The New Battle For Critical Minerals In The Amazon – Analysis

CRIMINALIZING ARTISANAL MINING


An aerial view of an area degraded by illegal mining in Novo Progresso, in the Brazilian Amazon, during Operation Gold Route, launched by Brazil’s Federal Police in early June 2026 to combat illegal gold mining. (Photo: Brazil Federal Police)

August 18, 2026
Diálogo Américas
By Eduardo Szklarz

Key Takeaways

Criminal organizations long established in Amazonian drug trafficking and illegal gold mining are adapting their territorial control, logistics (airstrips, river routes), middlemen and money-laundering channels to enter the high-value critical-minerals trade driven by global demand for batteries, semiconductors, defense and clean-energy technologies.

Analysts describe an emerging “narco-mineral complex” in which drugs, gold, coltan, cassiterite and other commodities form a single diversified criminal ecosystem that can blend illicitly extracted minerals into legitimate supply chains through forged documents and trade triangulation.

Preventing criminal capture of these strategic resources will require more than dismantling mining camps; it demands stronger financial intelligence, mineral traceability, border controls, disruption of logistical and commercial networks, and expanded international cooperation.

In the Amazon, where criminal organizations have spent decades building networks dedicated to drug trafficking, illegal gold mining, and smuggling, a new economic frontier is emerging. As global demand rises for critical minerals used in batteries, semiconductors, defense systems, artificial intelligence, and clean energy technologies, resources such as coltan, cassiterite, nickel, lithium, niobium, and rare earth elements are becoming increasingly strategic. While illegal gold remains the criminal underworld’s primary mining economy, analysts warn that the same networks controlling its extraction and trade are now well positioned to expand into other high-value minerals.

“These networks are beginning to adapt the infrastructure they use for cocaine and gold trafficking to minerals that power the energy transition, defense systems, and artificial intelligence,” Robert Muggah, co-founder of the Brazil-based Igarapé Institute, a think tank specializing in security and environmental policy, told Diálogo. For criminal organizations, the advantages are clear: They already control territory, clandestine airstrips, river corridors, middlemen, and money-laundering channels that can be rapidly repurposed to support new, high-value illicit markets.


For now, major criminal organizations are not involved in the critical minerals sector to the same extent that they dominate the illegal gold trade. Nevertheless, the trend is raising growing concern. “Gold prices have increased roughly eightfold over the past two decades, and rising prices for critical minerals are beginning to attract more sophisticated criminal groups into this market,” Muggah said.

A testing ground for organized crime

Illegal gold mining has become one of the principal sources of financing for Colombian guerrilla groups, Venezuelan criminal syndicates, Brazilian criminal organizations such as the First Capital Command (PCC) and Red Command (CV), networks linked to the Tren de Aragua, and international money-laundering organizations. Across many border regions of the Amazon, these groups not only exploit illegal mining sites but also exercise forms of criminal governance by controlling access to territory, collecting taxes, regulating mining activities, and providing armed protection for operations.

In June 2026, Brazil’s Federal Police launched Operation Gold Route (Operação Rota do Ouro) in Novo Progresso, Pará state, identifying a site where nearly 80 kilograms of gold are believed to have been extracted illegally over the previous three years. The case illustrates how illegal mining has become integrated into highly organized logistical and financial networks.

The model closely resembles the one that has characterized drug trafficking for decades. “The same groups, corridors, and financial systems that move cocaine, gold, mercury, timber, weapons, and money are now positioned to move critical minerals as well. This is the essence of the narco-mineral complex,” Muggah explained.

Operations carried out in recent years in the Yanomami Indigenous Territory clearly illustrate the complexity of the problem. Authorities discovered that illegal mining sites were supported by networks operating clandestine airstrips, fleets of boats, fuel supply systems, heavy machinery, and intermediaries responsible for funneling illegally mined gold into legitimate commercial supply chains. Destroying excavators and mining camps produced immediate results, but many operations quickly resumed because the underlying logistical and financial infrastructure remained intact. The experience demonstrated that dismantling camps and seizing equipment, while necessary, is not enough if the financial, logistical, and commercial networks sustaining the entire illicit supply chain remain untouched.

It is precisely this adaptability that makes critical minerals particularly vulnerable to criminal infiltration. Unlike narcotics, they can easily be blended with legally mined material. Through forged documentation, trade triangulation, and corporate laundering schemes, illegally extracted minerals can enter global supply chains appearing entirely legitimate.

A single criminal ecosystem

This trend reflects a broader transformation of transnational organized crime in Latin America. Increasingly, hybrid criminal structures no longer rely exclusively on drug trafficking but operate as diversified criminal enterprises. Drugs, gold, coltan, cassiterite, timber, smuggling, financial laundering, and institutional corruption are no longer separate illicit markets but components of a single criminal ecosystem.

Growing demand for critical minerals from the Amazon has accelerated this transformation, giving rise to what Muggah describes as the “narco-mineral complex.”

“It is a broad and enduring ecosystem involving armed groups, illegal miners, logistics operators, informal traders, political actors, public officials, and seemingly legitimate companies,” he said.

According to Muggah, the phenomenon rests on several pillars. The first is territorial control by armed groups over mining areas. In eastern Colombia, for example, dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) impose taxes and provide armed protection.

The second pillar is the repurposing of infrastructure originally built for cocaine and gold trafficking. “These systems have been refined over many years to move drugs, gold, mercury, weapons, and money. They can now also be adapted to transport cassiterite and coltan,” Muggah said.

The third pillar consists of commercial and documentary laundering mechanisms. Operation Hephaestus Forge (Operação Forja de Hefesto), conducted by Brazil’s Federal Police in 2023, demonstrated how cassiterite illegally extracted from the Yanomami Indigenous Territory could be sold through intermediary companies, processed by industrial operators, and ultimately exported to international markets, reaching major multinational corporations without revealing its illicit origin.


