From a Bulgarian factory to Sudanese militias, the FRANCE 24 Observers team reveals how European-made ammunition ended up on the Sudanese battlefield despite a European Union embargo on sending weapons to this war-torn country. This five-part investigation starts in the middle of the desert, with a series of videos filmed last November by Sudanese fighters.
Issued on: 17/04/2025
The FRANCE 24 Observers/
Elitsa GADEVA/
Quentin PESCHARD
After a long investigation, the France 24 Observers team was able to determine that the mortar shells that appear in footage filmed by Sudanese combatants with the Joint Forces on November 21, 2024 (at left) were manufactured in Bulgaria, a country in the European Union, by the company Dunarit (at right). © France Médias Monde graphic studio
The videos, posted to X and Facebook on November 21, 2024, show Sudanese militants in camouflage poring over piles of documents that include identity papers, photos and religious images. The militants are from the Joint Forces, a coalition of armed groups that are active in the western Sudanese region of Darfur. This group provides support to the Sudanese army in its fight against the rebel group the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The militants who are filming these videos have just captured a convoy of several vehicles in the middle of the desert. In the images, they seem confused.
At one point, one of the militants shown in the video examines a passport.
“What country is this?” he asks, in Zaghawa, a language spoken in Darfur. Then he picks up an image of a Catholic saint and says, “Look, they are Jews working for an international organisation,” clearly confusing the two religions.
“These people will do anything, even come to die here in Sudan,” he continues. “They’ve come to support the RSF.” The militant claims many times that the owners of the passports, who have allegedly been wounded or captured by his unit, are “mercenaries”. There are no prisoners or bodies shown in the footage.
On several occasions in the video, you can see two of the passports that the Sudanese militants are examining. This allows us to answer at least one of the militant’s questions: both passports belong to Colombian nationals.
'All that was for the Rapid Support Forces!'
As the video continues, one of the militants points to the ammunition.
“That’s for the Janjaweeds [Editor’s note: a name given to fighters in the Rapid Support Forces]. Mohammed bin Zayed sent them [Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the president of the United Arab Emirates].”
The man then pounds his fist on a vehicle that has apparently also been captured.
“The Emirates sent that, too,” he says.
A few hours after these videos first appeared online, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), one of the armed groups that is part of the Joint Forces, posted a statement on Facebook about the weapons that had been seized. Through these statements, we were able to learn a bit more about why two foreign nationals were traversing the Darfur desert with this ammunition.
“In the desert region on the border between Sudan, Libya and Chad, the Joint Forces thwarted a massive attempt at weapons smuggling to the terrorist militia the Rapid Support Forces (RSF),” reads a statement posted on the group’s Facebook page.
The SLM also reveals that the “mercenaries” were found to be carrying money from the UAE.
The SLM doesn’t say anything about the fates of the Colombian men suspected to be mercenaries— whether they have been captured, killed or wounded.
The FRANCE 24 Observers team was able to discover much more about where the weapons seized by the Joint Forces came from, thanks to the footage filmed and posted online. It turns out that the weapons are from the European Union. They were manufactured in Bulgaria and bought by an Emirati company. Before being intercepted by the Joint Forces in Sudan, the convoy transporting the weapons passed through eastern Libya, a zone that is controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, an ally of the UAE.
The UAE has been accused in the past by UN experts of providing the Rapid Support Forces with military and financial aid to preserve its own geopolitical and economic interests in the region. However, Emirati authorities have always denied these accusations.
The Rapid Support Forces Are Accused Of Multiple attacks Against Civilians. Some Of Them Have Already Been Documented By The FRANCE 24 Observers team.
European weapons made in Bulgaria
The labels stamped on the cylindrical containers indicate they hold mortar shells.
Four seconds into this video filmed by militants with the Joint Forces on November 21, you can see the labels stamped on the cylinders containing the mortar shells. It explains that they are “81mm Mortar [shells]”.
“These weapons are very common in every conflict, and certainly extremely common in all of the conflicts that have taken place in Sudan for decades,” says Mike Lewis, a specialist in armed conflicts and former member of the United Nations panel of experts on Sudan. “Mortar bombs [or shells] are explosives that are fired from a short cylinder, normally along a high parabola trajectory. So it goes up quite a long way and then descends.”
The footage filmed on November 21 shows a man opening one of the crates containing the mortar shells and zooming in on a label that reads: “BG-RSE-0082-HT".
The videos, posted to X and Facebook on November 21, 2024, show Sudanese militants in camouflage poring over piles of documents that include identity papers, photos and religious images. The militants are from the Joint Forces, a coalition of armed groups that are active in the western Sudanese region of Darfur. This group provides support to the Sudanese army in its fight against the rebel group the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The militants who are filming these videos have just captured a convoy of several vehicles in the middle of the desert. In the images, they seem confused.
At one point, one of the militants shown in the video examines a passport.
“What country is this?” he asks, in Zaghawa, a language spoken in Darfur. Then he picks up an image of a Catholic saint and says, “Look, they are Jews working for an international organisation,” clearly confusing the two religions.
“These people will do anything, even come to die here in Sudan,” he continues. “They’ve come to support the RSF.” The militant claims many times that the owners of the passports, who have allegedly been wounded or captured by his unit, are “mercenaries”. There are no prisoners or bodies shown in the footage.
