Wednesday, January 14, 2026

Municipal socialism

How Can Socialists Run Cities – will Mamdani show us the way?


Tuesday 13 January 2026
by Iain Bruce



Zohran Mamdani’s election to Mayor of New York has been a badly-needed boost to the confidence of the left in the U.S. and beyond. It has also reignited debate about the strategic choices facing socialists elected to local government, and eventually to national governments too. A special, end-of-year issue of Jacobin, the U.S. left magazine, was devoted to lessons of municipal socialism, from Red Vienna and Milwaukee’s ‘sewer socialists’ in the first half of the 20th century, to Communist-run cities in Italy or France after the defeat of fascism and Ken Livingstone’s Greater London Council in the 1980s, facing off, quite literally across the River Thames, against what was then the far-right, Margaret Thatcher, in government.


These are debates that we, too, need to take seriously, as we seek to build Your Party Scotland as a real, socialist alternative, here in Glasgow and across the country.

One of the most suggestive contributions to the discussion draws on experiences of participatory democracy in Latin America and elsewhere, to argue that as mayor, ‘Zohran Needs to Create Popular Assemblies’ (Jacobin 12.22.2025. https://jacobin.com/2025/12/mamdani-popular-assemblies-democratic-socialism) to build a bottom-up political culture that empowers working people. In this article, Gabriel Hetland, who has done a lot of work with social movements in Venezuela and Bolivia, and Bhaskar Sunkara, the editor of Jacobin, point to the positives of governing with such assemblies. In the short term, it enables the social base to keep mobilising, which is vital to sustain a progressive administration that will inevitably be hemmed in by hostile elites and procedural roadblocks, hindering its attempts to implement even its core, immediate, ‘affordability’ policies. In the process of these fights over housing and transport, childcare and the cost of groceries, it also begins to create new structures of power, increasing “the capacity of workers to collectively shape the decisions that shape their lives”, and “to lay the basis for a society beyond capitalism”.

Even without the aid of a crystal ball, it is not hard to see how a socialist administration in Glasgow City Council, or even in Holyrood, would confront many of the same obstacles, and need similar solutions, as it sought to seize back the cost-of-living agenda hijacked by Reform in Scotland, or even confront a far-right, Reform government in Westminster.

As Hetland and Sunkara make clear, the key point of assemblies or other forms of mass, participatory democracy, is to change the relationship between the governed and their government, shifting power back to the former. The forms this can take vary greatly. Even within Latin America, the early participatory budgets (PBs) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in the 1990s and early 2000s – cited here as one of the most successful examples – were very different from the communal councils and communes developed in Venezuela, or the more sporadic assemblies used in Bolivia, a few years later. Although not part of a wider revolutionary process, the scope of the powers in Porto Alegre was in fact much greater.

It would be foolish, from so far away, to pretend to offer much of an opinion on exactly what might work best in New York City. As these authors point out, it is more important to identify the underlying principles. It is these that will determine whether a given form of assembly democracy can effectively change the relations of power, and whether it really can, or even wants to, open up possible paths to a different kind of society.

The problem is that the principles they do identify are quite slight and could lead in a rather different direction. This is not semantic quibbling: the gap between ‘affecting decisions’ and exercising sovereign power is the gap between supplicants and rulers, between consultation theatre and the embryo of workers’ self-government. They are significantly weaker than the four core principles adopted by the founders of Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting. For example, Hetland and Sunkara talk about ordinary people having “real and meaningful opportunities to affect the decisions that shape their lives”, and counterpose this to the “participation without influence” that breeds cynicism about many exercises in participation that are merely consultative. This distinction is important, because many later versions of participatory budgeting were indeed consultations without real power. But the original Porto Alegre version was stronger still. Its second and third core principles were that (2) the PB should have sovereign decision-making power, and (3) that it should discuss the whole budget, not just a sliver of it. This sounds like a lot more than just ‘affecting’ decisions.

The first of the Porto Alegre core principles was that (1) the PB should be based on direct, universal participation. The basic building block was mass, local assemblies, where all citizens could take part – there were no delegates at this level of the process, and certainly no algorithms performing random selection or sortition – and where they could debate and decide on the main priorities. An elected PB Council would then work out the nuts and bolts. This partly overlaps with Hetland and Sunkara’s second principle, where they talk about creating spaces “to foster meaningful deliberation”. As they rightly observe, this “is how non-elites learn to govern themselves”, bringing working-class communities together across the divides of race, gender and language that often separate them. This is the essence of collective action, and it upends the isolation and atomisation that underpins most of our capitalist societies.

The fourth Porto Alegre principle was that (4) the PB process should be self-regulating. Its shape and procedures, its rules, would not be decided by anyone else or laid down in legislation by some other body. The assemblies and their elected council would work out the rules and keep changing them along the way as needed. There is at least a potential contradiction between this fundamental autonomy and the third principle our authors suggest for the new Mamdani administration. They talk about the need for a “deliberate design” to avoid the participatory space reproducing inequalities of confidence and political experience, or becoming dominated by existing activists.