The fourth pillar is the ability to move minerals across jurisdictions, mix them with legally mined production, and assign them a new origin. The growing international demand for these resources further increases the profitability of this model. One example occurred in April 2025, when Colombian authorities seized nearly 49 metric tons of coltan and tin extracted from areas controlled by armed groups. According to the investigation, the minerals were destined for illegal export to China.

The challenge is no longer limited to combating illegal extraction. It also requires identifying and dismantling the logistical, financial, and commercial networks that allow illicitly sourced minerals to enter international supply chains.

Protecting the supply chains of the future

All indications suggest that the race for the Amazon’s critical minerals is only beginning. As these resources become increasingly important for defense industries, semiconductor manufacturing, advanced technologies, and the global energy transition, criminal organizations will have greater incentives to incorporate them into their illicit economies.

For Amazonian countries, the challenge extends well beyond protecting mineral deposits or combating illegal mining. It will also require strengthening financial intelligence, improving mineral traceability, tightening border and customs controls, dismantling criminal logistics networks, and expanding international cooperation to prevent illegally extracted minerals from entering global supply chains.

If illegal gold demonstrated how organized crime can capture entire extractive industries, critical minerals present an opportunity to act before that model becomes entrenched. Preventing criminal organizations from replicating this pattern in strategically important resources will be essential not only to protecting the Amazon but also to strengthening regional security and safeguarding the integrity of the supply chains on which future economies and advanced technological capabilities will depend.

This article was published by Diálogo Américas

About Diálogo Américas
Diálogo Américas is a professional magazine published by U.S. Southern Command as an international forum for security issues in Latin America.
View all posts by Diálogo América

Cameroon Cracks Down On Illegal Mining



August 16, 2026
By Africa Defense Forum

Key Takeaways

Cameroonian authorities have intensified enforcement against illegal gold mining, shutting down multiple Chinese-run sites operating without permits and cancelling dozens of foreign mining permits, amid estimates that the vast majority of foreign miners work irregularly.

Illegal operations have caused massive economic losses through gold smuggling (tens of tons diverted versus minimal official exports) and severe environmental and health damage from mercury and cyanide pollution of rivers and farmland.

The activity has also sparked local conflicts and violence, labor-abuse complaints, and criticism that security interventions often favor foreign mechanized miners over artisanal ones, while international calls have urged greater accountability from Chinese companies.

Cameroonian authorities continue to crack down on illegal gold mining sites run by Chinese nationals. Over a three-day period in June, a delegation led by Fuh Calistus Gentry, Cameroon’s acting minister of mines, industry and technological development, made unannounced visits to several gold mining sites, four of which were shut down for operating without permits.

Several workers fled a Chinese-controlled mining site in the central Cameroonian village of Missole I on June 25 as Gentry’s group arrived. In eastern Cameroon, more than 10,500 of the estimated 11,000 foreign miners work without required permits, according to a report by Modern Ghana, an online newspaper. On June 29, the Mining Ministry canceled 74 foreign mining permits. Illegal Chinese mining mostly is concentrated in eastern Cameroon and the north central Adamawa region.

Cameroon’s national gold mining union reported in March that Chinese nationals operate almost 200 gold mining sites. These sites “operate without papers and sell their products to expatriates from neighboring countries who do not declare them and export them clandestinely,” the union said in a news release.


The crime fuels conflict and costs Cameroon a substantial sum of money. Between 2021 and 2025, 44 tons of Cameroonian gold were smuggled to Dubai, compared to only 148 kilograms officially declared — a $3.4 billion loss for Cameroon, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reported.

There also are accounting discrepancies. Cameroon reported 953 kilograms of gold production in 2023 but only 22.3 kilograms officially exported. Importing countries, however, reported receiving 15.2 metric tons (15,200 kilograms) — more than 680 times more.

According to the ISS, Cameroonian frontmen often obtain mining permits for foreigners. Influential Cameroonian businesspeople, local authorities and mining sector mediators facilitate this. Chinese operators typically work alongside officially registered companies.

The mining also affects the environment. Chinese mining operations use toxic substances such as cyanide and mercury to extract gold, destroying farmland and polluting rivers. Although Cameroon banned the use of mercury in mining in 2019, a daily average of 40 liters of mercury and cyanide have been found in the Djiengou, Fell and Lom rivers, which are near gold washing ponds used by Chinese companies.

The pollution kills fish and pollutes communities’ drinking water. Mercury’s effects on populations near Chinese gold mines are severe. Residents have reported increased miscarriages, chronic illness and exposure among children working in the mines. One study found that more than 70% of miners in these areas had mercury levels exceeding World Health Organization safety standards.


“Environmental human rights defenders are denied access to sites and face barriers to legal action, especially given that many foreign companies lack identifiable managers or offices,” the International Service for Human Rights reported.

Last year, United Nations experts asked Beijing to address the role and responsibility of Chinese companies involved in Cameroon’s gold mining operations.

Violence also is associated with Chinese-operated mines. On January 21, a protest against Chinese gold mining in the central Cameroonian village of Goro turned violent. After midnight, gendarmes intervened, and security forces opened fire. Several civilians, including a child, were killed, according to Cameroonian news and media platform StopBlaBlaCam. In 2022, an employee at a Chinese mining company in eastern Cameroon killed a Cameroonian man who was looking for gold on land the company said it owned.

“The villagers revolted and killed the Chinese in turn” with stones, local farmer Narma Ndoyama told Africanews. “There are permanent conflicts between Cameroonians and Chinese” over gold mining, Ndoyama added.

Such incidents persuaded authorities to deploy security forces to mining sites, remove artisanal and semimechanized miners, and temporarily suspend mining.

