Forging A Robust Middle Class: Lessons Learned From Comparisons Between Indonesia And China – Analysis

March 10, 2026 
 ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
By Sherry Tao Kong and Maria Monica Wihardja


The expansion of the middle-class has long been viewed as an indicator of successful development.[1] In China, large-scale poverty reduction under an industrialisation-led growth model beginning in the late 1970s was accompanied by sustained wage growth and the gradual expansion of social insurance. This allowed income gains to translate into greater economic security and the emergence of a large middle-class that has since consolidated.[2] Indonesia’s experience, however, presents a more fragile trajectory. Despite significant progress in lifting people out of poverty, middle-class expansion has slowed and even reversed in recent times.

Indonesia’s secure middle-class share has declined since 2018, while nearly half of the population remains economically insecure despite being no longer poor or near poor. Many households that have moved beyond poverty and near poverty remain exposed to income volatility, informal employment, and limited social protection. Stagnant real wages, weak manufacturing and high-end service sector growth, and rising informality have constrained upward mobility, while recent episodes of social unrest point to growing anxiety among those who are not poor or near poor but who remain economically insecure.

This Perspective argues that the central challenge facing Indonesia—and many middle-income economies in Southeast Asia—is not only how to expand the middle-class, but how to ensure that its expansion is resilient and durable. It advances a conceptual framework for middle-class resilience, defined as the capacity of households to sustain their economic position over time, absorb shocks, and convert income gains into lasting welfare and political stability. By comparing Indonesia with the case of China, the analysis shows how labour market conditions, social protection systems, structural transformation, and the fiscal capacity–governance nexus shape middle-class outcomes.

DEFINING THE MIDDLE-CLASS

Globally, there is no consensus when it comes to identifying the middle-class. Commonly adopted approaches include absolute (fixed) income (or expenditure) cutoffs, relative positions within the income distribution, and subjective self-identification. In Indonesia, the National Statistics Agency uses an absolute measure to define the middle-class where the cutoff values are based on economic vulnerability, following the approach used in the World Bank’s middle-class report for Latin America.[3]


It groups individuals into five economic classes:[4]

Poor: Those who live below the poverty line.

Vulnerable (near poor): Those who live above the poverty line but face more than a ten-percent probability of becoming poor in the following year.

Aspiring middle-class: Those who are neither poor nor vulnerable but face more than a ten-percent probability of becoming vulnerable in the following year.

Middle-class: Those who face less than a ten-percent probability of falling into poverty or vulnerability but face greater than a ten-percent probability of falling into the aspiring middle-class during the following year.

Upper-class: Those who face less than a ten-percent probability of falling into aspiring middle class or below in the following year.

With this definition, the middle-class are those who are relatively free from economic insecurity. Using the calculation described in Appendix 1 to set the expenditure threshold for each class category, the middle-class threshold is set at 3.5 to 17 times the poverty line. In 2024, this translates into those who consume IDR2.04 million-IDR9.91 million per capita expenditure per month (approximately USD136-USD661 per capita expenditure per month or USD6.5K-32K per household per year).

Figure 1: Indonesia’s household expenditure distribution (2010-2024)


Source: Susenas, 2010-2024; authors’ calculations. Note: Horizontal lines are indicated in the graph as higher and lower bounds for identifying middle class in Indonesia: 3.5-17 x national poverty line per capita expenditure per month.

Figure 1 shows that Indonesia’s middle-class consolidation has proven fragile. Although the middle-class was the fastest-growing expenditure group during the 2010s, its share has declined since 2018, with many households slipping back into the aspiring middle-class and the vulnerable class. This reversal reflects income volatility and limited access to social protection, particularly among wage earners without stable contracts or adequate employment protections. More fundamentally, the types and quality of jobs created over the past two decades have not generated sufficient upward mobility to absorb a substantial share of the aspiring middle-class into secure middle-class status.

Using Indonesia’s national definition of the middle-class, in 2024, Indonesia’s middle-class was estimated to have reached 47.9 million or only 17.1 percent of total population. It peaked at 22.5 percent in 2018 before declining to a share similar to that of a decade ago (2014). The middle-class lies between the 82nd and 99th percentiles of the consumption distribution.[5] Note that when an absolute measure is used, the middle-class does not necessarily comprise those in the ‘middle’ of the income or expenditure distribution as seen in the case of Indonesia.

Figure 2: China’s household income distribution (2010-2024)


Source: CFPS data and authors’ calculation. Note: Horizontal lines are indicated in the graph as higher and lower bounds for identifying the middle class in China: 80K-400K in 2010, 2012; 90K-450K in 2014, 2016; 100K-500K in 2018 and after, per household per year. The 2024 data is still preliminary.


China’s middle-class consolidation contrasts sharply with that of Indonesia. Like Indonesia, China adopts the absolute measure approach for its national definition of the middle-class albeit using income instead of expenditure. China’s National Bureau of Statistics categorises households into three income groups: low-income, middle-income and high-income. It defines the middle-income-group, a loosely comparable notion to the middle-class, using an absolute measure, namely those who earn RMB100K-500K (approximately USD14K-71K) per household per year in 2018 and after.

