What Lies Behind Trump’s Attacks Against Venezuela?
As if President Trump intended to meet professional US mercenary Erik Prince halfway, US Attorney General Pam Bondi increased the existing US bounty on President Maduro—originally set at $15 million—from $25 million to $50 million for anyone providing “information leading to his arrest or conviction.”
In late 2024, Prince, a professional mercenary, alongside Venezuela’s far right, promoted a plan to deploy a private army to Venezuela. He suggested that if the US raised the bounty on Maduro’s head to $100 million, targeting not only the president but also Diosdado Cabello and the entire government, they could “just sit back and wait for the magic to happen.” Prince and Venezuela’s far right even launched a crowdfunding campaign, Ya Casi Venezuela (“Almost There, Venezuela”), to collect the $100 million.
In November 2024, Prince declared that after 10 January 2025 (Maduro’s inauguration day), key figures—including Diosdado Cabello (Interior Minister), Jorge Rodríguez (National Assembly President), Delcy Rodríguez (Vice President), Vladimir Padrino López (Defence Minister), Tarek William Saab (Attorney General), Cilia Flores (Maduro’s wife), and Nicolás Maduro himself—would become “criminal objectives” with no diplomatic protection. On 12 January 2025, Prince sent a message of support to opposition leader María Corina Machado, urging her to “Stay resolute.”
Prince had pushed for the bounty to be raised to $100 million, but when the Biden administration ignored him, he secured backing from Senators Marco Rubio and Rick Scott, who share his objectives. On 20 September 2024, Scott and Rubio introduced the Securing Timely Opportunities for Payment and Maximizing Awards for Detaining Unlawful Regime Officials Act of 2024 (the STOP Maduro Act), allocating $100 million—taken from seized Venezuelan assets—to fund Prince’s efforts to depose Maduro.
The US charges against President Maduro are not only preposterous but entirely false and slanderous. He is accused of being one of the world’s largest drug traffickers, a threat to US national security, and the leader of the Cartel de los Soles, allegedly responsible for shipping hundreds of tons of cocaine into the US while collaborating with “narco-terrorists,” the Tren de Aragua gang, and Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel. Venezuela’s Foreign Minister, Yván Gil, dismissed Bondi’s “pathetic” bounty as “the most ridiculous smokescreen we have ever seen.”
Despite persistent propaganda about the Cartel de los Soles, drug trafficking, and “narco-terrorism”—used to justify labelling Venezuela a “narco-state”—the US has never provided credible evidence to support these claims. The DEA itself reports that over 80% of cocaine entering the US comes via the Pacific, with only 7% passing through the Eastern Caribbean (see DEA maps; notably, Venezuela has no Pacific coastline). This confirms Colombia as the region’s true narco-state, while Venezuela is, at worst, a transit route. The US also falsely accuses Venezuela of money laundering, despite the country being almost entirely cut off from the international financial system. And Mexico’s President, Claudia Sheinbaum, has just declared that Mexico has no evidence linking Venezuela’s Maduro to the Sinaloa cartel.
Bondi’s bounty against Venezuela’s democratically elected president is part of a broader US strategy targeting Latin America, ostensibly centred on combating drug cartels but threatening far more drastic measures. The New York Times (08/08/25) revealed that Trump “secretly signed a directive ordering the Pentagon to use military force against certain Latin American drug cartels designated as terrorist organisations by his administration.” Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum responded unequivocally: “The US will not send its military into Mexico. That is ruled out, absolutely ruled out.”
This outrageous US aggression against a Latin American head of state must be condemned unreservedly. The “pathetic” $50 million bounty consciously incentivises unsavoury actors to launch militaristic, murderous ventures—such as the 2020 mercenary incursion into Venezuela contracted by Guaidó. It marks an escalation in US efforts to overthrow a democratically elected leader, weaponizing bounties to force regime change.
Trump’s secret directive authorising military force against cartels—effectively threatening unilateral intervention in Latin America—must also be unequivocally rejected. While ostensibly targeting Mexico, the policy could easily be weaponised against governments the US seeks to topple, such as Venezuela, Cuba, or Nicaragua (or any other nation, for that matter).
The Trump administration is clearly intent on intimidating—and, given the opportunity, militarily intervening against—Latin American governments it opposes, using the “war on drugs” as a pretext. Worse, Bondi could issue similar bounties against other regional leaders. The US mercenary industry is well-developed, and such bounties would inevitably attract takers, further destabilising the region.
