India’s Rail Revolution: How Agni-Prime Just Changed The Nuclear Deterrence Game Forever – Analysis
India successfully launches an Agni-Prime missile from a rail-based launcher.
Photo Credit: DRDO
On September 24, 2025, India successfully tested the Agni-Prime missile from a rail-based launcher. This was more than just another defence achievement — it marked a major shift in strategic power, placing India among the few nations with mobile nuclear-capable systems. Defence officials called it a “textbook success,” proving India’s advanced technology and clear strategic thinking in today’s complex world.
Rail-based missile deployment is extremely important in today’s warfare and defence strategy. Unlike fixed silos (permanent underground launch sites) or road-based systems, rail launchers provide unmatched mobility and safety. India’s 2,000-km range missiles can be moved anywhere across the 68,000 km railway network, making it impossible for enemies to know their exact location or launch path. This keeps enemies guessing and guarantees that India will still be able to hit back strongly even if attacked first.
The rail-based Agni-Prime offers much more than just mobility. Since it is integrated with India’s existing railway network, it can be moved and operated easily with very little extra logistical support, while keeping the element of surprise. Its ability to travel across the country, launch independently, and use advanced communication systems makes it both strong and quick to respond. Today, with satellites and intelligence tracking every movement, traditional missile bases have become easier targets. In this situation, a rail-based system provides concealment and protection that fixed bases cannot offer.
Looking at the regional balance of power, the impact of India’s rail-based Agni-Prime becomes even clearer. Pakistan, though it has nuclear weapons and missiles, does not have a large or advanced railway network to use such a system effectively. Its railways are smaller and less developed compared to India’s, which makes rail-based deployment difficult both technically and strategically. Instead, Pakistan has mostly relied on road-mobile missiles and aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons. But here too, its geography and limited strategic space create weaknesses and risks.
China, however, already has the technology and a large, modern railway network that could support rail-based missiles. Its missile engineering is advanced enough for such deployments. But historically China’s strategy has favoured underground silos (heavily protected, permanent launch sites) and road-mobile launchers. Their DF-series missiles (Dong Feng family) are designed for this approach, combining silos for protection and mobile launchers for flexibility, ensuring a credible second-strike capability. So, while China could develop rail-based systems, its current strategy — together with vast internal territory and geographic advantages — makes rail launchers less immediately necessary for China than they are for India.
The development of the rail-based Agni-Prime reflects India’s special security needs and geography. India is located between two nuclear-armed neighbours and faces disputed borders on several sides, so it needs a nuclear force that is both credible and able to survive an enemy strike. The rail-based system meets this need by providing a mobile deterrent that can move easily across different terrains while staying linked to the civilian railway network. This makes it very hard for enemies to attack without also risking serious damage to civilian infrastructure.
This successful test is a major technological achievement and should not be underestimated. Building a canister-based missile (a missile kept in a sealed protective tube or container, which shields it from weather, makes transport easier, and allows quicker, safer launch preparation) that can launch from a rail platform means solving difficult engineering problems — such as keeping the launcher stable, ensuring secure communication systems, and fitting the missile into the railway network. The success of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) in doing this shows India’s advancing defence manufacturing skills and its ability to develop critical technologies on its own, giving the country more strategic independence.
Looking at the bigger picture, the rail-based Agni-Prime adds to India’s missile strength in an important way. The road-mobile version gives flexibility for quick, tactical use, while the rail-based version provides strategic mobility across the whole country. Together, they create a layered deterrent, meaning India now has multiple types of missile systems working at different levels — road for short-term flexibility and rail for wide-area coverage. This makes it much harder for enemies to plan or target effectively. Because the missiles can be hidden in many places, move quickly, and launch with little warning, India’s overall nuclear deterrence becomes stronger and more reliable.
The success of the Agni-Prime rail launch also opens the door for future growth in India’s strategic forces. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said this puts India in a small group of nations that have canister-based, rail-launched missiles. This technology can later be used for other Indian missiles too, creating a full rail-based deterrent system that takes advantage of India’s large railway network as a powerful defence asset.