Figure 2 shows that over the past decade, China’s income distribution has shifted from a steep pyramid toward a more ‘elongated vase’, reflecting a broad-based expansion of middle-income households.[6] While income dispersion remains and mobility across income groups is substantial, the middle of the distribution has thickened over time, reflecting a net expansion of middle-income households. This structural shift has been supported in part by sustained wage growth and rising formal employment; these have helped reduce the risk of large-scale backsliding even as income mobility remains high. In 2022, China’s middle-class is estimated to have reached 591 million people or close to 40 percent of total households​​, up from 14.4 percent in 2012, to lie neatly between the 53rd and 97th percentiles of the income distribution.

WHY THE MIDDLE-CLASS MATTERS

In Indonesia, the middle-class contributes significantly to national consumption. Indonesia’s middle-class accounted for 38 percent of total household consumption in 2024, which was disproportionately larger than the 17 percent share of the middle-class in the population.[7] Indonesia’s economy is largely driven by household consumption, which contributes a robust 53 percent of GDP. Robust domestic consumption, fueled by the middle-class, is therefore not just desirable; it is a strategic necessity for economic resilience and sustained growth. Moreover, a 2024 study in Indonesia shows that the middle-class contributed 51 percent of total tax revenues despite only receiving 9 percent of total government subsidies.[8]


Aside from its economic significance, a resilient middle-class is often correlated with greater political stability. Global experiences including Thailand,[9] Brazil,[10] and Indonesia[11] show that a fragile middle-class easily generates political instability. A recent study by Basri (2026) shows a strong correlation between social unrest intensity and middle-class shrinkage among emerging markets between 2019 and 2024.[12] This segment of the population is distinctly more educated than those in poorer sections of the population and typically make demands for better governance, transparency, and public services.[13] In Indonesia, more than one in four individuals aged 15 or older in the middle-class have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree, compared to only 9 percent or lower of those in the less economically secure class groups (Figure 3). Their political participation – whether through formal politics, civil society, or consumer activism – shapes national agendas and fosters more responsive institutions.

The middle-class is also distinct from other class groups in their consumption patterns and in quality of jobs. The middle-class spends more on non-food items than food items, unlike the more vulnerable class groups (Figure 4). They drive demand in key sectors such as automobiles, education, healthcare, entertainment, travel, and e-commerce, and they invest more in their children’s education and help break intergenerational poverty.[14] Moreover, Indonesia’s middle-class mostly work as wage employees in formal employment unlike those in lower-class groups who mostly work in the informal employment (Figure 5).

Figure 3: Highest Educational Attainment for Population Aged 15 and Above in 2024

 (Indonesia)

Figure 4: Average Share of Food and Non-Food Items by Income Class in 2022 (Indonesia)

Figure 5: Employment Status in 2024 (Indonesia)



Like Indonesia, China’s middle-class carries significant economic weight and exhibits stronger educational and occupational advantages compared to the low-income group. In 2022, it accounted for nearly half of total household consumption, exceeding its share of the population. Middle-income households in China have substantially higher educational attainment and spend more on non-food items compared to low-income households (Appendix Figure 1-2). They are more closely linked to formal employment in public and private enterprises compared to low-income households (Appendix Figure 3).

THE PILLARS OF MIDDLE-CLASS RESILIENCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALAYSIS

This section develops a framework organised around four pillars—quality jobs, structural transformation, social protection, and the fiscal capacity-governance nexus—to explain why poverty reduction has been more likely to translate into middle-class consolidation in China, while that class has remained more fragile in Indonesia. These pillars are inter-related. Structural transformation shapes the availability of productive jobs, which in turn determines labour market formality and wage dynamics, while social protection, fiscal capacity and governance provide the conditions in which income risks are managed over the life cycle. By using China as a benchmark for middle-class consolidation, the analysis of Indonesia’s case yields lessons for other middle-income economies across Southeast Asia.

Structural Transformation and Productivity

Structural transformation forms the foundation of middle-class resilience and shapes the economy’s capacity to generate productive, well-paying jobs. Middle-class expansion is more likely to be durable when labour moves into higher-productivity sectors and occupations that support sustained wage growth, rather than into low-productivity activities that limit earnings and job upgrading, and reinforce informality.

Indonesia’s structural transformation has been limited. Investment has increasingly been oriented towards resource-based activities and capital-intensive sectors, while labour-intensive manufacturing has failed to expand.[15] The high-end services sector has also been constrained by a limited supply of high-skill workers. While labour has transitioned away from the low-productivity agricultural sector, it has primarily been absorbed by the low-end services sector.[16] As a result, job creation has been concentrated in low-productivity services and informal activities, limiting wage growth and reinforcing employment precarity. This pattern helps explain why employment expansion has not translated into more substantial middle-class consolidation, despite rising consumption.


In contrast to Indonesia’s limited structural transformation, partly attributed to ‘premature deindustrialisation’ starting in the early 2000s, China’s middle-class expansion was underpinned by a sustained shift of labour into manufacturing and, more recently, to technology- and knowledge-intensive activities.[17] This transformation raised productivity and created large numbers of wage-paying jobs in the formal sector capable of supporting income growth over time. While not all employment has been high-quality, and regional disparities persist, the overall structure of growth has generated the productive jobs needed to sustain a broad middle-income group.

