosol dissemination of pathogens, may also have been in the mix. But suddenly the spigot of secret funding had been cut off! (2)

“Normal military channels were by-passed

17 January 1952 secret memorandum  (click to download) from Gen. Bullene to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., source Brill Online/National Archives

In a 17 January 1952 secret memorandum from Gen. Bullene to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., the Chemical Corps chief complained about the sudden lower priority assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to development of both Sarin nerve gas (codename GB) and to biological weaponry. The unexpected reduction in funding priority was retarding development of the Chemical Corps’ new agent production facilities for GB and BW, codenamed Projects Gibbet and Noodle, respectively.

“Priority and urgency must go hand in hand,” the general said.

“You will recall more than a year ago,” Bullene wrote to Pace (via Michael E. Kalette, special assistant for Construction at the Munitions Board, working in the office of the Undersecretary of Army for Research and Materiel), “a directive was issued to the Chief Chemical Officer… to initiate design and construction of certain highly classified projects in the field of GB and BW.”

Bullene continued:

“These projects were initiated with vigorous action under a scope of highest priority and unusual administrative procedures. Normal military channels were by-passed in the interests of urgency and for other peculiar reasons known to the Secretary’s office.”

Did the “other peculiar reasons” too secret to be detailed in a merely “secret” memorandum concern the use of “interim” Unit 731-style BW projects, which were utilized until the Chemical Corps more mainstream projects, such as the anti-personnel Brucella suis and anthrax bombs were ready for full-scale use?

The September 1952 report of the International Scientific Commission, headed by respected British scientist Joseph Needham documented the kinds of Unit 731 BW attacks that allegedly occurred throughout the first nine months of 1952. Looking at the use of insect vector attacks and other types of infected materials, such as chicken feathers, UK scientist Joseph Needham, and other scientists investigating the BW allegations in summer of 1952, wondered “whether the American Far Eastern Command was engaged in making use of methods essentially Japanese… questions which could hardly have been absent from the minds of members of the Commission” (pg. 12).

A sketch of an Uji Bomb, an “improved porcelain experimental bomb for bacterial liquid drawn from sketch submitted by Lt. Gen. Shiro Ishii,” was included, along with other Japanese bomb designs, in Chemical Corps’ officer Lt. Col. Arvo Thompson’s May 1946 report to Ft. Detrick on Japanese BW activities

Needham and company could hardly have known that Fort Detrick already had sketches of biological bombs drawn from information personally obtained from Unit 731’s Shiro Ishii.

Nor could the ISC have known that U.S. Army Chemical Corps researchers believed at the time that “Insects and other arthropods act as vectors and reservoirs of some of the most promising and highest priority BW agents affecting man and animals.” The 1953 fiscal year annual report for the Chemical Corps Biological Laboratoriesfurther enthused, “Arthropods provide a tactical concept of BW agent dissemination, as they can efficiently carry agents to specific targets.” (See pg. 77 of the report, which while dated 1 July 1953, covered the period from 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953.)

Imperial Japan’s Unit 731 and the U.S. Army’s Chemical Corps Intelligence Branch

The October 1951 “Summary History of the Chemical Corps,” quoted earlier above, described in its section on “Intelligence” how the activities of its Intelligence Branch — which operated under the Plans, Training, and Intelligence division of the Chemical Corps— “were greatly increased with the advent of the conflict in Korea. The branch received a vast amount of military and technical intelligence from the Far East. Consequently it was confronted with the job of reorganizing to meet this influx and of acquiring the qualified personnel to fill new positions. At the present time these problems are not entirely solved, and temporary expedients have been adopted to meet the emergency.” [pg. 32, bold emphases added.]

Unfortunately, we still don’t know too much about how the Chemical Corps incorporated this “vast amount of military and technical intelligence,” which can only have been the data and studies provided by Japan’s Unit 731 personnelunder the terms of an amnesty for war crimes secretly granted by the U.S. Most likely much of that information was destroyed, or still remains carefully guarded in the vaults where especially sensitive information remains sealed.

A portion of these materials ended up in the U.S. National Archives. In 1960, the U.S. government declassified three “key documents” from the Unit 731 materials. Titled “The Report of A” (anthrax), “The Report of G” (glanders), and “The Report of Q” (bubonic plague), the reports are hundreds of pages long. “They are available to the public at the U.S. Library of Congress.”

The 744-page Unit 731-Ft. Detrick report on “Q” (bubonic plague) rested for some years in the Technical Library at the Chemical Corps’ Dugway Proving Ground.

Much of what we do know about the postwar activities of Unit 731 and the work at Ft. Detrick during the Korean War comes from the investigations and reports of Chinese and North Korean military and scientific personnel, the limited release of certain COMINT documents by the CIA, a handful of contemporary newspaper reports, and the work of investigators from the International Association of Democratic Jurists and the International Scientific Commission.

Of much significance in this regard is a 26 June 1947 memorandum to the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee for the Far East from two Defense Department officials, Edward Wetter with the Research and Development Board (RDB) and Dr. Henry I. Stubblefield from Ft. Detrick.

The Wetter-Stubblefield memo explained that the U.S. agreement not to prosecute Ishii or other Unit 731 criminals was based on the promise “that information given by them on the Japanese BW program will be retained in intelligence channels.”

Evidently the materials became the property initially of the Intelligence Branch of the Chemical Corps, and probably the CIA, and were held closely on a need to know basis.

As an important side note, as I pointed out in an earlier article, by Spring 1950, Wetter was serving as Deputy Executive Director of RDB’s Biological Warfare Committee. He was the contact person for all the “panels” within the Committee that were working on biological warfare, including “panels” on “Man,” “Animals,” “Crops,” and “Intelligence.” The Army representative to the RDB’s BW Committee “Panel on Crops,” i.e., for anti-crop biological warfare, was Wetter’s old colleague, Dr. Henry I. Stubblefield.

