World Bank and IMF — Keeping Pakistan in shackles

Tuesday 28 January 2025, by Farooq Tariq


On 11th December 2024, while replying to a question in Pakistan’s National Assembly, the federal finance minister admitted for the first time that since 2019, and while under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, gas prices increased by a record 840% and electricity tariffs rose over 110 %.

Both developments contributed significantly to the unprecedented inflation that has eroded the purchasing power and living standards of the majority of Pakistani people. Electricity, gas and oil price hikes due to IMF conditions have greatly impacted farmers, rural communities. On electricity alone, prices have gone up in the last three years from Rupees 10 to Rupees 65 per unit, the highest price of electricity in the region.

On top of skyrocketing inflation, Pakistan is still reeling from the 2022 massive flooding that debilitated the agriculture sector and the overall economy. About 4.5 million acres of crops were damaged and one million farm animals were lost during the torrential rains-induced flooding. No compensation has been paid to farmers until now, contributing to deeper inequalities and a record increase in the number of “new poor”.

Pakistan has been a member of the World Bank and the IMF since 1950. Thus far, the IMF has provided loans to Pakistan 25 times or an average of one loan agreement every three years. The latest loan approved in October 2024 amounted to $7 billion, which Pakistan will receive in 37 installments. Pakistan must repay $100 billion foreign debt within the next four years, with $18 billion due in the current financial year.

All these loans, along with their accompanying programmes which Pakistan is compelled to implement as part of loan agreements, are avowedly for the uplift of the people’s standard of living. However, results have been just the opposite.

A World Bank report estimated Pakistan’s poverty rate at 40.5% in 2024. This means that an additional 2.6 million people in Pakistan fell below the poverty line in 2024. In Balochistan province, one of the richest in natural resources, the poverty rate reached a staggering 70%. The poverty rate in Pakistan over the past five years has increased despite all these loans from the IMF, World Bank and China.

Pakistan is unlikely to meet many of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The health sector impacts alone of these loans from the IMF and World Bank have been devastating. With debt repayments prioritized over the strengthening of public service infrastructure and delivery, half the population are without access to basic sanitation and health. Those who can pay are often forced to turn to more expensive private health providers, while those without the financial means are forced to resort to self-medication and unqualified local healers, or none at all.

Pakistan’s current government, which has been in power since 2022 with an interval interim government, has fulfilled the conditionalities of IMF with such brutality that it earned them commendation from Kristalina Georgieva, the IMF’s Managing Director, who said, “I want to congratulate the government and people of Pakistan for moving forward with the home-defined Pakistan-owned reforms.”

The “home-defined” and “owned” reforms mentioned by Georigieva consisted mainly of the increase and expansion of indirect taxation, particularly the General Sales Tax or GST, which now stands at 18 %, the highest in South Asia. Packaged food and most medicines were the latest to be included in the items which will be levied GST. The increase in GST is part of the effort to meet the IMF’s loan conditionality to raise tax revenue targets, not for social spending but to raise the financial resources for debt servicing and assure lenders. The government has also withdrawn subsidies, raised taxes and levies on the agriculture, power, gas and oil sectors. After this wave of increased taxes, a liter of packed milk is now sold at over 400 Rupees ($1.44) in a country involved heavily in agriculture and dairy production. A litre of milk is today more expensive than the price of a liter in the Netherlands. Conditionalities also include keeping the legislated minimum wage low at only 37,000 Rupees per month ($134.05). But even this meager amount is not enjoyed by over 80% of agriculture and food workers.
Withdrawal of Minimum Support Price for crops:

Other IMF conditionalities have effectively withdrawn social protections and social safety nets such as the non-provision of subsidies to farmers for electricity, farm inputs and farm machinery. The IMF’s recent loan includes a new condition for the Pakistan federal and provincial governments to phase out the minimum support price (MSP) system for staple crops by June 2026. The MSP, widely used in many developing countries, serves two key purposes: to guarantee farmers a minimum return on their produce and to stabilize the production and supply of essential crops. While the former aims to protect farmers from global price fluctuations and distress sales during periods of surplus, the latter safeguards consumers from supply-demand imbalances and market inefficiencies. There were only four crops whose minimum support price was fixed by the government which is a little relief to the farmers.
Push for corporate farming

Government’s anti-farmer and anti-poor policies, driven by the neo-liberal economic order under the IMF and World Bank, are destroying farmers’ livelihoods. The anti-farmers government is giving control of the agriculture and food systems sector to the military and transnational agribusiness companies. The military and the government’s plan has started to grab millions of hectares of land from farmers in the name of corporate farming.

The government, under the guise of the Green Pakistan Initiative, is planning to seize a staggering 4.8 million acres of land (roughly 28 lakh acres), across our country for corporate farming. The marked area for corporate farming is larger than the island of Jamaica and is approximately 9.5% of Punjab’s total land area.

Corporate farming will lead to the displacement of small farmers as they struggle to compete with agribusiness corporations. The concentration of land ownership among corporate entities will reduce employment opportunities for agricultural workers and rural communities. Those who have been awarded the lease for corporate farming are already busy evicting those tenants who were cultivating that land for decades. The tenants have shown great resistance to the eviction and they are ready to go any length to keep the land for their families.

Another massive struggle is going on in Sindh province where masses of people are demanding a stop to canal-building on the river Sindh as there is little or no water available for these canals. The planned six canals are in the Cholistan area of Punjab where corporate farming would be carried out on at least half a million acres of land. Corporate farming and the massive irrigation project in Punjab province has further aggravated the water-sharing dispute with Sindh province.
IMF-Imposed Privatization of the Public Sector

The IMF has been pushing Pakistan to privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs) since at least 1991. Despite privatizing 172 SOEs between 1991 and 2015, yielding $6.5 billion, the country was unable to solve its persistent budget deficit nor the issue of long-term growth. At present, there are 85 remaining SOEs, which operate in seven sectors. Two-thirds of these SOEs are turning a profit. Roughly 80-90% of public sector losses stem from only nine enterprises including five electricity distribution companies due to IMF-recommended Independent Power Producers and private power policies.