These are issues that have drawn attention within our own process of launching Your Party. Certainly, most would agree on the importance of taking steps to make political spaces – in this case the assemblies of participatory democracy – as accessible as possible, in relation to physical accessibility, child care, procedures, language, tone and so on. The problem is that these needs have also been used to justify a ‘deliberate design’ drawn up somewhere else according to criteria decided by no-one quite knows who. And this in turn raises suspicions of algorithms shaping representative samples, sortition and digital plebiscites. Such instruments, whose roots lie more in marketing and management studies, tend to reproduce the prevailing isolation of individuals, rather than foster the kinds of collective action that alone can begin to reverse the relations of power.

It is worth remembering that most of the core group that ‘invented’ the Porto Alegre experience saw themselves as revolutionary socialists. They were members of the Democracia Socialista current in the Workers Party (PT), which was then the Brazilian section of the Fourth International. When they suddenly found themselves at the head of the city hall administration in a medium-sized state capital, they asked themselves how they could use this to move towards a revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist state. And the first experience they turned to for possible inspiration was the Paris Commune.

Their conception of the participatory budget, and more broadly of direct, assembly-based democracy, was developed with this in mind. As a co-thinker of theirs in France, Catherine Samary, later put it, participatory democracy can be revolutionary if it permanently challenges the existing structures of the bourgeois state. If it ceases to challenge them, if it merely complements or ‘extends’ the processes of existing representative democracy, it becomes merely reformist and can easily be co-opted as a block to radical change and in effect a prop for the status quo.

Anyone who has endured a local council’s ‘community engagement’ session already knows where this leads: sticky notes on flip charts, facilitators with lanyards, and outcomes decided months ago by officers now nodding gravely at your contributions. That is why, not long after the successes of the early, radical participatory budget in Porto Alegre, the World Bank was soon promoting a watered-down, consultative version as a pillar of ‘good governance’ in the Global South. Although the situation in New York today may be very different, similar dilemmas, and dangers, are likely face any attempts by the new mayor to open up popular assemblies and spaces for participatory democracy. We should pay close attention because, with a bit of luck, we might later have to deal with parallel problems here in Glasgow.

1 January 2026

Source: Ecosocialist Scotland.


Attached documentshow-can-socialists-run-cities-will-mamdani-show-us-the-way_a9361.pdf (PDF - 1.1 MiB)
Extraction PDF [->article9361]

Iain Bruce is a journalist and eco-socialist activist living in Glasgow, member of Your Party. He is author of “The Porto Alegre Alternative: Direct Democracy in Action” (IIRE - International Institute for Research and Education).



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Conceptual Model of State Collapse



Summary

A minimalist conceptual model of the state is presented in which the fundamental basis of state existence and continuity is the flux of produced resources between producers and the needed state apparatus, while contending with powerful domestic non-state actors and foreign challenges. External conditions that reduce per capita production threaten state continuity, and the state attempts to survive by responding. Every decision either destabilizes the state and creates vulnerabilities or stabilizes the state on a road to recovery. The model provides a general framework for making and evaluating state decisions. It also provides predictions for circumstances that lead to state failure. I conclude that long-term state survival is possible, while describing the structural and dynamic challenges that must constantly be overcome.

Basic conceptual model of the state

The state is a living hierarchical structure that manages itself and controls and extracts cooperation and resources from its subjects and from its environment. It can be healthy or sick, and heal or die. The said structure includes the subjects who produce and state agents who are leaders, administrators, lieutenants, soldiers, teachers, analysts, and so on.

A given state is typically robust enough to thrive for several generations. Typical modern period life expectancy at birth of a new state is one or more centuries before being incapacitated by chronic systemic liabilities (Fischer, 1996; Goldstone, 1991; Turchin, 2003).

The state apparatus (or “state” for short, depending on the context) derives its resources from surplus productive work of subjects (“taxation”) and via pillaging operations abroad. In other words, the energy that feeds the state apparatus (i.e., the agents, equipment and infrastructure composing its structural and leadership or managerial hierarchy) is the labour and extracted physical resources provided by its subjects and provided by its targets and holdings abroad.

The state thrives as long as the influx of labour and physical resources is greater or equal to the resources expended to maintain all of its parts. That is, the resources needed to feed and maintain all of its agents (administrators, lieutenants, soldiers, teachers, analysts, and so on), and to maintain its equipment and infrastructure.

Note that I am purposefully avoiding the language of money and loans. This is because all that matters in reality is the flow of resources. Money instruments for coercion and bribes, and that represent promises to pay back, are irrelevant in themselves. The state is able to balance the fluxes of resources or it is not. It continues to thrive and grow or it degrades and fails, irrespective of the paper concepts of “debt” and “savings”. From the state view, its “savings” are temporarily unused resources whereas interest payments on “debt” owed by the state represent sinks of resources, lost for fear of lender repercussions.