The contrast highlights a core vulnerability. In Indonesia, household consumption accounts for a large share of GDP—around 53 per cent—yet this consumption-led growth has not been matched by a productivity-driven employment base. Without deeper structural transformation into sectors that generate ‘good jobs’, middle-class expansion is likely to remain fragile.

Quality Jobs

Labour market conditions are central to middle-class resilience in Indonesia, since wages (labour incomes) are the primary income source for its middle-income households. Stable real-wage growth and access to formal employment reduce income volatility and help households sustain middle-class living standards, while stagnant wages and informality increase the risk of backsliding.

Indonesia’s trajectory is concerning in this regard. Real wages have stagnated since around 2017, a reversal of the pre-2017 trend when real wages grew by 4.2 percent annually between 2010 and 2017.[18] Job creation has increasingly occurred in the informal sector rather than in the formal sector, reversing the long-term trend of formalisation.[19] It is notable that the issue here is not in job creation but in job quality. Recent shifts have weakened earnings stability and reduced access to employment-linked protections; this contributes directly to the decline since 2018 of the secure middle-class. The pattern reflects a structural change in labour market dynamics rather than a temporary cyclical slowdown.

In contrast to Indonesia’s recent labour-market trajectory, middle-income households in China have a mix of relatively secure formal employment in the public sector and private enterprises, alongside owning private businesses and self-employment. Wages in China account for around 70 per cent of middle-class income. While income mobility remains high and some downward movement persists, sustained wage growth has ensured that upward mobility has, on balance, exceeded downward mobility.

Social Protection

While labour market conditions and structural transformation establish the foundation for middle-class incomes, access to essential services and social protection determines whether those gains can be sustained in the face of economic shocks. Social protection is however not a substitute for decent jobs.[20] The extent and effectiveness of the safety nets thus constitute a third pillar of middle-class resilience.


Due to lack of access to social protection programmes, Indonesia’s middle-class has been described by some as ‘consuming like the middle-class but living with the anxiety of the poor’, reflecting limited insurance coverage and high exposure to health and economic shocks. Indonesia’s situation is characterised by a heavy reliance on private services (for those who can afford them) that have emerged in lieu of public alternatives that remain underdeveloped. For example, while 49 percent of government employees have a pension fund, this is true only for 12 percent of private-sector employees.[21] The share of workers in household enterprises with a pension fund is only 0.18 per cent. Moreover, while 75 percent of government employees have health insurance, only 69 percent of private-sector employees and less than 3 percent of workers in household enterprises do.[22] This qualitative dimension of fragility is evident in expenditure patterns, where middle-class households allocate a significant share of their spending to private health and education—a defensive strategy that drains resources which could otherwise be saved or invested for upward mobility.[23] The under-provision of public social protection also shifts risk management onto households, leaving them financially exposed. Without a functional safety net, the economic security of the middle-class remains provisional.

In contrast, the expansion of social insurance in China has proceeded in tandem with middle-class growth, providing a measurable degree of security. Coverage for medical insurance and old-age pensions exceeds 57 per cent of the relevant population, reflecting a systematic effort to build a broad-based safety net.[24] Although the social protection system, while extensive, remains incomplete, institutional backing has helped to cushion middle-income households against health emergencies and retirement insecurity, reducing the risk that a single shock could push them back into poverty.

The contrast between China’s institutionalised, albeit incomplete, system, and Indonesia’s fragmented, individually financed model, underscores the fact that the durability of the middle- class depends not only on the ability to earn a stable income but also on the collective capacity to pool risks and ensure general access to essential services.

Fiscal Capacity and Governance

The state’s capacity to mobilise resources, deliver services, and maintain public trust plays an important role in determining whether the economic foundations of middle-class resilience can be fully realised. Labour markets, structural transformation, and social protection do not operate in an institutional vacuum; their effectiveness is mediated by fiscal capacity and the governance pact between the state and its citizens.

Revenue mobilisation​ is the bedrock of state capacity, enabling investments in public goods that support middle-class stability. However, Indonesia struggles with low tax revenues relative to its economy, constraining the government’s ability to fund essential services.[25] This fiscal gap undermines the very public investments needed to consolidate the gains made from poverty reduction, leaving the middle-class exposed to underfunded systems.

State capacity and service delivery​ determine whether revenue translates into tangible benefits for households. When the state provides quality education, healthcare and infrastructure efficiently, it reinforces middle-class trust and reduces the need for costly private alternatives. In Indonesia, however, perceived inefficiency or corruption in public service delivery erodes confidence; this prompts households to opt for private services as a rational choice that, in turn, weakens the tax base and perpetuates underinvestment in public services. This vicious cycle highlights the fact that effective governance is not merely about collecting taxes but about demonstrating credible delivery to secure citizen buy-in.


In contrast, in China, rapid economic growth has expanded the tax base, allowing for substantial public spending on infrastructure, education and healthcare. These are key drivers of productivity and household security. Access to quality education, healthcare and infrastructure has also reduced the need for costly private services.

