Wednesday, June 15, 2022

The Realm of the Devil and the Destroyers of Rome

How the north came into its allure and the south lost its glory

World map prepared by the Arab geographer Muhammad al-Idrisi (1100-1165) for King of Sicily Roger II 
/ Universal History Archive / Getty Images

Where is “north”? Take, for example, the volcanic Bouvetøya or Bouvet Island. This ice-covered speck of Norway, about 19 square miles in area and inhabited by seals, penguins and seabirds, has been a nature preserve for half a century. In 1739, French mariner Jean-Baptiste Charles Bouvet de Lozier and his companions sighted it, but forbidding glacial cliffs prevented them from landing. Britain first claimed this remote outpost, but after Norway’s Harald Horntvedt explored it more thoroughly and planted the Norwegian flag there in 1927, Britain eventually ceded its claim. In one sense, Bouvetøya lies in the North — but only from the perspective of the South Pole. The island is located between South Africa and Antarctica and is also known as “the last place on earth.”

The north begins where the south ends. But where is the border between them, how can we recognize it, and who has the right to define it? For the German poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the Brenner Pass in the Alps connecting Austria and Italy constituted the “dividing line between the South and the North.” His contemporary, historian August Ludwig von Schlözer took up this question and wrote: “We Germans do not consider ourselves to be part of the North; only the Frenchman views our land as his North, and he speaks of Berlin as we do of Stockholm. Spanish writers commonly understand the North as Great Britain, and it is of course natural that African geographers and historians refer to the Mediterranean as the North Sea and believe that all Europeans are northern peoples.”

The concept of “North” (and of “South” respectively) represents a space both real and imaginary. At the beginning of the 19th century, before the competing concepts of the “West” and the “East” became Europe’s dominant paradigm, Russia was commonly considered part of the North.

The center of the world for the Europeans of antiquity, for people like Herodotus (c. 484-c. 425 BCE), was the extended Mediterranean. This is evident in a map of that era that depicts the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and their environs relatively realistically, whereas the northwest of the European continent is rendered as a single curved line that offers no intimation at all of the British Isles or Scandinavia. That wasn’t Herodotus’ or anyone else’s fault, of course. People could only depict on their maps what they knew from personal experience — or had at least read or heard about. The North was a phantasmagoric dark spot beyond the border of the Greco-Roman universe, on the other side of the Alps and the Black Sea. The ancient Greeks invented the legendary region of Hyperborea and located it in the European northeast, beyond the north wind Boreas, which was itself named after the god who brought winter. They imagined it as a land of plenty, populated by giants, wise, happy and immortal, who devoted themselves to music and dance and knew neither illness nor other human plagues. The catch was that there was no way for mortal men and women to get there. The Greek geographer Strabo, who came much later (c. 64 BCE-c. 24 CE), already had a far more concrete view of the North as encompassing northwestern Gaul, the British Isles, the Lower Rhineland and Scandinavia.

For a long time, in Europe, the North was considered the realm of the devil, the place from whence evil would come upon the world. By contrast, the Middle East was where the religions of the Old World had developed. The prophet Jeremiah further fleshed out the dichotomy, specifying that evil would take the form of invading northern hordes. In the superstitions of many cultures, northern peoples of various stripes have been considered harbingers of doom. Most famously the barbarian hordes from the North were blamed for the fall of Rome, while scholars now believe it collapsed under the weight of its own internal conflicts. Since antiquity, the North (as well as the West) was regarded as a region of cold and darkness, devoid of sunlight and inimical to life. This convenient interpretive system remained in place throughout the Middle Ages and continued in the speculations of 16th- and 17th-century alchemy.

The 12th-century medieval mystic Hildegard von Bingen derived her world view from Adam’s turn to the East after his creation. To Adam’s right was the blessed South, and to his left was the dark North. According to Hildegard, the north was the direction from which the church was menaced, and a “threatening, angrily growling bear” was the origin of the “godless” North Wind, “divorced of any utility, felicity and holiness” and bringing only misfortune and storms. The perniciousness of the North Wind was the basis for the character of the other three winds, which blew in opposition to it. These vague ideas about the North became more concrete as contact, both hostile and friendly, was established with the people who lived there.

Forays by aggressive Scandinavian warriors from the north left many people in the south fearing for their lives. The commercial network of the Vikings was gigantic, stretching from the northern Atlantic to Russia, Central Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. In this sense, they were pioneers of globalization, dealing in honey, amber, dried meat and pelts. They also sold loot from the cities they sacked. Their boats were powered by the strength of human arms and the wind. When winds were favorable, they were even able to sail their vessels against river currents, having adopted the square-rig sail that had been used for centuries in the Mediterranean. In 860 CE, the Varangians, a Swedish subgroup of the Vikings in an extended sense of the term, attacked Constantinople, and in 885 CE, Danish Vikings invaded Paris. In subsequent centuries, the Normans conquered Normandy, southern Italy and England.

The Vikings weren’t the only ones sailing the seas of the High North and establishing connections. Irish monks are thought to have sailed to the Faroe Islands and Iceland as early as the seventh century — most likely they were looking for solitude rather than trying to convert the few heathens who had settled there. In 1136, a monastery was founded in Arkhangelsk in northern Russia, and a century after that, monasteries dotted the map in Scandinavia and Iceland. With the increasing activity of missionaries, Christianity would also remain an important bond connecting Europe’s North and South for centuries — until the Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War, which would pit northern and southern Europe against one another.

How did cartographers eventually decide to put the north exclusively at the top of their maps? And why did this mode of representation become the dominant one? The practice goes back to second-century Greco-Roman mathematician and astronomer Claudius Ptolemy, if we are to believe the surviving copies of his works made by Byzantine monks more than 1,000 years later, in the 13th century. The cartographers who created the first mappa mundi — Gerardus Mercator, Henricus Martellus Germanus and Martin Waldseemüller — respected Ptolemy as a leading authority, took their cues from him and adopted his habit of putting the north at the top. Nonetheless, the Christian maps of the Middle Ages chose another perspective. A map of Europe and Africa made by Venetian seafarer and cartographer Andrea Bianco in the 15th century has the east on top and Jerusalem in the middle. Similarly, in maps from the Islamic world, north often appears at the bottom, as in Moroccan Muhammad al-Idrisi’s Tabula Rogeriana, made in 1154 for King Roger II of Sicily. The same is true of the 1459 mappa mundi of Fra Mauro, even if it is today usually reprinted in repolarized form (it just has to be flipped on its head to make sense to us). One possible reason is that 15th-century compasses pointed south. While it’s difficult to generalize about the sophisticated Chinese mapmaking tradition, the famous “Composite Map of the Ming Empire,” possibly created at the end of the 14th century, has north at the top. With the waning of Christian or Muslim views of the world that had put the east or south at the top, the north secured its fixed spot at the top of maps. But as self-evident as that shift might seem today, there was no strictly logical reason for the change.

Apart from Ptolemy’s precedent, there are at least two other potential reasons why north drifted to the top of maps. One is its use in navigation. Before the compass was imported from China via the Arab world around 1300, European seafarers used the stars to tell what direction they were headed in. The most useful one was the North Star, since it remained in one place, almost exactly at due north, while the other fixed stars seemed to move around the sky because of Earth’s rotation. The compass likewise pointed north (with the exception mentioned earlier).

Invented in China some 2,000 years ago during the Han dynasty, the compass was made of naturally magnetized lodestone and used for geomancy (a method of divination that interprets markings on the ground or the patterns formed by tossed soil, rocks or sand) and fortunetelling. By the time it came to be used for navigation on the seas, during the Song dynasty, it already had the needles we associate with the compass today. Another plausible explanation may be that information on the upper margin of maps was more easily visible and thus made to seem more important. European mapmakers, of course, lived in the Northern Hemisphere, so they may simply have wanted to see their own homeland as occupying a privileged position in the world.

When Geneva historian Paul Henri Mallet published translations of Old Norse tales written down in the 13th century, including the Prose Edda and excerpts from the Poetic Edda from Iceland, this triggered a new perception of Scandinavia in the eyes of many European intellectuals, including German poet Johann Gottfried Herder. He developed a euphoric sense of belonging to an imagined homeland in the North. Old Norse mythology offered an alternative to a stale classicism that venerated Greco-Roman legends and myths. Many people at the time were sick of the South. While Herder was opposed to the idea of distinct races, he was convinced that one human race had diversified into different cultures: “In all the different forms in which the human race appears on earth, it is nonetheless everywhere one and the same human species.” However, this sort of “cultural pluralism” didn’t prevent Herder from thinking in racist categories; he asked his readers “to sympathize with the Negro, but not despise him, since the conditions of his climate could not grant him nobler gifts.” He had few sympathies with the Chinese, “who, in their own corner of the earth, refrained, like the Jews, from mixing with other peoples.”

Herder’s rejection of the genealogy of Noah was unambiguous: “The various efforts of people to make all nations of the earth, according to this genealogy, into descendants of the Hebrews and half-brothers of the Jews, contradicts not only chronology and the entire history of humanity but also the standpoint of this narrative itself. … Enough of it! The fixed center of the largest part of the world, the primeval mountains of Asia, provided the first place of residence for the human race.” For Herder there were two basic coordinates: the North and Asia.