“However, these ad hoc interventions have not stabilized the affected areas,” ISS researchers wrote. Further, the removal of artisanal miners by defense forces is “perceived as favoring mechanized miners,” who are often foreign.

Cameroonian workers at Chinese-operated mines also complain of mistreatment. In May, Grégoire Owona, Cameroon’s minister of labor and social security, condemned viral footage showing a worker being abused inside a Chinese-owned company and ordered labor inspectors to investigate.

Investigation raises alarm over uranium in DRC cobalt shipments to China

An investigation by Lighthouse Reports, The Financial Times and Le Monde traces the possible export of uranium from the Democratic Republic of Congo back to a confidential International Atomic Energy Agency memo obtained in 2024. Chinese mining group CMOC, which owns the main site examined in Katanga, disputes the findings.


Issued on: 09/08/2026 - RFI

An artisanal miner holding a cobalt stone at the Shabara artisanal mine near Kolwezi, in Katanga, in October 2022. © AFP/Junior Kannah

Lighthouse Reports obtained a previously undisclosed internal memo from the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2024 and began investigating its contents.

The 2009 document cited credible information indicating that uranium was present in “significant quantities” in most cobalt ores from Katanga, in the southeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and was “effectively exported as a cobalt by-product”.

Lighthouse Reports conducted the investigation in partnership with The Financial Times and Le Monde.

Infrastructure at the Shinkolobwe uranium mine, near the city of Likasi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rene Nijenhuis/UNEP/OCHA

Uranium in mineral-rich Katanga

The Katanga region – part of Central Africa’s Copperbelt – has increasingly turned towards cobalt extraction as demand has grown for the metal, which is used in lithium-ion batteries and aerospace alloys.

But the region’s mines have also long been known to contain uranium. A significant proportion of the uranium used in the Manhattan Project, which developed the first atomic bombs, came from Katanga’s Shinkolobwe mine.

The mine was closed after independence and later placed within an exclusion zone. In 2004, then president Joseph Kabila declared the area a prohibited mining zone, citing national security, public safety and the presence of uranium, which Congolese law classifies as a reserved mineral substance.

“There are always by-products in Congolese mining exports – particularly cobalt – and these by-products are effectively monitored by the Congolese authorities. All except one: uranium,” Tomas Statius, a Lighthouse Reports journalist and co-author of the investigation, told RFI.

Unchecked mining waste taints DR Congo communities

Mining professionals say uranium, copper and cobalt frequently occur together in the Congolese and Zambian Copperbelt.

“It is not limited to specific locations; it is a constant feature,” Statius said.

Steve Muanza, head of the DRC’s nuclear energy agency, told The Financial Times that it was “technically possible” and even “probable” that Chinese companies were extracting uranium from cobalt ore exported from the country, although he said there was no direct evidence.

He said his agency had requested funding to install radioactivity detectors on trucks travelling from the DRC into Zambia.
Up to 5,000 tonnes exported

To estimate the amount of uranium potentially exported, Lighthouse Reports worked with Sébastien Philippe, then a senior researcher at Princeton University, and geologist Ryan Manzuk.

Their calculations drew on previous analyses of uranium concentrations in Katanga ores, mine production data and geological samples held by the AfricaMuseum in Belgium.

A paper by Manzuk and Philippe, published on 30 July in Nature Communications, estimated that between 2,000 and 5,000 tonnes of uranium were exported from the DRC to China in cobalt hydroxide shipments between 2000 and 2024.

According to the researchers, even the lower estimate would be sufficient to fuel a one-gigawatt nuclear reactor for at least a decade.

The investigation did not establish whether the uranium was subsequently extracted or used in China.

DRC takes on Apple: can conflict mineral mining be stopped?

The most extensively documented site was Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM), one of the DRC’s largest cobalt producers.

The mine was owned by US company Freeport-McMoRan until it was acquired by Chinese group CMOC in 2016.

Internal company documents reviewed by the investigators recorded uranium-rich cobalt samples, including a peak concentration of 1,100 parts per million in December 2016 – around 15 times the export limit cited by the investigation.

Further documents indicated that significant uranium concentrations remained in cobalt produced at TFM in June 2021.

“There is an established, known method for removing uranium from cobalt exports,” Statius said, adding that it had not been used.

“We have been unable to determine whether CMOC intends to retain the uranium for economic or strategic reasons,” he added.

Doug Alexander, a former senior metallurgist at Eurasian Resources Group, suggested there could be two supply chains in the region – one in which contamination is addressed once detected, and another in which lower-quality products containing greater levels of impurities are shipped directly to China.

The mining site of Kamoa Kakula, in the 'Katanga Copperbelt', Lualaba Province, is one of the largest unexploited copper field in the world. © CAROLINE THIRION / AFP

CMOC rejects findings

CMOC has categorically disputed the investigation. The company said all cobalt hydroxide currently produced by TFM complied with Congolese regulations and international customer standards, with no recorded breaches of permitted limits or trade rules.

It said it did not know the source of the investigation’s historical data and maintained that uranium levels were below the relevant threshold, making a dedicated removal process unnecessary.

CMOC denied carrying out uranium separation or extraction in either the DRC or China. It also challenged the use of 75 parts per million as a universal limit, citing alternative thresholds of up to 100 parts per million.

Freeport-McMoRan did not respond to requests for comment, while the investigators said they stood by their findings.

“Our investigation is based on internal documents from the mine and its owners, spanning nearly a decade, that reveal both the contamination and attempts by certain metallurgical engineers to address the issue,” Statius said.

“It also draws on a peer-reviewed scientific paper published in one of the world’s top journals.”

The investigation also found that a refinery in Kokkola, Finland, had received Congolese material containing uranium.