We must add that powerful non-state actors coexist with the state and compete to influence or control the state to their advantage while building and maintaining systems of parallel resource extraction. These are the elite, bankers, industrialists, landlords, organized criminals, and so on, who can eventually form coalitions and overthrow the state, or capture the state and manage it while retaining its organizational structure and facade.

As long as the state survives with its rulers in place, it will constantly address non-state actor challenges, in the same way that an organism, to the best of its ability, defends against aggressive parasites. In practice, the state will make many accommodations and reciprocal agreements with powerful non-state actors, rather than expend too much energy combating these persistent forces. In this way, the state will integrate many non-state actors into its hierarchical structure, thus keeping and securing control.

Regarding continued state stability, the state apparatus (agents), the subjects and the integrated non-state actors are embedded in a changing world. One gauge of changing overall conditions is population growth or decline, which in turn depends on many factors, including environmental capacity to provide resources and violent aggression (both intra-societal oppression and war campaigns). Population growth rate is associated with fetal, neonatal and infant mortality rates, and recently in many countries population growth rate is associated with fertility control and abortion rates. Individually experienced biological stress (Selye, 1956) undoubtedly plays a major role in fertility, as do societal norms.

However, contrary to suggestions by several authors, population growth or decline by itself does not destabilize the state. This can be demonstrated as follows.

From a theoretical perspective, let us say under constant division of labour and age structure conditions, if population grows at the same rate across social classes while each subject maintains its per capita capacity to generate resources, then there is no problem. The state simply grows accordingly and the balance of flows of resources (producers to state apparatus) per capita is maintained without friction. Likewise, if population decreases (at the same rate across social classes) while other conditions do not change, then the state only needs to downsize accordingly and the balance of flows of resources per capita is again maintained. Even population-growth-driven increased geographical distance between producer subjects and consuming state agents does not create significant transportation or distribution losses because the state apparatus can be optimally dispersed near production regions.

This is just to say that the total population quantum in itself does not affect or determine state stability.

What then can irreversibly destabilize the state?

A balanced flux of resources is the first consideration irrespective of size. Here is a general scenario under select constant conditions.

State stabilization under conditions of constant trade, technology, structure and population

For simplicity, we first keep as constant:

  1. the state’s ability to extract foreign resources (e.g., no wars),
  2. foreign trade,
  3. technology and resource-production practices,
  4. the state’s hierarchical (social) structure, and
  5. the population.

In this thought experiment, we then postulate that the capacity of subjects to generate resources diminishes because of external factors not controlled by the state.

Such external factors might include:

  • diminishing soil fertility
  • diminishing crop yields (environmental or ecological)
  • diminishing individual health (biological, evolutionary or epidemiological)
  • diminishing personal ability or motivation for productive work
  • increasing scarcity and cost of extraction of resources from wells, rivers, mines, forests, wildlife…

We can imagine that these factors would be caused by external circumstances such as:

  • unchanging ill-conceived agricultural practices
  • extended drought conditions
  • solar radiative output variations
  • solar constant (perpendicular solar irradiation onto the atmosphere) variations
  • variations in large-scale cloud dynamics (e.g., from geomagnetic changes)
  • over-exploitation without exploration or regeneration
  • volcanic eruptions of toxic substances (e.g., mercury) and dimming aerosols
  • invasive spread of insects or other species, including parasites and disease-carrying animals
  • development of allergic intolerance and nutritional deficiencies
  • inadequate waste disposal and management
  • external societal influences (including propaganda, inter-state exchanges, world religions) that affect the population age structure, work ethics, morale, nuclear family structure and dynamics, religious preoccupations…

    and so on.

Note that the latter category “external societal influences” is not strictly external since it is societal. It will typically be a convolution between worldwide or multi-state changes and domestic contribution and response. Todd (2024) has explained the transformational impact of such a change on the Western world, leading to a dramatic reduction in the ability of the Western world states (vassal or not) to produce both competent agents and highly trained subjects.

If we relax the condition of keeping foreign trade constant, then another mechanism that in-effect diminishes the capacity of subjects to generate resources is for a trade deficit to result from external trading partners demanding an increased exchange advantage, which is equivalent to a state currency devaluation in economic terms. This occurs via trade intimidation or when the state’s resources produced for export become less desirable to the outside.

Overall, from all such factors, the consequences to state viability are potentially serious. The postulated reduced capacity of subjects to generate resources implies that less taxes can be leveraged from the subjects. As a result, if nothing else changes, then the flux of resources to maintain the state apparatus becomes insufficient.

The state can respond in any combination of various ways, including the following.