Government privatized state institutions included Zarai Taraqi Bank (Agriculture Development Bank) which provide critical support to the food and agriculture sector. Agriculture Development Bank was offering interest free or very low interest loans to farmers community for agri machinery and seeds. Utility Stores Corporations were mainly providing subsidized food items and groceries since 1972. Other key state institutions affected by privatization are Pakistan International airlines, Pakistan Life Insurance Corporation, First Women Bank Limited, House Building Finance Corporation, several power distribution companies (DISCOS), Pakistan Engineering Company, etc.
Perspective and Demands by PKRC and affiliated Farmers Unions

Pakistani farmers and peasants are demanding accountability for the WB-IMF’s promotion of neoliberal and open market economic policies that fuels hunger and inequalities. The Pakistan Kissan Rabita Committee (PKRC) rejects these neoliberal open market policies and Free Trade Agreements dictated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the IMF which prioritize corporate profits over people’s needs. The Pakistan government’s decision to allow private wheat imports undermines local farmers’ efforts and benefits transnational corporations. Relying on imports has made Pakistan’s food supply vulnerable to global market volatility.

PKRC and its affiliated farmers’ unions are fighting for minimum support price (MSP) to protect farmers. This is a fight against neoliberal and capitalist institutions like the IMF and World Bank that are pushing the government of Pakistan to end MSP. It’s a fight against IMF-led neoliberal and anti farmers open market policies. It is a struggle to regulate the market to ensure fair prices for farmers’ produce. It’s a fight for parity prices and against the unfair competition, crippling production costs and influx or dumping of discounted imports.

The government has a responsibility to protect people from side-effects of stabilization through creating livelihood opportunities in agriculture, and other similar sectors, expanding social protection and safety nets and better administration and governance at a local level. Stabilization should not come at the cost of poor people.
Farmers’ bodies response to the withdrawal of subsidies and Minimum support Price system

In early May this year, tens of thousands of farmers in Pakistan held protests in several cities over the government’s decision not to buy their wheat, causing them huge losses in income. The farmers in Punjab, the country’s largest province and often called the “bread basket” of Pakistan, demanded that the government stop wheat imports that have flooded the market at a time when they expect bumper crops. The farmers were furious about the import of wheat in the second half of last year and the first three months of this year, resulting in an excess of wheat in the market and reducing prices. Last May 21, 2024, demonstrations in 30 districts responded to the call of PKRC to protect domestic products.

Following devastating floods in Pakistan in 2022, the impact on wheat farming caused a shortage of wheat in early 2023. While Pakistan consumes around 30 million tonnes of wheat per year, only 26.2 million tonnes were produced in 2022, pushing up prices and resulting in long queues of people in cities trying to buy wheat. There were even instances of people being crushed in crowds trying to access wheat.

The Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), the ruling coalition at the time, decided to allow the private sector to import wheat in July 2023, just a month before the end of its tenure in government. According to figures from the Ministry of National Food Security and Research, between September 2023 and March 2024, more than 3.5 million tones of wheat were imported into Pakistan from the international market, where prices were much lower. As a result of the excess, at the beginning of April this year, when Pakistan’s farmers started harvesting their wheat, the country’s national and provincial food storage department was holding more than 4.3 million tones of wheat in its stocks.

Usually, the government purchases around 20 percent of all the wheat produced by local farmers at a fixed price (about 5.6 million tones, based on a 2023 yield of 28 million tones). This intervention in the market, it says, ensures price stability, prevents hoarding and maintains the supply chain. This year, however, it has announced that it will purchase only 2 million tones of wheat from Pakistani farmers. Allowing private importers to bring unlimited wheat into the country last year means that farmers will now have to sell what they can to other sources at much-reduced prices – and they will suffer great losses.

The overall impact of World Bank and IMF policies has been very negative for Pakistan economy and for people’s economy. It has increased price hikes and inequalities. Unemployment is at a historic high. Not surprisingly, the IMF and World Bank are very unpopular in Pakistan, as they have also been used by the local corrupt elite to carry out price hikes. In one form or another, there is always public opposition to the IMF every day. These energies and activism of ordinary citizens sustain the hope of forging unities among trade unions, farmer organizations and the people at large to mount stronger opposition to IMF and World Bank prescriptions and to apply greater pressure on the government to withdraw or cancel them outright.

Asian People’s Mpvement on Debt and Development 19 December 2024


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Farooq Tariq is General Secretary, Pakistan Kissan Rabita Committee.
and President Haqooq Khalq Party. He previously played leading roles Awami Workers’ Party and before that of Labour Party Pakistan.


International Viewpoint is published under the responsibility of the Bureau of the Fourth International. Signed articles do not necessarily reflect editorial policy. Articles can be reprinted with acknowledgement, and a live link if possible.

Geopolitics

With Trump in the White House, China and Latin America may try to forge an even deeper relationship

Wednesday 29 January 2025, by Jose Caballero


Within days of Donald Trump’s election win in November 2024, China’s president Xi Jinping was at a ceremony opening a deep-water port in Peru as part of a “diplomatic blitz” through Latin America.

Xi’s presence was a symbol of China’s rising influence in the region.


The Chinese-funded (£2.8 billion) Chancay port represents an expansion of the relationship between China and Peru. The two countries also signed an agreement to expand free trade. Xi said this was the beginning of a maritime version of China’s belt and road initiative, to expand its worldwide trade and influence.

The first Trump administration opted for a confrontational stance towards many countries in the region, including Peru. This ultimately pushed it to deepen its alliance with China. Beijing saw the opportunity, through favourable trade deals and investments, to position itself as a more reliable and beneficial partner than Washington.