Even beyond Germany, he was an important force in paving the way for the categories “Aryan” and “Semitic” that, as Maurice Olender stressed in “The Languages of Paradise” (1993), “would influence scholarship in the human sciences throughout the nineteenth century.” Herder found a spiritual ally in Friedrich Schlegel, who had learned some Sanskrit during a stay in Paris and who declared at an 1805 lecture, “Everything absolutely everything, comes from India!” Schlegel also revived the term Aryan as a combination of the Sanskrit name “Ari” (meaning, among other things, lion, brave, inner skin and eagle) with the German word “Ehre” (honor). The concept can be traced back to the 18h-century French Orientalist Abraham-Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, who coined it in his translation of the Avesta, the holy book of Zoroastrianism. It was subsequently adopted by linguists in various countries.

However, at the turn of the 19th century, more and more people were no longer content to learn about the North from the comfort of their reading chairs and were willing to get their shoes a bit muddy to see it for themselves, both scientists and more romantic travelers. This was partly because the French Revolution made it more difficult and sometimes impossible to travel to central Europe, whereas English and German travelers could reach Scandinavia and Scotland without any great problem. Increasingly, tourists began visiting the North rather than the sites of antique culture in Italy and Greece. To stand in the Roman Forum as the first Caesar Augustus did or visit the ruins of Pompeii, one of the most dramatic natural disasters of antique Italy, had lost some of its appeal.

But how would the North of the mind materialize? While some of the travelers followed in the footsteps of the great Carl Linnaeus, who had undertaken a botanical-ethnographic trip to Lapland, among them were readers of the Genevan philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau who were hoping to find people in a “state of nature” — noble savages. Or they had heard about the wonders of the midnight sun and the majestic fjords of Norway. Journeying to Scotland, as to Scandinavia, didn’t present foreign visitors with a particularly stern test of courage. There, too, it was easier for women to travel than in the South or in the Middle East, particularly on their own. Emilie von Berlepsch, who visited in 1799, was a close acquaintance of Herder and, as she proudly described herself, “the first German woman who traveled to the fatherland of the bard [Ossian].” Having set off from Hamburg, she made landfall near Glasgow on the “classical ground of Ossian’s songs.” She believed that bagpipe music, which had “quite unpleasantly assaulted” her ears, must be a recent distortion of Scandinavian culture: “It is impossible to conceive of the beautiful, gentle emotions of Ossian arising during and being accompanied by this shrill bleating.”

In the summer of 1794, English author and women’s rights activist Mary Wollstonecraft made a journey through southern Norway, western Sweden, Denmark and northern Germany with her 1-year-old daughter, Fanny, and her governess. This was hardly a vacation trip. Wollstonecraft was there on a mission. With England and France at war, she was trying to help the American business owner Gilbert Imlay, who had attempted to smuggle a large amount of silver from France to Scandinavia. According to Wollstonecraft’s “From Letters Written during a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark,” she wanted to find a ship and retrieve the cargo.

Around the same time, naturalist Giuseppe Acerbi set off from Lombardy for the North. Why did he, a man of the South, “a native of Italy, a country abounding in all the beauties of nature, and the finest productions of art, voluntarily undergo the danger and fatigue of visiting the regions of the Arctic Circle?” His answer to his own question: “There is no people so advanced in civilization, or so highly cultivated, who may not be able to derive some advantage from being acquainted with arts and sciences of other nations, even of such as are the most barbarous.” The ultimate destination of his voyage was the North Cape: “Here everything is solitary, everything is sterile, everything sad and despondent. The shadowy forest no longer adorns the brow of the mountain; the singing of the birds, which enlivened even the woods of Lapland, is no longer heard in this scene of desolation; the ruggedness of the dark grey rock is not covered by a single shrub; the only music is the hoarse murmuring of the waves, ever and anon renewing their assaults on the huge masses that oppose them.”

Do cold north winds correspond with the mentality of the people living there? Does the lack of warmth mean that northern people lack passion? Is there a connection between their toughness and the harshness of the landscape? Speculations about how climatic conditions affect people’s mental and physical constitution began in antiquity and can be found across the ages.

A passage from the enormously popular polemic “Les Semaines” (The Weeks) by the 16th-century Huguenot writer Guillaume de Saluste Du Bartas read:

The northern-man is fair, the southern foul:
That’s white, this black; that smiles and this doth scoul;
Th’one blithe & frolike, th’other dull & froward;
Th’one’s full of courage, th’other fearfull coward;
Th’one’s hair is harsh, big, curled, th’others slender;
Th’one loveth labour, th’other books doth tender;
Th’one’s hot and moist, the other’s hot and dry.

The French philosopher Montesquieu used the contrast between a cold cultural zone and a hot one as the basis for a cultural anthropology that privileged the man of the North, insofar as he remained on his home terrain, over the man of the extreme South. Crucially, Montesquieu disputed that there were any inherently northern or southern character traits, insisting instead that people were formed by their surrounding climate. In his 1748 essay “Of Laws in Relation to the Nature of the Climate,” he conflated climate and mentality in idiosyncratic fashion: “The inhabitants of warm countries are, like old men, timorous; the people in cold countries are, like young men, brave. If we reflect on the late wars … we shall find that the northern people, transplanted into southern regions, did not perform such exploits as their countrymen who, fighting in their own climate, possessed their full vigor and courage.” Furthermore, Montesquieu made the remarkable observation: “I have been at the opera in England and in Italy, where I have seen the same pieces and the same performers: and yet the same music produces such different effects on the two nations: one is so cold and phlegmatic, and the other so lively and enraptured, that it seems almost inconceivable.” He also held that freedom, such as it existed in Europe, originated with the Scandinavian peoples, whereas he associated the South and the Orient with a distorted picture of despotism he believed still predominated there.

A few years later, in his lectures on physical geography, German philosopher Immanuel Kant assigned humanity to various “races” with differing characters. He proposed: “If one enquires as to the sources of the forms and temperament inherent in a people, then one need only consider the variations of animals in relation of form and behavior, for as soon as they are transported to a different climate, different air and food, etc., make them to be different from their descendants. A squirrel that is brown here will become grey in Siberia. A European dog taken to Guinea will become misshapen and bald, and so will its descendants.” Kant expanded this logic to human beings: “The descendants of the northern peoples who went to Spain not only have bodies that are not nearly as strong as they were originally, but also their temperament has changed into one very different from that of a Norwegian or Dane. The inhabitant of the temperate zone, especially in its central part, is more beautiful in body, harder working, more witty, more moderate in his passions, and more sensible than any other kind of people in the world. Consequently, these people have always taught the rest [of the world] and vanquished them by the use of weapons. The Romans, Greeks, the ancient Nordic peoples, Genghis Khan, the Turks, Tamburlaine, and the Europeans after Columbus’s discoveries, have astounded all the southern countries with their arts and their weapons.” Kant suggests a familiarity with circumstances in faraway places, which is ironic, because he spent nearly all his life in Königsberg (today, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad), in provincial East Prussia, and received much of his knowledge from often obscure travel accounts and from conversing with sailors at the harbor of his home city.

Another passionate participant in the discussion about northern and southern people was Friedrich de la Motte-Fouqué, a Prussian officer from an aristocratic Huguenot family, whose most famous work, aside from the fairy tale “Undine,” was the Nibelungen trilogy “The Hero of the North,” in which he appropriated elements of Norse mythology. In 1828, he published a book responding to Alexander von Humboldt titled, “The Man of the South and of the North.” While he ascribed a great flexibility to both north and south, he wrote: “As it happens, people of the south are often found sunken in a certain external calm that almost resembles beatitude but that is anything but. If there’s disturbance making it undeniable clear that they reside not in the land of fulfillment but rather in the fundamentally impoverished one of privation, the rage that elicits resembles that of the lion or tiger. By contrast, the man of the north can be better compared with the eagle, which also prefers to live in that region. Wrathfully hard where there is battle, but also silently alert and scanning in the distance, he never lapses back into that deceptive comfort that views the outbreak of martial struggle as something monstrous and entirely unexpected.”

Ernst Moritz Arndt, who made several trips to Sweden and was one of the most important early 19th-century German nationalist writers of the Napoleonic Wars and beyond, came late to the discussions concerning people of the north and south. His thoughts were guided by the principle that people became like their land. In 1844 he wrote: “Much here in the North that seems born happy and triumphant remains undeveloped or semi-developed like a clump of substance, rotting away in the fullness of its germs and drives that never finds the necessary sun. In the south, everything finds its natural development easily. In the north, a lot decays because of overabundance that cannot gain proportion and form.”

As evenhanded as Arndt sounds here, he thought the halfway point between the Arctic and the Equator was the ideal soil for cultural development — not coincidentally this was where he himself called home. For Arndt, the Germans were the epitome of settledness despite admittedly being, “as Christians, roving pilgrims and foreigners on earth in all respects.” The antithesis of Germans, in Arndt’s eyes, were “the Jews and gypsies scattered and intimidated across the great world, who never had a place on earth where they had the right to lay their heads.”

Obsessed with all things German and preaching a philosophy of Nordic love of nature, Arndt wasn’t even slightly interested in the historical and cultural connections between Europe and India that many of his contemporaries were investigating. His world was divided along clear lines: on the one hand the Germanic tribes, on the other the Romans; on the one hand the Germans, on the other the Jews; on the one hand the forest, on the other the desert. He degraded the semi-nomadic Sámi people as “spoilers of the forest,” while on another occasion he berated Italy as the “land of lemons and bandits.”