This has been adapted from the original article in French by RFI's Patient Ligodi

AU

WGC, OMM partner to advance artisanal and small-scale gold mining

Staff Writer | August 5, 2026 | 

Artisanal gold miners in the Democratic Republic of Congo. (Image by Robert Carruba, Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH – The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Flickr.)

The World Gold Council (WGC), OCIM Metals and Mining SA (OMM) announced on Wednesday a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to support the formalization of artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM). 

This partnership combines WGC’s experience in standards development, best practices and gold market infrastructure with OMM’s operational experience in centralized processing plants. The goal is to improve conditions in the ASGM sector, reducing illicit activity and creating opportunities for more legitimate ASGM production to enter the formal global supply chain. 

The agreement comes at a moment where there’s increasing pressure to control illicit trade, mercury pollution and unsafe labour practices. 

Together, they plan to develop a global standard for ASGM processing plants, which includes practicing due diligence, traceability and environmental and safety performance. The standard will also support WGC’s gold processing initiative, which aims to pilot formalization models in host countries. 

They also plan to build blueprint frameworks to guide policymakers, investors and others on responsible processing infrastructure, with hopes that with more upstream control, there will be less harm associated with the sector.

Both organizations have a shared commitment to foster practical and scalable solutions that can support miners, governments and the industry to build more transparent and sustainable gold supply chains. 

WGC’s plan for ASGM formalization focuses on three aspects: origin verification, centralized processing plants and stronger participation by legitimate buyers to combat illicit mining practices. OMM, on the other hand, has formalized partnerships with over 200 small-scale mining operations in Peru, being expected to produce 1,000 kg of gold by the end of this year.

These facilities have the capacity to produce 100,000 tons a year, meaning that they will be able to scale operations while still ensuring full traceability and banking-grade compliance through the ASGM value chain. 

AU

Dirty gold overtakes cocaine as crime’s cash machine

Cecilia Jamasmie | August 3, 2026 | 

Artisanal miner shows gold produced from ore mixed with mercury. (Stock image by Christophe | AdobeStock.)

Illegal gold mining has become one of organized crime’s most profitable businesses, surpassing cocaine as a source of revenue for some criminal groups and exposing financial institutions, refiners and governments to a rapidly growing illicit finance threat.

For decades, cocaine defined organized crime across Latin America. Today, soaring gold prices and weaker enforcement have transformed illegal mining into a lower-risk, higher-return enterprise, according to Julia Yansura, Program Director for Environmental Crime and Illicit Finance at the FACT Coalition.

“Illicit gold has become a low-risk, high-reward business,” Yansura told MINING.COM. “It generates enormous profits with a much lower likelihood of detection or prosecution than the illicit drug trade.”

The shift reflects a broader transformation in organized crime. Rather than relying primarily on narcotics, criminal organizations have diversified into businesses that include illegal mining, extortion, weapons trafficking and other illicit activities, choosing whichever markets offer the highest returns with the lowest chance of detection.

Governments, however, have been slower to adapt. Decades of investment in anti-narcotics enforcement have left illegal mining comparatively overlooked, allowing criminal groups to expand into a business that finances broader criminal operations while causing extensive environmental damage.

Ecuador has become one of the clearest examples of that shift. The country’s 2026-2029 National Security Plan elevates illegal mining from an environmental and regulatory problem to a national security threat after concluding criminal gangs have infiltrated the gold supply chain from extraction to export. 

Authorities say illicit gold now finances organized crime, fuels money laundering and is increasingly replacing cocaine as a key source of criminal revenue.

Laundering gold

Unlike cocaine, illegally mined gold can be integrated into legitimate supply chains, making it uniquely attractive to organized crime.

Yansura said illicit gold is often laundered close to the mine using forged paperwork or false identities before entering legitimate markets. By the time refiners, traders or banks encounter the metal, it frequently appears legitimate on paper.

Another vulnerability is what she calls the “hand-carry” loophole. While travellers entering or leaving the US must declare cash exceeding $10,000, comparable reporting requirements do not apply to gold bars, allowing criminal organizations to move high-value gold across borders with far less scrutiny.

The financial risks extend well beyond mining regions. Although transactions near illegal mines often involve cash, gold or cryptocurrency, exports are typically financed through the international banking system, exposing financial institutions to illicit finance risk.

A recent WWF-UK and Themis survey of more than 600 financial professionals in 22 countries found that more than 80% of financial institutions are exposed to illicit finance risks linked to illegal mining, yet 40% have not taken steps to address them.

The exposure is particularly significant in the US. FACT Coalition research found the country is the largest destination for Colombian gold exports, even though an estimated 80% of Colombia’s gold is believed to be illegally or criminally sourced.

Yansura said the response should focus as much on financial crime as environmental enforcement. She called for stronger beneficial ownership rules to prevent shell companies from concealing illicit transactions, making transnational illegal gold mining a predicate offence for money laundering under US law and closing customs loopholes that allow high-value gold to cross borders with limited disclosure.

“Governments need to follow not just the gold, but the money,” Yansura said. “That’s how we disrupt the criminal networks behind this trade rather than simply addressing the immediate environmental consequences.”

Gangs hijack Ecuador’s gold mining supply chain

Staff Writer | July 30, 2026 |

Gold panning on the River Anzu, Ecuador. (Stock image by Goran.)

Ecuador has elevated illegal mining to a national security threat after concluding that criminal gangs have infiltrated the country’s gold supply chain, from extraction to export, turning the sector into a major source of financing for organized crime.

The 2026-2029 National Security Plan identifies illegal mining as a strategic security challenge rather than simply an environmental or regulatory issue. 

The government says criminal organizations use illicit gold production to launder drug trafficking proceeds, while financing mining operations with machinery, chemical supplies and armed protection.