Code Name “SKELP”

Meanwhile, in January 1952, Gen. Bullene, in charge at the Chemical Corps, had his own fish to fry. In his memo to Pace, he described the special procurement procedures unique to both the Sarin and BW crash development programs:

“An expediting group for priority procurement was established within the Munitions Board, and direct access to the National Production Authority was exercised. These projects were pursued under a code name of ‘SKELP’ and MPA directives issued for these projects were known as SKELP directives. These measures insured special and positive actions regarding procurement.”

Hence, according to Bullene’s account, it appears that the funds for building the secret productions facilities to produce Sarin gas and agents of biological warfare were hidden in the guise of special Army military personnel directives (MPAs).

But now Bullene was flustered. Even though the “scope of priority and procedure” for procurement had continued “without hesitation or question” for over a year, suddenly in December 1951, the Munitions Board was throwing bureaucratic obstacles in the way of the Chemical Corps’ top secret projects.

Bullene described how that December the Munitions Board suddenly was requiring “a statement of priority from the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army” before proceeding with the special procurement procedures, “since the impact of other priority programs was being felt and the situation needed clarification.” When the Munitions Board did not receive such a “statement of priority or urgency,” it discontinued the SKELP priority procedures. For Bullene, the situation could not have come at a more “critical time.”

What other “priority programs” could suddenly have arisen to necessitate some kind of “clarification” at the Munitions Board (or in the office of the Under Secretary of the Army for Research and Materiel)? And why was December 1951-January 1952 such a “critical time”? Among other things, this was the period of the onset of large-scale bombing raids that allegedly used biological weapons. But there were other projects as well.

The subject line for Bullene’s memo specified that two classified programs were at stake here: the construction of a plant to develop Sarin gas (Project Gibbet) and one to produce biological weapons material, in particular, anti-crop agents (Project Noodle).

Author and researcher Nicholson Baker wrote about Project Noodle in his recent bookBaseless: My Search for Secrets in the Ruins of the Freedom of Information Act (page 112):

“A factory for vegetative agents, code-named NOODLE, was being built in Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, according to a Department of Defense progress report prepared in December 1951 by Earl Stevenson of Arthur D. Little and CIA chemist Willis Gibbons. ‘The anti-crop program is aimed at the bread basket of the Soviet Union,’ the report said. ‘Unfilled bombs for these agents have been produced and delivered to overseas bases. This year, increasingly significant quantities of anti-wheat and anti-rye agents have been harvested.’”

According to Baker, the Gibbet (or GIBBETT) Sarin plant was built in Muscle Shoals, Alabama. The Noodle plant to produce “vegetative agents,” such as wheat stem rust, was part of an anti-crop program of biological warfare whose main target was the Soviet Union.

A little over a month after Bullene sent his complaint to the Department of the Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a draft memorandum to the Chairman of the Munitions Board. Dated 25 February 1952, the draft memo, “Priority for Chemical and Biological Warfare Facilities,” proposed that both Projects Noodle and Gibbet be transferred to “the urgent ‘S’ category” for funding purposes. This policy had the backing of the Army’s Chief of Staff, who noted that previously, both Noodle and Gibbet “were given the highest authority under the name of SKELP.” (According to a 2012 Department of Defense history on DoD acquisition, [pg. 108], “S” category represented the “highest priority” of military urgency for munitions production, reserved for programs to be selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

The February 1952 JCS memo was the only other mention of SKELP directives that I have ever found in any of the extant documentation declassified to date.

“Somebody’s pet enthusiasm”

Screenshot, from pg. 4, 29 October 1951 memo to Air Force General Howard Bunker from William A. M. Burden, Source: Brillonline/National Archives

A final, suggestive explanation as to why SKELP funding of BW programs was suddenly curtailed in late 1951 appears in a 29 October 1951 memo to Air Force General Howard Bunker from William A. M. Burden, special assistant for research and development to Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter, and also an “heir to the Vanderbilt fortune,” (N. Baker, Baseless, p. 173).

Burden, who had conducted his own “brief review of the present BW program,” visiting Camp Detrick (later Ft. Detrick) and Edgewood Arsenal, while also conferring with the BW Committee at the Pentagon’s Research and Development Board (RDB), was critical of the program on a number of points. His criticisms were aimed at creating a robust BW capability in the least amount of time.

Burden pointed out that some unnamed “technical consultants” at the RDB BW Committee were critical about the selection of BW agents then under development. Burden didn’t say which agents these might be, but indicated the RDB consultants claimed the choice of BW agents had been made because “a) they were easy to produce, or b) or they were somebody’s pet enthusiasm, rather than because they were the most effective agent against the type of targets on which they would actually be used.”

Could the “easy to produce” agents, the product of “somebody’s pet enthusiasm” have been a reference to the mass of infected feathers, spiders, flies, fleas and voles that in late 1951 were being planned for BW drops on North Korean and Chinese troops and villages? Whether that turns out to be the case or not, we can see that even at high organizational levels of the BW effort there was conflict over which programs and munitions were best to pursue.

Project STEELYARD and the Transport of BW Agents Overseas

The anti-crop program aimed at the Soviets was code-named STEELYARD. By December 1951, 800 biological cluster bombs were positioned outside the continental United States, meant for use against the Russians. Four hundred had been sent to RAF Lakenheath, England, and the other 400 were positioned at Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli, Libya. Baker noted (p. 113) that Wheelus was “temporary home of the CIA’s 580th Air Resupply and Communications Wing.”

The Air Resupply and Communications Service (ARCS) had been created by the Air Force Psychological Warfare Division, in the Pentagon’s Directorate of Plans, and was initially connected to the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). (3) My own research shows the 582nd ARCS was stationed for a while at RAF Molesworth, only 55 miles from Lakenheath.