In the last 20, years China has dramatically expanded its role as a top trading partner for Latin America. In 2002, trade between China and the region was worth US$18 billion (£14.34 billion), that amount increased to US$500 billion by 2023. In the first two months of 2024, China’s exports to Latin America increased by 20.6%.

Trump’s first term was widely seen as driving Latin American nations away from US values and alliances and towards China. Brazil, for example, saw trade with the US drop to its lowest level for 11 years, while trade with China grew significantly. Joe Biden did little to improve relations.

Trump’s campaign rhetoric signals that the upcoming administration will continue that trend. And China is certainly ready to build on its partnerships in the region if, and when, opportunities arise.

The Trump administration is likely to be focused on immigration and drug trafficking, as well as trade. For instance, Mexico is more likely to become a policy priority, because of illegal immigration, than Brazil.

Trump may look for regional allies whose policies seem more aligned with his own. Argentina’s president Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele seem likely candidates, with their form of populism echoing some of Trump’s.

Despite efforts by Brazil’s president Jair Bolsanaro to work with Trump when they were both in power, and to echo Trump’s soundbites, trade between the two nations fell. Significantly, during Trump’s term of office three nations – the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama – withdrew recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign country, publicly shifting allegiance to Beijing and away from US-backed Taipei.

Video. President Xi visits Peru.
What next?

In 2025, countries with close ties with China could become targets for the Trump administration. Trump has threatened to increase tariffs on Chinese goods and outlined his tough China policies as part of his “America first” agenda. China may see the Chancay port as a back door to the US market, and possibly a way to avoid rising US tariffs. So Peru could become a trade-relations battleground.

Meanwhile, Trump’s America first policy, prioritising US interests, could also result in the reduction of regional aid.

Reduced US support might lead Latin American countries to seek even stronger ties with China. The latter has already been actively offering economic investments and supporting infrastructure projects through programmes related to the belt and road initiative over the past decade. Argentina has even become the base for a Chinese space station.

Belt-and-road-related projects are often seen as more attractive compared with aid and investments from western countries, including the US, as they come with fewer demands on the country receiving the investment.

Trump’s potential disengagement from multilateral organisations, such as Nato and the World Bank, could also strengthen China’s influence, globally. This US position would reduce its capacity to shape international norms and policies, leaving Latin American nations with fewer reasons to side with Washington.

Latin American countries, which often rely on multilateral institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank for economic and political support, could turn to China for increased investment. China’s diplomatic efforts, including high-level visits and participation in regional forums, continue to rise, signalling its intent to strengthen ties with Latin America.

Strong economic relations with China will probably remain appealing to Latin American countries. Particularly so for those that have experienced economic instability in the post-pandemic period and are looking for new avenues of growth and development.

Importantly, China’s investments in the region’s infrastructure and energy sectors have already been substantial in the last decade. They have provided much-needed capital and technology transfers. Such investments have not only boosted local economies but also strengthened diplomatic ties, positioning China an important partner in the region’s development.

China v US

Another aspect of China’s foreign policy that can be attractive to Latin American countries is its non-interventionist approach. This policy emphasises respect for sovereignty and the right of countries to choose their own development paths.

China presents itself as an alternative to traditional western powers. This enables China to portray itself as a fellow developing economy, suggesting a sense of solidarity with Latin American countries. This contrasts with the US’s complex history of intervention in the internal affairs of many of the region’s economies.

As Trump continues to emphasise a more isolationist and protectionist approach, countries in Latin America may find China’s approach more compatible with their own policies.

The hostile rhetoric towards many Latin American nations, particularly over immigration, during the first Trump term has left those nations expecting something similar this time. China appears poised to make even more of those opportunities.

The Conversation


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Jose Caballero

>Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)

 

Yemen’s Ansar Allah: On the Houthi movement’s roots, governance and resistance

By Helen Lackner

Published 30 January, 2025

First published at MERIP.

Until it fired missiles and drones against Israel in October 2023, the Yemeni Houthi movement, officially known as Ansar Allah, remained largely unknown in the Global North.

Head of the Houthi-led government Ahmad al-Rahawi (3rd from right) and members of his government listen to the representative of Hamas in Yemen, Muadh Abu Shammalah, during their visit to the Hamas office in Sanaa, Yemen on August 19, 2024. Khaled Abdullah/Reuters

In the year since, in support of the Palestinians under siege and genocide in Gaza, Ansar Allah have fired multiple projectiles against Israel, one of which successfully evaded Israeli air defenses in July 2024 and reached Tel Aviv, killing one person. Later attacks wounded some and damaged infrastructure, including Ben Gurion airport on September 15. The majority of their attacks have been on maritime trade in the Gulf and the Red Sea, significantly impacting international trade through the Suez Canal as well as traffic in Israel’s ports: Eilat has almost ceased operations, and in July 2024, the port declared bankruptcy.

Their actions contrast sharply with the passivity, not to say complicity, of the Arab states in the Arabian Peninsula and beyond, which, although making various tepid statements about Israel’s war, are helping get imports to Israel by facilitating overland transit from UAE ports through Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.

The Houthi movement has achieved worldwide prominence (and significant global popularity) as a key actor in the resistance to Israeli aggression and a member of the Axis of Resistance. Ansar Allah’s relationship with Iran, meanwhile, has been subject to widespread disinformation by international media and US and British policymakers, who tend to deny Houthi agency by describing them as mere Iranian proxies, in the narrowest sense of that word.

Both international support for and opposition to Houthi interventions in the Red Sea are largely based on ignorance of the nature of their rule in Yemen. Writing in these pages in 2023, Stacey Philbrick Yadav noted this tendency toward oversimplification in discussions of the Houthis and offered a short analysis of Ansar Allah’s relationship to Palestine. Below is a more detailed outline of the movement’s roots, the nature of their governance over millions of Yemenis and an analysis of Ansar Allah’s developing role in the Resistance Axis in light of shifting regional dynamics over the last year.