When we consider the US’s highly aggressive tariffs against Brazil alongside its hundreds of sanctions targeting Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, it becomes clear that Washington is testing a new cocktail of threats designed to force nations south of the Río Bravo into submission to US geopolitical demands. This is classic US behaviour—with one key difference under Trump: the abandonment of any pretence behind hollow justifications like ‘democracy’ or ‘human rights’, though such rhetoric still features in official statements.
The true objective is to stifle multipolarity and prevent Latin America from participating in it, all while reinforcing US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere under the guise of Make America Great Again. In reality, this is simply the Monroe Doctrine repackaged—an attempt to sever Latin America’s trade and exchanges with China, or more precisely, to expel Chinese influence from the region entirely. The abject capitulation of Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino, who withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative under Trump’s threats of a US military takeover of the Canal—despite the economic costs to his nation—stands as stark confirmation of this strategy.
Trump’s objectives stand in direct opposition to what progressive movements and governments across Latin America have sought to build: a fairer world without social exclusion, with reduced inequality and poverty, where policies prioritise people over private interests, and where universal rights to education, healthcare, and housing are upheld—all within a framework of strong national sovereignty that has enabled the region to resist US imperialist bullying.
This vision entails:
· An end to US lawfare against President Maduro and all aggression toward Venezuela or any regional government;
· No arbitrary US tariffs against Brazil or any other Latin American nation;
· The cessation of US military threats—let alone interventions—in Mexico, Venezuela, or elsewhere in the region;
· A Latin America free from US meddling in its internal affairs.
The struggle, then, is not merely about resisting individual policies but defending the very principle of self-determination against a US administration intent on rolling back decades of regional progress.
Defending Venezuela’s sovereignty from a working-class perspective
Salvador De León is a member of the Comité Autónomo e Independiente de Trabajadores(as) (Autonomous and Independent Workers’ Committee, CAIT). Speaking with Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, De León looks at the situation facing Venezuelan workers and trade unions, the Nicolás Maduro government’s economic policies, and defending sovereignty from a working-class perspective.
Could you describe the economic situation facing Venezuelan workers?
There has been a tremendous decline in workers’ wages in terms of their value and purchasing power. This crisis has been worsened by the collapse of the entire social welfare system. Healthcare, education, everything allowing workers to enjoy greater dignity is in tatters. The loss of wages is most keenly felt, but workers suffer the consequences of a dismantled social welfare system, which has left the population impoverished.
To understand how we got here, we have to go back to the period before the waves of crises began to hit in 2014. In the 2000s, China’s huge industrialisation program led to a rise in raw material prices, which benefitted Latin American countries. This coincided with the election of progressive governments in Latin America — Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Lula da Silva in Brazil, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, etc — and allowed them to redistribute wealth, to a greater or lesser extent. In Venezuela, there was a constitutional process in 1999 that laid the groundwork for further democratic and economic gains.
But after significant progress in redistributing wealth and expanding democracy, the commodity market collapsed and oil prices plummeted. Venezuela still has an unsustainable rentier economy given fundamental measures, such as nationalising the banks, were never taken. As part of a globalised capitalist economy in crisis, Venezuela was affected. Since then, crises have hit in waves, but it began with collapsing commodity prices.
During that time, the political will was not there to implement measures needed to deepen and sustain the revolutionary process. There is also a crisis in the trade union movement and the fact that the capitalist class has achieved its objectives. We got to where we are today because the government accepted its role of a Bonapartist regime [balancing off the major classes]. Today, like everywhere in the world, the government provides capitalists with all their needs and guarantees, while Venezuelan workers bear the brunt of the economic crisis.
What about democratic rights?
The crisis has led to the stripping of many democratic achievements enshrined in the constitution. Our constitution is highly democratic and inclusive, with profound democratic rights, but that are being violated and denigrated. For example, protests and union activity are criminalised. There are also political prisoners.
Part of the explanation is the actions of certain opposition forces, who have sought to carry out coups and disregarded institutions. The Venezuelan state engages in anti-democratic practices, but we must bear in mind that domestic far-right forces have always operated as satellites of imperialism.
They polarised politics and created conditions in which the state sought to protect governability through state of emergencies, allowing it to further disregard democratic guarantees. I am not justifying these actions, but we need to understand that the state of emergencies are a response to an opposition that ignored institutions and democratic participation, preferring coups.