On several occasions in the video, you can see two of the passports that the Sudanese militants are examining. This allows us to answer at least one of the militant’s questions: both passports belong to Colombian nationals.
Two passports, belonging to two Colombian nationals, Christian L. and Miguel P., are visible in the videos filmed by the Sudanese fighters on November 21, 2024. The Colombians are thought to have been part of the arms convoy. © The FRANCE 24 Observers
Two large wooden crates marked with an orange diamond-shaped label depicting an explosion, the international symbol for explosives, also appear in the video. They are filled with cylinders and labelled, in English, “81 mm Mortars HE”.
Two large wooden crates marked with an orange diamond-shaped label depicting an explosion, the international symbol for explosives, also appear in the video. They are filled with cylinders and labelled, in English, “81 mm Mortars HE”.
In their videos, the militants from the Joint Forces zoom in on the ammunition they've seized. Stored in wooden crates with an orange hazard symbol indicating explosives, the ammunition was found in numerous cylinders stamped, “81 mm Mortars HE.” © The FRANCE 24 Observers
'All that was for the Rapid Support Forces!'
As the video continues, one of the militants points to the ammunition.
“That’s for the Janjaweeds [Editor’s note: a name given to fighters in the Rapid Support Forces]. Mohammed bin Zayed sent them [Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the president of the United Arab Emirates].”
The man then pounds his fist on a vehicle that has apparently also been captured.
“The Emirates sent that, too,” he says.
A few hours after these videos first appeared online, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), one of the armed groups that is part of the Joint Forces, posted a statement on Facebook about the weapons that had been seized. Through these statements, we were able to learn a bit more about why two foreign nationals were traversing the Darfur desert with this ammunition.
“In the desert region on the border between Sudan, Libya and Chad, the Joint Forces thwarted a massive attempt at weapons smuggling to the terrorist militia the Rapid Support Forces (RSF),” reads a statement posted on the group’s Facebook page.
The SLM also reveals that the “mercenaries” were found to be carrying money from the UAE.
The SLM doesn’t say anything about the fates of the Colombian men suspected to be mercenaries— whether they have been captured, killed or wounded.
The FRANCE 24 Observers team was able to discover much more about where the weapons seized by the Joint Forces came from, thanks to the footage filmed and posted online. It turns out that the weapons are from the European Union. They were manufactured in Bulgaria and bought by an Emirati company. Before being intercepted by the Joint Forces in Sudan, the convoy transporting the weapons passed through eastern Libya, a zone that is controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, an ally of the UAE.
The UAE has been accused in the past by UN experts of providing the Rapid Support Forces with military and financial aid to preserve its own geopolitical and economic interests in the region. However, Emirati authorities have always denied these accusations.
The Rapid Support Forces Are Accused Of Multiple attacks Against Civilians. Some Of Them Have Already Been Documented By The FRANCE 24 Observers team.
European weapons made in Bulgaria
The labels stamped on the cylindrical containers indicate they hold mortar shells.
Four seconds into this video filmed by militants with the Joint Forces on November 21, you can see the labels stamped on the cylinders containing the mortar shells. It explains that they are “81mm Mortar [shells]”.
“These weapons are very common in every conflict, and certainly extremely common in all of the conflicts that have taken place in Sudan for decades,” says Mike Lewis, a specialist in armed conflicts and former member of the United Nations panel of experts on Sudan. “Mortar bombs [or shells] are explosives that are fired from a short cylinder, normally along a high parabola trajectory. So it goes up quite a long way and then descends.”
The footage filmed on November 21 shows a man opening one of the crates containing the mortar shells and zooming in on a label that reads: “BG-RSE-0082-HT".
After filming the cartons stamped with the label “81 mm Mortar HE”, the militant zooms in on other details on the wooden crate containing the ammunition — first a label crossed out in red (middle) and then a code that seems to have been burnt into the crate: “BG-RSE-0082-HT" (right). © The FRANCE 24 Observers
The letters, which are seared into the wooden crate, are an ISPM-15 code that is mandatory for goods transported in wood packaging. The first two letters of the code indicate the country of origin: “BG” stands for Bulgaria.
There is another clue pointing to Bulgaria. While the label on the box is written in French and English, it bears two names written in Cyrillic that presumably belong to workers in the factory where the weapons were manufactured. Bulgarian is written in Cyrillic and both names are common for women in Bulgaria.
The letters, which are seared into the wooden crate, are an ISPM-15 code that is mandatory for goods transported in wood packaging. The first two letters of the code indicate the country of origin: “BG” stands for Bulgaria.
There is another clue pointing to Bulgaria. While the label on the box is written in French and English, it bears two names written in Cyrillic that presumably belong to workers in the factory where the weapons were manufactured. Bulgarian is written in Cyrillic and both names are common for women in Bulgaria.
On the 5th and 6th lines of the label that appears in one of the videos from November 21, you can see two names written in Cyrillic. One name identifies the person who “packed” the munitions, and the other the “quality inspector”. Both surnames are common for women in Bulgaria. © The FRANCE 24 Observers
These labels provide clues not only on the composition of the ammunition, but also on their country of origin and their manufacturer.
These labels provide clues not only on the composition of the ammunition, but also on their country of origin and their manufacturer.
