Kurdish MP sparks controversy speaking Kurdish and Arabic in Turkish parliament

Green Left MP  Beritan Gunes Altin sparked controversy in the Turkish parliament when she delivered her speech also in Kurdish and Arabic

 
Wladimir van Wilgenburg

Turkish parliament (Photo: Anadolu News Agency)

ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – Beritan Gunes Altin, a parliament member for the Green Left Party, from the multilingual city of Mardin, sparked controversy on Thursday when she opened her address in Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic in her first address after being elected.

Gercek News reports that the Deputy Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly was asked by some MPs on Thursday to intervene when she saluted the parliament in Turkish, Kurdish, and Arabic.

The MPS argued that the language of the parliament is only Turkish.

"This is the first address I'm making in the Grand National Assembly, and before I continue with the rest of my address, I'd like to express my thanks in the languages of the peoples of Mardin, where I was elected,” MP Beritan Gunes Altin said, reported Gercek News.

“I wish that Mardin's multilingual and multicultural life serves as a model of inspiration for the assembly.”

While Turkish remains the sole official language in Turkey, there has been persistent demand from the Kurdish population, which numbers over 20 million, as well as other ethnic groups, for the right to education in their mother tongue.

Read More: Istanbul mayor supports Kurdish language campaign

In Turkey, various governments in the past have implemented strict bans or significant suppression of the Kurdish language.

Although there has been a gradual relaxation since the early 1990s, with the lifting of the ban on Kurdish names in 2000 and further liberalization during the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), including the establishment of a Kurdish-language government channel in 2009, the Turkish government has regressed to previous practices, reinstating measures reminiscent of past policies regarding the Kurdish language.

War Resistance and Independent Journalism: Russian Journalists in Exile

Professor Kari Aga Myklebost is Barents Chair in Russian Studies at UiT The Arctic University of Norway. Photo: Elizaveta Vereykina

By  Kari Aga Myklebost


This text is a translated and slightly edited version of a peer-reviewed article that first appeared in the journal Nordisk Østforum, 37, 2023: 87–95

On 31 March 2023, Georgii Chentemirov, a Russian exile journalist with The Barents Observer in Kirkenes, Norway, was declared foreign agent by the Russian Ministry of Justice, due to his independent reporting (Nilsen 2023). Chentemirov’s case is telling; Russian exile journalists have become key actors in the opposition against the Kremlin’s warfare in Ukraine, using fact-based and independent journalism to express war resistance. But are facts enough to fight down the Kremlin’s propaganda machinery?


Some of the most pronounced expressions of war resistance in Russian society are found among the Russian journalistic community in exile.

The hardening of state censorship and intensified repressions after 24 February 2022, provoked a wave of emigration and activism among Russian journalists. In Riga, Vilnius, Berlin, Amsterdam, Kirkenes and other European cities, Russian journalists in exile now use their profession to practice freedom of speech, to fight back Russian state censorship, disinformation, and war propaganda, and to express resistance towards the ongoing Russian warfare in Ukraine. This text discusses the consequences of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and intensified repressive policies for Russian independent journalism, focusing on Russian-language media outlets in exile. How do Russian journalists define their professional identity in exile, and which strategies and tools do they apply when working from outside of Russia? The text argues that the two factors of regime opposition and exile status work to mutually reinforce each other, and moreover, that Russian journalists in exile define war resistance as an integral and legitimate part of their professional activity. In the new situation, regime opposition, war resistance, and journalistic professionalism have become one.
Repressions and ‘censorship through noise’

The labelling of Georgii Chentemirov as foreign agent is part of a pattern of escalating state repressions during the spring of 2023, introducing longer sentences for political opposition, and aiming at enforcing Russian law beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. Since president Vladimir Putin was accused of war crimes by The International Criminal Court in March this year, Russian authorities have severely raised sentences for ‘internal enemies’, while at the same time increasingly targeting Russians outside of Russia as well as foreign citizens in Russia. In late March, Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich was arrested in Yekaterinburg and charged with espionage. Not since the days of the Cold War have the Kremlin raised such accusations against a foreign journalist (Kirby 2023). Simultaneously, opposition politician Vladimir Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in prison for spreading so-called false information about the Russian warfare in Ukraine, while Alexei Moskalev, known as the father of a schoolgirl in the Tula region who made an anti-war drawing, was detained in Belarus. Moskalev was fleeing from a sentence due to his daughter’s drawing (Meduza 2023; BBC News Russkaya Sluzhba 2023). Another high-profiled opposition politician, historian Ilya Yashin, recently lost the appeal case against the state and now faces 8,5 years in prison, also on charges of spreading false information about the Russian armed forces (Trevelyan 2023).


The espionage charges against Evan Gershkovich have caused serious concern among Western media who still have correspondents in Russia; what new risks are their reporters facing in the months to come?

