DETENTE
Op-Ed: China's New Carrier is a Challenge to Western Maritime Dominance
As part of a broader seapower strategy, it reflects Beijing’s ambition not just to contribute to, but to lead, the global maritime order.
[By Basil Germond]
China’s new Fujian aircraft carrier, unveiled recently by President Xi Jinping with great fanfare, has been hailed by Chinese state media as a major milestone in the country’s naval modernization program and a key development in the country’s aspirations to become a maritime power.
In the context of Beijing’s sustained seapower strategy, the long-term implications for the security and leadership of the global maritime order are certainly significant and enduring.
The launch means China now has three aircraft carriers in service and is capable of maintaining a continuous carrier presence at sea. And there have been reports of satellite images which suggest construction has already begun on China’s fourth carrier.
This will increase Beijing’s ability to preventatively deploy warships to faraway locations it considers important. It gives China the potential to control the airspace wherever their battle group is operating, as well as the ability to project air power in more distant theaters of conflict.
The new carrier also means China can launch heavier and specialist aircraft, for example with airborne early-warning systems and fighter jets equipped with greater fuel and payload capacity.
This expands Beijing’s operational options. It elevates China into a select group of four nations (US, UK, France, China) capable of independently operating a carrier battle group with the capacity to generate substantial strategic advantages from the sea.
Among this group, however, the US remains far ahead. It enjoys a significant lead in terms of carrier fleet size, technological sophistication, operational experience, global reach and sustained carrier strike capabilities.
Aircraft carriers are obviously key naval assets in confrontations between comparable nations in open ocean environments – known as “blue-water engagements”. But they are also important in controlling the maritime battlespace – particularly through air superiority – and in projecting power ashore.
The Fujian does not dramatically shift the global balance of power in China’s favor. But its enhanced land-attack capabilities nonetheless expand Beijing’s operational toolkit, allowing a more flexible and assertive naval strategy.
A strong symbolic power
Since the Second World War, aircraft carriers have replaced battleships as the capital ships, the principal and most powerful warships in any country’s navy that are designed to form the core of a fleet and deliver decisive combat power.
Such capital ships carry strong symbolic weight. They signal a state’s ability to mobilize the resources required to procure, sustain and operate such complex platforms, as well as its intent to function as an ocean-going naval power.
In this light, China’s aircraft carrier program has considerable symbolic resonance. It reflects both Beijing’s intrinsic naval capabilities and its extrinsic power – that is, its increasingly elevated status within the international pecking order.
China’s comprehensive seapower strategy
China’s carrier program needs to be understood as part of Beijing’s wider seapower strategy. Unlike other authoritarian states such as Russia or Iran, the power base of China’s regime is much more dependent on international trade and so on freedom of navigation. Consequently, China does not seek to disrupt the global maritime order. It wants to lead it and initiate a new cycle of global dominance.
To that end, Beijing is not only expanding its naval power but, perhaps more significantly, its civilian seapower. This includes a robust shipbuilding industry, a large and growing merchant marine registered as Chinese. And it has made substantial direct investments in critical western infrastructure, such as ports.
Many of these investments have been made via private Chinese firms which maintain close ties with the state. This gives Beijing additional leverage to exercise civilian seapower to further its political interests. For example, it can use Chinese shipping companies to circumvent western sanctions on Russia, or interfere in European ports owned by Chinese firms.
In the South China Sea, Beijing aggressively uses its fishing fleet, backed by its coastguard and navy to achieve a degree of control over contested areas it considers to have economic or strategic importance.
So the commissioning of the Fujian is more than a technical milestone for the Chinese navy – it is a signal of intent. It reinforces China’s growing capacity and willingness to shape the maritime domain. As part of a broader seapower strategy, it reflects Beijing’s ambition not just to contribute to, but to lead, the global maritime order.
Basil Germond is a professor in the department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University. He specializes in naval affairs, seapower, maritime security, maritime geopolitics, and ocean governance. Previously, he was a Visiting Research Fellow at Oxford (Changing Character of War program) and Research Fellow at the University of St Andrews. He holds a PhD from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.
This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and may be found in its original form here.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