The labels stamped on the cardboard tubes refer to a M-6 detonator, a model that is used in Russia, China and Bulgaria. The letters “HE” that follow the “81 mm Mortar” stand for “highly explosive.” The label also explains that these mortar shells have four propellant charges, which launch the mortar when it is detonated. Each of these pieces is marked with a corresponding six-number code. © The FRANCE 24 Observers
M-6 indicates a type of detonator that launches ammunition, while “81 mm Mortar HE” describes the ammunition, which measures 81 mm and is highly explosive. The “1+3 increment charges” refers to the number of propellant charges frequently found on this type of ammunition.
Each of these components has a 6-digit number that enables them to be traced. And all the numbers in the videos start with “46”. The FRANCE 24 Observers team spoke to a weapons expert who explained that in Bulgaria’s identification system, a number beginning with “46” indicates that the weapons were manufactured by the Bulgarian company Dunarit. He said that the number “19”, the final two digits of the number, indicate that the weapons were manufactured in 2019. This can be cross-referenced with the label on the crate.
Dunarit’s website indicates that the Bulgarian company does indeed manufacture highly explosive 81 mm mortar shells.
M-6 indicates a type of detonator that launches ammunition, while “81 mm Mortar HE” describes the ammunition, which measures 81 mm and is highly explosive. The “1+3 increment charges” refers to the number of propellant charges frequently found on this type of ammunition.
Each of these components has a 6-digit number that enables them to be traced. And all the numbers in the videos start with “46”. The FRANCE 24 Observers team spoke to a weapons expert who explained that in Bulgaria’s identification system, a number beginning with “46” indicates that the weapons were manufactured by the Bulgarian company Dunarit. He said that the number “19”, the final two digits of the number, indicate that the weapons were manufactured in 2019. This can be cross-referenced with the label on the crate.
Dunarit’s website indicates that the Bulgarian company does indeed manufacture highly explosive 81 mm mortar shells.
Dunarit’s website (here translated into English by Google) shows that the company does manufacture weapons with the same characteristics as those shown in the footage filmed in Sudan on November 21, 2024: 81mm highly explosive mortar shells with M-6 detonators. © The FRANCE 24 Observers
Moreover, when we looked at the company’s social media accounts, we saw photos of mortar shells packed into a wooden crate, just like the ones that appear in the video filmed in Sudan. Both crates shown in Dunarit’s photos and the ones that appear in the footage have the code ISPM-15 stamped on them. The number is written in the same format as those on the ammunition found in Sudan.
Moreover, when we looked at the company’s social media accounts, we saw photos of mortar shells packed into a wooden crate, just like the ones that appear in the video filmed in Sudan. Both crates shown in Dunarit’s photos and the ones that appear in the footage have the code ISPM-15 stamped on them. The number is written in the same format as those on the ammunition found in Sudan.
On a photo posted by Dunarit on its Facebook account in June 2024, the ISPM-15 code stamped on a wooden box containing mortar shells (marked in red at left) is the same as the one filmed by Sudanese fighters on November 21, 2024 (upper right). The number that appears on the box in the Facebook post (marked in blue at left) is written in a similar format to the ones seen on the video filmed in Sudan (bottom right): three two-digit numbers separated by dashes. In both cases, the numbers begin with the digits “46”. © The FRANCE 24 Observers
Dunarit’s CEO doesn’t deny that mortar shells were manufactured by his company
Our team contacted the CEO of Dunarit, Petar Petrov, who doesn’t deny that these mortar shells were manufactured by his company. We spoke to him on the phone after we had earlier shown him screen grabs from the videos:
The regulations on this kind of thing are very strict in Bulgaria. According to my information, everything in this contract [Editor’s note: the contract that allowed for the weapons to be exported] was done according to the rules.
He said that he found it difficult to believe that mortar shells manufactured by his company were found in Sudan and contested the veracity of the videos filmed on November 21.
Bombs that violate the European Union’s embargo on Sudan
But how did these bombs manufactured in Bulgaria, a country belonging to the European Union, end up in a supply convoy going to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces?
Since 1994, the European Union, of which Bulgaria is a member state, has had a total embargo on exporting weapons to Sudan.
“The sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, … to Sudan by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States... shall be prohibited whether originating or not in their territories,” the latest embargo states.
Nicolas Marsh is a specialist in arms exportation at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo:
There is an European Union arms embargo on Sudan that definitely covers this kind of equipment. There is a very clear EU policy. There are some exceptions, but I can’t see how a transfer that was going on to Sudan could possibly be covered by those exceptions. It is definitely a violation of the European Union policy.
Bulgaria has strongly rejected claims these weapons were sent directly from Bulgaria to Sudan.
The Interministerial Commission on Export Control, the Bulgarian authority that approves arms exportations, said by email that the weapons were sold with “suitable authorisation” to a “government of a country on which no sanctions are imposed.” They "denied categorically that the relevant Bulgarian authorities delivered export permits to Sudan” for these munitions.
As we continued our investigation, we did indeed establish that Dunarit’s mortar shells were not exported directly to Sudan. They were, however, sold to the International Golden Group — an Emirati company known for transfering weapons to zones under international embargo.
European weapons in Sudan (2/5): A €50 million Emirati contract
From a Bulgarian factory to Sudanese militias, the FRANCE 24 Observers team reveals how European-made ammunition ended up on the Sudanese battlefield, despite a European Union embargo on sending weapons to this war-torn country. This second article in our five-part investigation focuses on International Golden Group, an Emirati company known for its involvement in diverting arms to countries under international embargo.