The Houthi movement’s oppositional roots

Ansar Allah has its roots in the Sa‘ada governorate in the northwest of Yemen.

The region is the heartland of the Zaydi branch of Shi’a Islam, which historically dominated politics in northern Yemen. Until the 1962 revolution that created the Yemen Arab Republic, the ruling imams were Zaydis, who claimed descent from the Prophet and are part of the social group that Yemenis call sada. After the revolution, tribesmen dominated, and the sada — though retaining social status and influence — were politically marginalized.

When President Ali Abdullah Salih came to power in July 1978, one of the mechanisms he used to control the country was to encourage social and political conflict at the local level. In Sa’ada, these efforts took the form of allowing the rise of Sunni Salafism. Muqbil al-Wadi’i, a Zaydi who converted to Salafism during his years in Saudi Arabia, established the Dar al-Hadith (House of Hadith) religious community in the early 1980s in a village close to Sa’ada city, the regional capital.1 The community attracted thousands of Yemenis and foreigners who lived there and proselytized, building a strong Salafi movement which remains politically significant throughout Yemen today.

In response to this threat, Hussain al-Houthi started the Zaydi al-Shabab al-Mu’min (Believing Youth) movement in 1992. Al-Houthi’s movement was a “catalyst which could unite the interests of all those in Sa‘ada and beyond who felt economically neglected, politically ostracized and religiously marginalized.”2 In the following decade, the revivalist movement grew, forming an active opposition to the rising Salafi movement in the same area. While Hussain al-Houthi was a member of the Yemeni Parliament from 1993 to 1997, later disagreements with the Salih government led to the first military uprising in 2004.

The Believing Youth formed the core of the movement opposing the Salih government. It increased in strength and membership during the six wars that followed between Salih and the opposition — in part due to Salih’s indiscriminate destructive tactics and generalized aggression against the northwest, which alienated thousands of tribesmen and others who did not necessarily support Houthi ideology but were infuriated by the exactions of the regime. By the time a shaky ceasefire was reached in early 2010, the Houthis controlled an area well beyond the original heartland around Sa‘ada. The fighting would probably have resumed had the 2011 uprisings not taken place at the national level.

The Houthis joined the 2011 uprisings, though they acted largely independently, maintaining tents in Sana’a’s Change Square for two years, even when most others had left. They were not a party to the 2011 GCC Agreement that created a two-year transitional government, prompting them to begin cooperating with former president Salih to undermine the transition.

In September 2014 — as a result of the weakness of the transitional regime and their earlier expansion of territorial control southwards — the Houthis were able to take over the national capital, Sana’a. By early 2015 the transitional government was on the run. Over the following two years, the Houthi movement, which had gradually gained strength at the expense of its alliance with Salih, assassinated him in December 2017, thus achieving full control of about a third of the country’s land and two-thirds of its population.

From 2015 to 2022, the civil war was aggravated by the involvement of a Saudi-led coalition of nine states, including all GCC states except Oman. The key decision-makers in this coalition were Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and their increasing rivalry and support for competing factions within the internationally recognized government of Yemen (IRG) contributed to its weakness and inability to effectively confront Houthi forces.

With the 2022 UN mediated truce, lasting from April to October of that year, Saudi Arabia and the UAE stopped their airstrikes, which had caused massive destruction throughout the country. Since then, small-scale fighting between the different Yemeni forces has taken place on most fronts, though clashes increased in significance in 2024.

Houthi governance

Politically, the Houthis exercise a highly authoritarian and oppressive rule. Their control of the capital has enabled them to take over all government ministries, where they have ensured that Ansar Allah loyalists determine decision making and control funds. Ansar Allah claims not to want to re-instate the Imamate, but its political actions suggest a vision close to that prevailing in Iran, with a religious leader dominating a government that claims to be democratic. The sada currently hold the majority of senior positions in all institutions.

Although the Ansar Allah government formally includes sections of the General People’s Congress (GPC) — Salih’s former ruling organization — as well as other smaller parties, signs of dissent or of alternative positions have been met with imprisonment and torture. Journalists and civil society activists have been heavily targeted. In June 2024, the Houthis arrested and imprisoned more than 60 humanitarian workers, including 13 United Nations staff, accusing them of being US and Israeli spies. The movement has been particularly combative toward the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, briefly occupying its Sana’a office in early August 2024 after having held a senior staff member in detention since 2021.

Socially, the Houthi government has instituted policies severely restricting women’s mobility and other freedoms, forcing them to be escorted by a mahram (a male relative) when moving within and outside of the country and imposing strict conservative dress codes.

Among Ansar Allah’s problems when it comes to governance is finance. Before the war, Yemen was dependent on two primary sources of income: hydrocarbon exports and international assistance. The first has completely dried up since October 2022, when the Houthis prevented oil and gas exports by attacking the relevant ports. Meanwhile, limited international development aid has been replaced by far larger amounts of humanitarian aid, which is a major source of friction: On the one hand, humanitarian agencies try to prevent Ansar Allah’s influence over distribution mechanisms and the selection of beneficiaries. On the other, the Houthis impose restrictive rules governing the activities of international and national humanitarian organizations. This tug of war between Ansar Allah and the UN unfolds in the absence of representatives of the funding states, as most embassies closed in 2015.

Houthi finances also depend on taxation, port fees and customs duties on imports. Given that most basic commodities — wheat and other staples, medication, etc. — are imported, Houthi success in diverting most shipping to the Red Sea ports under its authority in 2023 was significant. Recently, however, this success has been partly undermined by the reduction in Red Sea maritime traffic since their intervention in Israel’s war.