Interviewees are also increasingly put at risk after the State Duma adopted amendments to the Russian penal code on treason in April, opening up for life sentence verdicts for ‘passing on information to foreigners’ (Coalson 2023). In consequence, Russian journalists – both in exile and in Russia – must consider the growing menace from the authorities: How will independent and critical reporting affect their personal lives, and could their work pose a threat to their families? How can they keep on reporting in a truthful way about the developments in Russia without endangering interviewees?

The repressive policies of Russian authorities are nothing new. The law on so-called foreign agents was adopted in 2012, starting off a Kremlin policy line of using the legal system to fight down oppositional voices and control the Russian public sphere. The power of the Russian regime is to a great extent based on monopolizing information and ruling by a strategy of ‘censorship through noise’: On the one hand, a harsh legal framework of censorship, on the other hand, state-sponsored bombardment of the public with disinformation, conspiracy theories, half-truths and competing narratives (Pomerantsev 2019; cf. also Aro 2022). This information strategy has been accompanied by increasing use of coercive power and a strengthened position in society for the state security services. Since 2015, Russian authorities have moved from low-intensive repressions primarily aimed at deterring the population, to more direct and coercive repressions. This is followed by a narrative from the Kremlin claiming that political opposition and protest among the population is induced by Western countries to undermine Russia; that independent media in Russia is nothing but Western infiltration, and that free media poses a threat to Russian traditional values and even to the sovereignty of the Russian state (Flikke 2023, p. 150.; Flikke 2020; cf. also Staalesen 2021, p. 6-8). This narrative is present also in the Kremlin foreign policy concept published in March this year (Kremlin 2023).
In exile

The developments since 24 February 2022, represent a new phase. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian federal executive agency responsible for censoring and monitoring the media, Roskomnadzor, instructed all media to report about the warfare using only official Russian sources, and to name the warfare as a ‘special military operation’. Shortly after, the State Duma and the Federation Council passed new legislation criminalizing the spreading of ‘false information’ about the Russian armed forces. Such actions can now be sentenced with prison terms up to 15 years (Current Time/Radio Free Europe 2022). The introduction of this war censorship in Russia is reflected in the 2023 report of Reporters without borders; Russia is now ranked number 164 of 180 countries in terms of press freedom, dropping down from number 155 in 2022 (Reporters Without Borders 2023).


The growing repressions and the war censorship since late February 2022 have caused a wave of Russian journalists leaving their home country and establishing exile offices abroad.

However, the first journalist exiles appeared already in 2014, shortly after the Russian annexation of Crimea. The news outlet Meduza was established in Riga by Galina Timchenko, after she was removed from the position as editor of Lenta.ru in Russia due to disagreement with the owner of the news site, oligarch and Putin-ally Alexander Mamut, about the coverage of Ukraine (Beard, 2014). Meduza was set up with an explicit mission to produce journalism that could no longer be published in Russia. Timchenko was not alone; a number of news outlets were blocked by Roskomnadzor from March 2014, and independent editors were removed and replaced by Kremlin-friendly ones. Simultaneously, new legislation limiting foreign ownership in Russian media and regulating so-called distribution of information was adopted (Nygren 2023, s. 190).


In the Norwegian town of Kirkenes on the border with Russia in northernmost Europe, the online news outlet Barents Observer was targeted in early 2014.

Barents Observer publishes news from the Barents Region and the Arctic, including the Russian northern regions, in English and Russian. After Barents Observer published an op-ed criticizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Russian General Consul in Kirkenes convinced the owners of the news outlet that this type of journalism was harmful to Norwegian-Russian relations. A conflict broke out between the owners and the journalists, who decided to leave and establish a new independent, journalist-owned news outlet, entitled The Independent Barents Observer. Two years later, editor Thomas Nilsen was denied entry to Russia. Since 2019 the news outlet has been blocked in Russia by Roskomnadzor. The journalists have found technical solutions to ensure the news outlet is still available to Russian readers. In the autumn of 2022, the team of journalists was enlarged with Russian exiles, strengthening Russian-language independent journalism in the border region between Norway and Russia. A main reason for the blocking by Roskomnadzor and the targeting by the General Consul was exactly this; that the news outlet reaches actively out to Russian readers by publishing independent journalism in Russian language (Aro 2022; cf. also Staalesen 2021; Staalesen & Nilsen 2016).
War resistance and independent journalism as a tool

Up until the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, a limited, but persistent flora of independent media outlets were still working in Russia, with TV Dozhd, the radio channel Ekho Moskvy, and newspapers Novaya Gazeta and The Moscow Times as the most prominent ones. After the introduction of harsher censorship legislation in February, the last remaining independent news outlets were either blocked by Roskomnadzor or chose to close down due to security reasons (Reuters, 2022; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Russian Service, 2022; Meduza 2022). During the ensuing months, a number of outlets re-opened outside of Russia: TV Dozdh and Novaya Gazeta Europe established exile teams in Riga, whereas the far smaller 7x7 chose Vilnius (Matthews 2022; Shcherbakova 2022; BBC News 2022; 7x7 Gorizontal’naya Rossiya 2023). The Moscow Times moved headquarters to Amsterdam (NL#Times, 2022).