Agni V: Strategic Pinnacle
The culmination of India’s missile development programme can be seen in the Agni-5, which represents the apex of the country’s long-range deterrent capabilities. With its range exceeding 5,000 kilometres and proven MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle) capability, demonstrated in the 2024 Mission Divyastra test, the Agni-5 provides India with the ability to strike multiple targets simultaneously across vast distances.
The missile’s three-stage solid-fuel design and canister-based launch system ensure rapid deployment when needed, while its capacity to carry 3–4 nuclear warheads significantly multiplies India’s strategic striking power. This makes it extremely difficult for enemy missile defence systems to stop all incoming warheads, ensuring that India’s nuclear deterrent remains reliable and effective against any potential adversary.
This capability, combined with the rail-based mobility of the Agni-Prime, creates a comprehensive deterrent framework that addresses both regional and intercontinental threats. Together, the mobile Agni-Prime and the long-range Agni-5 represent a mature and sophisticated nuclear deterrent that reflects India’s emergence as a responsible nuclear power with credible second-strike capabilities across the entire spectrum of strategic threats.
Agni-Prime vs Agni-5: Key Differences
While both Agni-Prime and Agni-5 strengthen India’s deterrence, their roles are distinct. The Agni-Prime, with a range of up to 2,000 km, is designed mainly for regional deterrence and quick deployment against nearby threats. It carries a single warhead and can be launched from both road and rail-based mobile platforms, giving it high mobility across India’s vast railway network. In contrast, the Agni-5 is India’s true long-range strategic missile, with a reach of over 5,000 km. It is canister-based but limited to road mobility, and its real power lies in its MIRV capability, allowing it to carry three to four nuclear warheads, each aimed at different targets. In short, Agni-Prime is about regional flexibility and rapid movement, while Agni-5 represents intercontinental reach and multi-target strike power. Together, they give India a layered and credible deterrent suited for both immediate regional threats and far-reaching strategic challenges.
Girish Linganna is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. You can reach him at: girishlinganna@gmail.com
India Upgrades Its Air Power By Embracing Tejas Jets After Bidding Adieu To MiG-21s – Analysis
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A HAL Tejas Mark 2 (Mk2). Photo Credit: Government of India, Wikipedia Commons
On 26 September 2025, 60 years on, “a bird for all seasons”, India’s first supersonic fighter jet – the MiG-21, the legendary Soviet-origin fighter aircraft that patrolled India’s skies and backbone of the Air Force’s combat fleet for six decades, finally bid adieu during the decommissioning ceremony in Chandigarh, the very place it had first touched down in 1963.
Six MiG-21s of the No.23 Panthers squadron flew in a formation before being given a water cannon salute. When the six Warbird flew into sunset, it marked a transformative chapter in India’s air power but also stood as a powerful symbol of the enduring and strategic partnership between India and Russia. This brought the IAF’s fighter jet squadron strength to a mere 29 for all practical purposes, the lowest since the 1960s.
The aircraft took part in every major conflict from the 1965 war to the recent Operation Sindoor. It intercepted enemy bombers not only in 1965 war but also in 1971 Indo-Pak war as well as in flying strike missions in the 1999 Kargil conflict to its controversial engagement during the 2019 Balakot strikes. In all these missions, the MiG-21 left an indelible mark in India’s combat history, triumph and loss notwithstanding in the process.
MiG-21 established India’s airpower on the global stage and excelled in multiple roles. The beauty of the MiG-21s is that as an interceptor, it stopped the enemy in ground attack roles and showed aggression. In air defence it protected India’s skies. As a trainer, it shaped generations of air warriors. It proved to be the most significant fighter aircraft in military history. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh reminded the countrymen during the decommissioning ceremony that no other aircraft was manufactured in such a large numbers. Total of 11,500 MiGs were built, of which 850 were inducted into the IAF.
