White Paper On China’s National Security – Analysis
By Lt Gen S L Narasimhan
When China’s National Security Commission was established in 2014, one of the tasks given to it was to formulate a National Security Strategy. On 11 May 2025, a White Paper on China’s National Security (WPCNS) was issued by Beijing. The method in which this paper was released was uncommon. In the past, China would release its Defence White Papers biannually with an official briefing. That practice was not followed this time. An abridged version of the Defence White Paper was released in English and the original paper itself was in Chinese. A rough translation of the full paper was released a day later by a China-watcher from the U.S. Naval War College[1] he abridged version released by China’s State Commission Information Office does not do justice to the full text.
The global response to this Defence White Paper has been muted, unlike past documents, which were analysed threadbare. Only a couple of articles[2], one in India’s Economic Times and another in The Diplomat magazine appeared that examined some aspects of the paper. The response is subdued this time because of two reasons. One, the world is in a state of flux with the Russia–Ukraine and Israel-Gaza conflicts. Two, the tariff issue in Mr Trump’s second tenure has drawn the attention of many countries to their internal concerns.
The Defence White Paper is 36 pages long in six parts with a preface and conclusion and is also philosophical in nature.
The preface sets the tone and states that the aim of the Defence White Paper is “to comprehensively explain the innovative concepts, vivid practices and achievements of China’s national security work in the new era, share experiences and practices, and work with other countries to promote world peace and development and build a community with a shared future for mankind”.
In the Defence White Paper, eight trends can be seen. One, China appreciates itself for jointly maintaining peace and development that brought in stability in a tempestuous world and for creating unity and self-reliance in the Global South, which has resulted in an adjustment of the international balance of power. It pats China’s back for maintaining international fairness and justice, adhering to true multilateralism, and promoting global governance by a process of consultation.
China feels that the Asia Pacific is stable in an uncertain world because countries in this region resolve issues by dialogue. However, China’s proactive actions in the East and South China Seas indicate the opposite.
Two, veiled accusations against the U.S. for abdicating responsibilities, undermining global stability and the multilateral trading system, unilateralism, protectionism, creating small groups (read Quad), playing the Taiwan card, controlling key technologies and complicating the maritime domain.
Three, the paper points to non-traditional security challenges which are increasing in the form of climate disasters, ecology, food and energy security, along with the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, as also major transnational epidemics. Traditional and non-traditional security threats, it says, are becoming intertwined.
Four, the paper makes a subtle projection of China’s ideology and model of governance. It highlights the contribution of the Communist Party of China for its theoretical achievements and practical experience in maintaining national unity. It plays up the contribution of Chinese wisdom in promoting and improving global security governance.
Five, the Defence White Paper enunciates a concept of “big security” which encompasses everything from traditional and non-traditional security, various regions of the world, scientific development, data security, biosafety governance to nuclear safety. Some concern is palpable when the Defence White Paper talks of national security lying with the Party, maintaining the security of the regime, system and ideology, colour revolution, street politics, secessionist and sabotage activities, some elements promoting Western democracy, freedom, human rights, universal values and other internal threats. Economic risks such as government debt, real estate and sluggish domestic demand contribute further to this concern. On economic security, China seeks to improve the fiscal and taxation system.
Six, the white paper links development with security and further connects China’s security with “common security”, implying thereby that it associates world peace and development with its own development. To support that argument, the Defence White Paper mentions the application of zero per cent tariff to all items originating from the least developed countries (LDCs) that have established diplomatic relations with China. However, it has been seen in many countries that this does not benefit the LDCs, as they export very little to China. The expectation is that the LDCs will return the favour, which will benefit China more.
Seven, the Defence White Paper lists out its core interests as state power, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, people’s well-being, and sustainable economic and social development. It does not include other core interests like the political system[3], concepts that have been enunciated from time to time. This paper exhorts countries to respect each other’s core interests and major concerns.
Eight, and finally, all its global initiatives find mention, and the community of a shared future appears many times.
The Global Security Initiative (GSI) proposed by China is the mainstay of the Defence White Paper, wherein it shows how expansive the concept is, and projects it as a world chapter for overall security. One of the major aspects of GSI, that is, creating an alternative global security architecture under the UN Charter and China’s support for UN peace keeping operations, finds an oblique mention. The red lines that have been specifically spelt out in the Defence White Paper are the Taiwan issue, democracy and human rights, the path and system (implying connectivity, corridors and anti-decoupling and supply chain disruptions) and the right to development. Missing are some of the usual red lines, like the South China Sea[4] enunciated from time to time.