A key aim for the exile outlets is to reach Russian audiences with fact-based reporting, to counter the Kremlin’s censorship, propaganda, and disinformation.

The key tool is Russian-language independent journalism distributed to Russian speaking populations both inside and outside of Russia. Aiming for this, The Moscow Times established a Russian edition in 2020, only to be blocked by Roskomnadzor shortly after the full-scale invasion. The edition is still available to readers in Russia by way of VPN (The Moscow Times 2022). A lot of work has been put into finding technical solutions to breach the censorship wall set up by Roskomnadzor, and most of the exile outlets have dedicated pages and newsletters explaining to readers how to ensure access (cf. f.ex. Novaya Gazeta Europe 2023; Sever.Realii 2023). These technical challenges have facilitated a rapidly evolving digital knowledge among the exile journalists, and Roskomnadzor has so far not succeeded in keeping the independent media out of reach for readers in Russia. Instead, Russian authorities have turned up the volume of state-controlled media, in an attempt to overrun the exile media outlets. Simultaneously, the use of VPN in Russia has exploded (The Moscow Times 2022b).

After 24 February 2022, the independent media’s fight against state censorship and propaganda has evolved into an explicitly formulated war resistance. Whereas Meduza in 2014 simply stated that their main agenda was to publish facts, we now find statements about countering the war propaganda from the Kremlin by telling the truth about the war in Ukraine (Beard, 2014; Meduza, 2023b).


Truthful and free reporting about the war, as well as reports about war opposition within Russia have become the main strategies for voicing an anti-war position with the exile media.

When establishing Novaya Gazeta Europe, head editor Kirill Martynov wrote that the main task for the outlet is to fight for “the voice of anti-war Russia” (Shcherbakova 2022). Mikhail Fishman at TV Dozhd has stated as his personal goal to drag Russians out of the propaganda bubble and make them realize that they all share responsibility for the Russian warfare (Matthews 2022). Choosing Riga and Vilnius to set up exile outlets also reflects the aim of countering the Kremlin’s war propaganda: here, the Russian-speaking audience is large, and the narratives propagated by the Kremlin are directed exactly at these readers, in addition to the population in Russia. Thus, the anti-war message of the exile media is of particular importance here (Bathke 2022; Gessen 2023).

War resistance is also expressed by way of new sections and columns with the exile media. TV Dozhd features daily reports from Ukraine, whereas Novaya Gazeta Europe has a separate section dedicated to the war as well as a section entitled ‘Data’ featuring investigative reports of conditions at the front line, as well as of Russian politics, economics, and law-making in times of war (Novaya Gazeta Europe 2023b; Novaya Gazeta Europe 2023c). Sever.Realii, a media project under the Russian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty covering the northern Russian regions, runs a new section entitled ‘The price of war’, which systematically covers the costs imposed upon Russian society due to the warfare (Sever.Realii 2023b). Another section is entitled ‘After the empire’ and includes future scenarios for Russia and discussions on possible paths toward true federalism and democratic political structures (Sever.Realii 2023c). Since the announcement of partial mobilization in September last year, a new field has appeared: Detailed reports informing readers on how Russian men can avoid mobilization and even regular conscription. By way of these reports, the exile media aims to counter the Russian warfare in Ukraine in a direct manner.
Activism as professionalism

This listing of exile media strategies and tools of war opposition could be continued. The developments since February 2022 show very clearly how the atrocities of war trigger anti-war activism among the exile journalists. However, activist attitudes have been characteristic of independent Russian journalism long before the full-scale invasion, expressed through opposition to the regime and through a continuous fight against state censorship and propaganda. In a somewhat longer perspective, however, it seems obvious that the new exile position in itself has produced a fiercer kind of activism – and it is tempting to conclude that that the exile status and regime opposition turned war resistance are mutually reinforcing each other (cf. Fomina 2019; Nygren 2023; Pomerantsev 2019, 2023; Stevnhøj 2023; Voronova et al. 2019). The increasingly coercive state repressions have also strengthened civic activism, - a development that indicates that the use of blunt force is not a sustainable strategy for Russian authorities in the long run (cf. Flikke 2023, p. 168 f.).