Ecuador’s new strategy reflects growing concern that illegal mining has become one of organized crime’s most lucrative businesses in the country, fuelling violence, money laundering and environmental destruction while exposing weaknesses across the local mineral supply chain.

Entering supply chains

The plan identifies Los Lobos as Ecuador’s dominant criminal organization in illegal mining and says the gang has expanded across the gold value chain. A report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) similarly concludes that Los Lobos is involved from extraction through exports via the ports of Guayaquil and Puerto Bolívar.

Authorities say illegally mined gold is blended with legally produced metal before entering formal markets, allowing criminal groups to launder proceeds from drug trafficking. The plan also links illegal mining to fuel theft, saying stolen diesel powers mining equipment used at illicit sites.

Official figures illustrate the industry’s rapid growth. Complaints of illegal mining rose to 393 in 2025 from 249 in 2021, an increase of about 58%, according to the Office of the Attorney General. 

GI-TOC estimates the number of illegal mining sites expanded from fewer than 60 before 2018 to more than 600 by 2024.

Nearly 70% of Ecuador’s protected areas are located in the Napo province, where most illegal miners are active.

Trade data also point to booming exports. UN Comtrade shows Ecuador exported 19.2 tonnes of gold worth more than $900 million in 2022, while the country’s central bank recorded exports of more than 27 tonnes of doré gold in 2023.

Ongoing crackdown

Ecuador has already intensified its campaign against illegal mining over the past year, particularly after 11 soldiers were killed in an ambush in the Amazon last year during an operation targeting illegal mining groups.

The government blamed the attack on the Border Commandos, a dissident faction of Colombia’s former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas, which authorities say operates alongside local criminal organizations.

To combat the surge, the government plans to tighten controls across the mining logistics chain, formalize artisanal mining, dismantle illegal fuel networks and expand military operations against illicit mines. 

It also aims to establish a nationwide monitoring system by 2027 and introduce a mineral traceability system between 2028 and 2029 covering all mining resources transported to ports and processing plants. The broader goal is to disrupt 88% of organized crime structures by 2029.

Gold flows to Hong Kong hit decade-high before clearing launch

Bloomberg News | July 29, 2026 

Stock image.

Hong Kong’s imports of gold surged to the most since late-2014 in June, driven by preparations for the city’s recently launched clearing system as well as solid demand from mainland China.

Bullion inflows surged to more than 130 tons, according to the city’s customs authority. Net imports, which indicate how much of the precious metal is staying within Hong Kong, were at their highest since December 2023.

Hong Kong began trial operations earlier this month for a clearing mechanism aimed at boosting the city’s role in global trading and pricing of bullion. Ahead of that, banks had to build up inventories of large gold bars to allow physical delivery into the system.

But part of the increase was also likely driven by appetite for bullion over the border in mainland China. The city functions as a key transit point for gold to be processed or traded before being re-exported, and the mainland accounts for the bulk of outbound volumes.

China’s gold imports hit a two-year high last month, as cheaper prices and a stronger yuan kept investors interested, while banks were motivated to use up import quotas and stock up on bullion to meet retail commitments.

(By Yihui Xie)

Zijin’s $4B Allied Gold takeover collapses, but it still buys in

Cecilia Jamasmie | July 29, 2026 | 

The CDI complex. (Image courtesy of Allied Gold.)  

Zijin Gold’s planned $4 billion acquisition of Allied Gold (TSX, NYSE: AAUC) has collapsed after Chinese regulators failed to approve the transaction before the deadline, leaving the state-backed miner with a 9.2% stake instead.

Shares of Allied fell nearly 18% in early morning trading in Toronto after the companies said Wednesday they had mutually agreed to let the July 29 deadline expire because there was “no reasonable likelihood” the remaining closing conditions would be satisfied within a reasonable period.

The stock dropped to C$24.27, valuing the Canadian gold miner at just over C$3 billion ($2.1 billion). In New York, the shares were down 16% at $17.68 as of 10 a.m. local time.

While the deal secured approvals in Canada and other international jurisdictions, it remained stalled in China. Other outstanding issues, including security and streaming arrangements, capital investments and lending agreements, also remained unresolved.

The collapse ends what would have been one of this year’s largest gold mining acquisitions. Zijin, which is indirectly owned by the Chinese government, offered $44 a share in cash for the Toronto-based miner in January, valuing Allied at about $4 billion and marking an all-time high for its stock.

Instead, Zijin agreed to subscribe for about 12.8 million newly issued Allied shares at C$32.55 each in a private placement worth about $295 million, with the transaction expected to close on or about Aug. 10.

The failed takeover underscores the growing challenges facing large cross-border mining transactions as geopolitical tensions and regulatory scrutiny increasingly complicate deals involving Chinese buyers. The financing nevertheless provides Allied with fresh capital as it ramps up production across Africa.

Growth plans

Allied said it will use the proceeds to complete and ramp up the Kurmuk mine in Ethiopia, expand the Sadiola mine in Mali, increase production at its Côte d’Ivoire operations and fund exploration across its portfolio.

The company operates gold mines in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire that produce about 375,000 oz. of gold annually and is preparing to begin production at Kurmuk. Allied went public in 2023, with executive chairman Peter Marrone investing about $50 million of his own money.

Marrone founded Yamana Gold in 2003 and later oversaw its $4.8 billion sale to Agnico Eagle Mines (TSX: AEM)(NYSE: AEM) and Pan American Silver (TSX: PAAS)(NYSE: PAAS) in 2023.

Brazil court issued final ruling on Belo Sun gold mining project

Staff Writer | July 28, 2026 |

The Volta Grande gold project is situated in the Pará State. (Image courtesy of Belo Sun.)

