Tuesday, November 18, 2025

Nuclear Stocks Crash, With A Potential Payoff Still Years Away

  • Uranium prices have surged amid a structural supply deficit and a global policy-driven nuclear revival, but the sector faces long project timelines and mounting volatility.

  • Despite major investment pledges like the U.S.–Canada $80 billion reactor partnership, nuclear and uranium stocks have plunged 15–45% in recent weeks.

  • Investors confront the industry’s slow path to revenue.

Over the past couple of years, uranium and nuclear energy markets have enjoyed a renaissance thanks to surging global power demand and the global energy crisis triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Uranium is no longer trading on legacy sentiment, with prices moving more on fundamentals characterized by tight physical supply, underbuilt production pipelines, and a policy-driven nuclear revival that’s accelerating faster than commodity markets anticipated.

The uranium market is experiencing a structural supply deficit, creating potential challenges for nuclear operators. 

Unlike many commodities, uranium trading usually involves small volumes with specialized participants, making the nuclear fuel susceptible to significant uranium market volatility. Meanwhile, governments across the globe are repositioning nuclear as critical infrastructure rather than transitional tech. Last month, the Trump administration struck a partnership with Canada’s Cameco Corp. (NYSE:CCJ) and Brookfield Asset Management (NYSE:BAM) to build at least $80 billion in nuclear reactors.

However, the harsh reality of the long lead and construction times of nuclear facilities, coupled with the fact that some stocks in the space with zero revenues are in nosebleed territory, has sent the sector into a tailspin. Nuclear and uranium stocks have pulled back sharply from recent highs, with many seeing double-digit losses: the sector's popular benchmark, VanEck Uranium and Nuclear ETF (NYSEARCA:NLR) has declined -16.6% over the past 30 days, at a time when the S&P 500 has gained nearly 3%.

Meanwhile, shares of advanced fission power plant developer, Oklo Inc. (NYSE:OKLO), are down -42.0% over the past month; Centrus Energy (NYSE:LEU) -35.9%, Energy Fuels Inc. (NYSE:UUUU) -33.9%, NuScale Power Corp. (NYSE:SMR) -47.7%, Uranium Energy Corp. (NYSE:UEC) -22.9%, BWX Technologies (NYSE:BWXT) -9.6%, Cameco Corp. (NYSE:CCJ) -6.1%, Vistra Corp. (NYSE:VST) -14.2% and NANO Nuclear Energy (NASDAQ:NNE) -40.2% and NexGen Energy (NYSE:NXE) -7.9%.

The market appears to be waking up to the reality that it could be up to a decade before we start to reap the benefits from the billions of dollars flowing into the sector. Whereas $80 billion can build enough reactors to power Virginia’s Data Center Alley, traditional reactors typically take 10 years or more to build. Meanwhile, the frequently touted small, modular reactors (SMRs) by the likes of NuScale Power, TerraPower and X-energy are still far from going mainstream primarily because the technology is still in early development and faces significant economic and regulatory hurdles. 

While some prototype units are operational in countries like Russia and China, most designs are still in the theoretical or early construction phases. Indeed, NuScale is the first and only U.S. company to have its SMR design certified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NuScale's SMR features include a factory-fabricated, modular design that is scalable from one to 12 modules, with each module producing 77 MWe of power. Key features are its passive safety systems relying on gravity and convection, flexibility for on-grid and off-grid use, redundancy through independent modules, and a smaller footprint than traditional plants. 

Amazon, on the other hand, has invested in X-energy with the goal of deploying up to 5 GW of SMRs by 2039.

Only Oklo Inc., Kairos Power and TerraPower have begun construction of their SMR plants; however, none have proven they can produce power at a commercial scale nor received regulatory approval to build a commercial system.

There’s a lot going on, and nothing is going on,” BloombergNEF’s head nuclear analyst Chris Gadomski recently quipped.