Moreover, the methods and tools employed by the exile journalists – using the Russian language, the freedom of speech, and social media to enlighten, raise awareness and mobilize opposition in Russia – poses a direct and acute threat as seen from the Kremlin.

Paradoxically, for Russian readers in search of independent, fact-based Russian-language journalism on the internet, the Roskomnadzor censorship and blocking have turned into a label of honor.

Side by side with the growing activism, we find a clearly formulated and persistent commitment to core principles of journalistic professionalism. The Russian exile media emphasize independent, fact-based and politically neutral reporting. Editorial guidelines include statements on avoiding economic ties, on protecting people in vulnerable situations, and on complying with internationally recognized principles on the professional code of ethics for journalists (cf. f.ex. TV Dozhd 2023; Sever.Realii 2023d). These principles make up a glaring contrast to the realities experienced by journalists working in Russian state-controlled media (Nygren 2023). The harsh political conditions for journalism in Russia make it difficult to say if the professional principles and anti-war activism promoted by the exile outlets will have an impact on the situation “at home”. The efficiency of the Kremlin’s censorship through noise has surprised even the most experienced Russian independent journalists, who expected that their reports from exile would raise political awareness and contribute to a more pronounced war opposition in the Russian public (Gessen 2023).

Due to the rapidly worsening security situation in Russia, the exile media outlets have increasingly applied what the head editor of Meduza calls proxy reporting; discreet gathering of information from anonymous sources, made by anonymous journalists in Russia, which is then put together in reports written by journalists and editors in exile (Gessen 2023). The question is how long this will remain a viable strategy.


The new legislation on treason and the escalation of repressions in the spring of 2023 make independent reporting an ever more dangerous endeavor.

Perhaps the key to building war resistance and win territory in the information war against the Kremlin lies not only in fact-based journalism, but also in a more basic and long-term building of belief in the Russian population that truth exists and that individuals can take on a constructive, positive role as politically active citizens. This is argued by the British, Soviet-born journalist Peter Pomerantsev. Pomerantsev, a child of Soviet dissidents, has spent his professional life studying the information strategies of the Kremlin. To him, it seems clear that a main challenge lies in countering the depoliticization of the Russian public, which he sees as a direct result of the Kremlin’s policies. According to Pomerantsev, most Russians believe that politics is all propaganda and lies, that there is no truth to be found among the manifold narratives circulating in the public sphere – and this is a main reason why they do not oppose the war. This is also why Volodomyr Zelensky speaks for deaf ears when he tries to address Russians in the Russian language, Pomerantsev argues. Pomerantsev draws a parallel to American politics, which are characterized by the same kind of basic distrust. What we are facing is not only the consequences of disinformation, but the structural disintegration of public space and a shared political conversation.

According to Pomerantsev, the solution lies in developing the sense of agency with individuals, to establish trust in politics on a societal level: «The Kremlin’s propaganda continuously undermines the sense of agency. [We have to find a way of] communication [that] can increase a sense of agency.” (Pomerantsev 2023).

In light of this, it seems the Russian exile community of journalists should define an even more ambitious goal for themselves. Fact-based reporting and solid, reliable knowledge, disseminated in the Russian language through the censorship wall put up by Roskomnadzor – these are the basic elements of their professional work in exile. This constitutes a highly demanding and increasingly dangerous endeavor in itself. In addition, the reporting must be framed in ways that counteract political inaction and distrust, and actively combats the information noise produced by the Kremlin.

Discussions on how to implement such endeavors are already underway. The exile journalists possess the necessary means and tools – the affinity and understanding of Russia in terms of language and culture. They thus hold the key to hone the message home to a Russian audience. For the time being, they also have channels, as the Russian censorship wall is not total. The question is how long the situation will allow for such ambitious and demanding work.


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WAR FOR THE ARCTIC

New Arctic industry gives boost in icy shipments

The port of Sabetta is a key logistical hub in the Russian Arctic. 

Photo: Atle Staalesen

Russia's nuclear-powered icebreakers made a total of 435
ship escort operations in the first half of 2023. New
industrial projects in the Yenisey Bay now generate
growth in Arctic shipping, says nuclear icebreaker
operator Atomflot.

By  Atle Staalesen

July 12, 2023

In the course of winter and spring, the fleet of nuclear powered icebreakers opened the waters a total of 435 times for ships sailing to Russian Arctic destinations. That is an increase of 11 shipments compared with the same period last year, nuclear power company Rosatom informs.

“The growth in goods traffic is connected with the ongoing building of new projects in the Yenisey Bay,” says Atomflot Director Leonid Irlitsa.

Irlitsa took over the lead at Atomflot after former director Mustafa Kasha unexpectedly resigned from the job in 2022.

In the six-month period, a total of 74 escort shipments were made to the Yenisey Bay where coal company Severnaya Zvezda is in the process of developing its Syradasayskoye project and oil company Rosneft builds its Vostok Oil project.

