Friday, February 27, 2026

 

US-India Trade Deal: A Colonial Era-Like Unequal Treaty



Prabhat Patnaik 

A trade pact listing the minimum amount of goods that one country must buy from another, flies in the face of the free market ideology loved by the bourgeoisie.


The Indo-US Trade Agreement, even leaving aside specific provisions, has two unusual features that mark it out as an Unequal Treaty, of the sort that imperial powers used to impose on countries of the Global South that they did not directly rule.

The first is the stipulation that, leaving aside commodities excluded altogether from the purview of the agreement, while the US would impose 18% import duty on Indian goods, India would impose, according to US President Donald Trump’s rough description, zero import duty on American goods.

To have an agreement that officially institutionalises such a difference in tariff rates is most bizarre. It amounts to the US adopting a “beggar-thy-neighbour” policy where the “neighbour” who is being reduced to the status of a “beggar” actually signs an agreement consenting to being reduced to such a status.

The second unusual feature is the stipulation that India must buy at least $100 billion of American goods every year for the next five years. A Trade Agreement providing the minimum amount of goods that one country must buy from another, come what may, flies in the face of the entire free market ideology so beloved of the bourgeoisie.

The actual amounts traded, according to this ideology, must depend upon the choices of the buyers; they cannot be dictated by governments and hence cannot be decisions of governments. To have this amount incorporated in an Agreement is, therefore, utterly bizarre; even more bizarre is the fact that this minimum amount is stipulated for only one country that is a party to the agreement but not the other, which clearly amounts, therefore, to an Unequal Treaty.

Such an Unequal Treaty can only be imposed by one country upon another. The Bharatiya Janata Party-led government, no matter what it pretends, has been arm-twisted by the US into signing this Agreement. This then becomes the first time in the history of post-independence India that the government of our free country has behaved in so craven a manner as to sign an Unequal Treaty that is reminiscent of colonial times.

The two most obvious implications of this Unequal Treaty are, first, with regard to the purchase of Russian oil, and second, with regard to the agricultural sector. The question that immediately arises is: how does the BJP-led government ensure that imports from the US are raised from around $40 billion now, to at least $100 billion in the coming year?

The government cannot obviously be hoping that imports of all kinds of goods and services from the US would suddenly more than double in just a few months, even if tariffs are reduced to zero; it must therefore be banking on a reduction in Russian oil imports and its substitution by American oil, for that is something it can actually bring about. This not only amounts to acceding to what the Americans have been demanding for some time, but would raise our oil import bill and give a push to inflationary pressures. This is because American oil is at least about 20% more expensive than Russian oil.

On average, about one-third of India’s total oil imports comes from Russia; this, of course, was before the government started cutting down on such imports in recent months, but such cutting down itself was a prelude to the Trade Agreement, so that its effect should be counted not separately but along with that of the Trade Agreement.

Now, taking our total oil imports to be around $120 billion, the switch from Russian to American oil, would thus add about $8 billion to our oil import bill. This is just one element of the colonial-style “drain” that the US is imposing on India through the new Trade Agreement.

This “drain” would not be coming out of the pockets of Indian oil companies; they would just “pass it on” to the buyers through higher prices of downstream goods. This means an inflationary push to the economy whose real victims would be the working people since they do not have their money incomes indexed to prices. The shift from Russian to American oil, therefore, is not just a matter of international diplomacy; it is also a very important class question.

As regards the agricultural sector, the government claims that since some important grains, such as rice and wheat, have been kept out of the purview of the Agreement, agriculture will not suffer because of it. But very significant segments of the sector itself or downstream activities, have been opened up, as the Commerce Minister himself has admitted, though not publicly. Notable instances are apple, cotton, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, soybean oil, and wine and spirits. Besides, animal feeds like DDGs and red sorghum have been opened up, which would place American companies in a virtual monopoly position in the Indian market. States such as Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat will be particularly adversely affected.

It would no doubt be argued that there is a shortage of animal feed in the country and that larger imports would be beneficial; but acquiring requisite imports to overcome shortage is very different from opening up the entire market for such imports at zero tariffs.