A little later, the talk about North, South and East and the peoples and mentalities associated with these directions began to take a decidedly different turn. In 1853, the French diplomat Joseph Arthur de Gobineau published the first half of his study “The Inequality of the Human Races.” He broke humanity down into the “white, yellow, and black” races — intending them to be understood in precisely that hierarchical order. Gobineau had a romanticized fascination for all things Oriental, and the following year brought an opportunity to further develop his ideas in a place that suited his fancy when he was sent to Tehran as a secretary to the French diplomatic mission there. During his three-year stay, he threw himself into learning the Persian language and Persian history. Before he began working on his book, he had spent the preceding decade studying the leading philosophers of his time. In 1843, Alexis de Tocqueville, one of France’s major liberal intellectuals and the author of “Democracy in America,” engaged Gobineau’s services for a research project on the origins of customs and morals in modern Europe.

For Gobineau, humanity was in decline, and racial intermingling was the reason. He loathed democracy and revolution and considered the Germanic peoples to be the creators of modern European culture, calling the Baltic coast and the Scandinavian Peninsula the “maternal lap of nations.” He considered the Aryans — the “honorable men” — to be superior. Gobineau turned the term Aryan, which until that point had only been used in a linguistic sense, into an ideological cypher for “Indo-Germanic.” The basis of this shift in meaning was a fateful conflation of the supposed congenital nature of a person (“race”) and their culture (“language”).

While the use of the term “Nordic,” which is connected to the German “nordisch,” meaning belonging to the North of Europe, can be traced long back in time, Russian-French anthropologist Joseph Deniker, chief librarian at the Paris Natural History Museum from 1888, first applied the term “nordique” to the concept of “races.” Things gained further momentum during the early 20th century, when racial categories were linked with earlier mythic ideas about Northern and Southern mentality and the idea of “blood.”

One important work in this context was “The Passing of the Great Race; or, The Racial Basis of European History,” published in the United States in 1916 and still one of the most famous and notorious racist texts ever. Its author, Madison Grant, was the scion of a wealthy New York family who devoted himself to his racial obsessions. Grant promoted the “Nordic race” as superior and responsible for Western civilization’s greatest achievements. His book discussed the geographical migration of peoples and “races” and glorified light skin and blond hair. In Grant’s view, the “great race” had originated in the forests and plains of eastern Germany, Poland and Russia. He also advanced the strange notion that Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo and Dante must have had “Nordic blood.”

While German philosopher of history Oswald Spengler, in his epochal work “The Decline of the West” (1918), didn’t lionize the North to the extent of many of his contemporaries, he nonetheless gave a decisive role in the course of world history to the people who lived there, writing that the “old Northern races, in whose primitive souls the Faustian [spirit] was already awakening, discovered in their grey dawn the art of sailing the seas which emancipated them. The Egyptians knew the sail, but only profited by it as a labor-saving device. They sailed, as they had done before in their oared ships, along the coast to Punt and Syria, but the idea of the high-seas voyage — what it meant as a liberation, a symbol — was not in them.” “Because of an internal reason,” Spengler wrote, the men of antiquity — and thus of the South — could not become conquerors, and “the Romans made no attempt to penetrate the interior of Africa.”

Intellectuals across Europe continued to glorify the North, reaching higher and higher levels of hyperbole. The South didn’t even enjoy its symbolic monopoly on the light anymore: Scandinavia as the realm of the midnight sun and bright light. The dark days and long nights of winter that weighed so heavily on the first European travelers to the region were hardly ever mentioned.

Speculative theories proliferating about “the North” and “the South” possessed an irresistible appeal to those who repeatedly tried to define those concepts. In 1929, Prussian Culture Minister and Orientalist Carl Heinrich Becker wrote: “The South is what we don’t have but desire. The North is very different. We feel the North present deep within our most personal life. We cannot escape it. It lives in our blood, in the mysterious depths of our personality as a people and as individuals. Our creative spirit somehow comes from the south, but the primeval creative power of our soul is of northern origin.”

After Adolf Hitler had come to power, the Nazis found like-minded allies in the nearby South, in Italy. And since Nazi ideologues understood the ancient Greeks as part of the “Aryan race,” there were no obstacles to enlisting them for the cause, especially as National Socialist visions of the ideal human body were borrowed from sculptures of ancient Greek athletes. This logic was extended to include the notions that “Aryans” had founded the antique culture of southern Europe during the migration of peoples and that the Greeks were “Aryan brothers” of the Germans, who, curiously, were also seen as having come down from the North. In a 1935 proclamation by Bernhard Rust, the Nazi minister for science, education and popular training, this vacuous theory was declared a fact that was henceforth to be promoted without contradiction: “World history is to be presented as the history of racially determined ethnicities. Taking the place of the school of ‘ex oriente lux’ (meaning “from the East comes the light”) is the knowledge that at least all of the Occidental cultures — in Asia Minor, Greece, Rome and the rest of the European countries — are primarily the work of Nordic peoples, most of whom prevailed in battle with other races.” And the Nazis had no objection to depictions of Italian and Arcadian landscapes, and Roman virtues were proclaimed as German ones as well, since both groups were considered Indo-Germanic. The Germanic tribes were thus no longer seen as the antipode of the Romans, as they had been in previous simple North-South antitheses. The main line of conflict now ran between Germanic people and Semitic people, especially the Jews, with all the disastrous consequences that ensued.


Bernd Brunner is an author
May 6, 2022

Adapted from “Extreme North: A Cultural History,” W. W. Norton, 2022 (original translation by Jefferson Chase, a few paragraphs are not part of the English-language edition)
The (Downplayed) Story of Female Scholars, Teachers and Leaders in Islam

The vibrant history of successful Muslim women has been disregarded and dismissed by conservative groups like the Taliban
June 3, 2022
French female imam Kahina Bahloul leads a Friday prayer in Paris on Feb. 21, 2020 / Lucas Barioulet / AFP via Getty Images


On the outskirts of Kabul, beneath shimmering snowflakes on a winter’s morning in 1099 CE, thousands braved the frost as they followed the bier of an eminent scholar and the region’s mufti. No, dear reader, this was not a man, but a woman: Biba al-Harthamiah. Biba was just one of hundreds of Muslim female scholars who once occupied positions of prestige and influence in the Muslim world yet who are now all but forgotten.

For 20 years, Afghan women and girls were permitted to excel in areas as diverse as jurisprudence, medicine, academia, professional soccer, robotics and classical music. Yet the current leadership is defining these accomplishments as part of an aberrant period, in conflict with Afghan historical culture and traditional Islamic norms. The Taliban are asserting a vision of Afghan society in which women can be prohibited from many areas of social participation and must abide by strict gender norms and forms of male guardianship.

Outside observers may thus understandably assume that Islam discourages or forbids female empowerment, success and participation in secular society. The association of Islam with restrictive gender norms and discouraging women and girls from developing and exercising self-agency is not a dilemma only for Afghan women. It is a genuine issue in different places: Muslim women in less-constrained societies often struggle with conflicting frameworks of values, one in which they are encouraged to develop their potential and contribute to society and another in which straying from clearly defined gender limitations is seen to detract from their piety, dignity and responsibilities as daughters, wives or mothers.

Ultraconservatives justify their restrictive treatment of women on two primary bases, namely Islam and historical cultural norms. But how definitive are these bases in substantiating their worldview? The strict patriarchal views espoused by the Taliban, and indeed others, primarily stem from their understanding of Quranic references such as “qawamah” and “nushuz,” often mistranslated as “guardianship” and “rebelliousness,” respectively. According to the worldview of the Taliban and other patriarchal interpreters, these concepts designate men as naturally superior to women and invest men with the control and responsibility of guardianship over them. In this worldview, women cannot be trusted to make decisions on their own and are regarded as susceptible to error and corruption.

Added to these concepts are pre-Islamic tribal ideals of morality and shame, linking women’s behavior to the honor of men and society. In this conception of society, men need to keep women in order, constraining their “evil” and preventing women from bringing shame on them, their family name and their community. This unfortunate cultural mindset underlies many harmful social practices and, in extreme cases, produces evils such as honor killing.

The interpretation of “qawwamun” as “guardians” relies on an association with the related word “qa’imun,” which means guardian or caretaker. Though sharing a root, the words have two distinctive connotations — the former is about flexible support, the latter about providing guardianship. A variation of the former concept, in the context of a building the word “qawa’im” refers to its internal supporting pillars; on the other hand, the “qa’imun” of a building are its custodians and guardians. Even Abdel Aziz Bin Baz, the former Saudi mufti, said in commentary about the verses: “The qawamah of men is one of responsibility to provide care (takleef) and not a privilege (tashreef).”

The term “nushuz” — commonly interpreted as female rebelliousness — literally describes the protruding fangs of an antagonized snake secreting venom. This image implies that “nushuz” is not a female characteristic or permanent state of being but a situation that arises from time to time in reaction to a threat. The Quran employs the term “nushuz” only twice, both in the same chapter, once in reference to women (4:34) and once in reference to men (4:128). Rather than an essential character deficiency in women‌, this word describes a situation that refers to either or both parties in the marriage, which can be remedied with the correct intervention. Hence, a more accurate understanding of “nushuz” refers to a toxic atmosphere in a relationship or in the behavior of the parties involved.