Whether or not ARCS was involved in the biological warfare program, the anti-crop munitions sent abroad were modified versions of the Air Force M16 leaflet bomb, a staple of the Air Force Psychological Warfare Division. But these bombs were modified to carry infected feathers — tens of thousands of them — meant to spread disease to the wheat and rye crops of the Soviet Union. The CIA had supplied a detailed report to the Pentagon in early 1952 describing the vulnerabilities of each targeted area.

Ft. Detrick’s Special Operations and Crops divisions had earlier produced a top-secret report, “Feathers as Carriers of Biological Warfare Agents.” The report explained that by December 1950 the Chemical Corps had determined that “feathers dusted with 10 per cent by weight of cereal rust spores and released from a modified [leaflet bomb] M16A1 cluster adapter at 1200 to 1800 feet above ground level will carry sufficient numbers of spores to initiate a cereal rust epidemic.” (Thanks to intrepid researcher Alice Atlas for providing this document.)

In general, anti-crop biological weapons, as well as the use of chemical defoliants against crops, was more advanced at the time of the Korean War than the rest of the U.S. biowarfare program. Despite the budgetary cutbacks that had hit the military after World War II, according to historian Simon Whitby, “Between 1943 and 1950 some 12,000 chemical agents had been screened for their potential as anti-crop chemical agents.” [Whitby, S.. Biological Warfare Against Crops (Global Issues) (p. 129). Kindle Edition.] The U.S. program also benefitted from close collaboration with both British and Canadian anti-crop BW programs.

According to a declassified portion of the Joint Chiefs’ Weapons System Evaluation Group’s (WSEG) July 1952 examination of “Offensive Biological Warfare Weapons Systems Employing Manned Aircraft,” the Air Force biological bombs used for Operation Steelyard were also intended to be sent to a base in French-held Morocco, as well as “a base in Cairo,” Egypt. Whether they ever were sent there or not is unknown. See pg. E-68 in document embedded below.(4)

WSEG Report №8, Enclosure “E”, Characteristics of Anti-crop Agents, Munitions, & Weapons Systems (Source: National Archives) — Click here to download declassified report

In early March 1952, Air Force Mission Support Services (AFMSS) sent a Top Secret, “Operational Immediate” memoto the Commanding General of Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson, and a number of other very high-ranking military officials, including the Commander in Chief of U.S. Air Force (European Command) in Wiesbaden, Germany; MATS command at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; the Commanding General at the Air Force Air Research and Development Command in Baltimore; Gen. Egbert Bullene at the Chemical Corps; Commanding General Third Air Force, headquartered in South Ruslip, England; the Commanding Officer at Wheelus AFB, Tripoli; and the commanding general, Strategic Air Command at Offutt AFB outside Omaha, Nebraska. The subject was Operation Steelyard.

The memo reiterated the positioning of 400 biological bombs each at Lakenheath and Wheelus, and stated the need for modifications to the bombs necessary for deployment. The memo further described the plans for airlift and delivery of agent fill for the bombs (5), including time bomb fuzes and arming wire. The fill and the fuzes were to be shipped from Edgewood Arsenal. The MATS commander was ordered to prepare for the airlift.

The memo concluded, “The time period for use of these munitions is from the present thru 30 May 52. Accordingly all planning and action required must be completed as soon as possible. Implementation of delivery and airlift for (TS) Steelyard will require specific directive this hq” (parentheses in original).

Disguising the Shipment of Biological Bombs

The secrecy wasn’t just in the procurement details. As early as 19 September 1951, a memo from AFMSS at USAF headquarters in Washington, D.C., to the Commanding General at Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson airbase described the necessity of camoflaging the biological bombs to be transported overseas. The memo was copied to the Commanding General, Strategic Air Command at Offutt AFB in Omaha; Commanding General, Army Chemical Center at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland; and the Chief of the Army Chemical Corps in D.C.

Screenshot from 19 September 1952 memo from USAF Mission Support Services to Commanding General, Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson AFB, re “shipping instructions for Biological Warfare munitions”

As written by “Mr. Williams” at AFMSS, the memo described the special shipping instructions for the bombs’ delivery to Lakenheath, England:

“Each adapter must be inclosed in a box, and designation on each box and all shipping instructions, such as bills of lading will be marked ‘Hardware’… There will be no markings or other indication on boxes or bombs to indicate purpose.”

Delivery to the U.S. Air Force Commanding Officer at Lakenheath was requested “as soon after 1 October 1951 as possible.”

Whether or not the anti-crop weapons sent to England and Libya for possible use against the Soviet Union were ever sent further onward to Korea is a matter of speculation. There is no evidence as yet they ever were. But as with the extraordinary SKELP directives, they point to the type of procedures the military may have used when sending non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons, to the Far East.

The idea of a transfer of BW munitions outside the European theater is not out of the question. A top secret 11 June 1951 U.S. Air Force “Staff Study” on the “BW-CW Program in USAF” aimed at fulfilling an earlier directive (JCS 1837/18) from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dated 21 February 1951 — during a period when the U.S. Army was in pell-mell retreat before Chinese forces in North Korea — the Joint Chiefs had called for “a BW-CW combat capability at the earliest possible date.”

Screenshot from USAF Staff Study on the “BW-CW Program in USAF”, 11 June 1951, National Archives/Public Domain (Link)

“BW and CW offer a tremendous military potentiality against the overwhelming manpower superiority of the Soviet Union,” the Staff Study stated. The report continued, without explanation, “It may be necessary to use BW against the Chinese suddenly.”