  1. The state can increase the taxation rate, meaning that it deprives the subjects of their usual personal resources in order to extract the needed quantum of resources to feed the state apparatus. With this policy, the subjects bear the cost of the externally imposed drop in resource production. This can heighten the resistance against taxation and diminish the subjects’ fitness to produce.
  2. The state can decrease resource delivery (aka salary) to its agents and expect them to continue performing the same tasks. With this policy, the state’s agents bear the cost of the externally imposed drop in resource production. This can increase internal opposition to the state hierarchy, thereby reducing service quality and dedication, and it can also reduce the agents’ fitness to perform their duties. This also thereby makes the state less able both to enforce taxation and address the constant non-state actor challenges.
  3. The state can increase demands (taxation) on the powerful non-state actors that coexist within the state (the said elite, bankers, industrialists, landlords, organized criminals, and so on). This has at least two effects: It produces destabilizing tensions within the systems of resource extraction controlled by the non-state actors; and it increases non-state actor opposition to the state. This in turn creates conditions for increased competition between non-state actors, likely leading to aggressive takeovers and larger and more powerful non-state actors. (E.g., smaller players with less defences may be regulated and taxed out of existence.)
  4. Taking the latter point further, the state can capture the holdings of powerful non-state actors (so-called nationalization) and dismantle non-state structures. This can provide a temporary influx of resources but it does not on its own solve the fundamental problem of resource flux imbalance caused by the externally imposed reduced capacity of subjects to generate resources.
  5. The state can sell off or lease its holdings (infrastructure, land, water, intellectual property, and so on) to non-state actors in exchange for resources. This, again, on its own does not solve the fundamental problem of resource flux imbalance caused by the externally imposed reduced capacity of subjects to generate resources. It only delays the inevitable. (Unless, of course, the new influx of resources is successfully used to make game-changing structural changes, such as technological developments or war, which are explored below.) Note that this sell off of holdings is distinct from so-called “privatization”, which is usually an outright giveaway ―under non-state actor pressure and manipulation―having the effect of expending state holdings and resources to contract out the depriving of subjects (point “1”) and of state agents (point “2”) of their usual resources.

The above picture, so far, under the given assumptions of constant conditions (above points “a” through “e”), means that the externally imposed reduction in capacity of subjects to generate resources, if the said reduction is too large and too prolonged, will lead to a breakdown or dissolution of the state.

As long as the external hardship conditions persist, the positive feedback reactions contained in the presented state responses (above points “1” through “5”) are such that the state system will experience a non-linear (accelerating) spiralling down into destruction, and only the accelerating rate of this downfall can be mitigated by state reactions.

State stabilization with unconstrained trade, technology, structure and population

Longer state lifetimes can be achieved, for example, in the following creative and adaptive ways, allowed by relaxing the above-postulated constant-condition constraints (points “a” through “e”).

One oft illustrated approach in history is for the state to raise an army and practice war, slavery and imperialism. If successful, this creates a larger state, an empire. However, the law of balancing fluxes of resources from subjects to the state apparatus (which now includes a maintained occupying army) remains the same, and such an empire can spiral down towards oblivion under a strong and growing pressure of reduced capacity of subjects to generate resources. An empire will generally have a longer lifetime than a small state, but the same law of balanced resource flux applies.

In this version of our hypothetical world which allows inter-state competition, wars and empire building, each state now has a defence burden as part of its apparatus, not only police and soldiers for domestic order.

In addition, having relaxed condition “d” (above) of a constant or unchanging social structure, the state’s administrative apparatus of service agents itself will be driven to grow larger in size and more demanding of resources through careerism and social-class greed, which must also be countered by the state.

Another approach to solving the deficient resource flux problem is for states to practice pillaging, which is the iconic resource supplementation strategy of the Vikings. Similarly, a large state can use protection-racket coercion, a popular method of the USA empire practised against its so-called allies through arms sales, military bases, corporate not-so-free trade and control of the world currency (Rancourt, 2019).

The now relaxed hypothetical rules (of our thought experiment) also allow improving technology and resource-production practices (point “c” above). Our hypothetical state therefore now has many new inventive ways to solve or alleviate its deficient resource flux problem (of externally imposed diminished capacity of subjects to generate resources).

The state, its subjects, and its agents can, under the newly considered relaxed constraints, respond in any combination, for example, of the following:

  1. develop improved and sustainable agricultural practices giving higher yields in both food quantity and quality (such as optimized livestock and crop rotations, improved water management methods, imported crop varieties, improved pest management methods, improved pollination strategies, and so on)
  2. increase, adjust or redistribute resource allowances to subjects in order to make them more productive (this is partly achieved through taxation policy and is akin to reducing poverty and unemployment, while improving living conditions and increasing individual fitness)
  3. develop improved state-run education and religious practices that increase national (state) identity and allegiance, while responding to worldwide changes in values
  4. develop improved intelligence systems for rooting out and discouraging subversion and corruption (thus keeping non-state actor ambitions and out-of-state infiltration more efficiently in check)
  5. adopt or adapt social and work-environment structures that strengthen state subject and state agent dedication and efficiency (such as highly stratified hierarchies with merit-based assignations) (Note that the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) in China, for example, had a robust merit-based hierarchy for its elite educated state public service agents, see Turchin, 2023.)
  6. develop improved and novel state management practices to continuously optimize the mosaic of production specialization and agent duty specialization, adjusting compartment populations as needed, in ways that do not create destabilizing tensions
  7. develop improved education or mentorship structures and incentives to transmit and develop technical skills and practices
  8. develop improved energy use technology in both mechanization and transportation
  9. develop improved and sustainable mining and energy extraction and refinement technologies
  10. develop improved land use practices, including specialization based on regional climate and ecological conditions
  11. develop improved waste management strategies and sanitation practices

and so on.