To exacerbate matters, the markets have bid up these companies to absurd valuations despite many having no revenues to show for their troubles. To wit, Oklo’s market cap has at times exceeded $20 billion, despite the company having no operating reactors, no licenses to operate commercially, and no binding contracts to supply power. Wall Street analysts currently project Oklo will not generate significant revenue until late 2027 or 2028. Oklo’s current market cap is $15.3 billion.

Similar to Oklo, NANO Nuclear Energy currently sports a market cap of $1.6 billion with no revenue, no commercial products, and no commercial operation timeline. Its valuation is purely based on investor optimism about the future potential of nuclear energy, particularly in powering artificial intelligence data centers.

That said, the nuclear sector could see a quicker turnaround from restarting abandoned nuclear plants. Holtec International has laid out plans for its Palisades plant in Michigan to resume service early 2026 while Constellation Energy Corp. (NYSE:CEG) is on track to switch on its Three Mile Island reactor in 2027. Further, NextEra Energy Inc. (NYSE:NEE) recently announced that its Duane Arnold plant in Iowa will come back online by 2029.

By Alex Kimani for Oilprice.com


Iran Minister Claims Nuclear Enrichment Halted After U.S.-Israeli Attack

  • Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that Iran has been unable to enrich uranium since the US-Israeli attacks in June because their nuclear facilities were damaged.

  • Araghchi asserted that all facilities are under IAEA monitoring and that there is no undeclared enrichment, yet he defended Iran's "inalienable" right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology including enrichment.

  • The article suggests Iran's admission could be a bluff, as the country now has an incentive to secretly develop nuclear weapons while publicly claiming no enrichment is happening.

Iran, having seen its key nuclear facilities blown up by the Israeli and US surprise attacks of last June, and having long been under Washington and Western-led sanctions, could now be signaling a major olive branch. It is telling the West that there is nothing to worry about in terms of allegations of uranium enrichment or that it is striving toward a nuclear weapon.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Sunday that the Islamic Republic has been unable to enrich uranium since the 12-day US-Israeli war.

In a very blunt and direct answer given to an Associated Press journalist visiting Iran, Araghchi stated "There is no undeclared nuclear enrichment in Iran." He described that "All of our facilities are under the safeguards and monitoring" of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Araghchi said.

"There is no enrichment right now because our facilities - our enrichment facilities - have been attacked," he asserted.

Still, he defended Iran's right to enrich uranium as a matter of national sovereignty, saying "Iran’s right for enrichment, for peaceful use of nuclear technology, including enrichment, is undeniable."

"We have this right, and we continue to exercise that, and we hope that the international community, including the United States, recognize our rights and understand that this is an inalienable right of Iran. And we would never give up our rights," he added.

This has remained a consistent and standard argument from Iranian leaders - that it is not seeking a nuke, and that all its efforts are for peaceful nuclear energy needs. Various Ayatollahs over the years have even called nuclear weapons 'unIslamic'.

Throughout its prior limited engagement with Washington on the nuclear issue, the Trump administration has continued to insist on zero enrichment and also sought limits on Iran's ballistic missile program.

But then the June war happened and all official dialogue has been off. President Trump has all along proclaimed the end of Iran's ability to enrich, and it is significant that Tehran is now admitting this is accurate.

However, it could also be a bluff. Iran now has every incentive to develop secret nuclear weapons while telling the world there is no enrichment happening.

Many analysts say that another round of fighting between Iran and Israel could be on the horizon. For starters, the Netanyahu government does not believe that Iran has given up its enrichment efforts, but Tel Aviv is likely being held back by the Trump White House.

By Zerohedge


Iran’s Hidden Nuclear Push Resumes Under Pickaxe Mountain

  • Iran is blocking IAEA access to key nuclear sites, including Fordow, Natanz, and the nearby Pickaxe Mountain.

  • Western intelligence fears Iran may be rebuilding centrifuge facilities or creating a new undeclared enrichment site.