Further pursuit of Pentagon and CIA documents may yet reveal the full parameters of the U.S. biological warfare activities during the Korean War. It’s clear that the claims of various scholars that biological weapons from Ft. Detrick never made it to the Korean War theater, including Japan, Guam, etc., are specious in that almost all of these analyses have failed to mention the implementation of operational offensive action with anti-crop bioweapons. To my knowledge, there has also been no mention of the secret funding that enabled important aspects of the BW program. Nor do any of these analyses persue the hints about “stop-gap” interim BW weapons in Korea, or the similarity between the kinds of BW reported by China and North Korea and the weapons developed by Unit 731, whose designs (at the very least) were handed over to the U.S. Chemical Corps.

BW and Strategic Air Command

One example of outstanding documentary evidence regarding the shipment of classified materials to the Far East in this period comes from a top secret 17 December 1952 memo from Commanding General Curtis LeMay, at Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB to the Commanding General, 15th Air Force at March AFB. Other addressees included the Commanding General of Air Materiel Command (AMC), Wright-Patterson, and Commanding Officer, 3rd Aviation Field Depot Squadron (“3AFDS”), Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

3AFDS had been assigned to 15th Air Force in mid-May 1951. A history of the Air Force Special Weapons Project(AFSWP) lists the 3rd AFDS as one of the components of the US Air Force’s Special Weapons Units, and trained by AFSWP.

USAF, Cable, CGSAC to CGAF 15th Air Force, et al., December 17, 1952, Top Secret, NARA

The memo, marked “Top Secret [-] Security Information [-] Operational Immediate,” was copied to the Air Force Chief of Staff in Washington, D.C., the Commanding General of the Air Division at Travis AFB, and the commanding officers at two units at Kelly AFB in Texas. It described an airlift of “highly classified material” from Kelly to Travis AFB on 19 December 1952. From Travis, the classified materiel departed the U.S. mainland (“ZI departure point”) for Anderson AFB, Guam, and an unspecified place of arrival in Japan.

The AMC C-124 cargo plane was to be closely monitored on the trip. SAC’s commanding general advised that Travis be ready for the shipment with salvage and security teams, as well as standby aircraft and crew. Travis was to pay special attention to perimeter security for the cargo plane’s arrival.

It seems most likely the secret shipment concerned nuclear materials or munition components, given the memo’s origination from Strategic Air Command. But many people are unaware that SAC was drawn into BW plans at various points. Some of that history, as well as other relevant aspects of the BW story touched on in this article, can be found in Nicholson Baker’s excellent bookBaseless: My Search for Secrets in the Ruins of the Freedom of Information Act (see in particular discussion beginning pg. 165).

The BW-SAC connection can be seen directly in a 17 June 1952 letter from Gen. LeMay to Lt. General Thomas D. White, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, at the Pentagon. LeMay explained, “As you know, Strategic Air Command has been directed to achieve a one-wing CW-BW operational capability by 1 December 1952.”

LeMay told White that the plans for such a wing were simple. An SOP developed at headquarters would be sufficient “for the briefing of the few key people of the wing who need to know about the CW-BW mission.” The remainder of the letter concerns LeMay’s concerns about maintaining the project’s details to as few people as possible.

Was the mid-December 1952 shipment of “highly classified material” from Kelly AFB to Guam and Japan relevant to the “one wing CW-BW” project? We don’t know. But again, until full perusal of all existing documentation, and declassification of currently classified material, takes place, the primary point here will be that such overseas transfers of WMD materials did take place, and it’s not inconceivable at all that some of these materials related to biological and/or chemical weapons. Indeed, in the case of anti-crop biological weapons, we know that to have been the case.

It’s the contention of this author that the revelations of a secret, outside normal channels, method of funding certain BW and CW projects, as discussed in this article, can be extrapolated to the actual biological warfare operations carried out in North Korea and China during the Korean War. Whether the latter were funded via SKELP directives, or by other equally secret means, is something that will ultimately become known as further declassifications take place, and as a new generation of historians and journalists with an appetite for truth pursue these questions.

ENDNOTES

(1) Endicott and Hagerman state, “[the] recommendation by the Army chief of staff that the secretary of defense but not the secretary of state be included in the implementation of bacteriological warfare is [in] an undated document titled ‘Deception in the Biological Warfare Field’ released with [a 1 Feb. 1952 Memorandum form the Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Memorandum by the Director, Joint Staff on Deception in the Biological Warfare Field].” Endicott and Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare, pg. 225, n. 2.

(2) Some might contend that the secret, special funding stream for the Chemical Corps concerned ongoing projects to complete the Corps’ standard, if highly classified, biological and chemical warfare projects, such as Operation Steelyard, which is reviewed elsewhere in this article. By late 1951, it was apparent that availability of operational BW in particular was taking longer than expected to implement, given the serious military setbacks for the U.S. and allies that had occurred after China entered the war in late October 1951, which created an “emergency” situation for the U.S. military.

Nicholson Baker has forwarded to me a copy of a November 1952 memorandum for the record from Col. Arthur Hoffman at the AF AFOAT BW-CW division office to Gen. James Doolittle, who was a big supporter of biological warfare, and was then special assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Hoffman indicated that “Phase I” of the military’s Biological Warfare program needed to be extended out another six months, due to “slippage in the Chemical Corps production program.”

In fact, this delay in completing Chemical Corps BW projects was why “stop-gap” measures, and an “interim BW weapon” were necessary. But it is likely not helpful for historians to draw a hard boundary between the official classified programs to develop biological weapons capacity ongoing at this time and the covert, Japanese-influenced (if not also partially staffed) programs to utilize whatever materials were at hand, including insect-vector munitions and old-fashioned sabotage tactics, in the fight with the DPRK and the PRC. While the programs were bureaucratically separate, there was significant overlap due to the fact that the actors involved — the Chemical Corps scientists and engineers, the Air Force command (particularly the Air Force’s Psychological Warfare Division, and Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base), the Research and Development Board, the Strategic Air Command, the Atomic Energy personnel, and the Munitions Board, and the CIA — were essentially the same, or drew upon the same pool of talent and expertise. The full story of the covert, Unit 731-related Korean War-era program has yet to be revealed.

