Who Owns The Middle Corridor? Agency And Rivalry In Eurasia – Analysis
President Donald Trump signs a trilateral joint declaration with President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, Friday, August 8, 2025, in the State Dining Room. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)
By Dr. Magsud Mammadov
A single deal this August in the White House has redrawn the politics of Eurasia’s transport map. Washington, claiming to broker peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in an unprecedented move secured exclusive development rights to a new corridor through southern Armenia.
Branded the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” the passage links Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan and grants the United States a 99-year lease on a strategic choke point at the heart of Eurasia. What looks like infrastructure is, in fact, a bold assertion of geopolitical influence, creating an alternative East–West trade route.
The corridor’s significance extends well beyond commerce. Within weeks of the deal, both Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders were in China pitching the same project to Xi Jinping as part of the Middle Corridor’s eastward expansion. The route once designed to reduce regional rivalries, has instead become another arena of global competition. The real question is not only who builds the Middle Corridor, but who will use it and, more importantly, who owns it.
Core States: From Agency to Arena
At its foundation, the Middle Corridor is a regional project. Initiated by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—and later joined by Turkey—these states have invested in ports like Baku and Aktau, built new railways and roads, and engaged heavily in soft infrastructure to streamline customs procedures and regional rules. Their goal has been clear: to shift from resource dependence, especially in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, toward becoming transit and logistics hubs linking Europe and Asia.
Yet operational agencies have not shielded them from external intrusion. The Zangezur Corridor/“Trump Route” deal illustrates how quickly sovereignty can be compromised. While formally under Armenian law, the corridor is effectively leased to Washington for nearly a century. What seems like a technical arrangement, in reality, a projection of US strategic control—one that provoked Iranian threats and uneasy silence from Moscow. The regional operators remain central, but the ground beneath them is increasingly contested.
Unmatched Geopolitics: China, Europe, and the Expanding Web
Europe has embraced the corridor as a hedge against Moscow. The EU has shown interest in investment and has already put significant political capital into the route.
China, meanwhile, has pursued the same objective. With the Belt and Road’s northern branch squeezed by war and sanctions, Beijing is pivoting south. It presents the initiative as a “win–win” for countries along the route, but its real aim is to secure a stable land connection to Europe that bypasses both northern routes and maritime choke points such as the Suez Canal.
Other regional players are also seeking entry. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan view the corridor as a lifeline for exports and greater autonomy. Armenia, long overshadowed by Moscow, now leverages its U.S. deal and Chinese overtures to regain influence—though at the risk of alienating Russia and Iran.
A Chessboard of Rivalries
The Middle Corridor has become a frontline of multipolar competition. Washington’s involvement in Zangezur seeksnot only to stabilize borders but also to prevent China from monopolizing Eurasian transit. Beijing counters with infrastructure, finance, and diplomacy to secure long-term influence over supply chains.
Russia and Iran, once dominant actors, now find themselves sidelined. Both condemned the US-brokered deal as a direct threat to their security and ambitions. Neither is likely to remain passive: competing projects, diplomatic obstruction, and even covert disruption remain on the table. The corridor is no longer just a trade route—it is a geopolitical chessboard.
The Paradox of Ownership
No single actor owns the Middle Corridor. Day-to-day operations rest with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, but the rules, financing, and political leverage flow from Washington, Brussels, and Beijing. The US seeks to control a choke point, China commands the political stage, and Europe bankrolls much of the framework. The result is overlapping sovereignty—a corridor with many landlords but no master.
This arrangement cuts both ways. Fragmented ownership may strengthen resilience: if one backer falters, another can step in. But it also breeds fragility: every checkpoint is politicized, every lease contested, and every agreement hostage to larger rivalries. The Middle Corridor is less a highway than a hall of mirrors—each power sees its reflection, but no one controls the road alone.
The future of the Middle Corridor will be shaped less by the ambitions of outside powers and more by the commitment of its four host nations—Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Without their joint stewardship, no amount of foreign investment or political maneuvering will be enough to make the corridor a truly reliable link across Eurasia. For policymakers and investors, the lesson is clear: lasting success depends not on the contest between great powers, but on empowering the regional states whose collaboration will ultimately determine the corridor’s fate.
- This article was published by Geopoliticl Monitor.com
Geopolitical Monitor
Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service, providing research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.
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