There is a profound need, first and foremost, to restore wages in Venezuela. This implies a debate that goes far beyond a dignified wage to include rebuilding the entire social welfare system.
We also need to win back democratic rights. This requires ensuring everyone works within the established democratic framework and participates in any institution and space open to workers. Faced with the crisis of the globalised capitalist economy and imperialist threats, we need to restore the country’s governability, institutions, and the internal political life if we are to win back democratic rights.
Debates outside Venezuela focus on blaming either US sanctions or the government for the crisis. What is your opinion?
The two have interwinned. First, it is a fact that sanctions exist, there is a blockade, and US imperialism’s policy is to fracture the nation-state. Imperialism needs to fracture nation-states because the crisis of the globalised capitalist economy requires it to destroy any democratic gains, no matter how small, in order to take control of raw materials.
Our conception of sovereignty is based on people’s ability to exert their self-determination and defend working class gains within the framework of nation-states. That is why this is not about defending Maduro. Defending Maduro has never been our central focus; nor have we advocated for the president’s ouster. We understand that, under attack from imperialism, we must unite forces, whether we like it or not, to defend the integrity of the nation-state. We do so from the perspective of the 1999 Constitution and all the laws that we, as the working class, have won since then.
The sanctions clearly have significantly affected the economy — the numbers speak for themselves. Ultimately, it is the working class who have been affected, not those in power or their governability. But we also have the government’s poor economic decisions. They chose not to more effectively redistribute oil revenues through greater state planning, as others proposed.
So, there was a debate about what direction the government should take?
In 2017, President Maduro announced his proposal for an Economic Recovery, Growth, and Prosperity Program. Throughout that year, there was a debate among the grassroots, where certain left critics, such as María Alejandra Diaz, Pasqualina Curcio, Tony Boza and other comrades, put forward proposals to ensure the vast majority were protected from the crisis. They said: yes there is a crisis and a blockade, but we can obtain funds through policies such as taxes on large transactions and the banks, to give a few examples.
Other comrades put forward different proposals, such as Jesús Farías who ended up spearheading the program that was ultimately implemented — a program based on deregulation, free market policies, and all the usual capitalist formulas. They argued fixing the economy required recreating conditions to attract foreign investment. Amid the internal crisis and state of emergencies, they enacted the Law on Foreign Investment, the Anti-Blockade Law, and other laws that, ultimately, promoted the free market and deregulation.
Since then we have had an economic recovery, but in capitalist terms. There has been economic growth, but Venezuela in 2025 is not the same as Venezuela in 2017. This is obvious when you go to a supermarket, where you can get whatever you want, but have to buy stuff on a pulverized salary and in a de facto dollarised economy. The economy is moving, unlike in 2017, but workers’ living standards are more precarious.
In the private sector, business groups are protected while anti-labour counter-reforms are increasingly likely. The few gains left face many threats. We are on the defensive, not the offensive. The situation has changed.
So, many elements came together. On the one hand, there is the blockade, there was a systematic economic war waged by the national capitalist class; but, on the other, the government lacked the political will, or rather shifted its policy toward more deregulation, more free market, and more policies in tune with the requirements of the globalised capitalist economy.
How should we understand US President Donald Trump’s policy toward Venezuela given the US government had talked about tightening sanctions and then extended Chevron’s license to exploit Venezuelan oil, and also sent a representative to meet publicly with Maduro only to then double the reward for Maduro’s arrest?
These constant twists and turns provide a glimpse into the volatile, unpredictable and anarchic nature of the crisis of the globalised capitalist economy. Confronted with this crisis, and various ongoing and potential wars, Trump may have a certain policy towards Venezuela but he also has to contend with capitalism’s crisis and intra-capitalist competition. We no longer live in a world of competition between national capitalisms. Instead we have different economic groups, including oil companies, competing to protect their own corporate interests. The crisis is so deep that in this competition, any group that fails to rapidly revalorise their capital disappears or is absorbed by another.
So, Trump can talk about tightening sanctions, but that comes with political costs and internal disputes. That is why he had to send a representative to meet Maduro. This was a response to the oil lobby’s demands, because Chevron has interests in continuing to exploit oil here. Now Chevron’s license has been approved but, at the same time, the Trump administration labelled Venezuela a terrorist state — this is the real issue and not so much the $50 million bounty on Maduro, because this status opens up possibilities for military intervention.