In addition, the icebreakers made 200 sailings to Novatek’s ports in Sabetta and Utrenneye, and 89 to Gazprom Neft’s Arctic Gate terminal in the Ob Bay. A total of 72 escorts were made to Dudinka on the Yenisey River for company Nornickel.

The industrial projects currently under development in the Russian Arctic will lead to an unprecedented level of shipping on the Northern Sea Route. Rosneft’s Vostok Oil is alone projected to produce more than 100 tons per year, all of which is to be shipped from the new Sever Bay oil terminal.

Russia today has a fleet of seven nuclear-powered icebreaker. Three of them are newly built vessels of the LK-60 class (Project 22220). Another three icebreakers of the kind are due to enter service in the course of the next four years.

WAR FOR THE ARCTIC

P-8 Poseidon on Barents Sea mission, turned off transponders

While the Norwegian P-8 Poseidon flew north of the Kola Peninsula, an American RC-135V Rivet Joint was circling over northernmost Finland, near the border with Russia.

By Thomas Nilsen
July 11, 2023


The two planes were in the skies close to Russia’s heavily militarized Murmansk region at the same time on Tuesday, from noon to shortly after 2 pm local time.

“It’s correct that we have been on a mission with the P-8 Poseidon today,” says Martin Mellquist, spokesperson with the Norwegian Air Force when asked by the Barents Observer.

“It was an ordinary flight, but for operational reasons, we do not want to disclose how far east we flew or the content of the flight,” Mellquist tells.

He would not elaborate, or say anything about a possible Russian air force scrambling from the Kola Peninsula to meet the Norwegian anti-sub warfare plane.

 

The P-8 Poseidon’s flightpath on Tuesday. Screenshot from FlightRadar24.com

The Barents Observer followed the P-8 Poseidon that took off from the air base at Evenes earlier in the day. Over the Barents Sea, the plane turned off the transponder. It was first possible to track the aircraft via Flightrader24 upon return when it flew into Norwegian airspace again northeast of the Varanger Peninsula. From there, the sub-hunter took the shortcut back to Evenes airport.

There were several civilian passenger planes flying over the area in the same period as the Norwegian aircraft turned off the transponder, including a few long-haul Emirates planes en route from the Middle East to North America.

For reasons not to provoke the Russian bear, Norwegians are not allowing allied intelligence-gathering aircraft to fly over eastern Finnmark, the parts of Norway near the border with the Kola Peninsula. Finland, though, does not apply similar self-imposed restrictions after becoming a member of NATO in April this year.

On Tuesday, a U.S. Air Force RC-135V Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft flew to northernmost Finland and circled a few rounds over Inari, the municipality bordering Russia’s Murmansk region.

The U.S. Air Force has not made public the nature of the flight.

The multi-sensor aircraft can detect, identify and geolocate signals throughout the electromagnetic spectrum.

Neither the Russian Northern Fleet nor the Defense Ministry have revealed information about any special military activities in northwest Russia on Tuesday, the same day as the high-level NATO Summit took place in Vilnius.

The P-8 Poseidon is a maritime patrol aircraft used for anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Photo: Thomas Nilsen

 

EU: Human rights-centred Digital Services Act must include global voices

POSTED ON JULY 11, 2023

Ivan Marc/Shutterstock

ARTICLE 19 joined partner organisations in the Digital Services Act Human Rights Alliance (DSA HR Alliance) in signing an open letter calling on the European Union regulators to adopt a human rights-based approach when implementing and enforcing the DSA and to include insights from international civil society groups in non-EU countries.  

DSA Human Rights Alliance

The Digital Services Act Human Rights Alliance is a group of human rights organisations representing diverse communities across the globe. The Alliance came together around the central tenet that the Digital Services Act must adopt a human rights-based approach to platform governance and that EU policy makers should consider the global impacts of EU legislation. Many members of the Alliance know firsthand why this is necessary. As grassroots organisations operating in non-EU countries, they have monitored human rights abuses stemming from shortsighted legislation tailored to prosecute human rights defenders and to suppress dissent.

DSA negotiations and recommendations

During the DSA negotiations, the DSA HR Alliance issued a number of recommendations for EU policymakers to make sure that future EU internet rules follow a human rights-based approach to content governance and platform accountability. Among others, we supported the following recommendations:

• to preserve the conditional model of intermediary liability for user-generated content hosted by online platforms;
• to avoid disproportionate demands on smaller service providers that would put users’ access to information in jeopardy;
• to reject unduly short time frames for platforms to remove problematic content due to their detrimental impact on the right to freedom of expression online and other fundamental rights;
• to not mandate the use of intrusive automated content moderation and content curation tools on platforms, but to focus on safeguarding people’s fundamental rights;
• to protect user privacy and personal data protection rights when it comes to cooperating with law enforcement authorities and to refrain from awarding such authorities the status of trusted flaggers;
• to strengthen due diligence obligations of large platforms, with specific focus on mandatory ex ante fundamental rights impact assessments and to make sure that risk assessment and mitigation measures respect necessity and proportionality requirements.