Likewise, the Commerce Minister’s claim that dairy products are left out of this particular Agreement, is of little consolation in view of the fact that they figure in the Free Trade Agreements signed recently with the European Union, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

In fact, it is noteworthy that the Trump Administration is talking about the incomes of American farmers rising by billions of dollars because of this Agreement, even as the Indian government is denying any adverse consequences for Indian agriculture. If American farmers are going to obtain a larger market in India, then it necessarily follows that Indian farmers must be getting squeezed out of the market. The only exception can be the case of fresh-credit-financed purchase of some agricultural products used as inputs like animal feed, but these can only be a fraction of the total increase in American farm exports to India in consequence of this Agreement.

Here again, we have an echo of the colonial era. The peasants and agricultural labourers then had been the worst victims of colonial encroachment into the economy, which is why the one slogan above all, inscribed on the banner of the anti-colonial struggle, had been that they would never have to face such a fate in independent India. Exactly the same hardship, however, is being visited upon them once again in complete betrayal of the promise of the freedom struggle, and, not surprisingly, by a government led by a party that had nothing whatsoever to do with the freedom struggle.

Critical commentaries on the Indo-US Trade Agreement tend typically to put the blame for it exclusively on the Narendra Modi government; but this is superficial. Governments, including fascistic ones, act in the interests of particular classes; and it is significant that the news of the Agreement being finalised had enthused the Indian stock market greatly.

The Indian big bourgeoisie and the upper segment of the salariat and professionals want such a tying up with the US even at the expense of the working people of the country. 

The Indian big bourgeoisie’s quest to go global gets a fillip with the availability of the American market, albeit with 18% tariffs. Likewise, the upper salariat and professionals’ desire to have their children settled in the US, which had received a setback because of Trump’s animosity, can now have a greater chance of fulfilment.

The fracturing of the anti-colonial class alliance, with the big bourgeoisie and the upper segment of the salariat and professionals willing to sacrifice the interests of the working people to further their own interests, is what underlies this capitulation to imperialism.

This fracturing, however, began even before the BJP-led government came on the scene. In fact, the adoption of the neo-liberal strategy itself was an expression of this fracturing. Here, as in other economic matters, in other words, the government led by the fascistic forces carries forward with a ruthless disregard for the working people, a tendency started earlier with the adoption of neo-liberalism.

The Modi government’s capitulation before US imperialism stands in sharp contrast to the attitude of an earlier Prime Minister, albeit presiding over a bourgeois-led regime, whose rejection of American pressure had been so resolute that an American President had confessed to being afraid of looking her in the eye. The difference between the two situations lies in the fact that she had been the Prime Minister of a dirigiste economic regime, which had emerged from the anti-colonial struggle, and, notwithstanding the bourgeois development it was ushering in, had not been oblivious of the interests of the working people.

Prabhat Patnaik is Professor Emeritus, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views are personal.

 

Book Review: Money, Banking and Finance in India


Santosh Kumar 


A new book provides a bridge between global theory and Indian practices.


For any modern economy, there exist two crucial elements: firstly, money at the core and secondly, a monetary or financial system that lets money show its full potentialities. The issues of financial inclusion and financial stability are outcomes of the financial system that have been debated without any final outcome. India has been through an evolution of money and financial system since the Gupta Period (3rd to 6th century). After intermittent debacles, a uniform system during the Mughal era was taken over by the British empire to drain India's wealth. More organised monetary management started with the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) on April 1, 1935.

Money and banking in India are complex phenomenon evolved over a long period and requires impeccable understanding of its foundations. It is in this context that the book "Foundation of Money and Banking in India" by Prof. Ankur Bhatnagar and Prof. C. Saratchand (Primus Book, Delhi; January 2026; 646 pages) serves the purpose of building a sound and organised understanding. It blends theoretical rigor with historical analysis, focusing on India's experience since independence in 1947. The authors describe it as a "synthetic outcome of a persistent academic dialogue", negotiating between mathematical models and non-mathematical expositions to make complex ideas accessible. The foreword, by eminent economist Prof. Prabhat Patnaik, sets a critical tone, arguing that in developing economies like India, fiscal policies have been ignored as effective pro-cyclical economic interventions and monetary policy intervention has been considered as a key lever for stability in the era of dominance of global finance. According to Prof. Patnaik, the book makes readers aware about the functioning of financial and monetary models which will be useful to understand the possible implications of financial and monetary policies practiced during this era.