Canadian miner Belo Sun Mining Corp. (TSX: BSX) has secured a final court ruling that permanently dismisses a class action challenging the Indigenous licensing process for its proposed $300 million Volta Grande gold project in Brazil.

Brazil’s Federal Regional Court of the 1st Region unanimously ruled the lawsuit must be dismissed because it duplicated an earlier case involving the same claims and requested remedies.

The Federal Public Defender’s Office (DPU), which sought to suspend the project’s installation licence pending additional consultations and studies with the Araras da Volta Grande and Jurunas da Paquiçamba Indigenous communities, did not appeal before the statutory deadline, making the decision final and binding.

Brazil names Belo Sun’s Volta Grande “strategic” project

“This final court ruling is a major milestone for Belo Sun and a clear validation of our legal position,” CEO Clovis Torres said. “Other repetitive lawsuits will certainly have the same fate. It reinforces our confidence in Brazil’s judicial framework as we remain focused on advancing the project responsibly, while maintaining open communication with local stakeholders, and delivering long-term value for our shareholders.”

The decision removes a significant legal obstacle for the Volta Grande project, which Belo Sun says has the potential to become Brazil’s largest open-pit gold mine. The ruling also strengthens the company’s position against similar legal challenges as it continues to pursue environmental licensing and project development.

Belo Sun said it will continue defending its legal position in Brazilian courts while advancing the project through the remaining permitting process. The company said it will provide further updates as developments warrant.

How France’s Fall Signals China’s Rise In The Sahel – Analysis

Captain Ibrahim Traoré inaugurated the Chinese-backed Sino-Burkina Ciments SA (CISINOB) industrial company at a 2025 ceremony in Burkina Faso. 

(Source: commerce.gov.bf)

July 31, 2026
Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Raghvendra Kumar

Key Takeaways:

Burkina Faso severed diplomatic ties with France in June 2026. Ouagadougou accused Paris of neo-colonial interference and supporting subversive networks, completing a process that began with the expulsion of French troops in 2023 and diplomats in 2024.

The break is part of a wider Sahel realignment. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have withdrawn from ECOWAS and the Rome Statute while consolidating the Alliance of Sahel States under Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s rotating presidency.

China has rapidly become the central external partner. Through arms deliveries, infrastructure financing, mineral access, and flexible terms, Beijing is filling the vacuum left by the West and advancing a broader strategy linking the Sahel hinterland to Atlantic coastal access.

(FPRI) — In a disturbing, though predictable, move, Burkina Faso severed diplomatic relations with France on June 26, 2026, accusing its former colonial ruler of pursuing “neo-colonial ambitions,” and maintaining “subversive networks,” and even supporting terrorist groups against the Burkinabè state. Paris describedthe decision as “hostile and unfounded.” Ouagadougou, however, called it long overdue, citing France’s alleged interference in Burkina Faso’s internal affairs along with the absence of trust, mutual respect, and respect for sovereignty that serve as the basis of normal diplomatic relations. The inevitability of this severing of the last institutional thread was predictable, as French troops were expelled from Burkina Faso in 2023, followed by French diplomats in 2024.

The diplomatic rupture is accompanied by a broader regional realignment. In June 2026, Burkina Faso, along with with Mali and Niger, formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), arguing that the regional bloc had increasingly come to serve the interests of France and other Western partners at the expense of their own national interests and sovereignty. Viewed alongside their decision to also withdraw from the Rome Statute, these moves signal a broader effort by these states to de-Westernize the normative architecture of the post-Cold War international order.


These decisions also reinforced these three states’ commitment to consolidating the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), whose rotating presidency is held by Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traoré in 2026. The AES was established through the Liptako-Gourma Charter, signed on September 16, 2023, creating a confederation that spans approximately 2.8 million square kilometers and is home to nearly 75 million people. Although initially conceived as a mutual defense and collective security pact, the alliance has since evolved into a broader political, security, and economic framework.

The diplomatic rupture should therefore be understood as a part of a broader geopolitical realignment rather than simply another de-Westernization surge in the coup-détente dominated politics of the Sahel region in response to Western calls for democratization. Two factors help explain this shift.
The Region’s History Makes What Is All Too Predictable

First, the ongoing push for de-Westernization in Sahelian states such as Burkina Faso is deeply rooted in the region’s colonial history and enjoys significant, materially grounded popular support. Captain Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s military ruler and interim president, has consciously and effectively utilized this sentiment by invoking the anti-imperialist legacy and iconography of Thomas Sankara, the country’s revered revolutionary and president, who was assassinated in 1987. Regarded as the “Father of the Burkinabè Revolution,” Sankara is often described as “Africa’s Che Guevara.”


Traoré has transformed Sankara’s legacy into a powerful instrument of political mobilization. His message has been further amplified across Africa and its diaspora through a dense digital ecosystem of sympathetic—and, at times, coordinated and inauthentic—media networks supported by non-Western partners.

Unlike earlier forms of rhetorical Third-Worldism—a movement advocating for solidarity and unity of developing, decolonized nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America against both Western capitalist influence and Soviet-style communism, prioritizing economic self-sufficiency and anti-imperialism during the Cold War period—or dependency-driven critiques of the West, the current sovereignty narrative in Burkina Faso seeks to translate de-Westernization into tangible economic and political outcomes.

The question of whether the de-Westernization narrative is successful or not does not matter as long as it is presented as delivering real nationalistic gains. For example, the nationalization of gold reserves, a billion-dollar agro-pastoral program, is yielding huge benefits. As a result, rice imports were suspended following record domestic cereal production, and a massive push of infrastructural development, including the construction of roads, dams, and food processing plants, are presented as evidence that self-reliance can be achieved without IMF-backed structural adjustment conditionalities in exchange for emergency financial assistance, such as fiscal austerity, privatization, and market deregulation.