Issued on: 18/04/2025 -
Quentin PESCHARD/
Elitsa GADEVA/
The FRANCE 24 Observers
Dunarit’s CEO doesn’t deny that mortar shells were manufactured by his company
Our team contacted the CEO of Dunarit, Petar Petrov, who doesn’t deny that these mortar shells were manufactured by his company. We spoke to him on the phone after we had earlier shown him screen grabs from the videos:
The regulations on this kind of thing are very strict in Bulgaria. According to my information, everything in this contract [Editor’s note: the contract that allowed for the weapons to be exported] was done according to the rules.
He said that he found it difficult to believe that mortar shells manufactured by his company were found in Sudan and contested the veracity of the videos filmed on November 21.
Bombs that violate the European Union’s embargo on Sudan
But how did these bombs manufactured in Bulgaria, a country belonging to the European Union, end up in a supply convoy going to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces?
Since 1994, the European Union, of which Bulgaria is a member state, has had a total embargo on exporting weapons to Sudan.
“The sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, … to Sudan by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States... shall be prohibited whether originating or not in their territories,” the latest embargo states.
Nicolas Marsh is a specialist in arms exportation at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo:
There is an European Union arms embargo on Sudan that definitely covers this kind of equipment. There is a very clear EU policy. There are some exceptions, but I can’t see how a transfer that was going on to Sudan could possibly be covered by those exceptions. It is definitely a violation of the European Union policy.
Bulgaria has strongly rejected claims these weapons were sent directly from Bulgaria to Sudan.
The Interministerial Commission on Export Control, the Bulgarian authority that approves arms exportations, said by email that the weapons were sold with “suitable authorisation” to a “government of a country on which no sanctions are imposed.” They "denied categorically that the relevant Bulgarian authorities delivered export permits to Sudan” for these munitions.
As we continued our investigation, we did indeed establish that Dunarit’s mortar shells were not exported directly to Sudan. They were, however, sold to the International Golden Group — an Emirati company known for transfering weapons to zones under international embargo.
European weapons in Sudan (2/5): A €50 million Emirati contract
From a Bulgarian factory to Sudanese militias, the FRANCE 24 Observers team reveals how European-made ammunition ended up on the Sudanese battlefield, despite a European Union embargo on sending weapons to this war-torn country. This second article in our five-part investigation focuses on International Golden Group, an Emirati company known for its involvement in diverting arms to countries under international embargo.
Issued on: 18/04/2025 -
Quentin PESCHARD/
Elitsa GADEVA/
The FRANCE 24 Observers
Through exclusive documents, the FRANCE 24 Observers team was able to trace the history of the Bulgarian mortar shells found in Sudan. Those were initially bought by International Golden Group, an Emirati company specialised in weapons known for its involvement in diverting arms. The image shows the head of the company, Fadel al-Kaabi, photographed during the inauguration of a partnership with the French company Safran. © France Médias Monde graphic studio
Recap of the first article in our series: On November 21, 2024, Sudanese fighters filmed what they said was a shipment of mortar shells bound for the Rapid Support Forces, the militia that is fighting against the Sudanese Army in the ongoing civil war. These weapons, manufactured in Bulgaria, were shipped to Sudan despite the European Union embargo on sending weapons to this war-torn country. We’ve been investigating how this happened.
Read moreEuropean weapons in Sudan (1/5): Bulgarian mortar shells in Darfur’s desert
How did European bombs get to a Sudanese battlefield, despite an EU embargo on shipping weapons there? After identifying the Bulgarian company that manufactured the mortar shells, Dunarit, the FRANCE 24 Observers team tried to trace the history of these weapons. We questioned the Interministerial Commission on Export Control, the Bulgarian authority that oversees arms exportations.
Initially, the commission did not disclose where the mortar bombs shown in the video filmed on November 21, 2024 in Sudan had been exported. All they said was that they “had not issued an export permit to Sudan”.
“The export permit was issued to the government of a country that is not subject to UN Security Council sanctions,” they added. “The relevant Bulgarian authorities were informed of the delivery of the goods and the original delivery certificate for the final destination of these products was provided.”
But the FRANCE 24 Observers team was able to obtain a copy of this delivery certificate from a source who asked to remain anonymous. The document, issued on August 16, 2020 by the “United Arab Emirates G.H.Q. [General Headquarters] Armed Forces”, provides a lot of information about the transaction. We learned that the “final destination" or end user of the Bulgarian mortar bombs was supposed to be the armed forces of the UAE.
Recap of the first article in our series: On November 21, 2024, Sudanese fighters filmed what they said was a shipment of mortar shells bound for the Rapid Support Forces, the militia that is fighting against the Sudanese Army in the ongoing civil war. These weapons, manufactured in Bulgaria, were shipped to Sudan despite the European Union embargo on sending weapons to this war-torn country. We’ve been investigating how this happened.
Read moreEuropean weapons in Sudan (1/5): Bulgarian mortar shells in Darfur’s desert
How did European bombs get to a Sudanese battlefield, despite an EU embargo on shipping weapons there? After identifying the Bulgarian company that manufactured the mortar shells, Dunarit, the FRANCE 24 Observers team tried to trace the history of these weapons. We questioned the Interministerial Commission on Export Control, the Bulgarian authority that oversees arms exportations.
Initially, the commission did not disclose where the mortar bombs shown in the video filmed on November 21, 2024 in Sudan had been exported. All they said was that they “had not issued an export permit to Sudan”.