The book is organised into five sections, each building on the last to provide a layered understanding. This reflects a logical progression from foundational concepts to applied Indian scenarios, enriched by numerous boxes, figures, and tables.

Money in Today’s World

Section I, Money: Concept, Theory and Measurement, lays the groundwork. This section clarifies how economic activities in an economy are determined by the presence of money and what are its basic characteristics that make money so significant for an individual and the country. We have witnessed emergence of crypto currencies as the recent development in the monetary and financial system across the world that are being used as digital medium of exchange for online and peer to peer transactions bypassing the role of national/fiat currency as also the role of central banking. According to the Cryptocurrency Market Report-2026, the projected growth rate of the size of cryptocurrency market was 17 percent during 2025-26 and is estimated to reach up to USD 3.35 billion in 2026. The book does have discussion on such latest development in the monetary world and its possible fallout. It also discusses Fintech in which India has been a leader as far as the extent of transactions is concerned triggered by demonetization in 2016. However, the share of cash circulation as percentage of GDP has gone up from 11.6 percent in 2015 to 13.7 percent in 2022 as per the book, defying one of the purposes of demonetization. This section stands out for its balance of economic theories and Indian specificity, incorporating discussions on fintech, crypto, and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).

Financial Systems

The global economy that has been through one crisis after another triggered by the exponential growth of the financial instruments and their size in the name of financial innovation with an objective of risk reduction. The sub-prime crisis of 2008 has been the latest event that shook the global economic world and brought misery in India too, leading to stagnation and inflation in the later part of the UPA-II and finally causing its ouster from the central government. UPA-II also relied on monetary and financial tools mainly to overcome the stagnation in the economy leading to unsustainable build-up of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) of the banking sector in India. But post-UPA-II, during the current political dispensation, NPAs might have come down but that has been possible only with slower GDP growth rate even though India is the fastest growing major economy in world as per the latest data.

The second section of the book is all about the prototypes of the financial system to the current structure of the financial system that world and India are characterised by, with evidence of financial crisis and bringing into the discussion one of the leading economists Hyman P. Minsky and his work on genesis of financial crisis. Such interweaving of theory and empirics is rare in textbooks from India's perspective.

Demystifying Interest Rates

Global domination of finance and its repercussions for developing economies is reflected in the interest policies of these countries. It has been continuously seen that developing countries adjust their interest rate as per the adjustment in federal rate of the USA to adjust the capital flight as per their needs. This trend raises the question on true sovereignty of a country and independence of its central banking. The recent rise of outflow of foreign capital to the magnitude of approximately USD 19 billion in 2025 is an indication of what happens when a developing country does not adjust its interest rate to the US federal bank rate as desired by global rentiers. Section III of the book deals with such issues with special reference to the whole notion of interest rate and its determination in the setting of Indian context. This Section excels in demystifying interest rates through graphics and Indian examples, though the mathematical models might intimidate non-economics majors.

Banking Sector and Monetary Policy

The final two sections of the book are about banking sector in India and monetary policy formulation by the central bank. It gives detailed functioning of role of banks and the central bank in an economy. The book goes beyond discussion of commercial and cooperative banking and brings into discussion new trends that have emerged on the financial horizon of India with greater possibility of instability, uncertainty and non-transparent financing of business expansion. Some of the important topics which any student of economics must understand such as functioning and objectives of Monetary Policy Committee in India makes this very useful.   

Global Theory to Local Practice

Overall, the book's strengths are manifold. Its integration of theory with Indian empirics, supported by over 100 graphics, fosters critical thinking. The focus on financial development since 1947, including demonetization and fintech, fills a gap in India-centric textbooks. Another important aspect is introducing basic concepts of Islamic banking, present in 60 countries, which brings in an aspect of banking not guided by profit maximisation. The breadth of the book, covering cryptos to crises, could overwhelm beginners, and the mathematical elements assume prior knowledge. Data in places only include figures up to 2022, which might limit its utility amid fast-changing events. While it includes comparative discourse related to USA and China, it could have also discussed emerging markets like Brazil or South Africa. The index is a good addition, and each chapter ends with quizzes, review questions, and references.