In all of this, the state must have breadth and depth in its own increasing and institutionalized knowledge of state management principles and response strategies and tactics. This knowledge base must be state-owned and independent. It should not rely on or be corrupted by non-state actors or foreign influence.

In this way, creative and coordinated state responses to external factors that would diminish the capacity of subjects to generate resources can ensure that the law of balanced resource flux (from subjects to the state apparatus) is dynamically maintained. Surpluses can be used to reduce poverty and increase employment in socially rewarding work, for both subjects and agents, thus strengthening the state and reducing internal frustration against the state.

As long as the state project is alive in the minds and hearts of subjects and agents, then such creative state responses to external factors that would diminish the capacity of subjects to generate resources can continue without state collapse except for the most extreme external shocks.

Regarding keeping the state project alive in minds and hearts, at the psychological level the individual is expected to largely take their identity from their place in the state-structured and maintained social hierarchy. The state is aided by a large biological impetus to belong, as is the case with all social animals, such that early and continued state education and institutions (including state religions) that promote state ideology do well in this regard. With vassal jurisdictions (states in facade only) the empire may provide globalized generic ideologies (Rancourt, 2019). Individuals (especially males) also have a natural impetus to rebel and to seek more power if promotion within the established hierarchy is not forthcoming or sufficient, especially among the elite social classes (Turchin, 2023). This biological impetus drives the growth and multiplication of non-state actors, if it is not accommodated by the state.

In all of this, population need not increase or decrease, although an increased and integrated population in-effect increases the size and power of the state in the world. Likewise, loss of population can so diminish the state’s effective size as to make it more vulnerable to external pressures and threats. Furthermore, an artificial or accelerated increase in state population, if not integrated, can cause an impetus for war, both civil and predatory.

Presently, it seems superficially that large societies that have long historic traditions of intended merit-based state management hierarchical structures (Russia, China) and experience with long-lived recent empires (Tsarist Russia, 1547-1917; Qing Dynasty, 1644-1912) are able to apply the above responses well, whereas states that have more colonizing traditions (Western world) tend to stick with the colonizing model, using both military projection and financial predation.

Can the state survive?

Finally, regarding the cycles of state breakdown that are observed historically from the late-Middle Ages through the early modern period (Fischer, 1996; Goldstone, 1991), it appears that these collapses were due to state failures to cope, in the presence of large intra-state and inter-state pressures, in which competing non-state actors played major roles. There are two main striking features of these cycles, in the particular (mostly European and northern Asian) states studied by Fischer (1996) and Goldstone (1991).

First, state stability periods did not last much more than approximately 100 years (3 generations), up to approximately 200 years; again, for these particular states studied by Fischer (1996) and Goldstone (1991). It seems one century or so was long enough for threatening non-state forces to generate and cause severing changes, while exploiting external conditions such as trade conflicts and war. Elite greed and ambition was certainly a driver, and relative inflation of cost of basic commodities was always a factor (Fischer, 1996; Goldstone, 1991; Turchin, 2023).

These events suggest that the state, like the body of a living animal, has a finite and species-specific lifetime. Once enough damage is accumulated in the process of living, then a non-linear final failure (death) precipitously occurs. Has modern technology and civilizational management experience made a new species of state having a super immune system? It is doubtful. However, as argued above, unlike with the body of a living animal, state longevity is not limited by biological laws, only by unchecked internal rot, conquest or external catastrophic shock.

From another perspective, the state is a social dominance hierarchy and all social dominance hierarchies are subject to a dynamical law of spontaneous creep away from merit-based stratification towards competing mega-players and a totalitarian end point (Hickey and Davidsen, 2019). The loss of merit-based social stratification is the death of a state. The theoretically predicted death by dominance dynamics is postponed by optimal choices of the rules of social-status competition (Hickey and Davidsen, 2019), which the state can control.

Overall, statecraft is the most challenging human endeavour. Long-lived states and empires are possible, where longevity depends more on autonomous internal management than on external factors. Every legislative, legal and policy decision of the state either stabilizes or destabilizes, in the changing environment of external factors.

Second, state stability (and instability) periods were essentially synchronous across continental-scale geographic space. This led Goldstone (1991) to conclude that there must be an overarching common external factor driving all state instabilities: Population growth pressure on natural resources. I disagree. The approximate said synchrony of state stability and state meltdown can be induced by several strong coupling forces that include:

        • inter-state trade
        • inter-state technology transfer (including agricultural practices)
        • war and territorial disputes
        • climatic change (e.g., Little Ice Age conditions, 1300-1850)
        • large volcanic eruptions

These coupling forces draw the states into a single dominance hierarchy which will then follow its own whole-system dynamics. Simply put, the states have synchronized cycles because they are integrated parts of one world.

This does not mean that an individual state is not self-determined. Only that its downfall is coupled to the downfalls of other states. Strong states follow their own paths. Failing states fail together.