The aircraft was the country’s first supersonic jet and a backbone of its aerial might. Of a total of around 12,000 units, around half were built locally by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The aircraft’s Indian fleet was the largest in the world, outside of the Soviet Bloc. The MiG-21 was initially acquired for one specific role, a high-altitude interceptor that could counter aircraft like the American U-2 spy plane.
India has finalised a deal after months of negotiations that will see Dassault Aviation’s Rafale-M jets replace the aging fleet of Russian-made MiG-29Ks, that were also deployed aboard its two aircraft carriers, INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya.
The fighter jet was involved in frequent fatal accidents that put the aircraft’s safety records under scrutiny and led to an understandable chorus of concern and calls for its early replacement. With upgrades, the IAF managed to keep them flying for so long. More than 400 MiG-21s were involved in accidents that killed around 200 pilots, earning the fighter jets unfortunate epithets such as “Flying Coffin” and “Widow Maker”. The fact is that more MiG-21s crashed than any other fighter because they formed the bulk of the aircraft in the IAF for the longest time. In the 1980s and 1990s, these planes accounted for more than 60 per cent of the air force’s fighting strength. The stigma of “human error” often compounded the pain for families, who perceived it as blaming the pilot rather than acknowledging systemic issues. However, the epithet “Saviour of the Skies” is more appropriate than the negative ones as mentioned above. After all, no sacrifice is ever great when it comes to protecting nation’s security and the MiG-21s did a wonderful job.
The aircraft’s safety record became a grave concern in the later years as the pilot fatalities and increased crashes were attributed to operational, technical, or age-related factors. The MiG-21U trainer variant was ill-suited for training. The IAF relied on subsonic trainers like the Kiran and Iskra, which were inadequate for preparing pilots for the MiG-21’s supersonic performance. The gap between basic trainers and the MiG-21 widened as the fleet expanded from eight squadrons in 1963 to nearly half the IAF’s strength by the 1980s.
For young pilots transitioning from subsonic trainers to the MiG-21, the lack of adequate preparation was a significant contributor. The stigma of “human error” often compounds the pain for families, who perceive it as blaming the pilot rather than acknowledging systemic issues.
The maiden batch of the six MiG-21s entered service in March-April 1963 and the IAF progressively inducted 874 MiG-21s (60 per cent of these were produced under licence in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited).
What is the legacy that the MiG-21s and other variants leave India for its Atmanirbhara agenda? The phasing out of the MiGs would now propel India to be in the pursuit of developing indigenous platforms such as the light combat aircraft (LCA Mk-1A) and the advanced medium combat aircraft and thus moving toward futuristic technologies. It needs to be remembered however that though the MiG-21s were inducted into the IAF over six decades ago, the aircrafts of multiple variants in service were not more than 40 years old, a life span considered normal for fighter jets worldwide.
Keeping this fact in view, India had initiated the process as early as in 1983 to build light combat aircraft that would eventually replace the MiG-21s. With now only 29 left with the IAF, it leaves the IAF in a very tight spot. Now the IAF is looking for the Tejas to replace the MiGs-21s. The IAF remains committed to the Tejas program and has placed orders for 180 Tejas Mk 1A. The IAF is also eagerly waiting for the Tejas Mk 2 version, including two squadrons of the Tejas in IOC and FOC versions. The IAF is looking at seeking government approval to go beyond the sanctioned fighter squadron strength of 42, based on generational capabilities.
This includes upgraded Su 30 MKIs, Rafale manufactured in India, Tejas MK1As (180 of which have been ordered), Tejas Mk2s, Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and possible procurement of other 5thgeneration type platforms, either as limited numbers in fly away condition or under the Make in India route. It is likely that by 2030, fighters like the MiG-29, Jaguar and Mirages will start getting phased out slowly. This would depend on the timely delivery of the Tejas Mk1A and Tejas Mk2 so that a repeat of the MiG-21 situation is avoided.