However, much Western analysis continues to interpret the Sahel’s realignment through the lens of how authoritarian regimes in these states work towards junta survival and military rule. But in doing so, this analysis ignores the domestic demand for beneficiation, sovereignty, and development that also drives these shifts. Meanwhile, the West’s repeated use of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation risks strengthening the very anti-Western sentiment it seeks to counter.
China Seizes the Opportunity

The second factor has a wider geopolitical significance. As the Sahel in general, and Burkina Faso in particular, have become the laboratory of Africa’s de-Westernization movement, China has seized the opportunity to embed itself deep into the region’s political, economic and security structures, using the moment to expand its sphere of influence and strategic depth. Burkina Faso, a landlocked and war-torn state, is central to Beijing’s strategic ambition in the region. Sitting at the center of West Africa, Burkina Faso connects the Sahara to the Gulf of Guinea’s hinterland. As such, nearly every commercial network and trade route from the ports of Abidjan, Lomé, and Cotonou to the Sahelian interior runs through Burkina Faso or its AES partners, making the confederation a strategically important hub.

Moreover, Burkina Faso is also Africa’s fourth-largest producer of gold, recording a record 94 tons in 2025. Recent finds of lithium, rare-earth elements, and cobalt reserves have further positioned the country at the center of the global critical mineral landscape, which is of interest to the US, China, and other powers. At the same time, Burkina Faso has also emerged as the epicentre of jihadist violence in the Sahel. The Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, for example, is estimated to contest control over nearly 60 percent of the country’s territory through a sustained violent insurgency, making the country one of Africa’s most fragileand conflict-prone states. This deteriorating security landscape contributed to Burkina Faso being ranked as the world’s second-most terrorism-affected country in 2025. For Traoré, this is his single biggest challenge. As such, whoever helps him fight Ouagadougou’s battles gains strategic leverage over the entire Sahelian heartland—and over the logistics corridors that link it to the Atlantic seaboard. As such, China has gone all out in providing the financial, military, diplomatic, logistical, and technological support that has sustained Burkina Faso’s efforts to combat jihadist groups.

The Traoré government, however, has not simply exchanged one external patron for another. Rather, Burkina Faso is pursuing a strategy of polyalignment, simultaneously cultivating functionally differentiated partnerships with multiple non-Western powers simultaneously in order to maximize strategic autonomy. Each partner serves distinct strategic needs. Russia, for example, provides the political and security pillar through the foundational bilateral agreement signed between the two countries in Moscow in February 2026. The agreement envisages the deployment of Africa Corps personnel for regime protection, cooperation on Rosatom’s proposed civil nuclear program, and networked support to the information ecosystem that reinforces the Traoré government’s narrative of sovereignty and de-Westernization. In addition, Turkey has emerged as a crucial defense and critical infrastructure partner, supplying Traoré with armed drones while expanding its role in the country’s energy sector. One example is the Turkish-built 119 MW power plant, financed by the Africa Finance Corporation, which is expected to become Burkina Faso’s largest electricity facility when it becomes functional in 2027. Investments from the Gulf states, meanwhile, fill important financing gaps across various sectors.


Nonetheless, Russia’s economic constraints and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict have posed severe structural limitations on Moscow’s ability to maintain long-term support. According to SIPRI, Russian arms exports declined by roughly 64 percent between 2015–19 and 2020–24, highlighting Russia’s diminishing capacity to sustain long-term economic and security partnerships abroad. Although Russia can reinforce the politics of geopolitical realignment, it lacks the economic depth to finance Burkina Faso’s developmental and defense ambitions. Against this backdrop, China assumes far greater significance than any other country engaging with Burkina Faso. Beijing can serve as the one-stop solution, capable of combining capital for long-term financing at scale, infrastructure, industrial capacity, defense equipment, and information ecosystem. These comprehensive offerings have positioned China as the material center of gravity in Burkina Faso’s evolving network of external partnerships.

China has moved swiftly moved to fill the vacuum that the West never managed to fill. Since restoring diplomatic relations with China in 2018 after severing ties with Taipei, Burkina Faso has witnessed a deep and rapid strengthening of its strategic partnership with Beijing. The relationship has built momentum following a recent multi-phase defense agreement with the PRC-owned arms conglomerate NORINCO in 2024, aimed at boosting the Traoré government’s defense capacity. Since then, Ouagadougou has received successive deliveries of Chinese defense equipment, including VP11 and CS/VP14 mine-resistant armoured vehicles, VN22B fire-support platforms, PLL-05 self-propelled gun-mortars, SR5 multiple rocket launchers, and other advanced military platforms. This technology has provided Burkina Faso’s forces with long-range strike capabilities, significantly enhancing its firepower and mobility for the first time against JNIM. More importantly, these defense systems were delivered in months rather than years and are reportedly financed through flexible arrangements that are backed by future gold exports, without the political and structural economic conditionalities that usually accompany Western security assistance.

Arms Transfers Database for Burkina Faso

Source: SIPRI

It is therefore unsurprising that China now accounts for roughly 26 percent of West African arms importsand has displaced Russia as sub-Saharan Africa’s largest weapons supplier. However, the partnership extends well beyond weapons. Beijing has also become a major development partner, funding energy projects, critical infrastructure, and digital connectivity, in addition to the extraction and processing of critical minerals, a sector in which China holds a global monopoly. Technology transfer (which France never provided over six decades), satellite communications systems, the Smart Burkina urban policing and security program, Chinese state-owned enterprise Yunhong’s involvement in rare-earth exploration, and the appointment of Chinese businessman Li Yubao, who acquired Burkinabè citizenship, as a special adviser to the president, indicates the growing institutionalization of the relationship between Ouagadougou and Beijing. The relationship provides both capacity and capability rather than a purely transactional exchange. For instance, Beijing has provided more than US$30 million in grant aid to Burkina Faso and brought the country within the implementation framework of the 2024–27 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Action Plan. This framework has paved the way for deeper institutionalized cooperation in security, infrastructure, and development, reflecting Beijing’s strategic ambition to position Burkina Faso as a model of its integrated security-development approach in the Sahel.