Acknowledgement. I thank my colleague Dr. Joseph Hickey for a critical review of the paper and several suggestions regarding content and clarity.

References

Fischer (1996): David Hackett Fischer, The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History Oxford University Press, p. 536, ISBN 0-19-512121-X (Pbk.)

Goldstone (1991): Goldstone, Jack A., Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, University of California Press, p. 608, ISBN 0-520-08267-2

Hickey and Davidsen (2019): Hickey J, Davidsen J, “Self-organization and time-stability of social hierarchies.” PLoS ONE 2019, 14(1): e0211403. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211403

Rancourt (2019): Rancourt, Denis G., Geo-Economics and Geo-Politics Drive Successive Eras of Predatory Globalization and Social Engineering – Historical Emergence of Climate Change, Gender Equity, and Anti-Racism as State Doctrines /// (April 02, 2019) /// Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5403798 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5403798

Selye (1956): Hans Selye, The Stress of Life, McGraw-Hill, p. 515, ISBN 0-07-056212-1

Todd (2024): Emmanuel Todd, La Défaite de l’Occident, Gallimard Publ., p. 384, ISBN 978-2073041135

Turchin (2003): Peter Turchin, Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall, Princeton University Press, p. 245, ISBN 978-0-691-18077-9

Turchin (2023): Peter Turchin, End Times: Elites, Counter-Elites, and the Path of Political Disintegration, Penguin Press, NY, p. 352, ISBN 9780593490501 (hardcover)

Denis G. Rancourt was a former tenured full professor of physics at the University of Ottawa, Canada. He is a researcher for the Ontario Civil Liberties Association. He has published more than 100 articles in leading scientific journals, on physics and environmental science. He is the author of the book Hierarchy and Free Expression in the Fight Against Racism. Denis can be reached at denis.rancourt@gmail.comRead other articles by Denis, or visit Denis's website.

Kropotkin explains in the French edition of his Memoirs “The research that I carried out in the course of familiarizing myself with the institutions of the ...

How to Save the World: Give Up War, Cars, and Leaf-Blowers... and Unveil the Stars

It’s imperative that we stand up to the forces of ecocide, while developing a more realistic vision of the better world that awaits us once we’ve jumped off the growth-by-carbonization bandwagon.



A night starry sky is shown against the background of the Milky Way and trees.
(Photo: Believe_In_Me/ iStock via Getty Images)


Stan Cox
Jan 14, 2026
TomDispatch


Let me start by putting things bluntly: Don’t bother to tell Donald Trump, but with his distinct help, we’re doing nothing less than cooking ourselves. Thanks to the continued use of fossil fuels in a staggering fashion and the growth of greenhouse gas emissions, almost half of the world’s population now suffers through 30 additional days of extreme heat annually. Heatwaves roll in thicker and faster every year.

On average, according to the medical journal The Lancet, 84% of the extremely hot days we’ve faced over the past five years would not have occurred without human-induced climate change that the American president seems intent on making so much worse. Heat-related deaths are already 63% more frequent than in the 1990s. That Lancet article also reported that heat- and drought-related hunger, as well as deaths from wildfire smoke and industrial air pollution, are breaking records globally almost yearly.

Climate Impacts Tracker dubbed 2025 “The Year of Climate Disasters,” noting:
Flash floods tearing up a Himalayan village in India, hurricanes and wildfires ravaging the US, heatwaves and wildfires scorching Europe, record-breaking heat in Iceland and Greenland, torrential rains and floods roaring through Southeast Asia—2025 marked yet another year of human tragedies, driven by extreme weather events.

The number of environmental disasters and their destructiveness are only ratcheting up in step with increases in global greenhouse gas emissions, ever more extraction of key minerals, the ever-greater exploitation of biological resources, and outbreaks of resource wars (most recently with the US assault on Venezuela). All of that is linked to one crucial phenomenon: the single-minded pursuit of economic growth by the owning and investing classes. Not surprisingly, they reap the lion’s share of the benefits from such growth and bear next to none of its devastating consequences.

Though it’s seldom highlighted, the world economy has indeed reached an astounding physical scale. During the past century, resource extraction has doubled every 20 years or so. Indeed, humanity reached a grim milestone in 2021, when the global quantity of human-made mass—that is, the total weight of all things our species manufactured or constructed—surpassed the total weight of all living plant, animal, and microbial biomass on this planet. And worse yet, that mass of human-made stuff continues to grow, year by year, even as the natural world diminishes further.

In other words, our species is vainly striving to circumvent what’s come to be known as Stein’s Law from an aphorism credited to economic guru Herbert Stein: “If something can’t go on forever, it won’t.”

Societies could indeed achieve a distinctly better quality of life because of (not in spite of) degrowth.

Count on this: At some point, global economic growth will finally have to grind to a halt and shift into reverse. After all, if the corporate and political powers carry on with business as usual, such growth will end in chaotic, violent collapse. (Think Mad Max.) But if the elites can be thwarted and we can dramatically reduce our dependence on fossil fuels and other resources in a reasonably well-planned way, we might be able to avoid that fate.