In conclusion, "Foundations of Money and Banking in India" is a robust, insightful textbook that demystifies a complex field for not only Indian readers but anyone who holds interest in the world of money and finance in Indian context. It acts as a bridge between global theory and local practice, ideal for undergraduate and postgraduate students, policymakers, and economists.

The writer is Associate Professor at Shri Ram College of Commerce, University of Delhi. The views are personal.

 

Green Industrial Policy: Climate Ambition or New Inequality?


Anusreeta Dutta | 20 Feb 2026

Green industrialisation, when unevenly distributed, may replicate historical patterns of regional inequality in India.


Representative image. Image Courtesy: Pexels

India no longer speaks about climate action in terms of prudence. It is speaking industrial language. Solar parks dot the desert, battery gigafactories are announced with great fanfare, and green hydrogen corridors promise to make India a global hub for sustainable manufacturing. The State is not only keeping pollution in check, but it is also changing the way markets work.

This move shows that green industrial strategy is becoming more popular. This is a strategic combination of climate ambition and economic nationalism. India is betting that it can use Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes, capital subsidies, viability gap assistance, and public procurement guarantees to help the economy change, while also reducing carbon emissions.

But there is a harder question underneath this hope: who benefits from this change, and who pays for it?

From Climate Commitment to Industrial Strategy

India's amended Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) commit the government to generating 50% of its installed energy from non-fossil sources and significantly reducing emissions intensity by 2030. However, the domestic political vocabulary has shifted from climate diplomacy to economic competition.

PLI plans for Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) batteries, high-efficiency solar photovoltaic (PV) modules, and green hydrogen are more than just climate solutions; these are tools for industrial self-sufficiency. The goal is clear: minimise reliance on imports (especially those from China), enhance domestic manufacturing, and integrate India into burgeoning clean-energy supply chains.

This is a trend that is happening all over the world. The Inflation Reduction Act in the US, the Green Deal Industrial Plan in the EU, and China's long-standing clean-tech subsidies have made climate action a competition between countries. India is doing the same thing.

Green growth is no longer just on the edges. It is essential to economic statecraft.

Promise of Jobs, Energy Security, Leaping Ahead in Tech

Supporters say that a green industrial strategy could fix a number of structural problems at once.

First, think about how safe your energy is. Increasing the production of solar panels and batteries in the country makes it less likely that global price shocks and political instability will hurt the economy.

Second, making jobs. The government thinks that solar, electric vehicles, hydrogen, and other services will create hundreds of thousands of jobs in manufacturing, logistics, installation, and other areas.

Third, progress in technology. India wants to move up the value chain by encouraging the production of wafers, cells, and modules in India, instead of just putting together parts that are shipped in.

Theoretically, this is a fair way to make the change: getting rid of carbon without getting rid of industry. But transitions are not often neutral.

Resistance from Land, Labour, Community

Big renewable energy and green hydrogen projects need a lot of land and water. In Rajasthan and Gujarat, solar parks, wind farms in Tamil Nadu, and possible hydrogen hubs in coastal areas often cross paths with grazing commons, farms, and areas that are sensitive to the environment. It's ironic that projects that are advertised as "green" can cause arguments in the community about buying land, paying for it, and the project's effect on the environment.

The promise of a job should also be looked at closely. Manufacturing jobs under PLI schemes require a lot of money and may not be able to hire coal miners who have lost their jobs or informal workers. The futures of coal districts in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha are uncertain, but a full plan for a fair transition has not yet been made. Green industrialisation, when unevenly distributed, may replicate historical patterns of regional inequality.

Supply Chains and Getting Resources

Another cause of conflict is critical minerals. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements, and copper are all needed for solar panels, lithium-ion batteries, and wind turbines. Getting these materials makes India want to make new extraction deals in Africa, Latin America, and Australia. Drilling for oil and gas in Jammu and Kashmir and Rajasthan has made people more interested in lithium reserves. But mining, even for clean technologies, has effects on the environment and society. The green transition doesn't end extraction; it changes how it works.