  • The E.U. expects escalating tensions as Iran boosts its defense budget by 200% and accelerates long-range missile development

Iran is blocking the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting multiple sites of interest in its nuclear weapons development programme, a senior source in the European Union’s (E.U.’s) security complex exclusively told OilPrice.com late last week. “These include the major sites targeted during the U.S. and Israeli strikes on its nuclear programme facilities in June, including Fordow and Natanz, and another site in particular -- close to Natanz that seems to be the focus of significant Iranian activity since then,” he said. “The pace has picked up even more since the ‘Snapback Sanctions’ were reimposed,” he added. So, what is Iran doing that it does not want the IAEA or anyone else to see, and what have the newly reimposed sanctions going to do with it?

August 28 saw the U.K., France, and Germany (the ‘E3’) begin the process of triggering the ‘snapback’ mechanism of restoring sanctions on Iran for its “significant non-performance” in meeting the terms of the Joint Comprehensives Plan of Action (JCPOA, or colloquially ‘the nuclear deal’) agreed between Iran and the P5+1 group of nations (the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China, ‘plus’ Germany) in 2015. At the end of the 30-day period, with no blocking resolution adopted, the sanctions legally snapped back into force. These included an arms embargo, a ban on uranium enrichment and reprocessing, a ban on launches and other activities with ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, a ban on ballistic missile technology transfer and technical assistance, a targeted global asset freeze and a travel ban on Iranian individuals and entities. They also gave authorisation for countries to inspect Iran Air cargo and the cargoes of Iran’s Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines for banned goods. Further sanctions relate to measures connected to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This has 40 active criteria and mechanisms in place to prevent money laundering -- an activity that is vital to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) activities across the world, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. It also has nine criteria and mechanisms in place to do the same for the financing of terrorism and related activities -- again, a core of the IRGC’s role in promoting Iran’s brand of Islam around the globe. The FATF also has sweeping powers to wield against individuals, companies, or countries that transgress any of its standards and is extremely aggressive in using them by degrees, depending on whether the sanctioned entity is on its ‘grey’ or ‘black’ list

In response to this – and to the earlier U.S. and Israeli attacks on its sites connected to its nuclear weapons development programme -- Iran’s official stance has been that it is prepared to re-engage with the U.S. in talks aimed at constructing a new ‘nuclear deal’ of some kind, although it is “not in a hurry” to do so. This is despite a significant deterioration in the country’s economy, including projections that the unemployment rate in the key ‘Under-35’ demographic will hit 44% by the end of 2026, according to the E.U. source. Unofficially, according to a senior energy source who works closely with Iran’s Petroleum Ministry and exclusively spoken to by OilPrice.com last week, pressure is growing from the IRGC on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to expedite the rebuilding of those key elements in the nuclear programme that were damaged in June. Additional pressure is coming from the same quarters for the Supreme Leader to approve Iran’s formal withdrawal from the ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’ (NPT). “[Iranian President, Masoud] Pezeshkian has said that [Iran] won’t leave [the NPT], but it’s what the Supreme Leader thinks and does that is relevant here,” he said. “The NPT is crucial because the CSA [Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement] – which is overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency -- is linked to the NPT, and Iran cannot advance its nuclear programme at this point without new builds [of nuclear facilities] and it can’t do this with the IAEA sniffing around on the ground,” he added.

The key reason why the IRGC is pushing for Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT is that all the new measures that would be included in any new nuclear deal negotiated now with the U.S. – from Iran’s current position of weakness – would be targeted at the eventual eradication of the IRGC as we know it, as also detailed in full in my latest book. “Washington has long made it clear – even under [former U.S. President, Barack] Obama -- that it wants the broader powers of the IRGC removed and for it to be rolled into the regular Iranian army,” said the E.U. source. “For the IRGC, and the Supreme Leader, this would remove the force from its primary role of protecting the legacy of the [1979 Iranian] Revolution and undermine the core purpose of that new Islamic order,” he added. “It’s the IRGC’s view that Iran needs to up the ante, and the best way for doing that right now is to leave the NPT, or at least make very serious threats to do it,” he underlined.