Since the IAF is willing to accept only fully ready fighters, the delivery of the Tejas MK1A is likely to begin only in the first quarter of 2026. The actual deliveries were contracted to start from February 2024 but engine delivery delays by American firm GE along with other issues delayed the program.
Though the IAF has placed orders for 180 Tejas Mk1A, it wants Tejas Mk 2 version, which is designed to have the capabilities of the Mirage 2000 aircraft and comes with longer endurance and firepower than previous versions. The airframe will be bigger than the Tejas MK1 and Mk1A versions. Unfortunately, the indigenous Tejas Mk 1A program encountered repeated setbacks initially due to critical GE F404 engine supply issues. As a result, the MiG-21s were forced to serve beyond their intended lifespan due to strategic necessity and procurement delays of the indigenous Tejas Mk 1A.
Now that the “Saviours of the Skies” entered the sunset, India’s defence planners have focused on advancing towards an indigenous future by alternatives. As the Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria recently reflected “the MiG-21 will always be remembered for its unmatched agility and the dedication of those who flew it. It served the nation well, but the times demand modern, safer platforms.” This being said, phasing out legacy aircraft such as the MiG-21 may be essential to improve safety and operational effectiveness, but the gap between decommissioned squadrons and incoming Tejas jets must be carefully managed to maintain air defence readiness.
It transpires therefore that the country’s ability to address the capability vacuum is heavily dependent on indigenous program. While the Tejas Mark 1A now entering full-scale induction, will assume the point-defence and light combat roles, high-end air dominance shall be increasingly handled by Rafale jets. The Su 30MK1 will continue to fulfil multi-role missions. As the ambitious Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project promises a prototype by 2028-29 and potential induction by 2034-35, the Tejas Mk 2 and AMCA are positioned to support India’s long-term transition to a self-reliant networked air force.
The partnership with the private industry like L & T’s airframe components and expanded engine testing that reflect a crucial shift shall be a game changer in India’s air defence capability. The participation of the private players in the PPP model in defence manufacturing shall be the end game in India’s path of achieving Atmanirbhar goal. Thus with the retirement of the MiG-21 aircrafts, a new technological transition has been made. This also reflects India’s evolution from a platform dependent force to a self-reliant nation, multi-role doctrine and strategic autonomy. The new projects are expected to build an Air Force that has the required capability, and vision worthy of the country’s ambitions, thereby protect the country’s skies as the MiG-21s did for the past six decades.
Dr. Rajaram Panda is former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library (PMML). Earlier Dr Panda was Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA and ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, JAPAN. His latest book "India and Japan: Past, Present and Future" was published in 2024 by Knowledge World. E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com
An Indian Army 15 Metre Sarvatra Bridging System. Photo Credit: Ministry of Defence, Wikipedia Commons
September 29, 2025
By Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee (Retd)
Bridges, roads and resilience: how Infrastructure shapes deterrence on India’s borders
In an age defined by unpredictable threats and shifting battlefields, the quiet craft of military engineering often serves as both lifeline and force multiplier. While India’s Corps of Engineers and organisations like the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) have demonstrated resilience; systemic underinvestment and weak civil–military synergy leave worrisome gaps in the nation’s military preparedness.
By contrast, China’s integrated, technology-driven, and civil–military fused model makes military engineering a spearhead of military modernisation. Given the rising militarisation along India’s borders, shifting security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, and India’s broader developmental ambitions, amplification of such insights is timely and imperative.
Military Engineering as a Bedrock of Strategy:
The Corps of Engineers has historically been tasked with bridging rivers, building roads, and ensuring mobility across some of the harshest terrains on the Earth. In independent India, so has been the case from the glacial heights of Siachen to the dense forests of the Northeast. However, a somewhat limited utilitarian description of military engineering among the nation’s top defence planners, under pressure of inadequate fiscal allocations, has underplayed its wider roles across peace, limited hostilities and full-scale war, thereby diminishing its strategic significance. This over-sight had been shaped by economic, technological, and industrial constraints, compounded by the top defence hierarchy’s debilitating unfamiliarity with strategic military thought.