The conservative interpretation of these two terms is difficult to square when “nushuz” is applied equally to men and women: If men are superior guardians of women, how can they be described on their terms, as “rebellious and disobedient”? To maintain their interpretation, the text has to be further manipulated by providing a different definition of “nushuz” for a man — it is when they “deny their wives carnal gratification.” Yet, far from justifying a rigid patriarchal hierarchy, the Quran speaks of the importance of mutual support between husband and wife and offers ways for both men and women to address and heal from toxicity within their marriage.

Prior to the advent of puritanical or fundamental movements, the more constraining view of women needing guardians instead of support was not the dominant view. This view seems widely accepted because it has been emphasized in public discourse to the extent that it has become normative within the Muslim community. This, in turn, makes it difficult to discuss the alternative view without sounding revisionist. In other words, this is not a problem of original sources but of ideological indoctrination. Still, the point here is not to tackle an ideological mindset and prove or disprove one reading or the other definitively, but to show that the meaning as defined by conservatives is not as universally agreed as they make it sound. Do not take my word for it — the 13th-century classical Arabic dictionary Lisan al-Arab has an entry about verse 4:34 substantiating the distinction between “qawwamun” and “qa’imun” as made earlier, in contrast to the common interpretation espoused by conservative groups.

The terms are appropriated to suit restrictive measures imposed by society, which brings us to the second basis of the conservative justification, namely Afghan cultural norms that ignore history, as the forgotten story of Biba al-Harthamiah demonstrates.

The legacy of outstanding Muslim women stretches back to the days of the Prophet Muhammad, who not only considered women capable of leadership but also appointed them to prominent positions. This is unsurprising, given that he and his successors had several female mentors. He had worked for his first wife, Khadijah, running her business between Mecca and the Levant, until their marriage. Barakah, also known by her epitaph Umm Ayman, served as a close adviser to two of his successors (Abu Bakr and Umar), who held her counsel in high regard.

While there is a common understanding among Muslims that women cannot hold positions of religious leadership or scholarship, the Prophet Muhammad himself provided two clear counterexamples: naming Umm Waraqah as an imam of her community and Ash-Shifa bint Abdillah as Medina’s head educator. He named Umm Waraqah as an imam “because she had mastered the art of the Quran and memorized it” and assigned to her a muezzin, the person who calls people to prayers at the mosque. The implication was that the Prophet allowed a woman to lead congregational prayers, and this congregation was open to those outside of her immediate family and household.

The majority of Islamic scholars agree that a woman can lead other women in prayers, especially among three of the four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence — the Hanafi, Shafi’i and Hanbali — based on the example of both Aishah and Umm Salamah leading women in prayers. However, scholars differ on whether a woman can lead men in prayer. They cite limitations of rearing children, menstruation and other responsibilities that make it difficult for women to lead prayers regularly. This remains a point of contention and an open debate.

Based on the examples of Umm Waraqah and Ash-Shifa, eminent scholars such as At-Tabari (ninth century), Ibn Hazm (11th), Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (12th) and Ibn Abidin (19th) have declared that a woman can hold public office.

Though Umm Waraqah is virtually unknown today, she is referenced in numerous manuscripts held in Timbuktu, Damascus, Istanbul and other places, including highly authoritative works like “Al-Ahkam As-Sultaniyyah” by Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi in the 11th century, “Al-Mughni” by Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi (13th) and “Irwa al-Ghalil” by Nasir al-Din al-Albani, who died in 1999. A reference to the Prophet Muhammad’s actions by Ibn al-Qattan, an authority on Hadith in 13th-century Córdoba, mentions “Imamatu Umm Waraqata bi-qawmiha” (Umm Waraqa leading her people), which is broader than her neighborhood, implying that she led a larger district. Another acclaimed scholar further east in 13th-century Syria, An-Nawawi, also cited three top jurists as permitting women to lead men in prayer.

Even the strict Ibn Taymiyyah, the ideological inspiration for several ultraconservative movements today, declared, “Ahmad [founder of the Hanbali school] permitted a woman to lead men in prayer, when the need arises, in cases when she is an expert on the Quran, when men are not, so she can lead them in the night prayers of Ramadan [“taraweeh”], the same way that the Prophet anointed Umm Waraqah as an Imam for her neighborhood and assigned a muezzin to her.” Ibn Taymiyyah clearly reiterates: “I say, for men to be led by a woman who is an expert in the Quran during taraweeh is permissible, based on the widely known [traditions] from the opinion of Ahmad.”

Summing up the general view, Andalusian sage Ibn Arabi declared, “There are those who unconditionally permit women to lead men in prayers, which is my opinion as well. There are those who completely prohibit her from such leadership and there are those who permit her to lead women, but not men.” He further explains his view, “The default state is that her leadership is permissible, and one should not heed to those who prohibit it without concrete proof, for there is no clear text to support their claim, and any evidence they bring forth could include them in the prohibition as well, thereby neutralizing the evidence in this regard, and maintaining the default state of her leadership’s permissibility.”


The Prophet Muhammad declared education not only a fundamental right, but also a solemn duty of all his followers. He taught that to teach a man is to educate an individual, yet to teach a woman is to inspire a nation.

The Prophet Muhammad declared education not only a fundamental right but also a solemn duty of all his followers. In fact, he taught that to teach a man is to educate an individual, yet to teach a woman is to inspire a nation. He understood very well that women not only teach their children but also influence their husbands. And if their husbands are powerful, they affect entire communities and a nation.

The Quran advises its readers, both female and male, to compete in seeking knowledge, and over 40 times it invokes not just rote memorization but the more nuanced concept of “aql,” connoting the development and use of reason and rational synthesis based on extensive research and analysis. Furthermore, the Quran instructed readers to increase their capacity in all forms of beneficial knowledge and understanding. It employed the concept of “ilm” in its indefinite form to encompass both spiritual and secular knowledge, as attested by the Prophet Muhammad hiring math and language tutors for his wife.

When the Prophet died in 632, his legacy to posterity was a book: the first manuscript of the Quran, the very first book to be written in the Arabic language. Despite the many men who could have been given the honor of custodianship of the manuscript, it was entrusted to a woman: Hafsah Bint Umar. Muhammad’s choice to give this task to a woman indicates that he held women in high regard. It was this very copy that would later be borrowed by Uthman, the third caliph, to compile the five standard copies of the scripture.

Biba Al-Harthamiah, the eminent female scholar from medieval Kabul, was not an anomaly. We have detailed records of scholars and teachers, thanks to the traditional Islamic approach to learning, whereby scholars established their credibility via unbroken chains of transmission. What is truly remarkable is the sheer number of women under whom eminent Islamic scholars studied. For example, 12th-century scholar Ibn al-Samaani studied under 69 female scholars; Muhammad Ibn al-Najjar (13th century) studied under 400 female scholars; Al-Sakhawi (15th) studied under 60 female scholars; and Al-Suyuti (16th) studied under 59 female scholars.

This trend was set from the very beginning of Islam. Thousands of men attended the great seventh-century jurist Umm Ad-Darda As-Sughra’s classes at the Umayyad Mosque, including the caliph Abdul-Malik ibn Marwan, who himself sat on the ground at her feet. In fact, one of her students, the celebrated scholar Iyas ibn Muawiyah al-Muzani, considered her to be the supreme authority of her time, surpassing all others.

In the 12th century, Fatimah As-Samarqandi was the mufti of Samarqand and served as an adviser and mentor to the legendary Crusades-era Salahaddin (Saladin). Fatimah was a brilliant scholar who amassed many certifications (called ijazah) from the most prominent scholars of her age and taught at prestigious academies in Syria.

Zaynab Bint al-Kamal of Damascus, one of scores of female teachers who taught the prolific Syrian scholar and historian Ibn Kathir, was considered a leading authority in the conservative Hanbali school in the 14th century. Several scholars of the school, including Ibn Taymiyyah, remarked how “she stood upon the pulpit with authority and spoke with great eloquence and erudition.” Zaynab was considered the top authority in the discipline of Hadith and was granted the prestigious title “Musnidat al-Sham” (senior transmission authority of the Levant).

Not only did women teach across the Islamic world, they also dominated many educational settings as students as well. The 12th-century eminent Syrian scholar Ibn Asakir documented concerns by men of his time about how women in classes “outnumbered” and “intimidated” them because of their “strong confidence and character.” Ibn Asakir informs us, “I personally studied at the feet of 80 female scholars, who surpassed their male counterparts in their respective fields.”

It is estimated that from the years 800 to 1100, Muslim women were credited with establishing over 35% of libraries and academic institutions in the Islamic world. They were led by the likes of Zubaidah (ninth century), who was a driving force and main sponsor behind the famed Bayt al-Hikamah at the time (The House of Wisdom) and Fatima al-Fihri, who established the world’s oldest, continually running university in 859 in Fez, Morocco. Both institutions had vast libraries, counting tens of thousands of books, launched with donations by these entrepreneurial women.