All this shows Trump has to contend with internal pressures.
Can we say, with the most recent measures, that one side or the other is winning the battle within the Trump administration?
We believe this latest move is more of an aggressive negotiation strategy than anything else. It is an attempt to apply pressure to maintain favourable negotiating conditions.
But the important thing is to recognise that Trump’s ambivalent, shifting, and contradictory policies towards Venezuela reflects the anarchic, chaotic world economy we live in.
There is no formula for predicting what might happen next. We do not know, for example, how Trump can sustain the oil sanctions, especially given the various ongoing and potential wars and competition with China and the BRICS, which could provide Venezuela with an alternative market.
Venezuela is in the eye of the storm because of our strategic geographic position, our proximity to the US, and the fact we have the world’s largest oil reserves. That is why Trump needs to ensure he is not burning any bridges to access Venezuela’s oil. But ultimately, not even he can guarantee what will happen.
What is certain, though, is that the Venezuelan workers will be the ones who continue to be affected by the sanctions and end up bearing the brunt of the crisis.
The main big business organisation, Fedecámaras (Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción de Venezuela/Federation of Chambers and Associations of Commerce and Production of Venezuela), along with other business federations, has abandoned its oppositional stance and begun to collaborate and even support the Maduro government. How did this happen?
Fedecámaras emerged in 1944, a year after then-president Isaías Medina Angarita publicly declared that no more money would be given to national business owners. Historically, the state has used oil revenue to finance the capitalist class, in the hope that this would help develop national industry. Instead, it led to the creation of a parasitic capitalist class. Fedecámaras was formed to defend these capitalists, and continues to defend those interests today.
When Chávez came to power, Fedecámaras immediately openly opposed his government. It took part in the 2002-03 oil industry lockout and promoted various coup attempts, because its underlying objective has always been defending the interests of the business community.
Once the government started implementing its policy of paying public sector salaries through non-salary bonuses, Fedecámaras saw the state doing what it had always wanted. The Economic Recovery Program contained two important measures for the public sector: Memorandum 2792, which suspended all collective bargaining agreements, and the ONAPRE Instruction, which flattened national pay scales. This is what Fedecámaras was proposing for the private sector. Add the government's bridge-mending efforts to attract investment, we can clearly see a rapprochement with the national business community.
Has the state at least enforced workers’ rights at the same time?
I will answer by giving you an example: Venezuelan law provides workers with job security, no worker can be fired [without prior approval from the Ministry of Labour’s Labour Inspectorate]. But workers do not trust state institutions, as the profound institutional crisis we face means Venezuelans no longer trust their institutions. So, workers simply do not go to the Ministry of Labour if they are fired.
Before this, when large companies laid off workers and the Ministry of Labour sought to intervene, the companies simply defied it. This was a tactic used by big business: Grupo Polar, Coca-Cola, Regional, Pepsi-Cola, Cargill. Some managers were jailed for a few days, but they had the economic power to deal with the fallout. There were no laws to punish them as these were socioeconomic crimes. We need laws that allow the state to go beyond the corporate veil, the legal fiction that protects shareholders, in order to mitigate and nullify these employer tactics by punishing them.
So, we need to look at the sequence of events that led us to this point. Fedecámaras stuck to its traditional strategy and managed to pierce the nation-state by simply refusing to obey the law. At the same time the state refused to go further.
At one point there was growing talk of workers' control, of expropriating businesses that were waging economic war — all this was debated in the grassroots and even inside the state. But the government opted to avoid further confrontations, arguing that imperialism would suffocate us and leave us worse off. The next step was the Economic Recovery Program where, again, it was argued that deeper and more radical steps were ill-advised, and instead we needed to be more inclusive towards the business community.
This demagogic rhetoric left us where we are today. Fedecámaras sees its policies and proposals being heard while continuing to do whatever they want. Today, capitalists have a greater capacity than workers to be heard, and greater political participation.
Would you say the government's economic policy is neoliberal?
The government has been adapting its policies to the demands of the globalised capitalist economy. I do not know if the best term is neoliberal. What we have, in economic and pragmatic terms, is opening up of the free market and deregulation. Under the pretext of the crisis, the state’s policy is that we need to attract investment to boost the economy — which has occurred, but in capitalist terms.