Conversely, in a world of contestation, military empowerment, anchored by military engineering amongst other support systems, remains a silent foundation for India’s ability to fight, deter, and survive. Wars have always been prosecuted through fortifications, firepower, mobility, manoeuvre, logistics, and other attributes of combat, each are equally significant. Alongside that attribute, the ability to construct and sustain myriad ranges of military infrastructure along the frontlines, flanks and depth areas is intrinsic to balanced force structuring, tactical employment of weaponry, and maintenance of training standards, morale, and leadership effectiveness. In doctrinal terms, engineering ensures the continuum between strategic intent and tactical execution.
India’s Wars: This above-stated concept has been validated across India’s post-independence wars, barring the debacle of 1962. In 1947-48, the Engineers cleared and opened up the axes of advance for the Indian forces to evict the Pakistani marauders; in 1965, they played pivotal roles in blocking the enemy’s offensives while facilitating own armoured thrusts across the Punjab’s canal network by laying assault bridges and clearing minefields under fire and so sustain India’s offensive momentum.
In 1971, Indian forces’ rapid advance into East Pakistan owed much to the Engineers who paved the obstacle ridden riverine and boggy terrain into operational axes for prosecution of a lightning campaign of advance, invest and attack, thereby avoiding what could have been weeks of grim, bloody struggle. In Kargil, the Sappers carved tracks into forbidding high-altitude terrain, constructed helipads and gun positions under extreme conditions- every movement with engineering stores was itself a struggle. Each of these wars underscored a fundamental truth: engineering feats have often marked the difference between stalemate and breakthrough.
Recent experiences, particularly along the LAC, reaffirm how military engineering remains decisive in operational readiness before, during, and after confrontation. Both in the cases of Doklam and Galwan confrontations, engineer task forces were successfully deployed to open axes for rapid troop deployment and sustain logistic support; before, during and after the cessation of hostile actions.
Post-2020, accelerated road and bridge construction in Ladakh and the North-East theatres have signalled not just the infrastructural upgrade but India’s resolve to match China’s border build-up. Herein, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) was deployed to reinstate its frontline strategic role, Its construction projects in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh (the whole of the North-East) not only facilitate mobility and logistic survivability of own forces but also serve as signals of the Indian State’s resolve in the face of inimical powers. In this sense, infrastructure is now both an operational enabler and a political signal. These concepts are neither new nor unique; powerful global militaries embrace them. In India’s case, however, the post-independence ethos of ‘peaceful existence’ led to disregard of the military’s role, and among others, the traditional four echelons of engineering support were neglected.
Here, the People’s Republic of China offers a stark example. Both the nations began in early 1950s from similar motivations of developmental aspirations and similar starting points and. But China, aided by focused approaches and sustained fiscal-technological support, has enabled its PLA to progress in leaps through its ambitious modernisation schemes.
China’s approach to military engineering has been integrated, centralised, and comprehensively resourced across all the four echelons of engineering support to the PLA. Beyond combat, frontline, depth, and rear tasks, PLA engineering is embedded within quasi-military organisations and civil–military synergies, where universities, state-owned enterprises, and the armed forces operate in concert. The PLA’s modernised structure – operational as well as logistic – embodies this coherence. It treats operational capacities and logistic infrastructure not as auxiliaries, but as integral to combat readiness.
PLA’s Civil-Military Synergy: By working together with state-owned enterprises and quasi-military entities, the PLA fuses military engineering with national development schemes. Roads, tunnels, and dual-use airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang serve not just the economic purposes but serve as deliberate instruments of coercion. In a wider context of fundamental aspects of military engineering, Chinese universities such as the Rocket Force University of Engineering and the Information Engineering University provide pipelines of talent in AI surveillance, battlefield survey, cyberwarfare, and propulsion systems. PLA officers driving the development of electromagnetic catapults and railguns symbolise how China integrates cutting-edge engineering into its military doctrine – while its engineer militias remain prepared for rear area support, civic actions and disaster relief.