(3) See discussion on ARCS by Endicott and Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare, 1998, University of Indiana Press, pp. 121–123.

(4) According to a 18 August 1952 U.S. Air Force Memorandum, “BW-CW Logistics Out of the ZI,” “seventeen areas in Africa and the Middle East and seven areas in the Atlantic” were considered for BW-CW storage as part of the logistics plan for the U.S. Air Force European Command. Presumably this included the STEELYARD plans, as suggested by late historian Matthew Aid in a historiographical essay on the period at Brill Online. Aid’s essay is of some interest, but one wonders what his agenda was, or if he had not yet completed his examination of the period. For one thing, in his discussion of the SKELP directives, he indicated they covered the construction of a pilot plant for Sarin production, but was mum on the documented connection with the work on biological weapons (particularly anti-crop weaponry).

(5) As regards the availability of the BW agent fill for the anti-crop bombs, see a 9 November 1951 memo from Air Force headquarters to Air Materiel Command at Wright-Patterson AFB, which indicated that at that point there was 1,200 lbs. of Wheat stem rust “available for shipment,” and 600 lbs of rye stem rust (with another 4,200 lbs. also to become available at some point). The Secret 9 November memo (declassified) is included as an enclosure to a separate memorandum from USAF Col. James Totten, Chief, BW-CW Division, Office of Assistant Director for Atomic Energy to the Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, Director of Plans, Operations Division USAF, dated 5 December 1951.

Jeffrey Kaye is a psychologist (retired) and author of “Cover-up at Guantanamo“.

Suffield Base Canada's Area 51: plawiuk — LiveJournal

Suffield Base in Alberta is the largest chemical biological weapons research centre in North America, and one of only three NATO CBW research projects world ...

May 26, 2017 - CFB Suffield has occasionally been dubbed Canada's Area 51, not because of any extraterrestrial links, but because it is also the epicentre of ...

The Case Against Nuclear Power: A Primer


  
SEPTEMBER 9, 2022Facebook

Image by Vladyslav Cherkasenko.

A version of the following was presented at Socialism 2022, sponsored by Haymarket Books, which is publishing Joshua Frank’s forthcoming Atomic Days: The Untold Story of the Most Toxic Place in America, available October 11.

***

Thanks everyone for showing up for this talk. I think it’s a vitally important topic, but I’ll admit, it’s a bit disheartening that it’s now a subject of debate on the Left.

I’ve long believed that we ought to build on the successes that came before us, not tear them down. Sadly, with the wrath of climate change impacting every corner of the earth, that is exactly what some are attempting to do. Last week a friend sent me an NPR story, “When Even Environmentalists Support Nuclear Power.” I read it, it’s awful propaganda that distorts the reality of how many of us view nuclear power and will continue to fight against it.

While opposition to nuclear power and weapons existed as far back as the 1940s, it wasn’t until the 1970s that anti-nuclear activism gained prominence. The most significant of these early protests against atomic energy took place in Seabrook, New Hampshire, where a nuclear plant was set to be constructed. After the town voted against the construction of the facility on three different occasions, their voices were ignored, and the building of the plant moved forward. 

When citizens weren’t able to curtail the plant’s building through the ballot box, they decided to adopt more radical tactics. In April 1977, an adhoc group of locals called the Clamshell Alliance, held a civil disobedience protest at the site’s location. Nearly 1,500 were arrested, and news spread quickly as it was one of the largest civil disobedience actions since the Vietnam era. 

Nuclear Liberation Front direct action protest at Seabrook, NH, photo courtesy of Joe Allen.

Across the country, more protests soon erupted. In California, the same year as the action in New Hampshire, a group called Abalone Alliance formed in an effort to stop the final phase of construction for the Diablo Canyon nuclear facility in San Louis Obisbo. Over a two-week period in September 1981, nearly 2,000 protestors were arrested when they successfully blocked workers from entering the construction site. Following the Diablo Canyon protests, PGE, the plant’s operator, vowed to abandon all future nuclear projects in the state, and Diablo was the last nuclear plant to go online in California, which it did in 1985. 

By the time the protestors were rounded up at Diablo, the movement against nuclear power had evolved dramatically, with the meltdown at Three Mile Island in March of 1979, validating their concerns. Three Mile Island acted as a catalyst for more protests around the country, even making its way across the Pacific to Japan, where survivors of Hiroshima gathered in Tokyo to oppose nuclear technologies. Ultimately, these actions culminated in the single largest anti-nuclear protest ever, which took place in New York City in September 1979 when an estimated 200,000 people rallied in Battery Park, calling for an immediate shut down of Three Mile Island and an end to nuclear power proliferation globally.

These envigorating actions, along with the 1986 disaster at Chernobyl, put a halt to the construction of new nuclear plants in the United States. Plans for dozens of plants were shelved. By the mid-1980s the anti-nuclear power movement shifted its focus, joining the rapidly growing nuclear freeze movement, which was working to put the breaks on the global nuclear arms race. In retrospect, the anti-nuclear power movement was one of the most successful social movements to take hold in the United States in the last 40 years. 

Yet now, in the name of fighting our burning climate, some are trying to undo this monumental success by prescribing nukes as a remedy for the illenss of climate change.

There are many reasons to oppose nuclear power, and I will address seven of them: Why nuclear energy is not carbon neutral, mining impacts, nuclear power’s ties to atomic weapons, waste issues, the risks of accidents, and costs. I will generally focus on the United States, as we still have the largest nuclear power fleet in the world. Nonetheless, these issues are largely universal. Currently, the US has 55 nuclear plants and 93 operating reactors in 28 states.

***

First, let’s address a major misconception about nuclear energy. It is not now and has never been, a carbon-free fuel source. So don’t believe the hype. Advocates often cite industry-funded PR data claiming that nuke power will reduce CO2 emissions by upwards of 50 percent. This is blatant misinformation.