Moreover, the reduction of humanitarian aid since the blockade began has also affected Houthi finances. The World Food Programme ceased its distributions in the areas under Houthi control in December 2023, with only two minor exceptional distributions in some areas benefiting 1.4 million people — a drastic reduction when compared with the 9.5 million who received regular support up to that time. In addition, the UN’s annual Humanitarian Response Plan in 2024 was 60 percent smaller than the previous year and, by the end of the year, had only been financed at 50 percent — worsening the humanitarian crisis throughout the country.

Houthi foreign policy

The Houthi’s basic slogan, “al-Sarkha” (the Scream), points to how issues beyond Yemen are at the core of Ansar Allah’s ideology. “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews” are three of its five points, the other two being “God is the greatest” and “Victory to Islam.” Palestine is mentioned frequently at all levels, with the movement’s opposition to Israel, at times, taking the form of antisemitic slogans and chants. But until Israel’s war on Gaza started in October 2023, the scream was an ideological assertion without much practical implementation. Even the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 provoked little response beyond accusations of betrayal of the Palestinian cause.

The current war in Gaza has given the Houthis an opportunity to live up to their slogan by engaging in direct military action against Israel. Within Yemen, their prestige has risen dramatically as the overwhelming majority of Yemenis, whether under IRG or Houthi rule, are sympathetic to Palestinians, horrified by the ongoing genocide and willing to tolerate the consequences of this support, at least up to now. In Houthi-controlled areas, their actions against Israel have boosted the movement’s popularity, which was deteriorating as their oppressive rule had alienated the majority, who were frustrated by the exactions and other demands on their household finances.

The maritime war has also increased Ansar Allah’s public image worldwide, in particular in majority Arab and Muslim states, where most of the population supports the Palestinian people and deplores what they see as their own leaders’ shameful inaction. In the Global North, Houthi actions in support of Palestinians have given them a positive image among many, particularly on the left.

Moreover, as a result of the US and British attacks on Yemen this past year, Houthis can now claim to be directly fighting the United States, the main imperialist enemy. To date, while these strikes have been limited and have degraded Houthi ability to attack shipping, they have not had a significant impact. Between the launch of Operation Poseidon Archer in January and November 2024, the United States and Britain have used 601 munitions in 279 air strikes to minimal effect. In that period the Houthis successfully sunk two ships and damaged more than 80 others.

Relationship with Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Houthis have had meaningful relations with Iranian religious leaders for decades, with many members of Ansar Allah having spent time studying in Iranian religious institutions.3 Badr al-Din al Houthi, father of Hussain al-Houthi and the current leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, studied in Iran’s Qom. He was deeply influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini — an influence evident in the Scream. He returned home with political ambitions and reforms intended to create a body of followers distinct from mainstream Zaydism. Though the movement remains Zaydi, it has institutionalized a number of religious and secular ritual celebrations, which were previously largely ignored in Yemen, including Scream Day, Popular Revolution Day, Resilience Day, Martyr’s Day and the Prophet’s birthday.

Salih accused Iran of supporting the Houthis as early as the Sa’ada wars (2004–2010), a claim the United States dismissed at the time as a “disingenuous attempt to garner Western and Sunni Arab support.”4 But since 2015, with the internationalization of the civil war, Iranian practical support for the Houthis has become more active and increased. It now includes political and financial support in the form of free fuel deliveries to the Houthis.

Militarily, in recent years the Houthis have exhibited a greater competence, in terms of strategy, tactics and equipment. Much of the latter is now manufactured locally. In September 2022, for instance, they held a three hour military parade in Sana’a, with tens of thousands of soldiers and a wide variety of missiles and other weapons.

The most sophisticated drone and missile components undoubtedly come from Iran, either directly or indirectly. Most smuggled items land in the far east of Yemen, in al-Mahra governorate, and then must cross more than a thousand kilometers of IRG-controlled territory before reaching Houthi territory across multiple checkpoints that cover the country (indicating either incompetence, corruption or both among the internationally recognized government). Some components also arrive by sea, thanks to assistance from smugglers and others in the Horn of Africa, who access the Yemeni Red Sea coast, despite the vast deployment of naval forces in the area. There have also been rumors of a few advisors from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and from Lebanon’s Hizballah helping to train Ansar Allah’s armed forces. But reliable publicly available evidence for these claims is largely absent.

With its numerous successful interventions in the Red Sea and attacks on Israel, Ansar Allah, over the past 15 months, has become a leading member of the Axis of Resistance, whose main participants are Hamas and Hizballah. Its other members, various Iraqi and Syrian militias, play a lesser role. In June 2024, Houthi military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, claimed the first joint operation with the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, which hit two cement tankers and two cargo ships in Israel’s Haifa port. Other attacks have followed.

Looking ahead

Ansar Allah has been clear that its attacks on Israel and shipping are in support of Gazan, Palestinian and now Lebanese resistance and would stop when Israel ceases its genocide and opens Gaza to humanitarian aid. Following the implementation of the first phase of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, agreed to in January 2025, the Houthis have released the crew of a siezed ship and halted their campaign. But they have been clear that they will resume their actions if Israel reneges on the ceasefire.

At the same time, however, support for the Houthis in Yemen over their domestic policy is dwindling, as living conditions continue to deteriorate.

The impact of Houthi actions on the Arabian Peninsula is particularly notable, evidenced by the deafening Saudi silence: In the face of its population’s support for Palestinians, and as a side-effect of Houthi actions, the Saudi regime has bowed to Houthi demands in its financial war against Yemen’s internationally recognized government. In July 2024, Saudi Arabia pressured the IRG to withdraw its attempt to cut off Sana’a based banks from the international SWIFT system. This step further weakened an already weak and divided entity. These developments are unwelcome for many Yemenis, for whom a stronger Houthi rule means increased repression of the population and a closing down of civil society and dissent.

Helen Lackner is the author of Yemen in Crisis (Saqi Books, 2023).