That’s the pitch put forward by the degrowth movement. In essence, it’s a refutation of the “green growth” doctrine. (Green-growthers, ignoring Stein’s Law, claim that technological “innovation” will ensure that economies can continue to grow indefinitely.) In that debate, degrowth finally seems to be getting a leg up. A 2023 survey of nearly 800 climate-policy researchers found that almost three-quarters of them favored degrowth or no growth over green growth.

And here’s the reality the rest of us need to take in: Societies could indeed achieve a distinctly better quality of life because of (not in spite of) degrowth, since full-scale restraints on the endless extraction and consumption of fossil fuels could force them to ensure that their limited resources would be used to satisfy basic human needs instead of being wasted on yet more increasing profits for the already wealthy few.

The growth-addled political and economic forces pushing us toward ecological doom are many and formidable indeed. And that makes it ever more important that people in rich, overconsuming countries like ours come to realize how important it is that we stand up to the forces of ecocide, while developing a more realistic vision of the better world that awaits us once we’ve jumped off the growth-by-carbonization bandwagon.

One way to bring that better world into sharper focus is to examine a few of the many miseries and dangers that degrowth would help us alleviate or even leave behind. What follows is just a handful of examples.
Goodbye, War Machine

Topping the list of American institutions and resources that a degrowth economy could starve would be the US military-industrial complex. After all, the Pentagon is actually the largest institutional user of fossil fuels in the world. The greenhouse gases our military emits, even in peacetime, are believed to have a global-warming impact of 60 million metric tons of carbon dioxide annually. The Earth can’t handle that any longer.

To begin shrinking our military’s now trillion-dollar annual budget would not only prevent a significant amount of global warming but also save countless human lives and greatly enhance the quality of life in this country and across the planet.

With degrowth, for example, the Defense (not—thank you, Donald Trump, Pete Hegseth, and crew!—War) Department’s nearly 3 million employees, who enable the resource-heavy, deadly work of war-fighting, imperialism, and, if the Trump administration gets its way, the suppression of domestic political protest, can find themselves better jobs. After all, employees in all but the top echelons of the military, underpaid and exploited, endure often harsh working and living conditions. Zeroing out the Pentagon would free up a vast workforce to help meet people’s actual needs rather than killing all too many of us on this planet (most recently, at least 115 in the bombing of Venezuelan boats and 40 more in the January 3rd attack on Caracas). And they’d be better off losing those jobs.

Enlisted personnel receive such small paychecks that many are eligible for SNAP (“food stamp”) benefits, even if only 14% apply for them. Among the families of junior enlisted troops, 45% often can’t afford enough food. More than 286,000 of them don’t get an adequate variety or amount of food and, of those, about 120,000 report sometimes skipping meals and eating less than they need for fear of running out of money.

And that’s not all. A nationwide analysis suggested that towns and cities abutting military bases have higher crime rates (19% greater for property crimes and 34% for violent crimes) than similar towns not near such installations.

Worse yet, people living or working in or around military bases are often exposed to dangerous levels of toxic contamination over long periods and can also be plagued by noise pollution. Not surprisingly, studies have also found high rates of hearing loss among the troops. In the United States, almost 15% of active-duty personnel suffer hearing impairment of some sort (and it’s one of the most common health problems among veterans as well).

Dismantling our war machine would also help restore a better quality of life for tens of millions of people elsewhere. Consider the death and misery our military has inflicted during the past six decades on Indochina, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, Kuwait, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Iran, and now the Caribbean Sea, the Eastern Pacific Ocean, and of course Venezuela.

As if that weren’t bad enough, for decades, our military-industrial complex has provided armaments to repressive, murderous regimes around the globe—Israel’s genocide of the Palestinian people being the most recent example.
Adiós, Vehicular Supremacy

In a much less resource-intensive American society, human needs would also no longer be subordinated to those of gasoline-driven motor vehicles, and our collective quality of life would improve dramatically.

Based on the importance of keeping this planet livable, any ecologically sane society would break free from what Gregory Shill has labeled “automobile supremacy” and that, of course, would be a particularly significant accomplishment for any degrowth movement in the United States or other wealthy countries.

As a start, motor vehicles are regularly among the top 10 causes of death for US residents under the age of 55. Worse yet, pedestrian fatalities, which had been falling for decades, shot up by 71% between 2010 and 2023, while fatalities caused by increasingly taller, heavier, more aggressively armored pickups and SUVs climbed at precisely twice that rate, 142%.

Starving militarism and automobile supremacy of resources, while improving the quality of life of our communities, would also go a long way toward halting the ecological breakdown of this planet while the sources of many smaller-scale dangers and ills would also fade into the past.

With private gas-driven vehicles largely replaced by extensive transit networks, electric vehicles, and bike and foot traffic, we also won’t have to contend with as many road-raging drivers in armored pickup trucks the size of World War II tanks. We won’t face the health dangers posed by air and noise pollution from vehicle traffic. Our cities will have vastly more green space, because significant parts of the 30% of their soil surface now covered by concrete or asphalt solely to accommodate motor vehicles could be revegetated. And we won’t suffer the extra-blistering summer heat that comes with such over-paving.