The national market has rebounded, businesses have reopened, there are more business owners, etc. Where I live, Maracaibo, you can find new pharmacy chains, new supermarket chains, but with workers on precarious contracts outside the protective framework of the Labour Law and constitution.
How has the union movement responded? What is the current state of the movement?
Venezuela’s trade union movement has been in crisis since before Chávez. The broader political crisis that erupted after the 1989 Caracazo uprising had its reflection in the union movement. One pillar of the old two-party system was the tripartite social dialogue between the government, Fedecámaras and the CTV (Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela/Confederation of Workers of Venezuela). The CTV was the most important union confederation and both main parties, Acción Democrática (Democratic Action) and COPEI (Partido Socialcristiano/Social Christian Party), were active in it. When the two-party system collapsed, so did the CTV. This is part of the history of the crisis we face today. There is also the fact that since the 1999 Constitution was adopted, we have never had a truly unified union confederation to accompany the revolutionary process under Chávez.
Today, there are several union confederations, but they are dispersed and polarised. There is the Central Bolivariana Socialista de Trabajadores (Socialist Bolivarian Workers’ Central, CSBT), which is important because it unites federations in the large state-owned industries. But it is limited by its lack of autonomy due to being aligned with the ruling party. Then there are union confederations that have been co-opted by opposition parties. Political polarisation has severely hampered trade union autonomy. No trade union movement truly understands the need for autonomy and operates accordingly.
On top of that, if you look at the health sector, you see many unions; if you look at the education sector, you will see many unions. There are some representative federations, but there is a lot of parallel unionism. Moreover, mass emigration took with it many union leaders. So, the crisis of the trade union movement is profound, serious and multifactorial.
A large number of union members and workers have been jailed for protesting. Why is this?
This issue has several aspects, especially the adoption of state of emergencies. The basis of any state of emergency is that the integrity of a nation is at risk. This is the case in any country, for example during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Venezuela, the state bases its actions on these exceptional decrees. Its actions are illegal and illegitimate, but are based on this criterion that arose from the attacks, for various reasons, facing the Venezuelan state.
We know that laws and justice are interpreted differently depending on your class. As workers, the danger is that our sovereignty is being eroded in terms of democratic gains. But the state sees it from the perspective of governability. For example, the government considers [the state oil company] PDVSA and [the state electricity company] CORPOELEC as strategic sectors and acts on the basis of precedents, such as the oil strike [that was part of the 2002-03 coup attempt], etc. This does not justify criminalising dissent, but we need to understand that, at one point, the opposition did try to carry out coups that ultimately empowered the state and government.
One specific example: if you look at the Law Against Organised Crime and Financing of Terrorism, or the Law against Hate, for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance, you can see that the state adopted these laws at the time when it confronted coup attempts by business sectors. But these laws became a double-edged sword, because just as they could be used against a bosses’ lockout, they have been used against union leaders under the same pretext of protecting the nation’s economy.
Most charges laid against the vast majority of these workers are based on laws created at a specific moment to confront coup attempts. These workers have been charged illegitimately, illegally, and often on trumped up accusations, using these laws.
What role does CAIT play in the face of all this?
CAIT takes as our starting point the need to use the democratic institutions and gains we have at hand. For example: we have frequently proposed creating a labour prosecutor's office to sanction and punish employers who disregard our rights and achievements.
We have also opposed the prosecution and criminalisation of union activity. Paradoxically, we have sought to do so through the Prosecutor's Office, using our political contacts. We have done it this way because of our position of respecting institutions. It is essential that workers participate in whatever space they can.
Defending our gains is central to us, and the constitution is our greatest gain. Using the constitution, we have always sought to defend gains under threat. Every time workers have been prosecuted or criminalised, we have highlighted these cases. We say that we must fight against criminalisation, but not by ignoring institutions or refusing to be proactive. The spirit of the constitution is participatory and protagonist democracy, which we always seek to enact.
The left in Venezuela is divided over the Maduro government. How do you characterise it?
We do not subscribe to the thesis that this is a dictatorial government or regime. Not because we justify its actions, but because it has to be understood in the framework of the opposition’s actions. The integrated structure of the nation-state, represented by the Maduro government, has been the target of coup plots. The opposition had a policy to prioritise coups while ruling out any avenues of democratic participation.
If you place a government in such a conflict, it will seek to hold onto power. The stance taken by María Corina Machado, Henrique Capriles, Leopoldo López, and the entire extreme right caused such a polarisation that the government ended up embracing it, justifying unjust actions based on precedents.