Women not only served as scholars and patrons of the arts but also held prominent positions of public authority. Influential women who held such offices included Lubna of Córdoba. An adviser to the caliph and polymath, Lubna distinguished herself as a master librarian and acquisition expert. When establishing the famed library at Medinat al-Zahra, she teamed up with Jewish scholar Hasdai ibn Shaprut to assemble a valuable collection of some 500,000 books. Despite being a former slave, 12th-century biographer Ibn Bashkuwal described Lubna as a “scholarly author, grammarian, poetess, erudite in arithmetic, comprehensive in her learning; none in the citadel was as noble as she.”

The formerly enslaved African, Thamal Al-Qahramanah, made history in 918 when she became the first female justice of the powerful Abbasid Empire. Notable scholars such as the 12th century’s Ibn al-Jawzi and al-Suyuti in the 16th century provided details of her office and mentioned that it “was not considered unusual at the time for a woman to preside over men in a public office so high.”

Women also ruled or governed, with over 90 attaining the position of “al-malikah al-hurrah,” meaning “the independent, sovereign queen.” Among those who combined both secular and academic authority were Razia of Delhi in the 13th century, patron of schools and libraries in northern India, and the 12th century’s Arwa As-Sulaihi, who was the senior scholarly authority and ruler of Yemen. Attaining the prestigious academic rank of “hujjah,” meaning “proof” or ”authority,” she is credited with establishing many of Yemen’s public libraries and academic institutions.

Why is it that, with such strong textual evidence, as well as practical evidence like the fact that women can pray next to men in the holy mosque in Mecca, women are still relegated to the back of so many mosques? Why is scripture in conflict with general behavior? On what basis did some communities decide to allow women to have a public role, and why did others turn their back on this rich history?

In some places, women can be jailed for preaching Islam in public, while in others, such as Turkey, they are increasing in number, with several hundred female preachers in the country, some even leading pilgrims to Mecca. Hui Muslim women in China have had their own mosques, where women have led them for over 300 years.

In Iran, a ban on women leading prayers was lifted in 2000, after a group of high-ranking ayatollahs issued the decree. Ali Asghar Nuri, then an official in the Iranian Education Ministry, said: “The employment of women as leaders of Friday congregation prayers at the head of other women during prayers held at schools constitutes a major development.”

Where does this leave us now? From the largely forgotten legacy of Muslim women, we learn that the development of women’s potential and their leadership is not inherently against an Islamic framework of values; it has, in fact, figured prominently throughout Muslim history. Yet we witness other voices, both in history and in our contemporary world, which present a much more constraining perspective toward women. Hence, the fundamental question is not whether Islam encourages or constrains women’s empowerment and exercise of leadership but rather who controls the narrative.

Understanding the history of Islam and the behavior of its founder provides a healthy example for the contemporary world. Though Afghanistan’s leaders may have forgotten Biba Al-Harthamiah, Afghans and others would do well to remember they once had leaders like her.

Mohamad Jebara is the author of “Muhammad the World-Changer: An Intimate Portrait” and the forthcoming “Life of the Qur’an”
ISIS WAR ON SUFIS
Afghanistan’s Sufis Are Under Attack

Recent bombing of a mosque in Kabul shows the growing security problems facing the Taliban government
Afghan followers of Sufism recite poetic verses from the Koran at the Pahlawan Mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan / Robert Nickelsberg / Getty Images

As I passed through my final years of high school in Kabul, it did not cross my mind that I might be able to go on and study at university. My father had just died from a long illness and, like so many Afghan teenagers, I was already thinking about how I might be able to support my family. We were poor enough that I had only one set of shirt and trousers to wear to my last two years of classes, so I knew I would have to find a job sooner rather than later.

I graduated from school in 2006 and, although times were tough on a personal level, there was a sense of optimism in much of the country back then. It’s true that security was starting to deteriorate, but memories of the 1990s civil war were still fresh in everyone’s minds, and there was a widespread belief that the international community would not abandon Afghanistan again.

After trying and failing to find a job with various NGOs for reasons none of them cared to explain, I was persuaded by one of my younger brothers to visit a local Sufi — “tasawwuf” — mosque in the hope that it might change my luck. I must admit that I initially laughed at his suggestion, not because I disliked Sufis but because I was skeptical of any practices that went against my belief in the more traditional tenets of Islam. I regard myself as a socially progressive Muslim who shows his devotion to God in conventional ways. I could not see how a visit to this particular mosque might be any better for me than praying in my usual mosque or at home. In the end, however, I agreed to go there to boost the morale of my brother and mother.

We cycled to the Khalifa Sahib mosque in Aladdin, a neighborhood in west Kabul near Parliament and the American University, and sat down to talk to one of its scholarly custodians. I remember him being a kind man who listened quietly from under his flat white turban as I explained about my futile search for a job. He then took out some paper talismans and told my brother to burn or smoke one at night. Another one he gave us was to be put in a glass of water, dissolved and drunk the next morning.

We obeyed his instructions and, while my luck didn’t change in the short term, it did eventually. I later found work as a journalist and graduated with a degree in Islamic law from Kabul University. I do not attribute this change in fortune to the Sufi mosque, but I have always looked back on that visit with fondness. I was a young man — a boy, really — going through a hard time, and it meant a lot to me to receive the kindness of a stranger, however eccentric his advice might have been.

Unfortunately, this memory of a more innocent time has taken on a melancholy hue in recent weeks. On April 29 an explosion ripped through that same Sufi mosque after Friday prayers. At least 10 people, and perhaps more than 50, were killed. There is confusion about whether the blast was a suicide attack or the result of a bomb planted at the scene, but it was not an isolated incident. A week earlier, on April 22, the Mawlawi Sekander Sufi mosque in the northern city of Kunduz was hit by a similar attack that killed at least 33 people and wounded dozens more. The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for that blast and is also believed to have been behind the bloodshed in Kabul. With Shia Muslims as well as Sufis being increasingly targeted, it is clear that attempts are underway to ignite a sectarian war in Afghanistan. History suggests this will not work, but nothing is certain anymore.

Sufism has roots in this country that are far older than the kind of ideology practiced by the Islamic State. While Afghans are often wary of its more esoteric aspects — such as the way worshipers engage in “dhikr” (chanting) to show their devotion to God — its mysticism has traditionally been a source of comfort for many people here. The sick visit Sufi shrines in search of cures for cancer or depression; infertile women go to them looking for the miracle they need to have a child. This has started to change in recent years and of course it would be better if everyone trusted in science, but it seems churlish to rebuke Afghans for finding hope wherever they can. During times of darkness we occasionally need artificial light.

Sufism is not a sect or a type of jurisprudence but a form of Islamic belief that emphasizes the mystical, peaceful aspects of our religion and prioritizes inner contemplation. As far as the Islamic State is concerned, this is enough to make Sufis idolators. But attacks such as the one on April 29 in Kabul are attacks on the heritage and culture of all Afghans. We do not have to be Sufis to understand and appreciate the role that Sufism has played in our history.

There are four main Sufi orders in Afghanistan and the wider region: the Chishti, the Qadiriyya, the Suhrawardiyya and the Naqshbandi. The Chishti originated near Herat in western Afghanistan, and some of our greatest poets were Sufis. The most famous of them, Jalaluddin Rumi, was born in Balkh in northern Afghanistan in the early 13th century. The United Nations cultural agency (UNESCO) celebrated his work in 2007, the same year I went to the Sufi mosque in Kabul. The U.N. secretary-general at the time, Ban Ki-moon, described Rumi’s work as “timeless” and praised his “humanist philosophy.” We Afghans also claim Abdur Rahman Baba, a 15th- and 16th-century Sufi poet from Peshawar, as one of our own and continue to draw inspiration from his writing.

Afghan Sufis fought against the Soviet occupation of our country in the 1980s, just like more hardline jihadists. Three of the seven Sunni mujahedeen parties during that time were led by Sufis. They may not have been as militarily effective as their rivals, but their followers still made enormous sacrifices in the name of defending Afghanistan and Islam.

Although the Taliban’s relationship with the Sufi community is complex, it is certainly not openly hostile. Afghan Sufi scholars have been vocal in their support for the current government and often refer to Sirajuddin Haqqani, the minister of interior, using the honorific “Khalifa” — a title traditionally given to Sufi disciples who reach scholarly levels of enlightenment. The respect seems both genuine and mutual, and it is arguably a good example of the compromises we Afghans need to make if we want our country to move forward. The shamans who always used to roam around Kabul collecting alms are no longer visible on the streets and seem to have been discouraged from carrying out their rituals in public since the Taliban’s takeover, but that is the only sign I have noticed of the Islamic Emirate possibly acting against Sufism.

This cordial relationship between the government and the Sufi community may be only a small cause for optimism, but it is worth noting. Given the increased activity of the Islamic State of late and the criticisms that have rightly been leveled at some of the Taliban’s more repressive social policies, we need to recognize that there is still some cause for hope. Whether this can be built on may well depend on whether security gets significantly worse.

A month after the attack on the Sufi mosque in Kabul, the Taliban marked the sixth anniversary of the death of their former leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan in 2016. To honor his memory, several senior officials attended a commemorative event on May 22 in a wedding hall in Kabul, the kind of place that would once have been the scene of raucous late-night parties. Although the atmosphere was measured, the meeting was revolutionary in its own way. The former head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha and current deputy foreign minister, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, used the occasion to call for girls’ schools to be reopened and for women’s rights to be respected. Even that meeting, however, was not allowed to pass peacefully. An explosion hit several vehicles parked outside, causing unknown numbers of casualties. This time a group calling itself the National Liberation Front claimed responsibility. Exactly who they are and what they want is unclear.