When each cycle of energy development is taken into account, nuclear falls well behind solar and wind with regard to CO2 emissions. These life cycle analyses (LCA) find that nuclear power, when every stage is taken into account, actually has a larger carbon footprint than natural gas plants, and almost double that of wind energy and a significant amount more than solar. How is this even possible if nuclear energy itself does not produce CO2 emissions? It’s because there are carbon dioxide emissions at every stage of the nuclear fuel chain. In fact, according to Mark Z Jacobsen, professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University, when you look at the 100-year life-cycle of CO2 emissions from different energy sources, nuclear is near the bottom of the ladder. 

From plant and reactor construction, uranium mining, milling, and fuel fabrication to the transport of waste, emissions aren’t far behind. 

Physicist Keith Barnham points out that proponents of nuclear power flagrantly ignore this reality and brush aside the fact that uranium mining is extremely carbon-intensive.  “Nuclear fuel preparation begins with the mining of uranium-containing ores, followed by the crushing of the ore then extraction of the uranium from the powdered ore chemically. All three stages take a lot of energy, most of which comes from fossil fuels. The inescapable fact is that the lower the concentration of uranium in the ore, the higher the fossil fuel energy required to extract uranium.”

***

That brings us to the topic of mining. The existing uranium mines currently operating around the world are nearing the end of their life spans. 

Andrea Wallner of the Austrian Institute of Technology writes that:

“Newly constructed nuclear power plants are supposed to have an operational lifetime of 60 years and a lead time between planning and operation of a facility of 10 to 19 years. Nuclear power plants which are currently being planned would reach their end of expected lifetime in the period of 2080—2090; power plants now starting to operate, would be shut-down at the end of 2070 . . . [Estimates assume that the] currently operated uranium mines would be exhausted between 2043 and 2055. If we assume this scenario to occur, it would not be possible to supply a nuclear power plant built now with uranium until the end of its lifetime.”

Uranium mining is an energy-demanding, brutal process and in the United States, it is also a neocolonial practice and one of the most toxic forms of mining in the world. Uranium has a half-life of 4.5 billion years, meaning it sticks around for a long, long time, even by geological standards, and paints a picture of the earliest days on planet Earth. 

The largest uranium deposits in the United States are located on the Colorado Plateau, the ancestral home of the Diné (Navajo) people. During the height of the country’s nuclear weapons program, the government extracted 250,000 metric tons of usable uranium from one hundred million tons of uranium ore. The mines, which were full of radioactivity, were largely worked by Indigenous Diné. During the height of the country’s uranium craze of the 1970s, there were twelve thousand miners employed in the United States, and a disproportionate number, upwards of five thousand, were of Diné descent.

Paid very little, at times less than minimum wage, these miners would enter deep uranium shafts and chip away at the walls, often 1,500 feet below the earth’s crust. They filled their wheelbarrows with this uranium ore, all while choking on soot and dust particles. It was dark. There was no ventilation. It was tremendously difficult, perilous work.

Radon exposure in these gruesome mines causes lung diseases, the dangers of which were well-known to scientists and the medical community. But the Diné and other miners were deemed expendable. Many developed lung cancers as a result; one estimate put the risk at thirty times greater for those who worked the mines as opposed to those who did not. The government later recognized their afflictions, and with the 1990 Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, paid out $100,000 per victim and issued a formal apology. 

But the damage was done.

In addition to the impact on Diné health, their land, too, was ravaged. Upwards of three billion metric tons of waste were created as a result of uranium extraction on Diné lands, a dizzying amount that continues to poison Native communities throughout the Southwest to this day. Any call for new nuclear power development, especially from advocates on the Left, mustn’t ignore these past horrors or the potential that this ugly imperialistic past would repeat itself.

Today, the United States imports most of the uranium it uses in nuclear processes. Many reports note the same deleterious impact this extraction has on those who mine it and the land that contains it. Uranium mines are notoriously poisonous operations, no matter how they are managed or regulated. Heap-leach mining, which uses sulphuric acid and cyanic salts in its processes, poisons water supplies. 

Underground mines produce uranium yellowcake, which often ends up in large, toxic dumps. Surface and open-pit mining, often deemed the best method, has plenty of risks aside from the blatant landscape alteration. As with utilizing mountaintop removal to extract coal in Appalachia, open pit uranium mines increase erosion and have the potential to kill entire waterways during landslide events. Such an incident occurred in 1979 on Diné land, when a dam broke, flooding the Puerco River near Church Rock, New Mexico with ninety-four million gallons of radioactive waste. 

CO2 emissions aside, uranium mining is a nasty, destructive enterprise, yet it’s vital to nuclear power generation.

Which leads me to ask: if you support the Land Back movement, if you care about Indigenous lands, if you care about the environment, how could you ever support the mining of uranium? 

The ends, even if you are to believe the propaganda put forward by the nuclear power industry and their allies, do not justify the means.

***

Now, let’s talk about nuclear power’s ties to nuclear weapons. 

First, I think it’s important to understand that nuclear power was born out of government weapons programs. In particular, the US and France, which has the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe, both were conceived through government-back projects, and both continue to be tied to the country’s nuclear weapons, financially and also when it comes to the fuels they both utilize.

As the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, the “dual-use [civilian and military] nature of nuclear technology is unavoidable. For the five nuclear-weapons states, commercial nuclear power was a spinoff from weapons programs; for later proliferators, the civilian sector has served as a convenient avenue and cover for weapons programs.”

In Britain, the country’s nuclear power program was used as a cover for military activities. In France, to this day, the country’s robust nuclear power industry is intricately linked to its nuclear weapons program.

In 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron was clear about his government’s dual interests in nuclear power and weapons.  “Without civilian nuclear energy there is no military use of this technology – and without military use there is no civilian nuclear energy.”