• 1

  Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen, Transnationalism and Religious Identity (London: Hurst, 2011).

• 2

  Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, a History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Hurst, 2017), p. 37.

• 3

  Walter Posch, “Iran’s relations with Yemen; Ideological and strategic aspects,” in Stephan Reiner, Alexander Weissenburger, eds., Yemen at a crossroads, What remains of Arabia Felix?  (Vienna: National Defence Academy, 2024), pp. 90–91.

• 4

  Quoted in Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis, Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope (London: Saqi Books, 2023), p. 188.

 

‘We have witnessed the final nail in the coffin of Western liberal pretence’: An interview With Gilbert Achcar

By Gilbert Achcar & Snigdhendu Bhattacharya

Published 30 January, 2025

First published at Outlook.

On October 7, 2023, Gaza-based armed group Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, killing approximately 1,200. They demanded that Israel free Palestinian prisoners from its jails and withdraw its settlers from Palestinian land. This flare-up in a chain of decades-long conflict led to another chain of reactions, with Israel’s all-out war on Gaza killing more than 50,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, including an overwhelming number of women and children from October 2023 to December 2024.

The conflict has gone beyond the borders of these two countries and the cry of the Gazan people has emerged as the biggest question mark rising on the horizon of the global community and the so-called civilisational conscience.

Gilbert Achcar, a Lebanese professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, is known for his deep understanding of West Asia’s geopolitics and the international interferences that often drive them. Speaking to Snigdhendu Bhattacharya on the current state of turmoil and uncertainty that the region is passing through, Achcar discusses issues ranging from the fall of the al-Assad dynasty in Syria and its implications on the Palestinians’ struggle to the hypocrisy of Western powers reflected by their contrasting role vis-a-vis the Russia-Ukraine war.

How do you see the implications of the regime change in Syria?

I wouldn’t call that a regime change because regime change is an expression that has taken a very specific meaning, especially since the US-led invasion of Iraq. It now means some external force working to change a regime. In Syria’s case, I would rather call it a real collapse of the regime in the same way as the collapse of the Kabul regime in 2021, when the US forces started leaving the country.

It is, of course, an event of huge importance because of the role that Syria played as a major platform for Iran, in particular, and also some other countries. You had five foreign forces on Syrian soil. The first of them is Israel, which has occupied the Golan Heights in the south of the country since 1967. The Iranian and Russian forces intervened in 2013 and 2015, respectively. The Turkish troops invaded in 2016 in some parts of the north. The American troops are in the northeast, the Kurdish region in particular.

Therefore, it is obvious that the collapse of the Assad regime, which Russia and Iran shored up, has a major strategic significance. That is why it is also a stunning event.

The day after Assad’s exit, Syrians, including refugees, celebrated in every single city. But the very event pushed Palestinians into deeper anxieties as they feared Assad’s fall could embolden Israel. Then, the Syrian celebration was cut short by Israel. Of course, Turkey and the US also bombed Syria but mostly it was the Israel factor that spoiled their celebration. Can you elaborate on the complexity of this geopolitical situation?

The humanitarian crisis was already there. In the last few years, Syria already witnessed an economic collapse before the political collapse. A mafia-like economy, controlled by the regime, developed around drugs. For the rest of the population, the economic situation was extremely dire. The local currency collapsed and people’s purchasing power collapsed with it. The average civil servant would get something like the equivalent of $25 or $30 per month. Even in the poorest countries, this is extremely low. So, you had a humanitarian situation already developing.

The collapse of the Syrian regime has been a huge relief. Hundreds of thousands of people had been incarcerated and tens of thousands disappeared and were killed in the jails during the brutal, tyrannical regime of the Assad family. But as happens frequently in such cases, when you have such a quasi-totalitarian regime collapsing, in the absence of a readily present alternative, you have a lot of anxiety about how things will go. Several forces are still active in Syria, including local and foreign ones. We more or less know the projects of each force but no one knows who is going to prevail. However, at the very least, people can breathe free for now. They are trying to organise. Civil society is trying to get alive again. And that’s the most positive element in the present situation.

Israel has seized this occasion to grab more Syrian land in the Golan Heights. But even more importantly, Israel launched hundreds of air raids in a very few days, destroying, according to Israeli sources themselves, 80 per cent of the Syrian military potential. It is the country’s official or regular military potential, not of fringe rebel groups. Israel destroyed the Syrian naval force, the air force, anti-aircraft machines, and so on. This is a total destruction of the military capability of one country by another in almost complete global indifference. It is amazing that this drew very little objection or protest.

Israel is continuing on a very aggressive course that it has embarked on, especially since October 2023, first with the war on Gaza, followed by attacks on Lebanon and Syria. The Israeli armed forces are now in the business of destroying three territories to a certain extent, including two supposedly sovereign countries — Lebanon and Syria.

For Palestine, Hamas looked at the Syrian regime as part of the so-called Axis of Resistance dominated by Iran. Even though Hamas had been at odds with the Assad regime for several years because they supported the anti-Assad uprising of 2011, they ended up mending fences with the regime. This was also part of their bid to re-establish the alliance with Iran. When they launched their operation on Israel on October 7, 2023, they appealed to Iran and the so-called Axis of Resistance to join them in the battle to liberate Palestine.

Now, with the collapse of the Assad regime, we have seen Hamas congratulating the Syrian people. So, they are changing tack again. They are now betting on the Islamic forces that played a key role in Assad’s downfall. Some of these groups are linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas itself is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is a regional organisation. At this level, we don’t know what kind of political power will emerge in Syria and what would be its position on Palestine. But one thing is sure, the destruction of the military potential of the Syrian State weakens very much all opposition to the Israeli state.

What about the Lebanon-based Hezbollah?