Having institutionalised its four tiers of military engineering, China is already moving decisively towards that direction, with visible results. PLA’s operational exercises in Tibet and across the Taiwan Strait simulate close combat engineering support across the entire frontlines, alongside the regular roles of rapid construction of fortifications, tracks, bridges, jetties, runways, billets, and bases. Under high-altitude and marine battle conditions, such capabilities can tilt strategic balances. Recent satellite imagery shows modular landing barges for Taiwan scenarios, while researchers test drones that split midair to evade defences. Hypersonic propulsion, AI-enabled logistics, and modular battlefield platforms underline how China treats engineering innovation as one of the spearheads of military modernisation.
Towards India’s Future-Ready Military Force:
Any comparison between the Indian and the Chinese military engineering capability is sobering and revealing. The BRO and MES have improved, but delays and bottlenecks persist, driven by institutional preconceptions, procedural bottlenecks, and fiscal hurdles. Unlike China’s centralised model, India’s federal structure produces friction among the ministries, states and even within the services. And so the political impetus remains insufficient.
Weighing its severely adverse security situation, the Indian defence structure is yet to effectively synergise its fiscal, industrial, and infrastructural growth with its military, including military engineering, needs. As a sub-set of its military empowerment, India needs to reframe its military engineering capability as a part of a live, active, and retaliatory strategy. Its strategic resolve demands revival of its overall military modernisation to include the upgraded equipment holdings, improved force mobility, quickly constructable tracks, modern battlefield fortifications and survivability capabilities, high-technology battle communications and surveillance networks, and upgraded survey and mapping systems.
All this requires not only a requisite resource planning, but also a cognitive reorientation of the strategic culture. Technological adaptions are mandatory in modern warfare. For engineering, this means adopting AI-based logistics mapping, modern construction systems, and energy-resilient habitats, among other innovations. Such aspects need to be prioritised for indigenous research and development.
Besides, the tradition of military engineers’ umbilical connections with the civilian engineering organisations, private sector engineering industries and engineering academia needs to be resuscitated. Today, that relationship has withered due to decades of defensive introversion among India’s leadership.
Military Survey, a core military engineering expertise, has increasingly shifted toward reliance on satellite data. But its present status is inadequate for tactical decision-making; dependence on private agencies and their poorly interpreted data remains fraught with massive uncertainties. On the other hand, operationally relevant, accurate and focused military survey inputs are gaining salience in today’s remote, precision warfare. While outsourcing has advantages, it dilutes the military’s control over critical frontier-specific knowledge without meeting the grim exclusivities of military-specific requirements. In a contested geography like the Himalayas, reliance on civilian inputs risks leaving the armed forces under hazy conditionalities of operational planning and execution. For military modernisation to be effective and efficient, this aspect needs serious consideration.
Any military engineering transformation of this magnitude requires revival of embedded institutional knowledge, backed by fiscal priority, industrial support, upgraded training, and modernised engineer stores. The military’s organisational structures must also evolve to articulate these capabilities. Traditional echelons of military engineering (viz. field engineering, line of communication engineering MES, BRO, Military Survey, civil works departments, and private industry) must be customised to achieve balance between defensive and offensive strategies.
Conclusion:
For India, ensuring that the Corps of Engineers evolves into a 21st century force multiplier, within a balanced all arms, joint service force-structure, is no longer optional, it is an existential call. The challenge is to fuse economic growth, technological innovation, industrial modernisation and development of native military doctrine. India has to catch up not just to mirror China, but to assert its own doctrine of all spectrum deterrence and stoic resilience. As China fuses engineering with the PLA’s force projection, India too must reimagine its Corps of Engineers as a strategic instrument to underwrite its military deterrence, resilience, and great-power credibility.
Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee (Retd)
Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee (Retd), PVSM, AVSM, YSM is a Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), India. He has served as the Chief of Staff, Central Command, and former Commandant of the Officers' Training Academy, Chennai (India).