Prior to the June military strikes by the U.S. and Israel, the IAEA stated in February that Iran had further increased its stockpile of enriched uranium even after the Agency had announced just three months before that the Islamic Republic had been “dramatically accelerating enrichment of uranium”. According to the IAEA, Iran’s stock of uranium refined to up to 60% in the form of uranium hexafluoride grew by 92.5 kg from December 2024 to February 2025 to 274.8 kg. It underlined that the 60% level of purity was very close in practical terms to the 90% or so weapons-grade benchmark. The Agency added that the 274.8 kg of 60%-enriched uranium Iran had even then was sufficient, if enriched further, for six nuclear bombs, and that there was enough for more weapons at lower enrichment levels. That said, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said earlier this month that this figure had since increased to around 400kg, but that “almost all” of that was “buried under the rubble” of nuclear facilities bombed by the U.S. and Israel. He added: “We have no intention of removing them from under the rubble until conditions are ready. We have no information on how much of the 400kg is untouched and how much is destroyed, and we will have no information until we dig them out.”

The problem with that is that Washington, Tel Aviv, London, and Brussels are not so sure. They have little doubt that considerable damage was done to several key Iranian nuclear installations – most notably perhaps, at the Fordow uranium enrichment facility, located in a mountain near Qom. However, this is still one of the sites to which the IAEA has not been granted access since the June attacks, so even this is not fully corroborated. The same is true of another such site close to Natanz and its associated facilities, with one of these in particular having come under close international scrutiny in recent days. The Institute for Science and International Security highlighted in early October that satellite imagery of Pickaxe Mountain (Mount Kolang Gaz-La) – a site around a mile south of the Natanz enrichment facility, that has been under construction since about 2020 -- shows that Iran is continuing construction activities there, although it did not characterise this as an expansion of the site. At the end of last month, the Center for Strategic and International Studies reported satellite imagery showing a significant uptick in mining and drilling into the mountain, and the construction of a huge security perimeter around the site. The Center has posited that there are three explanations for this. The first is that Iran is preparing for a centrifuge assembly facility. The second is that the Pickaxe Mountain site has been expanded to include some of the facilities and research and metallurgy that the U.S. destroyed at Isfahan. And third, that it may be a future uranium enrichment site that Iran is building undeclared.

“The fact that we can’t answer any of these questions on this site, and on many others, sets Iran and us [the E.U., U.S., Israel, and Great Britain] on a collision course again, with more sanctions being the next step, after which we will have to reassess our options,” added the E.U. source. “This is likely to get worse quite quickly, as Iran will increase its military budget by more than 200% next year, with much of this to go on fast tracking the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multi-warhead delivery systems with a range of up to 10,000 kilometres,” he said. “[Supreme Leader, Ali] Khamenei is determined to take the missile delivery systems at least to the level of North Korea when it began intercontinental ballistic missiles with multi-warhead capabilities for the first time,” he concluded.

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

Microbial teamwork slashes uranium pollution in just 48 hours



Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences
The energy scheme diagram of uranium reduction conducted by S.MR-1 and P. LXZ1 individually. 

image: 

The energy scheme diagram of uranium reduction conducted by S.MR-1 and P. LXZ1 individually (a) or accelerated by the synthetic consortia syncomS + P (b). The red arrows indicate the rapid electron flow in syncomS + P, while the black arrows denote the normal electron flow in S.MR-1. The blue arrows represent the transport of lactate to acetate from S.MR-1 to P. LXZ1, and the black dotted arrows illustrate the minimal electron flow in P. LXZ1. The bold black solid and dotted lines indicate the redox potentials corresponding to the respective reactions, while the red line represents the redox potential after syncomS + P formation.