Hezbollah is a major casualty. Israel dealt them very severe blows since launching its offensive in September 2024. Until late November, for about a couple of months, there have been intensive attacks by the Israeli forces on Hezbollah, which went far beyond anything that we have seen in Lebanon before, far beyond the 2006 Israeli onslaught on Hezbollah. This time, unlike 2006, the Israeli attack managed to deal a very heavy blow to Hezbollah. They completely decapitated the organisation. The secretary-general was assassinated.

Practically, the vast majority of the key leaders of the organisation were killed and the military capacity has been destroyed to a large extent. Now, with the downfall of the Syrian regime, which was the conduit through which Iran could send weapons to Hezbollah, the prospect of Hezbollah being rearmed, as happened after 2006, is practically thin, if not impossible. I can’t see or imagine how Iran could rearm Hezbollah. Iran has lost a lot in all this.

How is Iran impacted?

This happened just when Donald Trump was elected for a second term in the US. We know how hostile Trump was to Iran during his first term. We know that he is surrounded by people who are very much anti-Iran. Therefore, Iran has good reason to fear an attack, either a US-Israel combined attack or of the US alone under Trump, targeting its nuclear installations in particular. This has become very possible, very likely. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, will push hard, very hard, for an attack on Iran. This is something that he has been wishing for long. He can’t do it alone. Israel needs the US for that. And now is the time for that in the mind of Netanyahu, with his friend Donald Trump back at the White House.

Do you see the possibility of the emergence of any other Axis of Resistance, or whatever that may be called, developing against the US-Israel alliance?

There are only two Iranian allies that are still there with some capacities. One is the pro-Iran Shia militia in Iraq. However, their effectiveness regarding Israel or the US is very limited. Every time they tried to strike at US forces, they faced powerful retaliation. And then you have the Houthis in Yemen. They have been launching missiles in the Red Sea and also on Israel. Now, most of these missiles, especially those launched on Israel, are intercepted. But every now and then something goes through. Israel very recently escalated its retaliation against the Houthis in Yemen. And, they would probably go beyond that if this carries on. So, I mean, the militias in Iraq or the area of the Houthis in Yemen, or to the Hezbollah, which is very weakened—none of this represents any strong deterrence for Israel or the US. Iran stands strategically weakened. It’s a strategic defeat. And, they are now in a much weaker position at a time of heightened danger for them.

We, therefore, find the Palestinians all the more vulnerable right now, much more vulnerable than they already were. Despite Iran, Israel could launch and wage a genocidal war in Gaza for over a year, with impunity. They destroyed Gaza. They committed a real genocide, as is now exposed and denounced by all human rights organisations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Doctors Without Borders, besides the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court. Yet, they have been carrying on for 14 months. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank is reviving its role as kind of a proxy for the (Israeli) occupation. And that is quite dangerous for the future of the Palestinian people.

You mentioned the possibility of the US under Donald Trump trying to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. This reminds me of the George Bush-led US invasion of Iraq on the false charge that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. To many observers, that was the point that pushed West Asia into chaos. Who will hold America responsible for what they did to Iraq?

There is a major difference between the cases of Iraq and Iran. Iraq had zero weapons of mass destruction when the US led the invasion of the country in 2003. They searched everything and couldn’t find any trace of those weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration blatantly lied. However, in the case of Iran, first of all, there are nuclear installations. There is an important nuclear production potential in the country. There have been agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for some control of these facilities. That was part of the nuclear deal the US under the Barack Obama administration cut with Iran in 2015.

However, Trump, during his first term, repudiated this agreement. So, Iran felt freed from its commitment not to enrich uranium beyond a certain limit. And they have been producing highly enriched uranium, which, of course, normally can serve only one thing, which is the production of nuclear weapons. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency has been pointing to that and warning Iran about it. We might see something like a race in Iran now, prompted to accelerate the production of a nuclear weapon as a deterrent against an attack. And the attack we are talking about is not a matter of years. It’s a matter of maybe months. Either the Iranian leadership completely capitulates and allows real inspection of its facilities, or it is quite possible that the US would strike at these facilities.

From that perspective, this is much more dangerous than the invasion of Iraq. You won’t have an invasion of Iran. It would be just an airstrike. But it has the potential of igniting the whole region, which is a powder keg already, and then an oil barrel. It’s like sending a rocket into a huge oil barrel. All huge oil reserves. And that’s what you could get.

How do you see the role of the Western powers?

The Western powers are an integral part of the Israeli onslaught on Gaza. This is the first joint US-Israeli war ever. If you take all the wars in the history of the Israeli State since 1948, when it was founded, this is the first one that can be described as a fully joint war by the US and Israel. The only thing that is missing is the troops on the ground.

The United States is not part of the attack on Gaza but it has armed them, especially by providing the bombs that destroyed the Gaza Strip. It has funded, condoned and defended Israel politically. It has defended Israel militarily by deploying its troops in the region against any potential action by any enemy of Israel. And, it has blocked any calls for a ceasefire. That is a full endorsement combined with a full participation, materially, in the war.

Recently, some of the European states took what could be described as relatively righteous positions — just positions. Ireland went to the point of cutting its diplomatic relations with Israel. Countries like Spain and Belgium took positions closer to the international laws. But for most others, especially Germany, the position has been one of full endorsement, unconditional. And the US attitude has completely shattered the Western pretence of rules based on liberal international order, as they call it. When you compare their reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israeli invasion of Gaza, the huge difference destroys all pretence of respect for international laws, equity, human rights, and all of that.

In that sense, I believe that what we have seen is the final nail in the coffin of the Western liberal pretence. That’s not to say that the alternative is better. It is just to say that the world in which we are is more and more, unfortunately, a world ruled by the law of the jungle, that is, the law of the strongest.

Do you have any message for people in general?