The dynamics of the above four pillars produce a critical political economy feedback loop. A resilient middle-class tends to support long-term investment and fiscal capacity, and thus becomes a stabilising force, while a large, fragile ‘aspirational’ class—no longer poor or near poor but lacking economic security—can fuel grievances and populism, undermining the very policies that can foster long-term resilience.[26] While a state that delivers on its promises nurtures a resilient, tax-compliant middle-class, a mismatch between rising expectations for public services and limited fiscal capacity fuels political anxiety. Thus, in Indonesia, rebuilding the governance pact—where credible service delivery meets tax morale—is essential to prevent middle-class fragility from undermining long-term resilience.

Furthermore, the large share of Indonesian households clustered near the threshold of middle-class status (the aspiring middle-class) has translated into rising expectations for public services and protection, without a commensurate expansion of the stable tax base or fiscal space. By contrast, where income growth and employment are closely anchored in productivity gains, as in the case of China, governments have been better able to mobilise resources and expand social protection alongside middle-class growth. More broadly, the experience of Indonesia suggests that middle-class fragility can generate political pressures that, if not managed, risk reinforcing economic vulnerability and making reforms more difficult to implement.[27] This is an issue that holds growing relevance for middle-income countries across Southeast Asia.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

For Indonesia, the transition from poverty reduction to a resilient middle-class is not an automatic process. By using China as a benchmark case, the analysis in this paper shows that middle-class consolidation requires a deliberate and integrated policy approach that addresses the interconnected pillars of labour markets, social protection, and structural transformation, which are at the same time underpinned by sound fiscal capacity and governance and adapted to the country’s developmental context.[28] For Indonesia, there is an urgent need for middle-class consolidation​ in order to prevent backsliding.

Indonesia’s policy agenda needs to aim at stabilising its vast aspirational class and halting the erosion of its secure middle-class. This requires a coordinated strategy across the following three areas. First, policies must reverse the trend of de-formalisation. This involves labour market deregulation to incentivise formal hiring, coupled with targeted skills training aligned with the needs of higher-value sectors.

Second, to address the profound vulnerability highlighted by the social protection​ pillar, the government must prioritise expanding the social safety net. Enhancing the coverage and adequacy of health insurance and pension fund, and introducing a credible unemployment benefits system, are critical to reducing households’ exposure to shocks and building trust in state institutions.


Third, these efforts will be futile without a shift in structural transformation. Policy must consciously steer away from capital-intensive, resource-extractive FDI towards job-creating, competitive manufacturing and knowledge-intensive modern services, supported by improved regulatory certainty. Ultimately, these economic measures must be framed within a broader new social contract that demonstrates tangible improvements in public service delivery through the broadening of the tax base; this will break the vicious cycle of low tax morale and underfunded public goods.

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For appendices and endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

About the authors:

 Sherry Tao Kong is Head of Research at the Institute of Social Science Survey, and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Digital Finance, Peking University. She also teaches at the Institute of Area Studies, Peking University. 

Maria Monica Wihardja is Visiting Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Media, Technology and Society Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and also Adjunct Assistant Professor at the National University of Singapore.

Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), an autonomous organization established by an Act of Parliament in 1968, was renamed ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute in August 2015. Its aims are: To be a leading research centre and think tank dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. To stimulate research and debate within scholarly circles, enhance public awareness of the region, and facilitate the search for viable solutions to the varied problems confronting the region. To serve as a centre for international, regional and local scholars and other researchers to do research on the region and publish and publicize their findings. To achieve these aims, the Institute conducts a range of research programmes; holds conferences, workshops, lectures and seminars; publishes briefs, research journals and books; and generally provides a range of research support facilities, including a large library collection.

Thinking About The Unthinkable: Iran’s Grand Plan To End U.S. Presence In The Middle East – OpEd

March 10, 2026 
By Michael Hudson


Iran and Donald Trump have each explained why failure to fight the current war to the end would simply lead to a new set of mutual attacks. Trump announced on March 6 that “There will be no deal with Iran except unconditional surrender,” and announced that he must have a voice in naming or at least approving Iran’s new leader, as he has just done in Venezuela. “If the U.S. military must utterly defeat it and bring about a regime change, or else you go through this, and then in five years you realize you put somebody in who’s no better.” It will take at least that long for America to replace the weaponry that has been depleted, rebuild its radar and related installations and mount a new war.

Iranian officials likewise recognize that U.S. attacks will keep being repeated until the United States is driven out of the Middle East. Having agreed to a ceasefire last June instead of pressing its advantage when Israeli and regional U.S. anti-missile defenses were depleted, Iran realized that war would be resumed as soon as the United States could re-arm its allies and military bases to renew what both sides recognize as a fight to some kind of final solution.

The war that began on February 28 can realistically be deemed to be the formal opening of World War III because what is at issue are the terms on which the entire world will be able to buy oil and gas. Can they buy this energy from exporters in currencies other than the dollar, headed by Russia and Iran (and until recently, Venezuela)? Will the present U.S. demand to control of the international oil trade require oil-exporting countries to price it in dollars, and indeed to recycle their export earnings and national savings into investments in U.S. government securities, bonds and stocks?