It’s clear what Macron’s message was: Without government funding and support for nuclear power, France would not have a healthy and robust nuclear weapons arsenal.

It’s the same here in the United States and has been since the early days of the Manhattan Project. To this day, every process in the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium ore mining, uranium ore milling, uranium ore refining, and enrichment is still used for both power and military purposes and is tightly controlled by state governments. For starters, nuclear reactors are used to create the radioactive isotope of hydrogen, known as tritium, which is necessary for nuclear weapons. 

Secondly, plutonium is a by-product of the nuclear fuel cycle and is still used by some countries to make nuclear weapons. This will never change. Governments, rightly so I’d argue, will always be fearful of other countries or terror organizations getting their hands on nuclear fuels that could be used for atomic bombs. 

With all of this in mind, how could anyone who opposes nuclear weapons, support nuclear power? This would be like opposing the War on Terror but supporting Pentagon spending.

***

Then there’s the issue of what to do with all the waste that atomic energy produces, a problem that does not have an easy fix, or any fix at all. 

The radioactive leftovers have to go somewhere, but they can’t just go anywhere. The Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository, which is currently closed, remains on the shortlist for atomic dump sites in the US. But it’s a dangerous gambit. Geological faults run through the proposed site, which would include a one-thousand-foot shaft, dug deep into the mountain. Yucca is also a sacred site to the Western Shoshone, who vigorously oppose the use of Yucca as a nuclear repository, and have thus far been victorious.

Nuclear power proponents like to pretend future nuke plants won’t produce as much waste as the rickety old ones, that the amounts are small and manageable. Yet the reality is that they will still produce waste, and nobody knows exactly how much. Where will it all go? You can’t have nuclear power without nuclear waste. It would be like burning coal without there being any CO2 emissions. We know the poor and disadvantaged, and often Indigenous will end up dealing with the consequences. Currently, the United States produces almost two thousand metric tons of radioactive waste every year. 

It’s my opinion, and many others, that no energy source that produces radioactive waste that lasts millennia ought to be part of the climate solution. We can’t save the planet, or mankind for that matter, by destroying it.

Here’s the reality. Plutonium, as I mentioned, is a byproduct of the nuclear fission process. Plutonium-239 has a half-life of 24,000 years. There are hundreds of pounds of this stuff made every year by every reactor in operation. Taking into account plutonium’s half-life, in order for it to be safely stored until it is no longer radioactive, it would have to be kept safe for 250,000 years. 

What could possibly go wrong over that amount of time? Even if there were a way to make the storage of plutonium safe for 1,000 years, what about the next 249,000? Throw on top of that this stuff can be used for nuclear weapons fuel, you have a very serious problem on your hands, and on the hands of so many more generations to come. To put this in perspective, modern humans have only been roaming the Earth for 200,000 years. 

It’s not difficult to fathom what could possibly go wrong over this amount of time, as Nation-states vie for power, as the Earth erodes, shakes, and contorts. As rivers flood, as storms intensify. It’s just too risky.

Plutonium, despite the idea it could be used as a time travel fuel as depicted in Back to the Future – poses insurmountable risks. There are very serious by-products of nuclear power production, like cesium and strontium, but none pose the type of long-term risks as plutonium.

Knowing that plutonium is a natural by-product of nuclear power production, how could anyone ever claim nuclear energy is a safe, viable energy choice for the future of the planet?

***

Naturally, this leads us to discuss the potential for nuclear accidents. 

If you were to believe the risk assessments put out by the nuclear power industry, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the risks are extremely low. They put the risk of an accident is around 1 in 1,000,000. Sounds pretty safe, right? Nothing to worry about. 

With 400 nuclear plants operating in the world, that would mean we’d only see a meltdown of a nuclear reactor one time every 2,000 years. Well, policymakers at the NRC can’t do math apparently, because, even though nuclear power reactors have only been in operation for 80 years or so, we have witnessed 5 meltdowns of nuclear reactors in the past 40 years: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and three reactors at Fukushima. If you do that math, the risk of an accident at a nuclear power plant is 1 in 7. There have been many other accidents as well.

In 1961, an explosion at the Nuclear Reactor Testing Station in Idaho Falls killed three people, their bodies were found laced with radiation.  Michigan’s Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station, which sits on the banks of Lake Erie, experienced a partial meltdown in 1966, leaking radioactive material. Critics argue a major incident at the site was narrowly avoided, which could have destroyed the entire city of Detroit. 

There was the 1986 accident at the Surry Nuclear Plant in Virginia that killed four workers. In 1989, a fire broke out at Spain’s Vandellòs nuclear power plant, damaging the cooling system, and the plant nearly experienced a full meltdown. In 1992, Russia’s Sosnovy Bor nuclear plant released radioactive iodine into the air, the extent of which is hard to gauge. Japan’s Tokaimura accident in 1999 killed two workers, and the explosion caused a radiation leak.  A steam explosion and subsequent radiation leak at Japan’s Mihama Nuclear Power Plant in 2004 injured seven workers and killed four more. And there are many others.

We’ve all heard of Chernobyl. It’s been very well documented, but what hasn’t been well discussed is the death toll and health problems the meltdown caused over the past 36 years.

In 2009, the New York Academy of Sciences released the most significant English-language report on the deaths and environmental devastation caused by Chernobyl. After poring through thousands of reports and studies conducted in Eastern Europe and Russia, the academy concluded that nearly one million people have died as a result of radiation exposure from this one nuclear disaster. 

I think we should sit with that number for a minute. One million people may have died as a result of the meltdown of Chernobyl. Even if they are off by half, that’s an unfathomable toll. And remember, Chernobyl is still very much a radioactive wasteland to this day and will be for decades to come.