This time, the Defence White Paper gives out how China sees its relations with the U.S., Europe, the Indo pacific, the Middle East, Africa and takes note of its mediation efforts for Palestine and Ukraine. This paper extols China’s efforts to promote global food and security governance, the causes of the Global South and the community with a shared future. It reiterates the No First Use of nuclear weapons. China’s support for combating all forms of terrorism finds a place. However, China seems to be selective on the terrorism issue. The first deployment of weapons in outer space and data and artificial intelligence governance, have been duly claimed as initiatives launched by China and supported by the UN.
Over the decades, several security laws and regulations have been passed by China through which China seeks to modernise and strengthen its security system – a unified system layout, public security governance mechanism, social governance system, and foreign-related national security mechanism by 2035. Improving joint combat capabilities as part of building a strong defence barrier has been emphasised.
Expectedly, the usual promises of not seeking hegemony, expansion or sphere of influence have been made. The mention of Peaceful Reunification and not giving up the use of force, indicate China’s focus on Taiwan. The reference to the polar regions will have implications for the Arctic architecture that is still evolving. In 2018, China declared itself a near- Arctic state, though factually it is not, as its coasts do not border the Arctic Sea.
The global initiatives launched by China in the Defence White Paper warrant a deeper analysis. The Global Community of Shared Future is the overarching concept into which all the initiatives announced by China, namely One Belt One Road (OBOR), Global Initiative on Data Security (GIDS), Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), and Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative (GAIGI), fit in. The initiatives that are announced later subsume the ones declared earlier, and all of them culminate into the Global Community of Shared Future (see diagram below).
This concept seems to emerge clearly in the Defence White Paper. The priorities for various aspects of national security[5] seem to be shifting, and some new ones seem to have gained importance. The Comprehensive Security Concept is not new, but the Defence White Paper has made some additions to it.
For the world it means a China that is prescribing measures to be taken by all other countries in the aspects that it has mentioned in the initiatives and in the Defence White Paper. It indicates a China that feels it has arrived on the international scene. The initiatives mentioned in the paper and the Defence White Paper itself are done from a position of strength and superiority, signalling that China is serious.
For India, it means that it has to contend with an assertive China. It must take stock of its position on the Global Initiatives by China and this White Paper – for India’s and China’s interests may conflict with each other in the future.
Overall, this paper reveals a confident China but also a country now concerned with issues both internal and external.
- About the author: Lt Gen S L Narasimhan is the Adjunct Distinguished Fellow for China and National Security Studies at Gateway House.
- Source: This article was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.
References:
[1] Andrew S, Erickson, “New White Paper: ‘China’s National Security in the New Era’.” Andrew S. Erickson, May 12, 2025. https://www.andrewerickson.com/2025/05/new-white-paper-chinas-national-security-in-the-new-era/
[2] The Economic Times. “National Security White Paper Marks China’s Push for Global Order on Its Terms” May 2025. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/national-security-white-paper-marks-chinas-push-for-global-order-on-its-terms/articleshow/121330816.cms
[3] Feng, Zhaokui. “What Are China’s Core Interests?” China US Focus, October 21, 2014. https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/what-are-chinas-core-interests-2
[4] RFA Staff. “China Warns Philippines of ‘Red Line’ in the South China Sea.” Radio Free Asia, February 17, 2025. https://www.rfa.org/english/southchinasea/2025/02/17/munich-security-conference-south-china-sea/
[5] Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). “China’s National Security White Paper, with Katja Drinhausen und Helena Legarda.” MERICS China Podcast, July 4, 2025. https://merics.org/en/podcast/chinas-national-security-white-paper-katja-drinhausen-und-helena-legarda
[6] Valchev, Ivaylo. “China’s 2049 Plan a Big Challenge before the World.” South Asia Monitor, April 11, 2021. https://www.southasiamonitor.org/china-watch/chinas-2049-plan-big-challenge-world
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations is a foreign policy think-tank established in 2009, to engage India’s leading corporations and individuals in debate and scholarship on India’s foreign policy and its role in global affairs. Gateway House’s studies programme will be at the heart of the institute’s scholarship, with original research by global and local scholars in Geo-economics, Geopolitics, Foreign Policy analysis, Bilateral relations, Democracy and nation-building, National security, ethnic conflict and terrorism, Science, technology and innovation, and Energy and Environment.
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