That recycling of petrodollars has been the basis of America’s financialization and weaponization of the world’s oil trade, and its imperial strategy of isolating countries that resist adherence to the U.S. ruler-based order (no real rules, but simply U.S. ad hoc demands). So what is at issue is not only the U.S. military presence in the Middle East – along with its two proxy armies, Israel and ISIS/al Qaeda jihadists. And the U.S. and Israeli pretense that it is about Iran having atomic weapons of mass destruction is as fictitious an accusation as that levied against Iraq in 2003. What is at issue is ending the Middle East’s economic alliances with the United States and whether its oil-export earnings will continue to be accumulated in dollars as the buttress of the U.S. balance of payments to help pay for its military bases throughout the world.

Iran has announced that it will fight until it achieves three aims to prevent future wars. First and foremost, the United States must withdraw from all its military bases in the Middle East. Iran has already destroyed the backbone of radar warning systems and anti-aircraft and missile defense sites in Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, preventing them from guiding U.S. or Israeli missile attacks or attacking Iran. Arab countries that have bases or U.S. installations will be bombed if they are not abandoned.


The next two Iranian demands seem so far-reaching that they seem unthinkable to the West. Arab OPEC countries must end their close economic ties to the United States, starting with the U.S. data centers operated by Amazon, Microsoft and Google. And they not only must stop pricing their oil and gas in U.S. dollars, but disinvest in their existing petrodollar holdings of the U.S. investments that have been subsidizing the U.S. balance of payments since the 1974 agreements that were made to gain U.S. permission to quadruple their oil-export prices.

These three demands would end U.S. economic power over OPEC countries, and thus the world oil trade. The result would be to dedollarize the world’s oil trade and re-orient it toward Asia and Global Majority countries. And Iran’s plan involves not only a military and economic defeat for the United States, but an end to the political character of the Near Eastern client monarchies and their relations with their Shi’ite citizens.

Step 1: Driving the United States out of its Middle Eastern military bases

Iraq’s parliament has continued to demand that U.S. forces leave their country and stop stealing its oil (sending most of it to Israel). It has just approved legislation yet again directing that American forces leave their country. Meeting with senior advisor to Iraq’s interior minister and his accompanying military delegation in Tehran last Monday (March 2), Iran’s Brigadier General Ali Abdollahi reiterated the demand that Iran has been making for the last five years, ever since Donald Trump closed his first administration on January 3, 2020. by ordering the treacherous assassination of the two top Iranian and Iraqi anti-terror negotiators, Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who were seeking to avoid an all-out war. Seeing that Trump is now continuing the same policy, the Iranian commander stated: “Expulsion of the United States is the most important step toward the restoration of security and stability to the region.”


But all the Arab kingdoms are hosting U.S. military bases. Iran has announced that any
country permitting U.S. aircraft or other military forces to use these bases will risk immediate attack to destroy them. Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have already come under attack, leading Saudi Arabia to promise Iran not to permit the U.S. military to use its territory for part of its war.

Spain has banned the U.S. use of its airfields to support its war against Iran. But when its Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez forbade the United States from using them, President Trump pointed out at an Oval Office news conference that there was nothing that Spain really could do to prevent the U.S. air force from using the Rota and Morón installations in southern Spain that the U.S. and Spain share, but which remain under Spanish command. “And now Spain actually said we can’t use their bases. And that’s all right, we don’t want to do it. We could use the base if we want. We could just fly in and use it, nobody is going to tell us not to use it.” What would Spain do to prevent it, after all? Shoot down the U.S. aircraft?

This is the problem confronting the Arab monarchies if they try to deny U.S. access to their own U.S. bases and airspace to fight Iran. What can they do?

Or more to the point, what may they be willing to do? Iran is insisting that Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other Near Eastern monarchies close all U.S. military bases in their kingdoms and block U.S. use of their airspace and airports as a condition for not bombing them and extending the war to the monarchic regimes themselves.

Refusal – or inability to prevent the U.S. from using bases in their countries – will lead Iran to force regime change. This would be easiest in countries in which Palestinians are a large proportion of the labor force, as in Jordan. Iran has called for Shi’ite populations in Jordan and other Near Eastern countries to overthrow their monarchies to break away from U.S. control. There are rumors that Bahrain’s king has left the country.

Step #2: Ending the Middle East’s commercial and financial linkages to the U.S.

Arab monarchies are under further pressure to meet Iran’s ultimate demand that they decouple their economies from that of the United States. Ever since 1974, they have tied their economies to the United States. Most recently, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have sought to use their energy resources to attract computer data centers, including Starlink and other systems that have been associated with U.S. regime-change and military attacks on Iran.

Opposing U.S. plans to tightly integrate its non-oil sectors with the Arab OPEC Middle East, Iran has announced that these installations are “legitimate targets” for its drive to expel America from the region. One cloud computing manager suggested that Iran’s AWS attack on Amazon’s data center was targeted because it was serving military needs, much as Starlink (which the UAE is interested in financing) was used in February in the U.S. attempt to mobilize demonstrations against Iran’s government.
Step #3: Ending the recycling of OPEC oil exports into U.S. dollar holdings

The most radical Iranian demand has been for its Arab neighbors to dedollarize their economies. That is a key to preventing U.S. businesses from dominating their economies and hence their governments. An Iranian official told CNN that Iran has accused companies that buy U.S. government debt and invest in Treasury bonds of being partners in the war against itself, because it sees them as financiers of this war. “Tehran considers these companies and their managers in the region as legitimate targets. These individuals are warned to declare their capital withdrawal as soon as possible.”