These kinds of mysterious attacks took place regularly under the governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, and the Taliban will be keen to ensure they do not get out of hand. This spring we have often been without electricity in Kabul because the pylons in the north of the country that supply the city are being routinely targeted in sabotage operations. On the streets here no one is quite sure whether to blame rebel groups linked to the old Northern Alliance or hostile states — or, perhaps, both. Even as I write these lines at home now, I have just heard an explosion in the near distance. I will wait for the sound of ambulance sirens or a call from a friend or relative to find out if anyone was hurt.


Fazelminallah Qazizai is the Afghanistan correspondent at New Lines
June 1, 2022
“Letter from Kabul” is a newsletter in which our contributors provide their own unique glimpses into life on the ground in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan

SEE



Arab History Through Medieval Spanish Eyes — with Aymenn Al-Tamimi

New Lines Podcast
June 10, 2022
The Medieval city from the tower of the Alcazar fortress, Toledo, Spain
 / JMN / Getty Images


You could see a parallel between hostility to Islam today 
and hostility in the Middle Ages. I think it’s still there.

The bishop of Toledo, Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, wrote “Historia Arabum” in the 13th century. The book is one of the earliest accounts of Arabic history written by a Western author. It was translated from the original Latin into Arabic by Aymenn Al-Tamimi, a non-resident fellow at the New Lines Institute and a PhD student at the University of Swansea in Wales. In this podcast, he joins New Lines’ Lydia Wilson to discuss the book and his reasons for translating it.

Rodrigo’s Europe was awash with Arabic influences. Though popular interpretations of medieval history usually focus on the Crusades and other instances of religious confrontation, European Christian scholars nevertheless held great respect for the achievements of their Islamic counterparts, and Latin translations of Arabic works were in high demand. Even Rodrigo himself, who participated in the Christian “reconquista” of Spain, shared this ambivalent view. “You see even words of praise given to various Muslim rulers of Al Andalus,” Al-Tamimi points out.

Any appreciation of the Islamic world’s philosophical and scientific prowess, however, did little to assuage his antipathy toward Islam itself, which he denounced as the “false sect of Muhammad.” Al-Tamimi sees the roots of modern European Islamophobia in these medieval attitudes: “I think it’s still there.”

And yet Rodrigo also described the Arabs of Spain as being an integral part of the country. This apparent contradiction, Al-Tamimi explains, is actually quite instructive. Rodrigo, he says, was “happy to tolerate the Muslims in Spain provided that they were subject to Christian power.” That logic continues to underpin many supremacist social arrangements today.

New Lines Magazine · Arab History Through Medieval Spanish Eyes — with Aymenn Al-Tamimi and Lydia Wilson

Produced by Joshua Martin


A 13th-Century Text Teaches Us About Arabs and Europeans

A Catholic bishop’s writings reveal much about tolerance and coexistence in medieval Andalusia

Antique engraving depicting the town of Granada in the South of Spain / Getty Images


There has been much interest in the depiction of Arabs in contemporary Western culture and literature, whether in popular movies, newspapers or books. Concerns about negative depictions in earlier centuries, too, led to the term “Orientalist” being widely seen as pejorative. What if, however, we try to go even further back? In fact, how far back can we go? What was the earliest Western book focused specifically on Arabs and their history?

​​I did not actively set out to discover such a book but stumbled upon it by chance while I was looking into the subject of Latin translations of the Quran. Eventually I was to translate a 13th-century Latin text, “Historia Arabum” (History of the Arabs) into Arabic, as I have long believed that there should be more translation of Latin works into Arabic in general, and this work would surely be of interest to Arab readers. More recently, I have also done an English translation that had not been done before, though there have been others — one into medieval Castilian, an early form of Spanish, in the 14th century, and more recently into German, in 2006.

In the process of translation and analysis, I struggled with many questions and seeming contradictions in this work, which was unusual for its time in its apparent objectivity and use of Arabic sources. This was particularly surprising given the prologue, which primes the reader to expect a polemic against Arabs and Muslims: the threat they posed to Christendom and the destruction they caused in Spain for more than 500 years. Did the apparent inconsistency between the bulk of the book’s content and the prologue reveal something about the author’s “real” attitude toward Arabs and Muslims beneath the surface of hostility to Islam as a religion? What could the work tell us about the author’s own times? Does it have lessons for us today in an increasingly polarized world?

The earliest complete and proper translation of the Quran into Latin (the lingua franca of the educated in medieval Europe) that was generally faithful to the original was completed by Mark of Toledo in 1210 CE. Despite the relative lack of polemical influence on the translation of the text, the reasons for commissioning it were anything but an objective study of Islam. The translator tells us in the prologue that it was at the behest of Toledo Archbishop Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, who lamented how parts of his region were being “infested by the enemies of the cross” and that they still had control of some areas in the region. Where sacrifices to Christ were once offered, now the name of “the false prophet” was extolled. Rodrigo wanted the Quran translated so that its “sacrilegious institutes and monstrous precepts” should come to the attention of true Christian believers, and he could at least try to refute the Muslims through polemic if he could not do it through arms.

It is to this same Rodrigo that the distinction of composing the first Western book on Arab history belongs. Rodrigo, who was born in 1170 CE and served as archbishop of Toledo from 1209 until his death in 1247, lived through a key period of transition in Spain’s history that saw a significant reduction in Muslim power on the Iberian Peninsula. By the time of his death, Muslim rule was largely reduced to the Emirate of Granada, which had already become a mere tributary of the Christian kingdom of Castile and had emerged from the vacuum that the withdrawal of the Berber Almohad Caliphate from Spain left behind.

Rodrigo himself played a noteworthy role in blunting and reversing the Almohads’ fortunes in Spain, as he mobilized support for Crusader campaigns against them in Iberia and participated in the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 alongside King Alfonso VIII of Castile, which was a decisive defeat for the Almohads and probably the high point of Rodrigo’s career. But while Rodrigo may have contributed to the decline of Muslim influence in Spain, his own fortunes and influence within Christian Spain also went into decline, particularly in the last decade or so of his life. Besides ultimately failing in his quest to make the church of Toledo preeminent in the hierarchy of the Catholic church, Rodrigo himself ended up being exiled from Toledo by the city council amid controversies of corruption and favoritism.

Rodrigo’s primary legacy is his written output, and his main interest was in history. His first work was probably the “Breviarium Historie Catholice” (Summary of Catholic History), a book of liturgy guiding daily worship and prayer as well as a world history that begins from the time of the Creation of the world by God until the dispersal of the Apostles to preach the Gospel with the gift of languages. The work largely consists of quotations from the Bible with narrative elaborations and commentary, drawing heavily on a popular Bible companion work by the French scholar Peter Comestor. In commenting on verses of Genesis that apparently predict the rise of Ishmael (one of Abraham’s sons and the reputed ancestor of the Arabs), Rodrigo considers the later Arab conquests to be a fulfillment of the pronouncement that Ishmael will be a “wild man.” It is also here that Rodrigo first indicated his desire to write a history of the Arabs: “Concerning these things and the line of Ishmael, I have intended to follow up on the genealogy and deeds of his people in another volume if the Lord grants.”

This intention eventually came to fruition with “Historia Arabum,” which was the last work Rodrigo composed in his life, completed around 1245-1246. The book is not a standalone work but the last of a five-book “History of Spain” series, originally commissioned by King Ferdinand III and probably begun by Rodrigo in the 1230s. The first book, by far the longest with nine mini-“books” of its own, is called the “Gothic History,” telling the history of Spain from its first settlement by some descendants of Noah through the conquest of Spain by the Visigoths (a Germanic people who ultimately established their kingdom in Spain following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, ruling a united peninsula before the Muslim conquest that began in 711), then the Christian kingdoms that arose in Iberia following the Muslim conquest, which were seen as effective “successors” of the Visigoths. The entire eighth book of the series is taken up by the events of the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. The last major event covered in the whole series is the Christian reconquest of Córdoba in 1236 and the conversion of its grand mosque into a cathedral.

The remaining history books of Rodrigo are in effect supplements that are intended to help the reader understand how foreign peoples have contributed to Spain’s history. In the second book, he deals with the history of the Romans; in the third book, the Vandals, Alans and Suevi (who established realms in Spain in the fifth century CE and were ultimately supplanted by the Visigoths); in the fourth book, the Ostrogoths (who ruled Italy and briefly controlled Gothic holdings in Spain through unification under Theodoric the Great); and finally the Arabs.

The “Historia Arabum” is by far the longest of these supplemental books, spanning a prologue and 49 chapters. It gives an account of Arab history that can effectively be divided into three parts: a biography of the Prophet Muhammad; a general account of Arab history detailing the immediate successors to Muhammad and the era of the Umayyad caliphate, including the conquest of Spain; and finally, a part focusing exclusively on Arab/Muslim history in Spain. This last part continues the narrative from the rise of the Umayyad Emirate of Córdoba (independent from the Abbasid Caliphate) through to its evolution into a rival caliphate, and then its final collapse in 1031, followed by the rise of the independent ta’ifa mini-states in the region, briefly charting the Berber Almoravid dynasty, which subjugated the ta’ifa states only to be eventually replaced by the Almohads (whose rise is dealt with in the Gothic history).

