The Enduring Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Factor In Myanmar Politics – Analysis

Aung San Suu Kyi. Photo by Claude TRUONG-NGOC, Wikipedia Commons.


October 12, 2026
 ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
By Kyaw Yin Hlaing

Key Takeaways:

More than five years after the 2021 coup, Aung San Suu Kyi remains detained and no longer directs Myanmar’s democratic movement, yet she retains unmatched nationwide popular legitimacy that neither the military nor the resistance can ignore.

Post-coup resistance has grown more decentralised and armed, with younger activists, PDFs and ethnic organisations developing independent leadership; surveys show strong support for her release but more conditional enthusiasm for her return to power, especially among ethnic minorities who expect recognition of post-2021 sacrifices.

The military faces a dilemma: releasing her risks electoral defeat while continued exclusion reinforces her symbolic stature, so both sides must reckon with her residual legitimacy even as democratic succession and federal institutions become more urgent.

Introduction

For nearly four decades, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has occupied an extraordinary place in Myanmar politics. She emerged from the 1988 pro-democracy uprising as the country’s most prominent opposition leader, spent much of the next two decades under detention, entered parliament during President U Thein Sein’s political opening, and led the National League for Democracy (NLD) to overwhelming electoral victories in 2015 and 2020. Constitutionally barred from becoming president, she nevertheless led the civilian government from 2016 until the military seized power on February 1, 2021.

More than five years after the coup, the political environment in which she once exercised unparalleled civilian influence has changed dramatically. A new generation of activists has emerged; armed resistance has become central to the struggle against military rule; ethnic resistance organisations have gained greater influence; and the NLD no longer dominates the democratic movement organisationally. Aung San Suu Kyi has remained in detention and has had virtually no opportunity to shape these developments. Yet no civilian political figure appears to have acquired comparable nationwide legitimacy, nor to have evoked a similar level of recognition from external interlocutors. Calls for her release continue, as does the attention – domestically and externally – on her health and the conditions of her current detention. The regime in Naypyidaw has intermittently responded to these concerns; the most recent being the facilitation of a meeting with the ICRC representative, at a designated location in Naypyidaw. This was the first widely publicised meeting since her detention in 2021, and drew much attention and comment.[1]


This Perspective argues that the “Aung San Suu Kyi factor” in Myanmar’s politics has not disappeared but has instead changed in nature and discusses why she remains politically relevant when Myanmar and the movement she once led have changed so profoundly. Before 2021, her importance rested on personal popularity, the ability to lead and shape Myanmar’s democratic opposition, and, after the NLD’s landslide election win, democratic legitimacy. Today, her capacity to exercise political leadership has sharply diminished, though much of her popular legitimacy remains. That legitimacy has become more conditional, particularly among ethnic minorities and younger resistance actors. Resistance forces cannot assume a leading role similar to her unquestioned leadership in past years, nor can they easily disregard her legitimacy. Meanwhile, the military has strong incentives to exclude a rival it has repeatedly failed to match electorally; yet, the military’s very act of excluding her politically may strengthen her symbolic legitimacy it seeks to diminish.
From Opposition Icon to National Political Leader

Aung San Suu Kyi’s initial political importance rested as much on symbolism as on formal power. After emerging as a leader of the 1988 democracy movement, she became the principal civilian challenger to military rule. The NLD overwhelmingly won the 1990 election, but the military refused to transfer power, and she spent much of the next two decades under house arrest. Her detention strengthened her standing by making her the most visible symbol of the denial of democratic rule. Efforts to weaken her through restrictions, propaganda, and prolonged detention often had the opposite effect: exclusion reinforced her association with resistance to military rule.[2]


Her appeal also extended beyond the predominantly Bamar democratic opposition. Her advocacy of democracy and federalism resonated with many ethnic minorities seeking political equality and autonomy. The political opening after 2011 fundamentally changed her role. The military-drafted 2008 Constitution preserved extensive military prerogatives, including guaranteed parliamentary representation and control over key security ministries, creating a military-supervised political system.[3] Nevertheless, President Thein Sein introduced reforms that created greater political space. Changes to electoral rules enabled the NLD to contest the 2012 by-elections, through which Aung San Suu Kyi entered the Pyithu Hluttaw.[4] She was now seeking to change the system through its institutions rather than challenging it only from outside.