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Credit: Environmental Science and Ecotechnology






A research team has developed a synthetic microbial consortium that completely reduces soluble uranium [U(VI)] to insoluble U(IV) within 48 hours, showing nearly twice the efficiency of a single-strain system. The study reveals how Shewanella oneidensis MR-1 and Pseudomonas aeruginosa LXZ1 cooperate to accelerate extracellular electron transfer (EET). P. aeruginosa LXZ1 secretes pyocyanin, which interacts with the outer-membrane cytochrome OmcA in MR-1, while its extracellular DNA forms conductive networks within the biofilm. These mechanisms jointly enhance electron flow and energy metabolism, overcoming the limitations of conventional microbial reduction. The findings highlight a community-based approach for sustainable uranium bioremediation.

Uranium contamination from mining and natural leaching threatens groundwater safety due to the high solubility and mobility of hexavalent uranium [U(VI)]. Bioreduction by dissimilatory metal-reducing bacteria converts soluble U(VI) to insoluble U(IV), offering an environmentally friendly remediation strategy. However, this process is often limited by low redox mediator production and poor biofilm conductivity in single-species systems. Synthetic microbial communities that combine complementary metabolic and electron-transfer functions may provide a more efficient alternative. Due to these limitations, it is necessary to investigate cooperative microbial systems that can achieve faster and more complete uranium reduction.

A study by the University of South China and Xi’an University of Technology, published (DOI: 10.1016/j.ese.2025.100629) in Environmental Science and Ecotechnology in October 2025, reports a synthetic microbial consortium capable of complete uranium reduction within 48 hours. The system combines Shewanella oneidensis MR-1, a model metal-reducing bacterium, with Pseudomonas aeruginosa LXZ1 isolated from uranium-contaminated soil. Through electrochemical experiments, molecular simulations, and gene expression analysis, the researchers revealed how phenazine-mediated electron transfer and extracellular DNA jointly improve the efficiency of microbial uranium reduction.

The researchers co-cultured S. oneidensis MR-1 with P. aeruginosa LXZ1, forming a synthetic microbial community that removed 75% of uranium within 12 hours and achieved complete reduction after 48 hours, compared with 60% by MR-1 alone. This improvement arose from two complementary mechanisms. P. aeruginosa LXZ1 secreted pyocyanin, a redox-active phenazine, which bound to MR-1’s outer-membrane cytochrome OmcA and shifted its redox potential, facilitating directional electron flow and reducing proton-transfer constraints. Meanwhile, P. aeruginosa LXZ1 released extracellular DNA (eDNA) that organized into conductive structures, enhancing electron transport across the biofilm. Electrochemical gating tests showed a fourfold increase in current output, which decreased sharply after DNase I digestion, confirming the essential role of eDNA. Transcriptomic results indicated upregulation of metabolic and EET-related genes (ldhndhfdhpflBackA), along with higher NAD⁺/NADH ratios and ATP levels. Together, these processes established a stable and efficient electron-transfer network for uranium immobilization.

“Our results show how naturally occurring microbial interactions can be used to improve metal reduction efficiency,” said Dr. Xizi Long, corresponding author of the study. “By combining Shewanella and Pseudomonas, we achieved a balance between metabolic complementarity and electron transfer enhancement. Pyocyanin functions as an intercellular redox mediator, while extracellular DNA provides a conductive matrix. This cooperative design illustrates how microbial communities can be organized for more effective environmental remediation.”

The synthetic microbial consortium offers a feasible and sustainable method for uranium-contaminated soil and groundwater treatment. Its design demonstrates how interspecies electron exchange can improve the stability and conductivity of biofilms, potentially extending to other redox-active pollutants such as chromium, arsenic, or technetium. Beyond environmental cleanup, the findings deepen understanding of microbial electrochemical cooperation and may inform future developments in bioenergy conversion and microbial material design. This approach exemplifies how ecological cooperation principles can be applied to optimize bioremediation efficiency in complex environments.