Human rights-centred enforcement

We welcome the fact that many of our suggestions were taken into account by the drafters of the final DSA text. However, the DSA still features problematic aspects that can have negative consequences for vulnerable and historically oppressed groups. There is ambiguity in the text of several provisions, and the practical consequences they may have once implemented are unknown. For example, as the DSA gives considerable power to government agencies and other actors with partisan interests to flag and remove potentially illegal content, these actors may take advantage of the vagueness of the concept to undermine fundamental rights protection. Moreover, it is not clear how very large online platforms will mitigate risks in practice. The role of civil society groups, researchers, and overall stakeholder engagement in the due diligence process is still shrouded in mystery.

The co-regulatory model of the DSA is an opportunity to ensure that civil society organisations and digital rights defenders worldwide have a voice in, and are allowed to make a difference, during the implementation and enforcement of the Act. However, if implemented incorrectly, it could also invite shadow negotiations suspected of corporate capture, and to exclude fundamental rights voices. Such worrisome developments will ultimately deepen the existing adverse fundamental rights impacts of the platforms’ practices and policies, particularly on vulnerable communities. Thus, for the DSA to constitute a positive framework aimed at protecting digital rights also beyond the EU, there must be human rights-centred implementation and enforcement of the text over the next few years, accompanied with proactive and meaningful engagement of international civil society voices. The DSA HR Alliance has a critical role to play in this process.

We are already witnessing the spread of platform regulatory bills in regions outside the EU, many of which are inspired by or directly copy the principles of the DSA. We also have started assessing the undeniable impact that the DSA has throughout the Global Majority.

Call on EU regulators to value insights of non-EU voices

The DSA HR Alliance calls on EU regulators to establish transparent international regulatory dialogues, and for an inclusive implementation and enforcement approach that includes meaningful and formalised stakeholder engagement.

We urge them to value the insights that non-EU organisations can bring to the implementation process of the DSA. This is the case especially for grassroots organisations operating in the Global Majority and civil rights groups fighting for the protections of historically oppressed and vulnerable groups. These groups frequently find themselves on the receiving end of badly designed legislation and can contribute substantially to minimising the damage throughout the platforms’ value chains.

Signatories

Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)

Access Now

Civil Liberties Union for Europe

Centre for Democracy & Technology, Europe Office

European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL)

Global Forum for Media Development

CELE (Center for Studies on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information)

7amleh

Association for Progressive Communications (APC)

ARTICLE 19

Network in Defense of Digital Rights (R3D

 

Read PDF version of letter

The good advice that could lift people out of poverty

Peer-Reviewed Publication

UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA

Providing access to housing, debt, and benefit advice within food banks could help lift people out of poverty - according to a University of East Anglia study.

Researchers worked with Norwich Foodbank centres, part of the Trussell Trust, on a pilot project that saw representatives from Citizens Advice and Shelter posted within the service.

The ‘Making a Difference’ initiative meant that people forced to use a food bank were also able to access advice on a range of issues - from housing and debt to benefits.

It is now hoped that this scheme will be rolled out to foodbanks nationally.

Lead researcher Dr Sarah Hanson, from UEA’s School of Health Sciences, said: “As the cost-of-living crisis continues, more and more people are turning to food banks because they simply can’t afford to eat.

“This might be because they have had an acute change in circumstances, are on a low income, in debt, or because their benefits have either changed or been delayed.

“We wanted to see whether making more support available to people at food banks would help - so that they would no longer need to rely on emergency food.

“We know that signposting, for example giving information about other local organisations, is not enough. This is because people’s issues are complex and need a more holistic approach.”

The Norwich Foodbank has supported 11,797 people in the last year. This has shot up from 8,905 people in 2015.

The ‘Making a Difference’ project is a pilot advisory scheme in the region with staff from Shelter and Citizen’s Advice posted within some of its food banks.

The UEA team interviewed food bank volunteers and advice workers, to provide lived experience feedback on the scheme.

Dr Hanson said: “One of the main things that emerged was that having a person-centred, holistic, and compassionate approach is essential for clients with complex needs that cut across many different services.

“It can be very difficult for people to navigate the benefit system, the housing system, social services – you need a joined-up approach with advisers that can help on a number of levels.

“A lot of people are missing out on benefits such as Healthy Start vouchers and pension credit - because they don’t realise that they are entitled to them.