Her political relationship with parliamentary speaker Thura U Shwe Mann enlarged the NLD’s political space and coincided with a more assertive legislature. Parliament scrutinised budgets, questioned ministers, revised laws, and at times checked the executive more actively than expected under the military-designed system.[5] By 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD had emerged as the most credible vehicle for a transition to civilian democratic government for much of the electorate. The NLD’s landslide victory in the November 2015 general election demonstrated the breadth of this popular support.[6] Because eligibility criteria listed in the 2008 Constitution’s Article 59(f) prevented her from becoming president, the NLD created the position of State Counsellor to allow her to exercise de facto leadership. She thus evolved from an opposition symbol to a participant in a military-designed transition, and finally to a dominant civilian political leader.

Governing, Disappointment, and the Limits of Popularity

Holding power changed Aung San Suu Kyi’s relationship with the public. No doubt, the NLD inherited a political order constrained by the 2008 Constitution, military autonomy, armed conflict, and weak institutions, but these constraints did not fully explain its disappointing performance. Decision-making was highly centralised, ministerial capacity was uneven, and the government often struggled to translate its electoral mandate into effective policy. Some retired civil servants who became ministers continued to operate like rigid bureaucrats, while many NLD leaders lacked experience in government. A senior NLD government official attributed many shortcomings to the shortage of qualified and experienced politicians, arguing that this helps explain why the government often struggled to address fundamentally administrative problems through political means.[7] Disappointment was especially pronounced among ethnic minorities expecting greater progress toward federalism and political equality. The controversy over General Aung San’s statue illustrated this tension. In Kayah (Karenni) State, the NLD-led state government proceeded with a statue in Loikaw despite strong local opposition. Many Karenni activists argued that honouring a Bamar national hero while neglecting local history and the autonomy associated with the Panglong[8] promises reflected Bamar-centred nation-building. Protests and a police crackdown deepened this perception.[9]


The peace process became another major source of frustration. The NLD inherited a difficult and fragmented process, with the military continuing to exercise decisive influence over security matters. In any case, the government failed to provide sufficient political leadership to rebuild trust with ethnic resistance organisations or overcome disagreements over federalism and security arrangements.[10] Comprehensive federal constitutional reform required military cooperation; the amendment rules gave the military an effective veto. Yet the NLD still had room to pursue decentralisation through legislation, administrative delegation, fiscal arrangements, and stronger state and region institutions. The 2018 transfer of the General Administration Department out of the military-controlled Home Affairs Ministry demonstrated that meaningful administrative change was possible without comprehensive constitutional reform, but such efforts remained limited. The inability to fully use the political and administrative means available, and the military’s blocking of planned major reforms, thus affected the NLD government’s performance. Its handling of the Rohingya crisis further damaged Aung San Suu Kyi’s international standing, particularly after her 2019 appearance before the International Court of Justice.[11] Domestically, that appearance gained her both domestic support and disappointment.

Domestic disappointment did not translate directly into political rejection. Critics sometimes used the derisive label “ni paw,” roughly “goofy reds,” for NLD politicians and supporters seen as uncritical, excessively partisan, and even arrogant. Yet even many who criticised the NLD’s performance or its supporters could not identify another civilian leader with a popularity equivalent to Aung San Suu Kyi’s. The 2020 election demonstrated this distinction: amid or despite criticism of its performance, the NLD won a second landslide parliamentary majority, reflecting widespread anti-military sentiment and Aung San Suu Kyi’s continuing appeal.