###

References

DOI

10.1016/j.ese.2025.100629

Original Source URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ese.2025.100629

Funding Information

This work was financially supported by Hunan Provincial Natural Science Foundation [2024JJ4035, 2022JJ10040], the Science and Technology Innovation Program of Hunan province [2024RC3210]. National Natural Science Foundation of China grant number [42207073, 42107030, 12275123], Department of Natural Resources of Hunan Province [HBZ20240138], and Open Fund for Research at Hunan Provincial Key Laboratory of Geochemical Process and Resource Environmental Effect [GRE202306G].

About Environmental Science and Ecotechnology

Environmental Science and Ecotechnology (ISSN 2666-4984) is an international, peer-reviewed, and open-access journal published by Elsevier. The journal publishes significant views and research across the full spectrum of ecology and environmental sciences, such as climate change, sustainability, biodiversity conservation, environment & health, green catalysis/processing for pollution control, and AI-driven environmental engineering. The latest impact factor of ESE is 14.3, according to the Journal Citation ReportsTM 2024.

From Oil Giant to Mining Superpower—Saudi Arabia’s Next Big Move

  • Beyond oil and defense, Saudi Arabia’s $2.5 trillion mineral wealth and global mining ambitions will be key discussion points in the meeting between Trump and MBS.

  • Riyadh is turning PIF’s Manara Minerals into an international mining powerhouse.

  • MBS aims to position Saudi Arabia as a “swing investor” in the energy transition, using mining investments to gain geopolitical influence.

In the coming days, the media will push themes related to the upcoming meeting between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and US President Trump in Washington. While most will be looking at the possibilities of Saudi investments in US LNG via Aramco or defense deals, Saudi Arabia’s mineral strategy and opportunities will also be on the table. Geopolitically, Washington will also be interested in Saudi Arabia’s international mining investment strategy, through its national champion, Ma’aden, or its sovereign wealth fund, PIF. In the last few years, under Vision 2030, mining has changed from being the poor cousin of hydrocarbons to the “third pillar” of the economy. Results are impressive, especially given that Riyadh now claims $2.5 trillion in untapped mineral wealth beneath its soil, up from an earlier estimate of $1.3 trillion. MBS wants mining to become a serious contributor to non-oil GDP. Reality at present shows that this means two parallel projects: turning the kingdom itself into a mining province and turning the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and Ma’aden into global players in critical minerals supply chains. Both of interest not only to Washington, but also to China, India, and maybe Europe.

The domestic changes have been remarkable, as the Saudi state has done something rare in the mining industry. Riyadh has built a regulatory regime from scratch with capital already lined up. A new mining law, streamlined licensing, and state-funded geoscience have been packaged with generous fiscal terms and a signal that PIF will co-invest where needed. Based on Riyadh's upgraded estimate of mineral resources at $2.5 trillion, talks are ongoing to unlock at least $75 billion in new mining investments over the coming decade.

Related: US Oil Drilling Picks Up: Baker Hughes

The message from Saudi Arabia has fallen on fertile ground; international companies have heard it and are acting. Alcoa has long been embedded in the Ma’aden aluminum complex at Ras al-Khair, holding 25.1% stakes in the bauxite, alumina, and smelter JVs. Mosaic partnered with Ma’aden in phosphate, while the international mining giant Barrick set up a 50-50 JV to operate the Jabal Sayid underground copper mine.

Western powers have increased their attention, especially after Asian interest has been materializing. New exploration licenses were awarded to Ajlan & Bros with China’s Zijin Mining and to India’s Vedanta. These licenses cover nearly 4,800 square kilometers of copper, zinc, gold, and silver prospects. At the International Mining Forum 2024 in Riyadh, nine metals and mining deals worth more than $9bn were signed, such as a copper project by Vedanta at Ras al-Khair and a phased zinc–lithium–copper complex by Zijin. Chinese involvement and possible high interest in other projects are worrying the USA and Europe, as they could mean another power play within the Kingdom. Metals and minerals are geopolitical-geo-economic power-play instruments, in which Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

Saudi mining giant Ma’aden holds the pivotal position in this domestic build-out. While it is majority-owned by PIF (around 65%), the company has behaved like both a national champion and a private company. In recent years, it has ramped up production in gold, phosphates, and aluminum, while now targeting copper and, increasingly, lithium. Signs are clear: based on a non-binding term sheet with Aramco and KAUST to explore a minerals venture focused on energy-transition metals, including lithium extraction from unconventional sources, Saudi Arabia wants to produce, not just import, battery metals by the late 2020s.