“The export permit was issued to the government of a country that is not subject to UN Security Council sanctions,” they added. “The relevant Bulgarian authorities were informed of the delivery of the goods and the original delivery certificate for the final destination of these products was provided.”
But the FRANCE 24 Observers team was able to obtain a copy of this delivery certificate from a source who asked to remain anonymous. The document, issued on August 16, 2020 by the “United Arab Emirates G.H.Q. [General Headquarters] Armed Forces”, provides a lot of information about the transaction. We learned that the “final destination" or end user of the Bulgarian mortar bombs was supposed to be the armed forces of the UAE.
The FRANCE 24 Observers team obtained a document linked to the sale of the Bulgarian mortar bombs found in Sudan. It is a delivery verification certificate, a document from the person supposed to be the end user of the weapons that attests that they were delivered. Issued by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates (first frame), this document attests that the Army received a shipment of the same type of mortar shells shown in the video filmed in Sudan, “81 mm Mortar Bomb HE” (final frame) as well as other types of mortar bombs. The Emirati Army is listed as the “end user” of the bombs. Two companies involved in the transaction are also listed: an Emirati company called “International Golden Group PJSC” (second frame) and a Bulgarian company “ARM-BG LTD” (third frame). © The FRANCE 24 Observers
This document shows just how large the shipment of mortar bombs was: 15,000 bombs measuring 81 mm (like those seen in the videos from November 21, 2024 filmed in Sudan) but also 2,780 bombs measuring 60 mm, 30,000 measuring 82 mm and 11,464 bombs measuring 120 mm, a much more powerful calibre.
The arms were delivered to the Emirati Army in two shipments, in January and February 2020. Moreover, the document lists two companies, as well as the General Headquarters of the Army: a Bulgarian “supplier”, ARM-BG Ltd., and an Emirati “importer”, International Golden Group PJSC. The manufacturer, Dunarit, isn’t mentioned.
Our team was able to corroborate this information with a second document, which we obtained from a separate source with access to information supplied by the Emirati Army on the arms sale. This subsequent document, called an end-user certificate, is a guarantee to the manufacturer and regulators in the country where the armaments came from that the final user of the weapons has been verified.
This certificate also allows the end user to make a number of binding commitments, including whether or not they are permitted to re-export weapons.
In this case, the certificate was issued by the Emirati Army, who is also listed as the end user. It features the same contract number, supplier and importer as the first one.
“It is a reasonable assumption that these two documents are part of the same transaction,” says Nicholas Marsh, a researcher specialised in arms exports at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo.
'The end user did not let us know that there would be any kind of re-exportation. I don’t know what happened afterwards.'
On the end-user certificate, dated October 2019, the Emirati Army agrees that it will use the weapons for its own needs and that they “will never be transferred, re-exported, lent, rented out or handed to third parties or countries without written consent of the authorised bodies of Bulgaria…”
Our team asked the Bulgarian Interministerial Commission on Export Control if they had agreed that the weapons be re-exported to Sudan or elsewhere. They reiterated that they “had not issued a permit to export the weapons to Sudan.”
The CEO of Dunarit, Petar Petrov, went into further detail during a phone call with our team:
On the documents, you see the destination country, but also the company [Editor’s note: International Golden Group], it’s a public company. We don’t have restrictions on exports to the United Arab Emirates and that is what our commission looked into. By law, if the end user decides to re-export the weapons, they need to let all parties involved in the transaction know — the manufacturer, the commission, everyone. In this case, they didn’t do that. I don’t know what happened afterwards.
The end user certificate also refers to a much larger quantity of bombs than the first document: 105,000 mortar bombs versus a little less than 60,000 listed in the first document.
Expert Nicholas Marsh says that there is nothing unusual about this. “That's to make it easier for them if they have other deliveries. That way, they don't have to go back and ask for a new licence,” he said. “We can't be sure that the difference between the number on the delivery verification certificate and the number on the end-user certificate [Editor’s note: a little over 45,000 mortar bombs] was effectively delivered.”
A contract worth around 50 million euros
Marsh estimated that the total price for these 105,000 mortar bombs would be around 50 million euros.
This kind of shipment would be consistent with a large non-state armed group. This is a serious amount of ammunition for this type of group. However, for a national government involved in a war, it would be pretty small.
Our team was able to run Marsh’s estimates by the Omega Research Foundation, a network of researchers specialising in identifying and exposing human rights abuses committed across the world by people using police, security, and military equipment. They agreed that this number was verifiable.
An arms sale of 50 million euros would be a big deal for Bulgaria. According to data collected by the European network against arms trade, Bulgarian exports to the United Arab Emirates was valued at between 10 and 30 million euros annually from 2015 to 2020.
In 2019, the year of the transaction, this figure leapt to 83 million euros. In this year, the sale of 105,000 mortar bombs likely represented more than half of the value of Bulgarian exports to the UAE.
ARM-BG, the Bulgarian intermediary
The Bulgarian Interministerial Commission on Export Control maintained in numerous exchanges with our team that Bulgaria respects all agreements on export control and has a responsible national policy.
However, the profiles of the parties involved in this sale raise serious questions. There is very little information available about ARM-BG, the Bulgarian exporter, though this company does indeed have an official licence to export and import arms.