How does Rodrigo depict Arabs in the “Historia Arabum”? What sources did he use? The opening prologue gives a highly negative impression of the Arabs, as Rodrigo says that he will relate the “disasters” they brought, just as he related previously how Spain endured losses “in the piles of calamities.” For “532 years and beyond,” Spain was repeatedly cut apart by their sword, and only with the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa was “the sword of the Arabs blunted” and “the Gothic strength restored,” thus opening up “the paths of revenge for the Christians.” Intending to begin his history of the Arabs from the time of Muhammad, Rodrigo hopes to “uncover the savagery and cunning” of the Arabs. The reader should notice how Muhammad’s “false” revelation “bound lustful souls in knots, as it were” and so the young should learn to “abstain from fables, be bound by the cords of Adam and be drawn by the bonds of kindness.”

The biography Rodrigo gives of Muhammad, then, is intended as an “anti-hagiography.” But it is more than a simple diatribe against Islam’s founder. While Rodrigo sees Muhammad as a malicious liar driven primarily by a lust for power, the biography he presents generally marks a notable improvement on the already existing and rather extensive body of Latin literature on Muhammad.

Indeed, Rodrigo presents a rather curious amalgamation of material from different sources. On the one hand, it would appear that he was the first Westerner to make detailed use of material from traditional Islamic sources, thus recounting episodes like the splitting of Muhammad’s chest by angels to cleanse and weigh his heart, the placing of the black stone during the renovation of the Kaaba in Mecca, and the story of his night journey and ascension to heaven. Rodrigo’s accounts here bear many parallels with material going back to Ibn Ishaq, the earliest biographer of the Prophet. Rodrigo also appears to have been one of the first Latin writers to establish more clearly the significance of the towns of Mecca and Medina (Yathrib) and the link between them in the Prophet’s life, noting how Muhammad left Mecca for Yathrib as the pagan Quraysh rejected his monotheistic message, only for him to return in triumph later.

On the other hand, Rodrigo’s account also contains some basic errors and elements that would seem strange to those familiar with the Islamic sources, suggesting he was working with translated excerpts compiled by an intermediary. For instance, he gives the name of Muhammad’s father as Ali (rather than Abdullah) and places Muhammad’s birth in Yathrib. He appears to duplicate the character of Muhammad’s first wife, Khadija, saying that Muhammad first worked for a wealthy widow named Hadiya before marrying Khadija and then marrying this Hadiya.

According to Rodrigo, Muhammad was supposedly instructed in secular sciences, Judaism and Catholicism by a Jewish astrologer who was a friend of Muhammad’s father. Muhammad subsequently draws on this education when he devises his religion, as he incorporates elements of both Judaism and Christianity. This element of Rodrigo’s biography is one of the many versions of the “Sergius-Bahira legend” that circulated in medieval Christian writings about Muhammad. This legend combines early Christian legends about a monk named Sergius (who taught Muhammad) and a story in Islamic tradition about a monk named Bahira who predicted Muhammad’s future prophethood. Though there are many versions, the “Sergius-Bahira legend” usually involves a non-Muslim instructor for Muhammad helping him to form the basis of his new religion, thus discrediting the idea that Muhammad received revelations from God.

The culmination of Muhammad’s career, in Rodrigo’s telling, is his elevation to become king of the Arabs, establishing his kingdom in Damascus and ruling for 10 years following a rebellion he led against the Byzantines. This element of the biography has a clearly identifiable source: the “Mozarabic Chronicle,” an anonymous mid-eighth-century Iberian text that is among the first Latin works to mention Muhammad by name and discuss Arab history in any way (it also deals with Byzantine and Visigoth history).

The “Mozarabic Chronicle,” as it turns out, forms the backbone of Rodrigo’s work detailing Muhammad’s immediate successors and the Umayyad Caliphate that followed. This can be seen in the close parallels in language and content between the two works. Indeed, in certain instances, we can identify where Rodrigo has apparently misunderstood the “Mozarabic Chronicle,” either because of poor manuscript transmission or because of difficulty in understanding the sometimes obscure and awkward Latin of the chronicle. In one memorable instance, he confuses the word “dodran” (Latin for “three-quarters”) with the name of a person and tells us that a character named “Dedran” incited rebellion during the reign of al-Walid II, thus bringing Spain into a state of turmoil.

The reliance on the “Mozarabic Chronicle” also means that Rodrigo follows the original source’s judgments on Arab rulers and governors, positive or negative. Thus, contrary to how the Umayyad caliph Yazid I is often reviled in popular Muslim memory for the killing of the Prophet’s grandson Hussein, Rodrigo tells us that he was considered “very pleasing to all,” as he never sought the glory of regal dignity but rather lived as a commoner. More glaringly, Rodrigo’s account, following the “Mozarabic Chronicle,” omits Ali’s caliphate, transitioning straight from Othman to the first Umayyad caliph Mu’awiya. Rodrigo informs us of Ali and his caliphate later, in Chapter 18, while relaying an erroneous account that the rival Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties originated from the offspring of Ali and his wife Fatima.

Occasionally, some information is used from sources besides the “Mozarabic Chronicle”: For example, Rodrigo narrates the legend of “Solomon’s table” found during the Muslim conquest of Spain, a story found in Arabic though not Latin sources. Sometimes, Rodrigo confuses information from different sources. The most notable example is when he tells us that “Zama” (al-Samh bin Malik al-Khawlani, an Umayyad governor of Spain) was killed during a failed siege of Toulouse in France, an account he takes from the “Mozarabic Chronicle.” He then tells us that the caliph sent a person named “Azham filius Melic” to govern Spain, providing information on him attested in Arabic sources. Azham filius Melic is the same person as Zama, but Rodrigo does not realize it.

If positive judgments of Arab and Muslim rulers seem rather sparse in this section of the work, they become much more common in the third major section, devoted to independent Umayyad Spain, which is also the most mysterious in terms of its sources. For example, Rodrigo tells us that the Umayyad Emir Hisham I “peacefully governed the whole land with justice and affection.” His successor al-Hakam I favored the poor in many of his judgments, worked to keep criminals in check and generously gave alms. Abd al-Rahman III, who established the independent Umayyad caliphate, governed with justice and sound judgment, and so on. The picture that emerges here is far more nuanced than the impression given by Rodrigo’s prologue, which could lead the reader into thinking that Arab history in Spain consisted of nothing but destruction and disaster. It is also clear that the history Rodrigo documents in this section is more than just Arab history in Spain: the Berbers emerge as a distinct group and faction who influence politics, as do the “eunuchs” — an apparent mistranslation of the Arabic term “fityan,” which refers to ex-slaves of Slavic origin who also came to have an influential role in politics and governance, including the establishment of the ta’ifa states.

The puzzle here is the sources Rodrigo is using. In general, his writings on Muslim Spain do not have any clear parallel in Latin works, though Arabic sources can offer some clues. In one memorable example, following the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate in Córdoba, a certain individual named Umayya asks the people of Córdoba to make him ruler. They tell him that the city is in a state of disturbance and that they fear he will be killed, to which he replies: “Obey me today and kill me tomorrow.” The anecdote, intended to illustrate how love of power brought about the destabilization and collapse of the state, has a direct parallel in the words attributed to him in Arabic sources: “bay’iuni al-yawm wa uqtuluni ghadan” (pledge allegiance to me today and kill me tomorrow).

But Rodrigo shows only superficial understanding of Arab history beyond Spain and after 750, unaware, for example, of rivals to the Abbasids such as the Fatimid Caliphate. On this basis it is very unlikely that Rodrigo was drawing on any Arabic work covering general Arab history, as he would show a more detailed knowledge of events outside Spain. Perhaps the most likely suspect is not a single source but a compendium, given that a lot of medieval Arabic history survives in this form whereby quotations are taken from different sources to present different versions of events.

One possible example is the “day of the ditch”: a massacre of the rebels of Toledo during the reign of al-Hakam I, supposedly involving the digging of a ditch and the dumping of the rebels’ bodies into it after they were beheaded at a banquet to which they had been invited. Rodrigo covers this incident in two chapters, and there are multiple accounts of it in Arabic sources. While Rodrigo’s version does not precisely match a single Arabic account in all the details, it is closer to the family of versions linked to Ibn al-Qutiya (a 10th-century Andalusian historian and grammarian) and other writers than the family of versions linked to Ahmad al-Razi (a 10th-century historian who wrote a history, continued by his son Isa, of the Umayyad rulers in al-Andalus). In this case, comparison is partly enabled by surviving fragments of a compilation work by Ibn Hayyan (a prolific Andalusian compiler and writer of history). That work is called “al-Muqtabis,” and one could suppose that Rodrigo made use of it. However, more portions of it and other lost works would need to be recovered to enable firmer conclusions in that direction.

Regardless of the mystery of Rodrigo’s precise sources, the mere devotion of a book to Arab history, the repeated and extensive use of information coming from Arabic source materials and the general objectivity of much of this work are remarkable, especially in comparison with other medieval works. But does the uniqueness of this text and its approach show something similarly distinct about the author’s attitude toward Arabs and Muslims? In other words, does it demonstrate a tolerance and openness toward them?