The most interesting part of the ongoing strategy is outside of the Kingdom. Since 2023, when Manara Minerals, a JV between PIF and Ma’aden, was established as its dedicated outbound mining arm, significant investments have been made. Manara’s mandate is unequivocal; the company will need to buy into copper, nickel, lithium, and rare-earth assets abroad and use those stakes to secure long-term offtake for the kingdom’s future industries. Main clients inside the Kingdom will be electric vehicles, batteries, data centers, and defence.

The results are impressive, as shown by Manara's $2.5 billion acquisition of a 10% stake in Vale Base Metals, the energy transition division of Brazilian giant Vale. In the next 10 years, Brazil’s Vale expects to spend $25–30bn in copper and nickel projects in Brazil, Canada, and Indonesia. Ambitions are very high; Vale wants to triple copper output and almost double nickel production. By investing in Vale via Manara, the Kingdom is now plugged into the growth. Not only will Riyadh have financial exposure, but it can also negotiate leverage in future supply contracts.

At the same time, Manara’s portfolio is expanding and will continue to grow. At present, the company is in advanced talks to acquire a minority stake in First Quantum’s Zambian copper and nickel assets. At the same time, it is expected to buy 10–20% of Pakistan’s $9bn Reko Diq copper–gold project, which is already seen as a future giant in the global copper industry. The deal, slated to be between $500 million and $1bn, will be done via an equity stake purchased from the Pakistani state. In Africa’s mining hotspot, the Democratic Republic of Congo, PIF and Ma’aden are exploring a $3bn joint venture, combined with other African jurisdictions. Riyadh seems not to be buying control, but adjacency. The strategy is to have enough equity to negotiate supply, technology transfer, and political goodwill, without taking on full operator risk.

In January 2026, the Future Minerals Forum (FMF) 2026 will be held again, the diplomatic theatre for Riyadh’s strategy. Already termed as the “UN of Minerals”, almost like Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative (Davos in the Desert), the forum will be drawing more than 18,000 attendees, 70 ministers, and hundreds of CEOs to discuss mineral security, critical supply chains, and the energy transition. During FMF 2025, 126 agreements and MoUs worth roughly SAR107bn ($28.5bn) were signed across exploration, financing, R&D, and processing. The 2026 version is expected to be even harder hitting, as it is labeled the “Dawn of a Global Cause” in mineral supply chains. In another move, Riyadh has signed or is negotiating mining and critical minerals partnerships with the UK and the United States, explicitly framed around copper, lithium, and nickel for EVs and AI-hungry data centers. MBS’s Washington visit could also address these deals. While the world is talking to Riyadh, it still feels strange to see the lack of movement from Brussels and from companies in its member countries.

Saudi’s approach is not charity, but precise hedging. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and the US's dependence on Chinese processing have shown Riyadh to act. Saudi experts and officials have concluded that minerals will be the next arena where reliability is priced at a premium. The hedging position is powerful, as for Washington, a Saudi partner in copper, nickel, and rare earths is preferable to a Chinese one. For the UK, especially London, a Gulf hub for critical minerals trade (Riyadh) looks like a hedge against insecure supply from Congo or Indonesia. When looking at the reasons for Saudi Arabia, it is clear that these partnerships convert its cash and its geography into political leverage in capitals that still shape security guarantees and technology flows.