According to information available on the specialist website Orbis, the company only has four employees and seems to have made most of its profits during the two years when the Dunarit arms sale was taking place. Its revenue rose to more than 78 million US dollars in 2019, then 106 million in 2020, before dropping sharply to 6 million dollars in 2021, the year when ARM-BG went into severe deficit. It seems to have lost nearly 3.5 million dollars.
This document shows just how large the shipment of mortar bombs was: 15,000 bombs measuring 81 mm (like those seen in the videos from November 21, 2024 filmed in Sudan) but also 2,780 bombs measuring 60 mm, 30,000 measuring 82 mm and 11,464 bombs measuring 120 mm, a much more powerful calibre.
The arms were delivered to the Emirati Army in two shipments, in January and February 2020. Moreover, the document lists two companies, as well as the General Headquarters of the Army: a Bulgarian “supplier”, ARM-BG Ltd., and an Emirati “importer”, International Golden Group PJSC. The manufacturer, Dunarit, isn’t mentioned.
Our team was able to corroborate this information with a second document, which we obtained from a separate source with access to information supplied by the Emirati Army on the arms sale. This subsequent document, called an end-user certificate, is a guarantee to the manufacturer and regulators in the country where the armaments came from that the final user of the weapons has been verified.
This certificate also allows the end user to make a number of binding commitments, including whether or not they are permitted to re-export weapons.
In this case, the certificate was issued by the Emirati Army, who is also listed as the end user. It features the same contract number, supplier and importer as the first one.
“It is a reasonable assumption that these two documents are part of the same transaction,” says Nicholas Marsh, a researcher specialised in arms exports at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo.
'The end user did not let us know that there would be any kind of re-exportation. I don’t know what happened afterwards.'
On the end-user certificate, dated October 2019, the Emirati Army agrees that it will use the weapons for its own needs and that they “will never be transferred, re-exported, lent, rented out or handed to third parties or countries without written consent of the authorised bodies of Bulgaria…”
Our team asked the Bulgarian Interministerial Commission on Export Control if they had agreed that the weapons be re-exported to Sudan or elsewhere. They reiterated that they “had not issued a permit to export the weapons to Sudan.”
The CEO of Dunarit, Petar Petrov, went into further detail during a phone call with our team:
On the documents, you see the destination country, but also the company [Editor’s note: International Golden Group], it’s a public company. We don’t have restrictions on exports to the United Arab Emirates and that is what our commission looked into. By law, if the end user decides to re-export the weapons, they need to let all parties involved in the transaction know — the manufacturer, the commission, everyone. In this case, they didn’t do that. I don’t know what happened afterwards.
The end user certificate also refers to a much larger quantity of bombs than the first document: 105,000 mortar bombs versus a little less than 60,000 listed in the first document.
Expert Nicholas Marsh says that there is nothing unusual about this. “That's to make it easier for them if they have other deliveries. That way, they don't have to go back and ask for a new licence,” he said. “We can't be sure that the difference between the number on the delivery verification certificate and the number on the end-user certificate [Editor’s note: a little over 45,000 mortar bombs] was effectively delivered.”
A contract worth around 50 million euros
Marsh estimated that the total price for these 105,000 mortar bombs would be around 50 million euros.
This kind of shipment would be consistent with a large non-state armed group. This is a serious amount of ammunition for this type of group. However, for a national government involved in a war, it would be pretty small.
Our team was able to run Marsh’s estimates by the Omega Research Foundation, a network of researchers specialising in identifying and exposing human rights abuses committed across the world by people using police, security, and military equipment. They agreed that this number was verifiable.
An arms sale of 50 million euros would be a big deal for Bulgaria. According to data collected by the European network against arms trade, Bulgarian exports to the United Arab Emirates was valued at between 10 and 30 million euros annually from 2015 to 2020.
In 2019, the year of the transaction, this figure leapt to 83 million euros. In this year, the sale of 105,000 mortar bombs likely represented more than half of the value of Bulgarian exports to the UAE.
ARM-BG, the Bulgarian intermediary
The Bulgarian Interministerial Commission on Export Control maintained in numerous exchanges with our team that Bulgaria respects all agreements on export control and has a responsible national policy.
However, the profiles of the parties involved in this sale raise serious questions. There is very little information available about ARM-BG, the Bulgarian exporter, though this company does indeed have an official licence to export and import arms.
According to information available on the specialist website Orbis, the company only has four employees and seems to have made most of its profits during the two years when the Dunarit arms sale was taking place. Its revenue rose to more than 78 million US dollars in 2019, then 106 million in 2020, before dropping sharply to 6 million dollars in 2021, the year when ARM-BG went into severe deficit. It seems to have lost nearly 3.5 million dollars.
This information about the company ARM-BG’s finances was taken from the specialised platform Orbis. You can see that the company’s revenue rises sharply from more than a million US dollars in 2018 to more than 78 million dollars in 2019. That’s the year when the Emirati Army provided Bulgarian authorities with documents concerning the export of the mortar bombs manufactured by Dunarit. ARM-BG’s revenues continued to go up in 2020 - the year when the two mortar bomb shipments recorded in the documents viewed by the FRANCE 24 Observers team took place, reaching 100 million dollars. The numbers dropped brutally after that, leaving the company in a nearly four million dollar deficit. © The FRANCE 24 Observers
We spoke to Arsen Nazaria, a manager at ARM-BG, who insisted that the transaction his company undertook was legal:
The application for the export permit issuance for the UAE End user was submitted by ARM-BG Ltd. to the Interministerial Commission for Export Control [...] and contained all the data and documentation mandated by Bulgarian and European legislation and UN regulations.