Without the right protections, trying to make supply chains cleaner could move environmental problems to weaker countries, which would be a new form of the unfairness of relying on fossil fuels.

Dynamics Between Central and state governments

The green industrial strategy also changes how power works in the federal government. States compete for investment in solar parks, electric vehicle (EV) plants, and hydrogen hubs by offering tax breaks and land.

But the ability of each state is different. Wealthier or industrialised states may get too much investment, while poorer states may not get enough. Green growth corridors could make unfair differences between states even worse if they don't get the right kind of help. Climate federalism, which is the division of power, money, and rewards among states, will decide if industrial decarbonisation is fair or unfair.

Climate Ambition or Climate Branding?

There is also a part of the story. Green industrial policy helps India become known around the world as a leader in climate change while still allowing it to control its own development. It shows faith that India will decarbonise on its own terms.

But ambition should be measured by the results of distribution, not just the number of gigawatts installed or factories promised. If renewable energy production grows but informal settlements keep dying from the heat and can't get cool, the change won't be complete. If hydrogen exports go up while people in rural areas have trouble paying for energy, ambition will become unbalanced.

The Crossroads

India is at a crossroads in terms of its structure. The change in energy sources is speeding up. Manufacturing is changing its position. Climate and competition are becoming more and more connected in international politics.

The green industrial strategy is a rare chance to make progress in technology while also cutting down on emissions. But it does test the State's political imagination. Will decarbonisation be centralised and require a lot of money, leading to new winners and areas that don't get much attention? Or can it be more inclusive, balanced across regions, and responsive to communities that don't have enough energy? The answer will decide if India's climate goals become a model for fair growth or just another story of uneven wealth. The factories could be green. The question is whether the change will be fair.

The writer is a columnist and climate researcher with experience in political analysis, ESG research, and energy policy. The views are personal.

 

Invisible Debt: A Silent Trap in India’s Digital Finance


Kulvinder Singh Sethi 


How ‘Buy Now Pay Later’ schemes and embedded credit lines are trapping citizens, sparking India’s next financial crisis.

Ramesh, a young professional in Delhi, downloads a food delivery app. A pop-up offers him “instant rewards” if he activates a wallet feature. He clicks without thinking. What he doesn’t realise is that he has just opened a credit line. The debt will quietly accumulate, invisible in his bank statements and beyond the reach of traditional consumer protections.

This is not a rare case. Across India, millions of citizens are being nudged into debt relationships they never consciously agreed to. The rise of embedded credit—where loans are tucked inside apps, wallets, and digital platforms—represents the next frontier of financial risk. Unlike traditional loans, these debts are invisible, unregulated, and dangerously easy to trigger.

The Illusion of Convenience

Digital finance is celebrated for speed and inclusion. But convenience often hides complexity. Citizens are being turned into borrowers without their knowledge. “Buy Now, Pay Later” schemes, wallet activations, and instant offers are often disguised micro-loans. The danger is not just financial—it is constitutional. Consent, transparency, and accountability are being eroded in the name of innovation.

BNPL Explained – Why It Matters

BNPL stands for Buy Now, Pay Later. It lets you buy something today and pay for it later, often in small instalments. The fintech company or bank pays the shop upfront, and you repay them over time.

Why people like it:

  • Quick approval, often inside apps.
  • No need for a credit card.
  • Payments split into smaller chunks.

The hidden problem:

  • BNPL loans often don’t show up in your credit history. You could be piling up debt across multiple apps without realizing it.
  • Late payments can attract heavy fees or interest.
  • Regulators haven’t fully caught up, so protections are weaker than with traditional loans.

For ordinary citizens, BNPL feels like convenience, but it can quietly turn into invisible debt. What looks like a harmless payment plan is actually borrowing without knowing you’re borrowing.

Algorithmic Overreach

Algorithms now decide who gets credit, how much, and on what terms. There is no human banker to appeal to, no conversation about repayment capacity, no empathy for circumstance.