By saying this, I am not justifying arbitrary arrests or criminalising protests by workers or communities. We do not justify any measure that violates any democratic freedoms. We denounce them. But they are the result of a domestic conflict and foreign imperialist policies that have sought to fracture the nation-state.
Faced with the threat of the complete dismantling of the nation-state we must be clear on what we are defending. Because, ultimately, there are no possible gains, no possible democratic rights to defend or enjoy, if there is no nation-state. So, for us, sovereignty is the capacity to exercise those rights and gains within the framework of the nation-state.
More specifically, do you view the Maduro government as representing a continuation or a break with Chávez and the Bolivarian process?
The reality we face today is that the working class does not have its own political expression in Venezuela. For better or worse, the Maduro government represents Chavismo. We are represented by the Maduro government so long as the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is in force. It may not be complied with in practice, but that is another matter; we must ensure it is applied.
The moment this constitutional framework is annulled will be the moment we can say there has been a complete rupture between Chávez and Maduro. That is why we denounced the danger posed by Maduro’s constitutional reform when it was first announced. If the proposal is to deepen democratic rights, great. But if the proposal is to strip us of our rights, then we will not allow a comma to be touched. We must defend the Constitution.
That is our start point. For CAIT, the key is to embrace and defend these gains, and defend the nation-state and sovereignty from a working-class perspective. We recognise that there are other comrades and different groups, each with their own views and who raise very valid criticisms, such as the criminalisation and prosecution of dissent. They may have a different position to us, but we sit down with them, discuss and debate with them, and participate together in many different spaces. The Venezuelan left needs to again seek common ground on the basis of what unites us: our class position.
It is worth adding something important: after the July 28 presidential elections, the Maduro government finds itself in a position in which governability has been restored. There is no political crisis in Venezuela because the radical opposition has, in one way or another, been defeated. This means the government can take whatever action needs to be taken. But this brings with it the consequence that, if it fails to take needed actions, it will no longer have an excuse or a scapegoat to justify its lack of efficiency and effectiveness.
Many leftist organisations and individuals have worked for years in solidarity with the Venezuelan people. Given the changed situation, a debate has arisen over whether opposing imperialism requires supporting the Maduro government. How do you view this?
It is a complex issue. I will start by drawing an analogy with the position we have taken towards solidarity with comrades from other countries. A government that represents even a minimal defense of sovereignty, with all its contradictions and however ambiguous the concept of sovereignty can be, for us merits solidarity against imperialist aggression. As for what happens domestically, we can have the best intentions, but only the working class there can organise and respond to the challenges; we cannot substitute for it.
So, if there is imperialist aggression, we must oppose it. And in Venezuela’s case, imperialism’s attacks are evident: the sanctions, the blockade, and now the issue of migration. All of this merits international solidarity. Separate to this is how a government might seek to capitalise on it to legitimise its domestic policies. International solidarity does not mean a blank check for a government’s domestic politics.
But this is where the issue becomes quite complex. On the one hand, the priority is defending sovereignty, but on the other, there is the need for unconditional solidarity with comrades who are being prosecuted and criminalised for exercising their right to freedom of association, etc. Faced with this, there is no formula we can apply.
What is certain is that any solidarity must clearly state its support for sovereignty and explain that it is directly with those comrades and their organisations, distancing itself from any possible manipulation by other forces. We cannot offer solidarity that serves as a spearhead for imperialist policies.
The problem is that, as workers, we are scattered and disorganised when it comes to solidarity. We can see that Latin American governments are responding in a disjointed manner to imperialist aggression, especially with regards to the migration issue. Gustavo Petro in Colombia is going in one direction, Lula another, and Maduro yet another. There is no united action in response to these imperialist aggressions.
All of this confirms the need to consolidate spaces from which to confront imperialism’s interventionist policies from a working class perspective. That is why we, as CAIT, are part of organising a continental conference in Mexico in September that seeks to organise such solidarity at the Latin American-wide level.
We are promoting this conference to organise, channel and put forward proposals that establish our position not only against Trump’s immigration policies but also against his increasingly aggressive policies towards nation-states in the region. We can see this with the move to classify Venezuela as a terrorist state, and with his 50% tariffs on Brazilian products. It is vital for us as workers to meet and discuss how these imperialist policies affect the working class in different Latin American countries and organise our response.
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