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar are indeed discussing withdrawing from U.S. and other investments, as Iran’s blocking of Hormuz has led them to stop producing oil and LNG now that their storage capacity is full. Their income from energy, shipping and tourism has stopped. The Gulf States met on Sunday, March 8, to discuss drawing down their $2 trillion in U.S. dollar investments (mainly from Saudi Arabia). The threat is that this is an initial step to diversifying OPEC investment outside of the U.S. dollar.

In conjunction with U.S. surrender of its military bases in the Middle East, such decoupling from the dollar would greatly reduce U.S. control of Middle Eastern oil. It would end the U.S. ability to use this oil trade as a chokepoint with which to coerce other countries into adhering to Trump’s America First ruler-based order (his own whims, with no clear rules).


For the monarchies themselves, the changes demanded by Iran to end the U.S. war to control the Middle East may have an effect similar to the aftermath of World War that ended the epoch of European monarchies. In this case, it may end monarchic regimes in many of the countries whose economies and political alliances have been based on an alliance with the United States.

For starters, pressure is now on Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, all of which have agreed to join Trump’s Board of Peace. Indonesia, with the world’s largest Islamic population, has just withdrawn its offer to provide 8000 troops for his Gaza “peace plan.” And Iran is pressuring Arab monarchies to follow suit by withdrawing to protest U.S. policy.

Will they do so? And will they go so far as to end U.S. access to bases in their territory? runs if they try to avoid being offensive to the United States, they will leave themselves open to Iranian accusations that they are not really opposing the war. But if they follow Iran’s request, they run the risk that the United States may simply seize or at least freeze their dollar holdings to force them to change their mind.

Iran is putting pressure on the most U.S.-friendly Arab monarchies. The last few days have seen it attack two Saudi oil depots, and a drone has hit a desalination plant in Bahrain in response to an attack launched from Bahrainian territory on Iran’s desalination plant at Qeshm Island. Most of the Arab kingdoms depend on desalination to a much higher degree, topped by Saudi Arabia at 70% and Bahrain at 60%. That makes Bahrain’s attack akin to the folly of fighting with bricks while living in a glass house oneself.
Collateral effects of Iran’s goal to drive the United States out of the Middle East

Iran will escalate as Israel and the U.S. military exhaust their supply of anti-aircraft and missile defense, enabling Iran to launch its serious attack on a scale that it stopped short of last June when it agreed to a ceasefire. It will start using its most sophisticated missiles to attack Israel and other U.S. proxies.

There’s nowhere to put additional Arab oil production now that Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz to all but its own ships, most of which are carrying oil destined for China. The storage tanks are full, with nowhere to save new production, which has therefore been forced to stop. And as for liquified natural gas, which is exported mainly by Qatar, its LNG gas works have been bombed. They will have to be rebuilt, which will take two weeks plus an equal time to put them back online by cooling this gas properly.

In any case, no ships are even trying to approach Hormuz because Lloyd’s of London is not issuing insurance policies. The U.S. military has recently sunk or seized Russian ships carrying oil, but the soaring oil prices have led it to permit such transfers in order to stem global inflation. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said the Treasury Department is examining whether additional sanctioned Russian crude shipments could be released to the market. “We may unsanction other Russian oil,” he said. “There are hundreds of millions of barrels of sanctioned crude on the water … by unsanctioning them, Treasury can create supply.” His remarks follow a U.S. decision to issue a temporary 30-day waiver allowing Indian refiners to purchase Russian oil in an effort to maintain global supply.


Throughout the world, rising oil and gas prices will force economies to choose between having to cut back domestic social spending in order to pay their dollar debts. This war is splitting the US/NATO West from the Global Majority, by creating strains that Japan, Korea and even Europe no longer can afford. The chaotic effect of the U.S. attack has destroyed the narrative that has enabled U.S. diplomats to demand subsidies and “burden sharing” for its global military spending. The predicate fiction is that the world needs U.S. military support to protect it against Russia and China, and now Iran, as if these countries pose a real threat to Europe and Asia.

But instead of protecting the rest of the world by waging the present Cold War, the chaos in world oil and gas markets resulting from its attack on Iran shows that the United States actually is the greatest threat to the security, stability and prosperity of its allies. Its attack has fallen largely on its closest allies – Japan, South Korea and Europe. Their gas prices have soared by 20% and are now on their way further upward today. Korea’s stock market has plunged 18% in the last two days. All this is shifting support for removing U.S. control of Near Eastern oil and reorienting it to a market free from U.S. demands for control and dollarization of the world’s energy trade.