So what about Fukishima, which was an even larger meltdown than Chernobyl? Well, numbers are hard to come by for a reason. In December 2013, Japan passed an obstructive Cancer Registration Law, which made it illegal to share medical data or information on radiation-related issues, denying public access to medical records, violators are subject to fines of two million Yen or 5-10 years in prison.

Additionally, a confidentiality agreement to control medical information about radiation exposure was signed in January 2014 by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Fukushima Prefecture, and Fukushima Medical University. After that, all the info about illness from radiation is reported to a central repository run by Fukushima Medical Centre and the IAEA. What this means is simple, all information on radiation-related illnesses in and around the Fukushima disaster is a tightly guarded secret. It’s important here to point out that the IAEA was set up to promote nuclear power, so any evidence that damages its credibility directly challenges its mission.

Why would governments, be they in Russia, the US or Japan, or the IAEA, not want accurate data on radiation-related cancers and deaths? I think we all know the answer to that question. Information on the impacts of radiation from a nuclear accident would directly challenge the nuclear industry and the governments that keep it running.

***

Okay, if the fact that nuclear power isn’t carbon neutral doesn’t bother you. If mining on Indigenous lands doesn’t bother you. If the trouble with the disposal of radioactive waste doesn’t bother you. If nuclear powers’ ties to nuclear weapons don’t bother you. If the risks of accidents don’t bother you, then maybe the cost of nuclear development will give you pause.

Nuclear power is very, very expensive, and if we are to believe in the urgency of combating climate change, it cannot be deployed fast enough to replace fossil fuels. The average time it takes to build a new nuclear reactor is about 10-15 years. As of 2020, renewables were the cheapest form of energy in the world and also the quickest to deploy. For the first time, they were competitive with coal, which has always been cheap. Renewables were cheaper than natural gas and far cheaper than nuclear power. 

Proponents of nuclear power, which often echo the industry itself, will tell us that nuclear is still the best bang for the buck because it can produce so much energy. But even the pro-nuclear lobby admits that without huge government subsidies, nuclear cannot compete with the renewables market.

Aside from a few countries, including Japan and Russia, the majority of the world is turning against nuclear power. Germany, Korea, Belgium, and Switzerland are planning to phase out nuclear power. France, the largest nuclear producer in Europe, is closing down facilities and investing in renewables, and the reason is clear: it’s cheaper to transition to renewable energy than it is to build new plants or keep old ones running. In California, where I live, Gov. Newsom just extended the life of Diablo Canyon, our state’s last nuke plant, to the tune of $1.4 billion.

It’s a huge waste of money, and a dangerous decision as Diablo sits on top of a major faultline, right on the Pacific coast. The basis for shuttering Diablo, which was agreed upon after years of negotiations by unions, PGE, and environmentalists, was largely made after a comparison was done of renewable upgrades versus the price to keep it running. The study found using renewables/efficiency to replace it would cost $12 billion and keeping it running would run $17 billion. 

Let’s get back to France, which is often said to be a perfect nuclear state, run exactly how a nuclear-powered country should operate. Yet, France is taking many of its plants offline, and, as we’ve seen this past summer as a severe heatwave engulfed Europe, nuclear power was anything but reliable. France was forced to shut down half of its nuclear power plants this summer because of safety/corrosion issues. And as rivers heat up, the water in the rivers is too warm to cool down France’s nuclear reactors, and this is not likely to change as climate change continues to impact us.

In the US, as the country’s nuclear fleet begins to age, the Dept of Energy has allocated billions to keep it up and running. And since the 1940s, taxpayers have shelled out hundreds of billions of dollars in corporate welfare to the nuclear power industry, and Biden is again calling on more money for nukes, and the latest Inflation Reduction Act gives tax incentives and other handouts to the nuclear industry. 

Private investors have long known nuclear is a poor place to put their money, which is why governments have had to keep the industry afloat. Why do investors shun nuclear? Because nuclear power continues to be riddled with cost and risk concerns that scare away these private financial backers, leaving the industry asking for more taxpayer handouts. 

It’s a one-way love affair that must end. Taxpayer subsides should be pouring into real renewable energy projects, not keeping an old dangerous one alive. 

Lastly, I have to talk briefly about the threat that nuclear power currently poses to Ukraine and Russia. As a result of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, and its subsequent occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Europe’s largest, the threat of a nuclear accident appears imminent. 

Shelling around the plant, likely by both sides, while Ukrainian workers are inside, literally working at gunpoint, is leading to a very dire situation. Recent satellite images show there is damage to at least one building at the plant. This week International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors headed to the plant to assess the situation.

The plant has lost power on several occasions, and backup generators were started to keep its waste cool. But if a fire were to break out in one of the reactors, if control panels melt, or the generators fail, all bets are off, and an accident far greater than Chernobyl could occur. 

Any proponent of nuclear power must take into account that no other energy source would pose such a risk in a war zone. The outcome could be catastrophic, equivalent to an atomic bomb. 

While this is the first time a nuclear plant has been in the line of fire, there are no guarantees it will be the last. For example, Taiwan has several nuclear plants. Iran has a nuclear plant. Saudi Arabia is building a plant. Nobody can promise without a doubt that these plants will never come under attack. If a nuclear reactor has a 1 in 7 chance of having a major accident in its lifetime, I imagine those odds are much higher if it is operating in a war zone. 

***

For all the reasons I’ve laid out here and so many more, I hope you’ll join me in continuing to uphold the legacy of anti-nuke activists that came before us, and oppose this expensive, dangerous, destructive and exploitative source of energy. As a very smart person once said, nuclear power is a hell of a way to boil water.

We can do better, and we must. Thank you.

JOSHUA FRANK is the managing editor of CounterPunch. He is the author of the forthcoming book, Atomic Days: The Untold Story of the Most Toxic Place in America, published by Haymarket Books. He can be reached at joshua@counterpunch.org. You can troll him on Twitter @joshua__frank.