Geo-economics is also clearly at play. Saudi PIF’s own strategy calls for at least $40bn a year in domestic investment and for international assets to make up roughly a quarter of its $1.07trn target balance sheet by 2025. For the Kingdom, mining is the bridge between both, as it is an option to diversify away from oil and to build downstream manufacturing in EVs and defence, while it also inserts itself into value chains that will outlive the Internal Combustion Engine.

The road is clear, successes are there, but it is also full of tensions and constraints. PIF’s governor has said the fund plans to reduce the share of foreign investment by at least 20% to focus more on domestic ventures, even as Manara is told to scale up overseas mining bets. Some analysts are warning that the more capital the kingdom ties up in copper pits in Pakistan and Zambia, the less it has for Vision 2030 white elephants at home. Saudi reality shows that mining is capital-intensive and slow, taking almost a decade from a MoU signed in a Riyadh conference hall to the first ton of copper cathode. MBS and its proponents now need to adjust to a new reality. The MBS political system, which has grown accustomed to immediate, visible mega-projects, now needs to get used to the grind of permitting, community relations, and ESG scrutiny in Congo or Pakistan, which may prove frustrating. Speeding up the process may require the involvement of others, maybe Washington-based players?

At the same time, Riyadh is slowly understanding that its game is not one-sided; there are more players in it. Already inside the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is not the only player, as shown by Abu Dhabi’s ADQ and Mubadala, both exploring critical minerals. Abu Dhabi’s new giant IHC is also targeting mining. At the same time, the Kingdom will need to deal with Qatar’s sovereign vehicles, as they are slowly probing metals supply chains. Within Africa, Saudis will need to confront China’s Zijin, a formidable competitor across Africa and Latin America. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is finding that its pivot to the East (Asia) and its cooperation with China don’t remove the primary market constraint: China’s processing dominance and its grip on many upstream projects.

Mining has also become a primary political tool for Riyadh.  Manara’s planned entry into Reko Diq is not just a copper investment, but also a reinforcement of the growing geopolitical and military link with Pakistan. Riyadh is no longer only a critical creditor but also a partner in Islamabad’s foreign-policy balancing. Inside Africa, the situation is very tricky. A serious investment move into Congo will thrust Saudi Arabia into the messy politics of resource nationalism, artisanal mining, and human rights scrutiny that it has so far watched mainly from afar. The capabilities of Saudi officials and diplomats will be challenged.

Still, mining will be on the table in Washington, as a tool for MBS to recalibrate his relations with the Trump Administration and the financial and mining backers available. At present, a US-Saudi mining cooperation agreement is being prepared, with critical minerals explicitly on the agenda alongside more traditional energy and defence issues. MBS’s message will be challenging but also attractive to some. The Crown Prince will tell the White House that the Kingdom is no longer just a swing producer of oil; it wants recognition as a future swing investor in the metals that underpin clean energy, AI, and defence industrial bases. For Washington, the latter is of immense interest, as access to Saudi capital and Saudi-backed offtake will support American and allied mining projects to clear financing hurdles. MBS will want, in return, that Washington shows political recognition of its new role.

The MBS bet is challenging for all sides. It will only be positive if Saudi Arabia can show it can take minority stakes in complex jurisdictions and still secure reliable, ESG-compliant supply without getting sucked into local governance crises. At the same time, the rush for critical assets has already driven up project valuations; the Kingdom could risk overpaying for middling assets. Western countries will need to decide whether they are comfortable swapping some dependence on Chinese processing for a new degree of reliance on a highly centralized Gulf monarchy.

MBS’s theory at present is based on the assessment that in a world where everyone is anxious about securing copper, nickel, and lithium, partners will forgive a lot. Even though MBS’s Vision 2030 started as a blueprint to diversify away from oil, the Kingdom’s mining strategy is its most explicit acknowledgement that Riyadh’s influence in a post-oil world will still be built on the ground beneath other people’s feet.

By Cyril Widdershoven for Oilprice.com