“Many people visiting food banks have poor mental or physical health, as well as personal trauma. Having advisers available at the point of need means that people don’t have to tell their stories multiple times to different organisations.

“We found that the service is reaching very vulnerable people who fall through the gaps, in the heart of really deprived communities. These people may have previously found advice services inaccessible, and they are too often socially excluded from opportunities and services that could support them.

“Importantly, the initiative is empowering clients by treating them with dignity and sensitivity in often distressing circumstances,” she added.

But while the scheme is helping food bank clients, the researchers found that frontline staff may need some help themselves.

Dr Hanson said: “We heard that being on the frontline can impact mental health. It is therefore important that anyone who is listening to and supporting people in crisis in a very challenging landscape, should have access to support themselves.”

Rhiannon Barrow​, Trussell Trust financial inclusion manager for the East of England, said: “The partnership between UEA and Norwich Foodbank was one of the first collaborations between a university and a Trussell Trust Foodbank.

“The evaluation of the ‘Making a Difference’ project demonstrates the effectiveness of working in partnership with organisations so individuals are supported holistically and don’t have to be retraumatised by repeating their stories.

“The evaluation also enabled reflection and a space to discuss continuous improvement to enable Norwich Foodbank to better serve their community and support staff and volunteers, which they always strive to do.”

Hannah Worsley, Norwich Foodbank project manager, said: “We were delighted to work with the UEA research team to independently evaluate and understand our project, in terms of what we expected the outcomes to be and what some actual outcomes were.

“The interviews with our volunteers, and Citizen's Advice and Shelter advisors’ insights, along with the research provided by UEA, gave us a thorough and better understanding of what this work is currently achieving for those we serve and, most importantly, how we can improve the service for our clients.”

Nidhi Mittal, pathfinder lead at the Trussell Trust, said: “The UEA study, funded via the Trussell Trust Pathfinder programme, is an innovative piece of work that provides valuable insights into the impact that financial inclusion services embedded within a holistic model of support can have on reducing the need for emergency food parcels.

“The Pathfinder programme at Trussell Trust aims to support innovation and learning on how we can address underlying causes of poverty in the UK, and this study led by UEA offers some excellent testimony for the work of Norwich foodbank and a base of valuable learning and knowledge for our wider foodbank network and partners.”

‘A qualitative exploration of a Financial Inclusion service in an English foodbank’ is published in the journal Perspectives In Public Health.

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JOURNAL

Perspectives in Public Health

METHOD OF RESEARCH

Survey

SUBJECT OF RESEARCH

People

ARTICLE TITLE

A qualitative exploration of a Financial Inclusion service in an English foodbank

ARTICLE PUBLICATION DATE

12-Jul-2023

County-level income inequality, social mobility, and deaths of despair in the US

JAMA Network Open

Peer-Reviewed Publication

JAMA NETWORK

About The Study: This study found that the joint exposure of unequal income distribution and lack of social mobility was associated with additional risks for deaths of despair (deaths from suicide, drug overdose, and alcohol-related liver disease), suggesting that addressing the underlying social and economic conditions is crucial in responding to the epidemic of deaths of despair. 

Authors: Chun-Tung Kuo, Ph.D., of National Taiwan University in Taipei, is the corresponding author. 

To access the embargoed study: Visit our For The Media website at this link https://media.jamanetwork.com/ 

(doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.23030)

Editor’s Note: Please see the article for additional information, including other authors, author contributions and affiliations, conflict of interest and financial disclosures, and funding and support.

#  #  #

Embed this link to provide your readers free access to the full-text article This link will be live at the embargo time http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2023.23030?utm_source=For_The_Media&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=ftm_links&utm_term=071223

About JAMA Network Open: JAMA Network Open is an online-only open access general medical journal from the JAMA Network. On weekdays, the journal publishes peer-reviewed clinical research and commentary in more than 40 medical and health subject areas. Every article is free online from the day of publication.

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JOURNAL

JAMA Network Open

SCI FI TEK

Birmingham start-up awarded funding for technology that generates water out of air

Grant and Award Announcement

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

NovNat Tech Ltd, a visionary new company based in the Unit 9 incubator at the Birmingham Research Park, has secured funding from Innovate UK to develop a novel technology that can generate water out of air. 

NovNat Tech is offering solutions to one of the most critical problems of today and the future, the global water scarcity crisis, and is developing a first of its kind ‘atmospheric water harvester’ to help address the global water shortage. 

The harvest uses a proprietary material that has already been vigorously tested for its water sorption characteristics, and has displayed breakthrough performance, capturing and releasing water from air at a faster rate and with less energy required than any existing material.

The Innovate UK funding will support the development of an on-board vehicle atmospheric water generator, that can produce clean water while on the go, and the five-month project will allow the company to further expand on the core technologies and IP developed so far.