To view China’s Sahel engagement as merely continental or country-centric is to overlook its most consequential dimension: Beijing’s geo-economic strategy. For Beijing, strategically located, landlocked, resource-rich states in the Sahel region are not ends in themselves but cartographic means in order to gain strategic access to the Atlantic coast. China’s template is now becoming predictable and clearly visible. In the Indian Ocean, China translated more than two decades of ports, pipelines, and undersea cables projects investment in Djibouti into a naval base and logistics nodes to facilitate the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) “far seas defense” doctrine. As such, the strategic and tactical depth that China has gained in the western Indian Ocean region is now being replicated, more quietly and with less international scrutiny, on West Africa’s Atlantic-facing seaboard. The substantive evidence is quite visible, as the Chinese-built Niger-Benin pipeline, a 2,000-kilometer pipeline built at a cost of roughly US$6 billion and one of the longest on the continent, does not just terminate in the Sahel; rather, it terminates at the Atlantic export terminal of Sèmè-Kraké.

Furthermore, China’s state-owned defense giant NORINCO’s newest African primary support and service office is located in Dakar, Senegal, an important Atlantic connectivity hub, and is strategically positioned to service and cater for the arms supply ecosystem of all three AES militaries through personnel training, maintenance, and logistical support in the heart of West Africa. Beyond defense and security cooperation, Chinese-financed strategic port infrastructure now stretches from the re-expanded Friendship Port in Nouakchott, Mauritania, through the Gulf of Guinea, which US strategic planners have identified as consistent with Beijing’s strategy to establish a permanent naval facility on the eastern flank of the Atlantic. In January 2026, the first- ever BRICS-plus naval exercise was conducted off South Africa’s Western Cape in Atlantic waters involving Chinese, Russian, and Iranian warships. These developments suggest that China’s deeper engagement in the Sahelian interior is part of a larger strategy to weave a strategic corridor from the hinterland to the Atlantic coast, connecting gradually—corridor by corridor and contract by contract—to an emerging Atlantic maritime network that could provide PLAN strategic and tactical depth in “far off seas.”


The strategic implications are difficult to ignore. Since the Second World War, the Atlantic has largely remained the strategic heartland of Western (primarily US) maritime power—a maritime space where NATO and the US have enjoyed overwhelming naval dominance. An expanding Chinese strategic presence along Africa’s Atlantic rim—supported mostly by strategic Chinese investments in commercial ports with potential dual-use functions, integrated defense logistics, digital and satellite infrastructure, and access to the resource-rich Sahel—would provide Beijing with strategic options comparable to those created through its investment in Djibouti and Gwadar in the Indian Ocean. Such a network will give PLAN the capacity to sustain a long-term presence along critical sea lines of communication, broaden the geographical scope of strategic competition beyond the Indo-Pacific, and incrementally overturn the balance of power. In this respect, Burkina Faso is a critical frontier when viewed through Alfred Thayer Mahan’s famous observation that, “sea power begins ashore.” Burkina Faso, a landlocked country, may never host a Chinese naval base, but it provides Beijing with inroads that gradually shape and anchor strategic geography for greater maritime influence in the Atlantic.

However, China’s Sahel strategy also faces significant constraints. In Niger, for instance, Beijing has faced severe headwinds when Niger expelled Chinese oil executives and unilaterally revised the contractual terms governing Chinese National Petroleum Company’s operations. Its investment in the Niger–Benin oil pipeline has also come under severe strain due to repeated attacks by the Front patriotique de libération, an anti-junta rebel group. In Mali, the government has recently summoned the Chinese ambassador over deep concerns relating to illicit artisanal and illegal mining, a sector which has come under attack from JNIM. Across Africa, particularly among military regimes, governments have increasingly applied their resource nationalism clause in equal measure to Beijing as to Paris. Moreover, Chinese-supplied military platforms have not fundamentally altered the security balance, as JNIM still continues to expand its operational reach despite successive arms acquisitions by Sahel military governments. As such, China’s expanding footprint in this part of Africa is often described by strategists as built on politically fragile and highly contested ground.


Nonetheless, the broader direction of China’s expansion is becoming increasingly clear. The West has relied heavily on sanctions, the suspensions of diplomatic ties, and political and economic conditionality, a strategy that has, in many respects, done more harm than anticipated by further accelerating the very geopolitical realignment it sought to prevent. Consequently, non-Western democracies and responsible middle and emerging powers have become increasingly relevant to this evolving geopolitical landscape. However, they will need to compete on the scale and speed of delivery, infrastructure, finance, technology transfer, and credible partnerships, rather than relying primarily on normative messaging. In this context, India and other Global South middle powers have the opportunity to provide Ouagadougou with additional strategic options to de-risk and diversify without prescribing whom it should choose. Through demand-driven development finance partnership, capacity building and capability enhancement, technology transfer, resource beneficiation, and digital public infrastructure offered as sovereign public goods, they can strengthen Burkina Faso’s genuine strategic autonomy while ensuring that every external partner, including China, operates within a competitive environment rather than assuming the role of another neo-colonial actor. Ultimately, the defining moment in Africa’s quest for de-Westernization in an emerging multipolar order will hinge largely on whether the process produces genuine strategic autonomy and multilateral alignment rather than merely reproducing another cycle of dependency.

About the author: Raghvendra Kumar is a Non-Resident Fellow in FPRI’s Asia Program and a Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of International Relations and Peace Studies, Nalanda University.

Source: This article was published by FPRI

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