Your loan decision isn’t made by a banker anymore. It’s made by a program that doesn’t listen, doesn’t explain, and doesn’t care—it just calculates.

This isn’t just about technology—it’s about fairness. People are being pushed into debts they can’t see, without clear information, and without any real choice.

Institutional Complicity

Banks, once custodians of public trust, are now silent partners in the embedded finance revolution. By teaming up with fintechs, they chase fast growth while moving risks off their own balance sheets. What looks like innovation is often risk outsourcing — hidden from citizens until the cracks widen.

Case Study 1 – BNPL Partnerships

A private bank funds a fintech’s Buy Now, Pay Later programme. The fintech handles customer acquisition and bears the first layer of defaults. The bank reports loan growth without carrying reputational damage or balance sheet stress. Citizens, meanwhile, face opaque terms, hidden fees, and aggressive recovery practices.
→ Risk shifted: away from the bank, onto thinly capitalised fintechs and unsuspecting borrowers.

Case Study 2 – NeoBank Wallets

Banks plug their systems into fintech wallets, letting the apps run the show while they stay in the background. The fintech markets aggressively, but when fraud or technical failures occur, the burden falls on users. Banks still book transaction growth, while citizens struggle with poor grievance redressal.
→ Risk shifted: away from the bank, onto fintech operators and citizens with little protection.

Case Study 3 – Digital MicroLoans

Banks extend funding lines to fintechs offering instant microloans. Defaults are absorbed by the fintech, which often lacks capital buffers. Citizens face predatory interest rates and harassment from recovery agents.
→ Risk shifted: away from the bank, onto vulnerable borrowers and unregulated players.

The result? A shadow banking ecosystem operating inside apps, invisible to citizens and regulators alike. Debt is discovered only when recovery agents—or worse, automated app notifications—come knocking.

The regulator is watching the parade, while pickpockets are already in the crowd.

Citizen’s Toolkit – How to Spot and Resist Invisible Debt

  • Ask Questions: File RTIs (Right to Information) demanding disclosure of all embedded credit partnerships between banks and fintechs.

  • Check Offers Carefully: Watch for “instant rewards” or “wallet activation” prompts. These often hide credit lines.
  • Scrutinise BNPL Schemes: “Buy Now, Pay Later” is not free—it is a loan. Track your exposure.
  • Document Harassment: If apps send repeated repayment nudges, take screenshots. These can be used in consumer complaints.

Reform Mandates – What Regulators Must Fix Now

  • Consent is missing today: Apps can activate hidden credit lines with a single click, often without clear warning.
    Reform needed: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) must enforce mandatory disclosure pop-ups so citizens know exactly when they are entering a loan agreement.

  • No public record of partnerships: Banks quietly tie up with fintechs to push embedded credit, but citizens have no way to know who is involved.
    Reform needed: RBI should publish a public registry of all bank–fintech partnerships, so citizens can see who is offering what.
  • Algorithms act without appeal: AI (artificial intelligence) systems decide loan approvals and rejections, but citizens cannot challenge these decisions.
    Reform needed: Citizens must have the right to appeal to a human officer, ensuring fairness and accountability.
  • BNPL loans are invisible: Buy Now, Pay Later schemes often don’t show up in credit histories, meaning citizens may unknowingly pile up debt.
    Reform needed: All BNPL exposures must be reported to credit bureaus, so citizens have a full picture of their liabilities.
  • Digital recovery harassment is unchecked: Apps can send repeated repayment nudges or threatening notifications, with no consumer protection in place.
    Reform needed: The Consumer Protection Act should be amended to cover harassment through digital recovery practices.

Closing Statement

Invisible debt is not innovation—it is institutionalised ambush. Citizens are being trapped in contracts they never signed, while regulators applaud “digital inclusion.” If India’s financial future is to remain democratic, visibility and consent must be restored.

Convenience without consent is not progress. It is fraud dressed as innovation.

The writer is a CAIIB (Certified Associate of the Indian Institute of Banking and Finance), has 37 years of work experience in the private sector and in a nationalised bank, and former All India Deputy General Secretary of All India Bank Officers’ Confederation.