Founders Abdulbari Belouafi and Ibrahim Albaik first met as graduate researchers at the University of Birmingham, after which they worked on developing the breakthrough technology, which has broad-based patent protection. 

They then attended UoB Elevate, an incubator and business growth programme for University of Birmingham students and graduates, before founding NovNat Tech, an engineering design company to develop water harvesting systems enabled by advanced materials.

While the innovators saw a broad range of applications for their technology, the University’s Entrepreneur in Residence helped them focus their thinking and shaped their business proposition.  

The innovators applied for, and won, grant funding from the Climate Innovation Platform, and entered Unit 9 to build a prototype that can collect water from air, utilizing the waste heat emitted from various processes within buildings to produce potable water, with a net zero carbon footprint.

Abdulbari said: “As first-time innovators we were unaware of the range of support that is available.  The monthly tenant meetings allow us to discuss our current challenges with fellow innovators and business support advisors from University of Birmingham Enterprise, and the information share and signposting is truly valuable.”

Unit 9, University of Birmingham Enterprise’s incubator, provides flexible, low-cost facilities to meet the needs of aspiring companies who want space for medical research, proof-of-concept, or prototyping activities.  For information about space or facilities, contact Angie Reynolds, Head of Birmingham Research Park. 

 ALL OUR RELATIONS; SOME ARE FAMILIARS

Belief in animal​​s’ capacity for emotion linked to better health and welfare

New research finds equids whose owners believe animals feel emotions or who have an emotional bond with them were in significantly better health

Peer-Reviewed Publication

UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH

Working equids whose owners believe in their capacity to feel emotion have significantly better health and welfare outcomes than those whose owners do not, according to new research by the University of Portsmouth and international animal welfare charity, The Donkey Sanctuary. 

The study is the first to show a link between the welfare of working equids - including donkeys, horses, and mules - and the attitudes and beliefs of their owners, in different countries and contexts around the world.  

Researchers visited equid-owning communities in Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan, Senegal, Spain and Portugal, where they carried out ​​​​welfare assessments. This included a questionnaire for owners about their beliefs, values and attitudes toward their ​animals​; and a ​detailed assessment​ of the equids’ ​welfare. 

The study, published in the Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, found animals whose owners believed they felt emotions or who had an emotional bond with them, were in significantly better health and had higher body condition scores than those whose owners did not​,​ or who focused on ​how profitable or useful they were​.

Similarly, animals whose owners believed they could feel pain were much less likely to be lame. These relationships were evident ​across multiple​ countries​, with varying economic incomes.​     ​​​     ​ 

Lead author, Dr Emily Haddy, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Portsmouth’s ​Centre for Comparative and Evolutionary Psychology​, said: “We know people’s feelings toward their animals can impact their welfare, but we wanted to know if this differs across cultures. Our research involved equid-owning communities in six countries, whose animals worked in a diverse range of contexts including agriculture, tourism and construction. 

“​This​​ ​is the first study to link owner attitudes to the welfare of their working equids across multiple countries and contexts. Our findings highlight the importance of the relationship between owners and their animals, and its significant impact on animal health and welfare.” 

Co-author and Executive Director of Equine Operations at The Donkey Sanctuary, ​​​Dr ​Faith Burden, said: “We have long understood that donkeys and mules are sensitive and sentient beings, who fare best when they are treated​ as individuals and​ with the kindness and respect they deserve. This study provides further peer-reviewed, scientific evidence​ to support our work across the world​.  

“What’s really exciting is these findings could inform and increase the efficacy of future welfare initiatives. For example, promoting emotional connection and awareness of animal sentience among owners of working equids could potentially influence attitudes and lead to improvements in the welfare of working equids around the world.” 

Co-author, ​Dr Leanne Proops​, Associate Professor in Animal Behaviour at the​ University of Portsmouth’s Department of Psychology​, ​added​​​: “This is a fascinating study that highlights the link between attitudes to animal sentience and welfare. However, it’s important to avoid assumptions about the owners of animals who had poorer health and welfare indicators. 

​​“​It’s possible these owners simply don’t have the resources to look after their animals as well, and because they don’t like to think of them suffering, they adjust their beliefs to think that their animals don’t feel pain. This is a well-documented psychological technique that people use to minimise psychological distress when their behaviour and beliefs don’t align. 

“This is a very important study that paves the way for further research to establish causality, and a greater understanding of compassion and animal welfare.” 

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JOURNAL

Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science

DOI

10.1080/10888705.2023.2228029 

METHOD OF RESEARCH

Survey

SUBJECT OF RESEARCH

Animals

ARTICLE TITLE

Belief in Animal Sentience and Affective Owner Attitudes are linked to Positive Working Equid Welfare across Six Countries