There are two competing views on these questions. One is to say that the apparent objectivity of the “Historia Arabum” should not obscure the author’s undoubted hostility to Islam (as illustrated in the Muhammad biography and the purpose of commissioning a translation of the Quran) and a generally negative view of Arabs and Muslims, as outlined in the prologue. This reading highlights the need to consider the work in the context of Rodrigo’s bigger history of Spain project, the largest of which — the “Gothic History” — culminates in the recapture of Córdoba, thus cleansing the city “from the filth of Muhammad.” Furthermore, it draws attention to Rodrigo’s career and his participation in the Crusades in Iberia. To the extent that the “Historia Arabum” seems objective, it is argued that this derives from uncritical use of information from Arabic source material, not a real attitude of tolerance. In the view of some scholars, Rodrigo wanted to expel Muslims from Spain because he saw them as foreign invaders: In effect, his attitude was the precursor to the expulsions and forced conversions that targeted Jews and Muslims in the post-1492 era in Spain after Muslim sovereignty came to an end.

The contrasting view argues that Rodrigo believed in “tolerance” in a limited and relative sense, even if he wanted to see an end to Muslim sovereignty in Spain. In this reading, when Rodrigo offers words of praise for Arab and Muslim rulers, he does so because he wants to point out good examples for kings to follow, underlining his view of history as serving a didactic purpose as he outlined in the prologue to his “Gothic History.” Further, it is argued that he sees the Arabs in Spain as at least being part of Spain, such as when he speaks about the “Spanish Arabs” or at the end of the book about the “Vandal Arabs” (i.e., Arabs of al-Andalus, based on an etymology of al-Andalus, in effect recognizing their distinctness from the Berbers of North Africa and Arabs of the Middle East).

The concept of “tolerance,” though, is itself liable to misrepresentation in discussions about medieval Spain, especially the parts under Muslim rule. One often hears complaints of a “myth of the Andalusian paradise,” based on a supposedly multicultural and harmonious example for today’s world in which Muslims, Jews and Christians got along. While this conception may exist to some degree at a popular level, few modern scholars of medieval Spain would uphold it. “Tolerance” is rather understood here as allowing for some kind of coexistence even as one group asserts its dominance. In the case of Muslim-held Spain, Christians and Jews were, in general, second-class citizens (“dhimmis”) but were tolerated in the sense of being allowed to practice their religion and retain their property. In effect, one could apply the same reasoning to Christian-held parts of Spain and argue that what Rodrigo envisioned was a dhimmi status for Muslims (and Jews): subordinate to the ruling Christian authorities but allowed to practice their religion and retain their property.

The evidence seems to point in this direction, regardless of whether one reads Rodrigo’s praise for Arab rulers in the “Historia Arabum” as reflective of his own views. While Rodrigo’s hostility to Islam is clear, it is not necessarily any more hostile than his attitude toward Judaism. Rodrigo not only called Judaism the “Judaic perfidy” in this work but also wrote (or at least claimed as his own) a much earlier work dedicated to refuting Judaism: the “Dialogus Libri Vite” (Dialogue of the Book of Life). Yet the practical record shows Rodrigo not only had dealings with the Jewish community in Toledo but also sought to protect them from mob violence and harsher measures imposed by the Catholic Church’s central leadership. One could argue that he was driven in this regard by his own business and political interests, but this pragmatism is to be contrasted with an approach to forms of Christian “heresy,” which would have to be wiped out. The terminology of “heresy” is applied neither to Judaism nor in general to Islam: It is clear that Rodrigo did not view Islam as simply being some kind of Christian “heresy.”

Perhaps the prologue of the “Historia Arabum” itself shows the limited “tolerance” Rodrigo envisions, because after mentioning the opening of the ways of revenge for the Christians, he declares:

“Just as from the beginning they oppressed the Christian inhabitants under the burden of tribute, so also they now live in accustomed servitude under tribute following the restoration of the fortifications to the Christian leaders.”

These relative and nuanced understandings of “tolerance” and “coexistence,” of course, should not obscure the very real oppression that could and did come with second-class citizen status, whether in Muslim-held Spain or Christian-held Spain. It is therefore correct to caution against upholding these experiences as good examples for today. The reality is that “coexistence” and oppression can exist together at the same time. Even in the present setting, one sees attempts (such as in the Israeli-occupied West Bank or Turkish-occupied Afrin in Syria) to uphold coexistence as a cover for the realities of occupation and discriminatory systems. At the same time, the “Historia Arabum” and what it reveals about Rodrigo’s time are also good lessons against the tendency to polarized judgment that one sees in today’s popular discourse: Neither romanticizing nor absolute condemnation is called for, but rather a more objective understanding of history.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a nonresident fellow at New Lines Institute and an independent writer and analyst

In Archaeology, a Shard Isn’t Just a Shard

But as with other crimes they commit in their former colonies, privileged Westerners who steal from dig sites are somehow stunned by their arrests

June 13, 2022
Retired British geologist James Fitton and German psychologist Volker Waldmann were arrested in March at Baghdad Airport for having ancient pottery shards in their luggage 
/ Ameer Al-Mohammedawi / picture alliance via Getty Images

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When I was based in the United Arab Emirates, there was a category of news story we came to expect, particularly from the British press, that was simply an exercise in Dubai-bashing. I’m not talking about legitimate stories like the plight of laborers or human rights abuses. But stories meant to bash the city for its self-promotion as a hub of modernity, business and diversity.

One perfect example of this phenomenon was the saga in 2008 of two Britons who were arrested and jailed for allegedly having sex on the beach in Dubai. The story had a lot of surrounding circumstances whose veracity is difficult to gauge, including whether they were actually having sex and claims that the police officer who detained them had initially warned them and was assaulted by the couple the second time he found them, among other titillating reports. They were ultimately convicted and sentenced to three months in jail, though the sentence was suspended, allowing them to leave the country.

The British press covered the salacious story with voracity, reporting in exaggerated bewilderment at the temerity of a city arresting someone for having public sex. The subtext was that Dubai, for all its pretensions to modernity, was this backward place that could not quite come to terms with Western customs. Never mind that the couple would have been arrested for public sex in most other places in the world.

Still, the tone of gentlemanly shock was fascinating to me — it seemed meant to convey an inoffensive stupefaction at the ways of these Stone Age natives. It also came with the presumption that laws should not apply to their own citizens. It had nothing to do with the actual validity of the law per se, but the prospect that citizens of a first-world country should be beholden to laws at all beyond their own shores, especially in backwards Arab countries. Later in college I learned there was a term for this sort of behavior — extraterritoriality. It was a legal principle that colonists applied to countries they colonized, where their own citizens enjoyed legal immunity in the colony for actions that would otherwise be crimes or that they would be prosecuted for at home, as though it were some type of imperial hangover.

Oddly enough the sex on the beach case came to my mind as I read the breathless coverage of the story of a retired British geologist who was sentenced to 15 years in prison in Iraq after allegedly taking a dozen rocks and pottery fragments (it’s not clear what the breakdown of each category is) from the ancient archaeological site of Eridu and trying to fly out of the country with them in his luggage, for the crime of trafficking antiquities.

Fifteen years, particularly given the man’s age, is an excessive sentence. I don’t know what he was thinking the moment he picked up the artifact fragments from the site, though presumably as a geologist he should have known better, at least in terms of the difference between indigenous rocks and archaeological fragments. He insists he did not know he was breaking the law.

The BBC published a statement from the family that I found fascinating, however. After declaring that they were heartbroken by the verdict, they described the crime as “trivial” and “dubious,” urging the British government to intervene in the case. The tone of the coverage has also generally been bafflement at the prospect of someone being tried at all for taking artifacts from one of the most important sites in ancient Mesopotamia.

First of all, there is nothing trivial about laws meant to protect Iraq’s heritage. The country has endured decades of looting and artifact trafficking and destruction, from the notorious images of the looting of Iraqi museums in the immediate aftermath of the American occupation to the destruction of heritage sites and manuscripts by the terrorists of the Islamic State group. Many of these priceless treasures have ended up in private collections or museums in the West, and efforts are ongoing to repatriate them.

There is also the fact that a British citizen would not attempt to take away pottery fragments from Stonehenge or a British museum, or even touch the historical artifacts on display. That they were simply lying around in the open on an archaeological dig site is not an excuse to lay claim to them.

Finally, the press coverage also inevitably incorporates demands of the British government and its diplomatic mission to intervene in the case and win the man’s freedom, which has of course been met with platitudes that they are providing consular assistance to a British national. It’s not clear to me what the British government is supposed to do exactly in a case where a citizen is convicted of a crime abroad. Are British subjects not supposed to be beholden to the laws that apply to citizens of the country they are in? To the law of the land? This is not a case of a human rights activist or dissident being jailed for their views, like the British citizen Alaa Abdel-Fattah (nothing of consequence has been done to free him from arbitrary detention in Egypt), or an academic being falsely accused of espionage. Can Iraq or Egypt or Lebanon or Syria intervene whenever one of their citizens is jailed in the West for a crime? Or is the assumption that Western laws are worthy of being followed, that their progenitors are above following the laws of those backward countries?

I do hope the man ultimately returns to his family and his sentence is reduced or suspended because of mitigating circumstances. But I also hope the media abandons this colonialist mindset — that crimes in the developing world don’t quite count.

   Kareem Shaheen is the Middle East and newsletters editor at New Lines