Michael Hudson

Prof. Hudson is Chief Economic Advisor to the Reform Task Force Latvia (RTFL). Michael Hudson is President of The Institute for the Study of Long-Term Economic Trends (ISLET), a Wall Street Financial Analyst, Distinguished Research Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri, Kansas City and author of Killing the Host (2015) Super-Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (1968 & 2003), Trade, Development and Foreign Debt (1992 & 2009) and of The Myth of Aid (1971). For more of his writing check out his website: http://michael-hudson.com

LeBlanc heading to Washington after Carney says CUSMA 'broken' by U.S. tariffs

By The Canadian Press
 March 05, 2026 

Former ministry of finance special advisor Julian Karaguesian says Dominic LeBlanc may want to ‘scope out the parameters’ of a new trade deal.

OTTAWA — Canada-U.S. Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc is set to meet President Donald Trump’s trade czar in Washington on Friday, a day after the United States announced it was launching bilateral discussions with Mexico on the review of the continental trade p
act.

LeBlanc’s office said he will be meeting with United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to discuss the upcoming mandatory review of the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement on trade, known as CUSMA, as well as other bilateral concerns.

The continental trade pact has shielded Canada from the worst impacts of Trump’s tariffs but the president has repeatedly questioned whether CUSMA should be continued.

The Canada-U.S. relationship has been upended by Trump’s tariffs and threats of annexation. Prime Minister Mark Carney said during a media availability in Australia on Wednesday that CUSMA “effectively has been broken in the short term by U.S. actions.”

Carney said Canada is looking to this year’s trade pact review to “re-establish the trust” individuals, businesses and investors need to guide trade between the nations.


Trade talks between Canada and the United States stalled last October after Trump was angered by an Ontario-sponsored ad quoting former president Ronald Reagan criticizing tariffs.

Despite the freeze-out, LeBlanc and Greer have continued communications by phone.

Canada began domestic CUSMA consultations last year but Ottawa has not formally launched anything with the United States. Greer said last month Canadians have barriers that make it difficult to hold bilateral trade talks.

“They refuse to sell U.S. wine and spirits on their shelves,” Greer told Fox Business. “There are a variety of issues they have not addressed and aren’t addressing and this makes it a big challenge and an obstacle for starting real negotiations with them.”

Some have suggested that the contentious Canada-U.S. relationship could mean the United States and Mexico begin CUSMA negotiations with Canada on the sidelines.

Something similar happened during the original CUSMA negotiations to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement during Trump’s first term.

Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s trade representative at the time, recounted in his book that the United States and Mexico came to an agreement and “Canada was welcome to join if it wanted,” but Washington and Mexico City were “prepared to move forward bilaterally if it did not.”

Ultimately, an agreement was reached that was hailed a success in all three countries.

In a news release Thursday, Greer’s office announced that he and Mexican Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard have instructed their negotiators to begin a “scoping discussion” on the trilateral trade pact.

The release said negotiators are expected to hold their first meeting the week of March 16, and to then meet regularly afterwards as part of the review.

LeBlanc’s meeting in the United States capital could lay the groundwork for Canada to be brought to the CUSMA negotiating table.


CUSMA’s review essentially sets up a three-way choice for the partner countries to make in July. They can renew the deal for another 16 years, withdraw from it or signal both non-renewal and non-withdrawal — which would trigger an annual review that could keep negotiations going for up to a decade.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published March 5, 2026.

The Canadian Press

Mexican companies eager to keep CUSMA treaty, report shows

By Reuters
March 09, 2026 

From left to right: Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney; Mexico's President Claudia Sheinbaum; U.S. President Donald Trump. (The Canadian Press / The Associated Press)

MEXICO CITY -- Mexican businesses are eager to maintain a trilateral trade agreement with the United States and Canada that is up for review this year, according to a report summarizing Mexico’s public consultation, released on Monday.

The consulted companies called the CUSMA treaty, which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement in 2020, essential for investment certainty and protecting regional supply chains.

Mexico’s Economy Ministry released the 88-page report one week before the U.S. and Mexico are slated to hold bilateral discussions to kick off a three-way review of the USMCA.

With some 80% of Mexican exports going to the U.S., the treaty is critical to the Latin American country’s economy.

The pact, signed during U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term, requires Mexico, the U.S. and Canada to hold a joint review this year to extend the agreement.


If extended, the treaty will remain in place for another 16 years. If the countries don’t reach an agreement, it is subject to annual reviews, which many industries consider an effective death knell for the USMCA.

The report stresses that Mexican businesses broadly want to strengthen the pact rather than a wholesale renegotiation.

That, however, may be overly optimistic, given that Trump has publicly questioned the need for the treaty and threatened to pull out of it altogether.

(Reporting by Emily Green; Editing by Stephen Eisenhammer and Andrei Khalip)

Half of Canadian small businesses see U.S. as unreliable partner one year into trade war: CFIB

ByAnam Khan
March 04, 2026 

The Toronto skyline  

THE CANADIAN PRESS/Chris Young

Half of Canadian small businesses no longer view the U.S. as a reliable trading partner one year into the trade war, according to a new study by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business.

The study shows the strain is showing up directly in day-to-day business dealings.

“Small businesses have faced massive uncertainty since the trade battle began last year,” Dan Kelly, president of the CFIB said in a press release.

“Small business owners have been dealing with the whiplash of trying to keep up with sudden changes and threats, including many that don’t happen or are revised within hours. With the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) coming up for review in the months ahead, the stakes are even higher.”