A global catastrophe has begun. It reminds us of what happened a century ago over Nazism and Fascism. Now, we additionally have a climate disaster looming large. If the people do not rise up and fight for the defence of democracy against the far-right trends that we see worldwide, and for peace, for reviving a world based on the UN charter on international law and a world where instead of spending trillions of dollars on weapons, the money could be spent on the fight against climate change and poverty, then our humanity is facing a terrible, terrible fate.

The world is on the brink of a major, major disaster. The journey has begun. We are hearing more about the use of nuclear weapons than we used to hear even during the Cold War — I mean, aside from the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. We are hearing this regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the possible US-Iran conflict. We are facing a catastrophe and I’m not exaggerating at all.

KURDISTAN

The revolution in North and East Syria after the fall of Assad

By Chris Slee

Published 29 January, 2025

The revolution in North and Eastern Syria began in 2012 among Kurds living there, but spread to involve other nationalities in the area.

The Kurds were oppressed under the Bashar al-Assad regime. Many were denied Syrian citizenship. Land was taken from Kurds and given to Arab settlers. The Kurdish language was discriminated against. Kurdish political organisations were repressed.

The outbreak of the revolution in other parts of Syria in 2011 weakened the regime and allowed Kurdish political organisations to operate more freely.

In July 2012 there was an uprising in Kurdish areas, led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD). There was little resistance from Assad regime troops, most of whom surrendered without a fight.

In Kobani, for example, a mass of people assembled outside the army base as a delegation informed soldiers that if they gave up their weapons, their safety would be guaranteed. The soldiers agreed. Some returned to their homes in other parts of Syria, while others stayed in Kobani.1

Rojava revolution

The Kurdish area of North and East Syria is known as Rojava (meaning western Kurdistan). The uprising came to be referred to as the “Rojava revolution”.

The PYD initiated the creation of democratic structures. Base level organisations were called communes. In the countryside, a commune might be a village. In the cities, a commune might comprise a few hundred households on the same street. Each commune elected representatives to a higher level body.2

The PYD promotes equality for men and women. For example, communes and other organisations were required to have male and female co-chairs. The PYD also promotes the inclusion of all ethnic and religious groups in the democratic structures.

The PYD led in the creation of armed forces to defend the revolution. They created the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). The latter is an all-women armed force.

In the rest of Syria, the popular uprising turned into a civil war. Peaceful protests were violently repressed. So, many opponents of the regime took up arms.

The problem was that weapons and money for the rebels came from Turkey and the Gulf States, who tended to support the most reactionary rebel groups, including Arab chauvinists hostile to Kurdish rights and Islamist groups hostile to religious minorities and the secular PYD. Turkey was particularly opposed to Kurdish self-determination and supported groups that were hostile to Rojava.

Daesh

The PYD distrusted both the Assad regime and many of the rebel groups. It tried to stay out of the fighting between the regime and the rebels. However, Rojava came under attack from some Turkish-backed groups. In 2014 Rojava was attacked by Daesh, or the so-called Islamic State.

Daesh captured large areas of Iraq and Syria, including Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, after the Iraqi army collapsed there. Daesh also attempted to capture Kobane, but was driven back by Kurdish fighters and some Arab Free Syrian Army fighters.

Worried about the rise of Daesh, the United States formed an alliance with the YPG and YPJ to fight against Daesh. This was paradoxical, because the US was also supporting Turkey in its war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey and northern Iraq.

The PYD follows the ideas of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. The Turkish government views the PYD and PKK as essentially the same. Yet the US was supporting Turkey against the PKK while supporting the YPG and YPJ against Daesh.

Over the next few years Daesh was driven out of North and East Syria. The alliance between the YPG and YPJ and some Arab groups led to the formation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As the war against Daesh continued, more Arabs joined the SDF. With each successful push against Daesh, more areas populated by Arabs came under SDF control.

To highlight the multi-ethnic character of North and East Syria, the Kurdish name Rojava was replaced by Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). On the other hand, Turkey named its Syrian proxies the Syrian National Army.

In 2018, Turkey invaded Afrin, a predominantly Kurdish area in northern Syria. The SDF resisted the Turkish invasion of Afrin for more than two months, but the light weapons of the SDF were no match for the aircraft and tanks of the Turkish armed forces.

Although helping the SDF fight Daesh, the US did not help the SDF fight the Turkish invasion of Afrin. This showed the limitations of the alliance: the US has no interest in defending the revolution.

In 2019, Turkey invaded a strip of land along the border in northern Syria. Since then, Turkey and its SNA proxy have continued their attacks on AANES-controlled areas.

Syria’s future

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) became the dominant force in Idlib province, in north-western Syria. HTS was allied with Turkey, but not totally under Turkey’s control; it was relatively independent. In November 2024, HTS launched an offensive against the Assad regime, leading to its rapid collapse.

At the same time, Turkey and the SNA stepped up their attacks on AANES. They captured some areas west of the Euphrates river, including the towns of Tal Rifaat and Manbij. These forces are currently trying to cross the Euphrates, but the SDF is resisting this offensive. There is a battle for control of the Tishrin dam.

Meanwhile, AANES is putting forward its ideas for the future of Syria as a whole. They call for a National Dialogue Congress, which would involve “political and social organizations, as well as ethnic, religious and cultural groups” that could develop a “common social contract”.3

They also call for the liberation of the areas under Turkish occupation and for the new government in Damascus to join them in this struggle.

HTS is unlikely to agree to AANES’s proposals, but there is hope that they will gain an audience among the Syrian people beyond the north and east.

Based on a talk given to an online discussion about Syria organised by the moderators of the Marxmail discussion list.

• 1

  Revolution in Rojava, by Michael Knapp, Anja Flach, and Ercan Ayboga, Pluto Press, 2016, page 54

• 2

  Revolution in Rojava, p.87

• 3

  “Peoples’ Assembly of North-East Syria presents six principles for Syrian Constitution”, ANF English https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/peoples-assembly-of-north-east-syria-presents-six-principles-for-syrian-constitution-77461