The military rejected the 2020 election result and alleged widespread electoral fraud instead. Though there were some shortcomings in voter lists and election administration, independent observers found that voters were able to express their will freely, and that the irregularities were not sufficient to reverse the NLD’s landslide victory. The Carter Center reported no major irregularities on election day,[12] while ANFREL concluded that the outcome reflected the electorate’s will.[13] A Gallup survey conducted around the time of the 2020 election found that 82 percent of adults expressed confidence in the honesty of elections.[14] Legal channels also existed for electoral complaints. A local survey of 500 respondents found that a large majority did not regard allegations of fraud as a legitimate justification for military intervention, suggesting that electoral disputes should have been addressed through legal and political mechanisms.[15] The February 2021 coup, on the eve of elected lawmakers being sworn in, consequently triggered nationwide protests and a civil disobedience movement demanding the restoration of the elected government.
A New Resistance and a Changing Daw Suu Factor

The post-coup resistance initially drew considerable legitimacy from the 2020 election. Elected NLD parliamentarians became important actors in institutions created after the coup, including the National Unity Government (NUG). Yet the resistance became broader and more decentralised than the pre-coup NLD-led movement. Research has emphasised the expansion of armed resistance and the emergence of new relationships among Bamar activists, ethnic resistance organisations, local armed groups, and federalist actors.[16] The NUG also sought a more inclusive anti-military coalition and placed federal democracy more explicitly at the centre of its program.[17] Younger activists, People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), ethnic resistance organisations, and local political organisations consequently developed leadership structures and objectives largely without Aung San Suu Kyi’s involvement. Today, five years (and counting) of resistance have produced actors accustomed to making decisions without Aung San Suu Kyi’s guidance. Political autonomy has thus increased even where respect remains strong for her. Even so, such respect is also nuanced. Various resistance participants would invariably choose Aung San Suu Kyi over coup-leader-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing, but they do not necessarily view her as the only choice of an acceptable leader. A more commonly held view was that there was an absence of a Bamar leader who would understand them.

Indeed, interviews with resistance participants show that respect no longer necessarily means unconditional acceptance of her political judgment. Aung San Suu Kyi built much of her reputation around nonviolent struggle, but for those who have spent years fighting the military, armed resistance has become a source of sacrifice, identity, and legitimacy. Thirty-five PDF soldiers interviewed for this research expressed concern that she might reject their movement and insist that nonviolence remained the only viable path. One explained:

“I respected Daw Suu. I wanted her to return to power if people still wanted her, but I would not want her to reject our resistance movement. Many people have sacrificed their lives. She must acknowledge their sacrifices. If she ever got a chance to run the country again, it would not be because of the goodwill of Min Aung Hlaing. It would be because of the sacrifices of the people. If she rejected us, I would be very upset.”[18]


The comment points to a change in the politics of legitimacy. Electoral legitimacy from the 2020 election, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s own historical legitimacy, remain important, but resistance participants now increasingly claim another source: sacrifices made since 2021. Any contemplation of Aung San Suu Kyi’s potential return to politics would require considering the changes in Myanmar’s political environment, which, since 2021, has become significantly different from 2016. Such changes may mean that while her influence may not wane, she may no longer wield similar authority over the democratic movement as in the past.
Popular but No Longer Uncontested

A survey of 630 respondents conducted as research for this paper provides further evidence of this changing relationship. The sample consisted of 400 Bamar and 230 non-Bamar ethnic respondents.[19] Approximately 83 percent believed that the political changes sought by the Myanmar people would not have occurred without Aung San Suu Kyi.[20] Yet recognition of her historical contribution and support for her release do not automatically translate to support for her return to power. Among the 230 non-Bamar respondents, 182 wanted her released, but only 83 explicitly wanted her to return to power; 132 said they would not oppose her return.[21]

These findings reveal attitudes more complex than a simple division between supporters and opponents. Many ethnic minority respondents regarded her detention as unacceptable while remaining ambivalent about restoring her former authority. Some believed she could support the resistance and contribute to a transition, but should allow younger leaders a larger role and responsibility.[22] Even before the 2021 coup, ethnic voters did not simply behave as an extension of the NLD electorate; regional location, ethnic-party competition, and perceptions of representation shaped their choices. The coup and subsequent resistance to it have further strengthened ethnic political actors, rendering visions of Myanmar’s political future more explicitly federal and multipolar. Aung San Suu Kyi therefore retains substantial national legitimacy, but her continuing popularity cannot simply be equated with a demand to restore the pre-2021 political order.