Speaking with our team on the phone, he added: “We are a brokerage company. We don’t export or import ourselves, nor do we deal with the goods.” However, in the documents provided by the Emiratis to the Bulgarian authorities, ARM-BG is listed as the “exporter” or “supplier”.
We contacted ARM-BG a second time, but they declined to comment further. The Interministerial Commission for Export Control said that they had “no proof of Arm BG Ltd.’s involvement in shipments to illegitimate final users or in illegal plans to re-export.”
International Golden Group, the Emirati buyer linked to diverting weapons
The other company listed on the documents is International Golden Group. It is listed as the “importer” of these weapons into the United Arab Emirates. Helen Close, a researcher specialising in armaments at Omega Research Foundation, was able to gather information about the company through its activities in the weapons market in the UAE.
International Golden Group was created in 2002 and we think that it was a private or semi-private company, but it definitely had links to the [Emirati] government. In 2017, it stated that it was a leading supplier to the UAE Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior.
There are no sanctions or embargoes on the sale of European weapons to the United Arab Emirates. But International Golden Group isn’t exactly a run-of-the-mill company: aside from supplying the Emirati Army, it is known for illegally diverting weapons to war zones, said several specialists who spoke to the FRANCE 24 Observers team.
Tony Fortin at the Lyon-based Observatory for Armament, an organisation that specialises in monitoring arms sales and companies in the sector, says:
International Golden Group has a very bad reputation, it is well known, including among manufacturers in the sector. It is a company that has a reputation for functioning as sort of a state within the Emirate state, and is used to manage arms movements without regard for transparency.
Indications of illicit activity appeared in reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, a country which has been subject to a total arms embargo by the United Nations Security Council since 2011.
Every year, the panel completes a general report on the situation in Libya and tries to identify the countries, companies, and individuals who violate this embargo.
In its report from 2013, International Golden Group was identified as a key party in the transfer of hundreds of thousands of Albanian-made weapons' cartridges to Benghazi, in eastern Libya.
“International Golden Group represented the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates in the deal,” the report states.
We spoke to Arsen Nazaria, a manager at ARM-BG, who insisted that the transaction his company undertook was legal:
The application for the export permit issuance for the UAE End user was submitted by ARM-BG Ltd. to the Interministerial Commission for Export Control [...] and contained all the data and documentation mandated by Bulgarian and European legislation and UN regulations.
Speaking with our team on the phone, he added: “We are a brokerage company. We don’t export or import ourselves, nor do we deal with the goods.” However, in the documents provided by the Emiratis to the Bulgarian authorities, ARM-BG is listed as the “exporter” or “supplier”.
We contacted ARM-BG a second time, but they declined to comment further. The Interministerial Commission for Export Control said that they had “no proof of Arm BG Ltd.’s involvement in shipments to illegitimate final users or in illegal plans to re-export.”
International Golden Group, the Emirati buyer linked to diverting weapons
The other company listed on the documents is International Golden Group. It is listed as the “importer” of these weapons into the United Arab Emirates. Helen Close, a researcher specialising in armaments at Omega Research Foundation, was able to gather information about the company through its activities in the weapons market in the UAE.
International Golden Group was created in 2002 and we think that it was a private or semi-private company, but it definitely had links to the [Emirati] government. In 2017, it stated that it was a leading supplier to the UAE Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior.
There are no sanctions or embargoes on the sale of European weapons to the United Arab Emirates. But International Golden Group isn’t exactly a run-of-the-mill company: aside from supplying the Emirati Army, it is known for illegally diverting weapons to war zones, said several specialists who spoke to the FRANCE 24 Observers team.
Tony Fortin at the Lyon-based Observatory for Armament, an organisation that specialises in monitoring arms sales and companies in the sector, says:
International Golden Group has a very bad reputation, it is well known, including among manufacturers in the sector. It is a company that has a reputation for functioning as sort of a state within the Emirate state, and is used to manage arms movements without regard for transparency.
Indications of illicit activity appeared in reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, a country which has been subject to a total arms embargo by the United Nations Security Council since 2011.
Every year, the panel completes a general report on the situation in Libya and tries to identify the countries, companies, and individuals who violate this embargo.
In its report from 2013, International Golden Group was identified as a key party in the transfer of hundreds of thousands of Albanian-made weapons' cartridges to Benghazi, in eastern Libya.
“International Golden Group represented the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates in the deal,” the report states.
International Golden Group was mentioned all the way back in a 2013 report by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya. The report stated that the company (whose name is visible in the orange box) represented the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates in the purchase of Albanian cartridges, which were actually then illegally re-exported to Benghazi, in eastern Libya. UN Panel of Experts on Libya
International Golden Group is identified in several other reports by the panel. Reports from 2016, 2022 and 2023 all mention that the group has acted in violation of the UN embargo on exporting weapons to Libya.
The report from 2022 mentions Serbian-made 120 mm mortar bombs. One of these bombs was used to booby-trap a civilian home in Tripoli in November 2020 when General Khalifa Haftar, the military leader of eastern Libya, led a massive incursion on the Tripoli region, which was then under the control of the UN-recognised Libyan government. Haftar had support in this offensive from the UAE as well as the Russian paramilitary Wagner group.