With degrowth and the end of automobile supremacy, traffic jams will vanish into the past; we’ll no longer risk being killed while simply walking, biking along a roadway, crossing a street legally, or engaging in lawful, peaceful protest; and everyone will all too literally be able to stop driving everyone else crazy.
Farewell to So Many Other Fossil-Fuelized Plagues

Starving militarism and automobile supremacy of resources, while improving the quality of life of our communities, would also go a long way toward halting the ecological breakdown of this planet while the sources of many smaller-scale dangers and ills would also fade into the past. Taken alone, each might appear insignificant, but cumulatively, such culprits severely degrade the quality of life in our wildly growth-oriented economy. As just one example of something that, with degrowth, we could say “good riddance” to, let me suggest that loud-mouthed neighborhood bully, the leaf blower.

Generating wind speeds approaching those of an EF5 tornado, gas-powered leaf blowers blast out noise at 95 to 115 decibels (two to eight times louder than the safe upper limit set by federal agencies). Electric leaf blowers, while less noisy, still significantly exceed the maximum safe noise level near schools, hospitals, daycare centers, retirement homes, or anywhere else where there are vulnerable people present.

Most gas-powered blowers and other deafening lawn machinery are operated for long hours by commercial landscaping crews, whose ears are just a couple of feet from the roar. Often surrounded by other leaf blowers, lawn mowers, and gas-powered equipment, such workers commonly suffer hearing loss.

The noise of a leaf blower, like that produced by vehicular traffic and wind turbines, is rich in low-frequency sound that carries long distances, easily passing through walls. Exposure to such noise raises the risk of a range of health problems, including sleep disruption, mental stress, high blood pressure, heart ailments, stroke, and immune-system dysfunction.

And keep in mind that the substitution of leaf blowers for perfectly functional rakes is just the tip of the iceberg. Our economy is now chock-full of unnecessary products that diminish the quality of life and would be left in the nearest ditch if energy consumption were deeply reduced.
Hello Again, Night Sky

By ending profligate energy consumption, degrowth could also restore much-loved wonders of nature that the growth economy has stolen from us.

Consider the night sky. Since 2010, in cities and towns, as well as anyplace near them, “skyglow” (a bleaching out of the night sky that hides stars from view) has been increasing at an astonishing rate of 10% a year.

This surge in light pollution has coincided with the rapid adoption of light-emitting diodes (LEDs) for streetlights and other outdoor illumination. Such LEDs produce far more light per watt of energy consumed than older light sources. Unfortunately, companies and municipalities have taken advantage of LED efficiency not by cutting their energy consumption, but by flooding parking lots, streets, billboards, sports fields, and car dealerships with even brighter light.

We’d reap myriad benefits by deeply cutting resource use while ensuring that collective sufficiency and justice for all become the focus of our world.

Most LED lighting now in use is rich in short wavelengths at the “cool-blue” end of the visible spectrum, which ensures that it will be scattered by the atmosphere more efficiently and so produce a rapid increase in skyglow. As a result, stars have all but disappeared from the night sky in cities, suburbs, and nearby rural areas.

Exposure to cool-blue light at night also threatens humans and other species by disrupting our circadian sleep-wake cycle. Among the impacts on human health are gastrointestinal disorders, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and even cancer.

A degrowth society dialing down its energy use would not only reduce light and noise pollution but achieve significant advances in environmental justice. Brightly lit industrial and commercial facilities and parking lots are all too often placed in low-income, racialized communities. As a consequence, across the United States, light pollution is more severe in neighborhoods where a larger proportion of the population is Black, Latino, or Asian.

Amid mounting ecological and humanitarian crises and with Donald Trump still in the White House for another three potentially devastating years, the vanishing of the heavens may be regarded as a problem only for astronomers and aesthetes. But such a view badly underestimates how important the starry night sky has proven to be to our culture, scientific progress, and social cohesion. It was an unalloyed good, shared freely and equally by all humanity. And it could be so again if, with degrowth, we put our cities and towns on a dimmer switch.

To be clear, the degrowth movement’s not claiming that the way to prevent ecological and civilizational collapse is simply to play Whac-A-Mole by working our way through individual problems like traffic congestion or light and noise pollution. In fact, the point of degrowth is that societies should leave all such problems, including the potential disaster of climate change, in history’s trash heap. We’d reap myriad benefits by deeply cutting resource use while ensuring that collective sufficiency and justice for all become the focus of our world.

© 2023 TomDispatch.com


Stan Cox is the author of The Green New Deal and Beyond (2020), The Path to a Livable Future (2021), and the ‘In Real Time’ blog, all from City Lights Books. See the evolving ‘In Real Time’ visual work at the illustrated archive; listen to the ‘In Real Time’ podcast for the spoken version of this article; and hear a discussion of it on the Anti-Empire Project podcast
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