The Military’s Daw Suu Dilemma

Aung San Suu Kyi’s continuing popularity creates a difficult dilemma for the military and military-backed political establishment. The Thein Sein years offer a cautionary lesson: political and administrative reforms paved the way for her and the NLD to enter the political process in a military-designed system, after which the NLD overwhelmingly defeated the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in two successive national elections. The military’s inability to translate institutional dominance into comparable electoral popularity was a fundamental tension in the post-2011 order.[23]

A source close to the USDP argued that the current military and USDP leadership is highly unlikely to repeat what it regards as Thein Sein’s mistake. Allowing Aung San Suu Kyi to re-enter political life could recreate conditions that enabled the NLD to overwhelm the USDP electorally. The military and USDP leadership, the source observed, “know they are no match for Daw Suu.”[24] Preventing her return therefore has an obvious logic from the standpoint of regime preservation.[25] Yet exclusion has costs. A source close to the military noted the paradox: the harder the military tries to keep her out of politics, the more it strengthens her popularity and public resentment toward the military.[26]


This problem has characterised much of her political career. Detention deprives her of organisational power while strengthening her symbolic position as a victim of military coercion. The military can prevent her from speaking, campaigning, organising, and contesting elections, but it has been far less successful at producing a civilian figure capable of replacing her in the popular imagination. Releasing her risks restoring a competitor military-backed politicians have repeatedly failed to defeat electorally; excluding her perpetuates a deeper legitimacy problem.
Conclusion: Influence Without Control

Aung San Suu Kyi’s contemporary relevance cannot be assessed simply by asking whether she can return to power. She has moved from symbol of opposition to military rule, to participant in the post-2011 opening, to dominant civilian leader after 2015, and, since 2021, back to detained political figure. But the political environment to which she might return is fundamentally different from the one she left.

She no longer controls Myanmar’s democratic movement. The resistance movement since 2021 has developed its own leaders, armed organisations, institutions, and sources of legitimacy. Among ethnic minorities, support for her release does not necessarily translate into enthusiasm for her return to power. Among PDF members, respect is accompanied by an expectation that she acknowledges the legitimacy and sacrifices of a resistance movement that developed in her absence. Yet, declining political control has not meant the disappearance of popular legitimacy. The survey findings show that a large majority still recognise her historical importance, while no other civilian political leader has clearly emerged with comparable nationwide recognition.

This produces dilemmas for both sides. Resistance forces cannot assume that Aung San Suu Kyi could simply resume her former leadership, but neither can they easily construct a political settlement that ignores her continuing legitimacy. The military faces the opposite problem: allowing her back into politics could revive a competitor it is unlikely to defeat under genuinely competitive conditions, while continued exclusion may perpetuate the popularity she enjoys and which it seeks to diminish. Her age and the emergence of a new political generation also raise a larger question of democratic succession. Myanmar’s democratic forces ultimately need to transform her accumulated legitimacy, the NLD’s electoral mandate, and the sacrifices of the post-2021 resistance into durable institutions capable of outlasting individual leaders. For the immediate future, however, neither restoring her to her former position nor removing her from Myanmar’s political equation are options. That is the enduring Aung San Suu Kyi factor: whether it is the military or its opponents, neither can safely construct Myanmar’s political future without taking her into account. Her popular legitimacy still outweighs her lessened control over political events.

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf 

document.About the author: Kyaw Yin Hlaing is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was previously a visiting scholar at Cornell University’s Southeast Asia Program.

Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

About ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), an autonomous organization established by an Act of Parliament in 1968, was renamed ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute in August 2015. Its aims are: To be a leading research centre and think tank dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. To stimulate research and debate within scholarly circles, enhance public awareness of the region, and facilitate the search for viable solutions to the varied problems confronting the region. To serve as a centre for international, regional and local scholars and other researchers to do research on the region and publish and publicize their findings. To achieve these aims, the Institute conducts a range of research programmes; holds conferences, workshops, lectures and seminars; publishes briefs, research journals and books; and generally provides a range of research support facilities, including a large library collection.
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