International Golden Group is identified in several other reports by the panel. Reports from 2016, 2022 and 2023 all mention that the group has acted in violation of the UN embargo on exporting weapons to Libya.
The report from 2022 mentions Serbian-made 120 mm mortar bombs. One of these bombs was used to booby-trap a civilian home in Tripoli in November 2020 when General Khalifa Haftar, the military leader of eastern Libya, led a massive incursion on the Tripoli region, which was then under the control of the UN-recognised Libyan government. Haftar had support in this offensive from the UAE as well as the Russian paramilitary Wagner group.
Reports by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya mention the name International Golden Group and its links to illegal arms exports to parts of Libya under the control of General Khalifa Haftar, an ally of the United Arab Emirates. The 2022 report also delves into the origins of a Serbian 120 mm mortar bomb used to booby-trap a civilian home in Tripoli that had been previously occupied by Haftar’s forces. The bomb is shown here attached to a stuffed toy. It was purchased by the International Golden Group in 2018, using documents that listed the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates as the end user of the weapons. © The FRANCE 24 Observers
In the same report, the panel goes into further detail on the 2013 case: “Although the end user was falsely declared as the United Arab Emirates [Editor’s note: on the document provided by International Golden Group], the ammunition was shipped by air directly to Benghazi, Libya" from the Albanese territory.
The flight that carried the weapons was chartered by an intermediary and while the flight plan showed the United Arab Emirates as the final destination, it was changed at the last minute to Libya.
The 2016 report details how the panel demanded Bulgaria trace how rifles manufactured in their country ended up in Libya.
“The Bulgarian authorities informed the Panel that the International Golden Group originally imported the weapons and that the end user was the UAE Armed Forces,” the Panel says.
The Bulgarian authorities have known since at least 2016 that weapons sold to International Golden Group, supposedly on behalf of the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates, might be illegally re-exported — that’s a full three years before the UAE sent the Bulgarian authorities the first documents on the purchase of mortar bombs manufactured by Dunarit.
"What should happen [in this kind of situation] is as soon as Bulgaria knows about this, they should share the information with other European governments,” Marsh said.
And then they should stop using IGG. They should also be very careful about exporting anything to the United Arab Emirates. But that isn't happening nearly as much as it should.
Our team asked the Bulgarian Interministerial Commission for Export Control if, when they authorised the export of Dunarit bombs to the UAE in 2019, they were aware of the many cases documented by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya and its findings that International Golden Group was illegally diverting weapons. They did not respond to our questions.
Our team was not able to trace the final leg of the Bulgarian weapons’ journey to the battlefield in Sudan — if, indeed, they were exported by International Golden Group to zones in eastern Libya under the control of General Haftar. We put these questions to both the Bulgarian Interministerial Commission on Export Control and International Golden Group. Neither responded to our questions.
But that wasn’t the end of the road. We were able to learn more about the weapons transfer by tracing the path of one of the men who was part of the weapons' convoy that brought the Bulgarian armaments to Sudan. His Colombian passport can be seen in the videos from November 21, 2024.
In the same report, the panel goes into further detail on the 2013 case: “Although the end user was falsely declared as the United Arab Emirates [Editor’s note: on the document provided by International Golden Group], the ammunition was shipped by air directly to Benghazi, Libya" from the Albanese territory.
The flight that carried the weapons was chartered by an intermediary and while the flight plan showed the United Arab Emirates as the final destination, it was changed at the last minute to Libya.
The 2016 report details how the panel demanded Bulgaria trace how rifles manufactured in their country ended up in Libya.
“The Bulgarian authorities informed the Panel that the International Golden Group originally imported the weapons and that the end user was the UAE Armed Forces,” the Panel says.
The Bulgarian authorities have known since at least 2016 that weapons sold to International Golden Group, supposedly on behalf of the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates, might be illegally re-exported — that’s a full three years before the UAE sent the Bulgarian authorities the first documents on the purchase of mortar bombs manufactured by Dunarit.
"What should happen [in this kind of situation] is as soon as Bulgaria knows about this, they should share the information with other European governments,” Marsh said.
And then they should stop using IGG. They should also be very careful about exporting anything to the United Arab Emirates. But that isn't happening nearly as much as it should.
Our team asked the Bulgarian Interministerial Commission for Export Control if, when they authorised the export of Dunarit bombs to the UAE in 2019, they were aware of the many cases documented by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya and its findings that International Golden Group was illegally diverting weapons. They did not respond to our questions.
Our team was not able to trace the final leg of the Bulgarian weapons’ journey to the battlefield in Sudan — if, indeed, they were exported by International Golden Group to zones in eastern Libya under the control of General Haftar. We put these questions to both the Bulgarian Interministerial Commission on Export Control and International Golden Group. Neither responded to our questions.
But that wasn’t the end of the road. We were able to learn more about the weapons transfer by tracing the path of one of the men who was part of the weapons' convoy that brought the Bulgarian armaments to Sudan. His Colombian passport can be seen in the videos from November 21, 2024.
Two passports, belonging to two Colombian nationals, Christian L. and Miguel P., are visible in the videos filmed by the Sudanese fighters on November 21, 2024. The Colombians are thought to have been part of the arms convoy. © The FRANCE 24 Observers
This is the second article of a five-part investigation.
Julia Rougié also contributed to this article.
This is the second article of a five-part investigation.
Julia Rougié also contributed to this article.
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