About 75 per cent of small businesses say the tariff fight has strained their relationships with U.S. partners or clients, up from 49 per cent in March 2025. More than two-thirds (68 per cent) of Canadian small business owners also continue to report being negatively affected by U.S. tariffs.

Tariff pain is widespread, relief is limited

CFIB research also found tariffs hit firms unevenly, with 37 per cent of owners saying 2025 was a good year, while 35 per cent said it was a poor one.

“There’s reduced profits, reduced revenues. These are the major things, and all of this has implications on what funds they have available to reinvest in their business, or to pay employees,” said Marvin Cruz, CFIB’s senior director of research and one of the authors of the report.

“The entrepreneurial spirit is a bit dampened.”

Cruz said the pressure is pushing some owners toward tough decisions, including taking on more debt or even thinking about closing.

About 18 per cent of businesses that reported a poor year said they contemplated permanently closing because of tariffs, compared with two per cent among those reporting an average or good year.

Nearly a third, 31 per cent, of businesses that had a poor year said they took on increased debt, compared with 10 per cent for those reporting an average year and five per cent for those reporting a good year. Poor-performing businesses also reported higher levels of reduced hiring and paused investments.

Federal relief failing to support SMEs

While a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on tariff rates is expected to provide some relief, CFIB said it will not change the situation for most Canadian exports, since many goods are already covered under CUSMA. The group said the ruling should still help the 27 per cent of businesses hurt by tariffs on non-CUSMA compliant goods.

At the same time, CFIB said steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by both countries remain a major challenge, with 44 per cent of small businesses reporting they have been affected.

Limited uptake in federal tariff response initiative

CFIB also pointed to limited uptake of Ottawa’s Regional Tariff Response Initiative (RTRI), stating that less than one per cent of small businesses have applied and 77 per cent are entirely unaware the program exists.

“We keep hearing the same things from small business owners: they’re too small to qualify, they didn’t know about the program, or that the required paperwork isn’t worth the time and resources,” said Corinne Pohlmann, CFIB executive vice-president of advocacy.

CFIB said restrictive eligibility rules are a key barrier. In British Columbia, businesses must employ at least 10 full-time workers to qualify, while in Quebec, eligibility is now closed and applications are limited to manufacturing firms with annual revenues of $2 million or more.

The organization said it has sent a letter to Prime Minister Mark Carney, Finance Minister Champagne, and Canada’s Regional Development Agencies questioning the program’s design and effectiveness.

CFIB is calling on Ottawa to:Provide broad tax relief, including a reduction in the small business tax rate from nine per cent to six per cent.
Create a rebate program for tariff-impacted SMEs and ensure rebates and refunds are not treated as taxable income
Stay focused on maintaining the CUSMA agreement to reduce uncertainty and protect cross-border supply chains.

Methodology

Final results for the Your Voice- February 2026 survey. The online survey was conducted between February 5-24, n= 1,379. For comparison purposes, a probability sample with the same number of respondents would have a margin of error of at most +/- 2.60 per cent, 19 times out of 20.

Final results for the Your Voice – December survey. The online survey was conducted between December 4-31, 2025, n= 1,663. For comparison purposes, a probability sample with the same number of respondents would have a margin of error of at most +/- 2.40 per cent, 19 times out of 20.


Anam Khan
Journalist, BNNBloomberg.ca

More than 20 U.S. states sue over new global tariffs Trump imposed after his stinging U.S. Supreme Court loss

ByThe Associated Press
March 05, 2026 

Cars drive by a Mercedes-Benz dealership on the Bedford Automile in Bedford, Ohio, Friday, Feb. 20, 2026. (AP Photo/Sue Ogrocki)

WASHINGTON — Some two dozen states challenged U.S. President Donald Trump’s new global tariffs on Thursday, filing a lawsuit over import taxes he imposed after a stinging loss at the Supreme Court.

The Democratic attorneys general and governors in the lawsuit argue that Trump is overstepping his power with planned 15 per cent tariffs on much of the world.

Trump has said the tariffs are essential to reduce America’s longstanding trade deficits. He imposed duties under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 after the Supreme Court struck down tariffs he imposed last year under an emergency powers law.

Section 122, which has never been invoked, allows the president to impose tariffs of up to 15 per cent. They are limited to five months unless extended by Congress.

The lawsuit is led by attorneys general from Oregon, Arizona, California and New York.

“The focus right now should be on paying people back, not doubling down on illegal tariffs,” said Oregon Attorney General Dan Rayfield. The suit comes a day after a judge ruled t hat companies who paid tariffs under Trump’s old framework should get refunds.

The new suit argues that Trump can’t pivot to Section 122 because it was intended to be used only in specific, limited circumstances -- not for sweeping import taxes. It also contends the tariffs will drive up costs for states, businesses and consumers.

Many of those states also successfully sued over Trump’s tariffs imposed under a different law: the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

A FedEx cargo plane is shown on the tarmac at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, Tuesday, April 20, 2021, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (AP Photo/Wilfredo Lee, File)

Four days after the Supreme Court struck down his sweeping IEEPA tariffs Feb. 20, Trump invoked Section 122 to slap 10 per cent tariffs on foreign goods. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant told CNBC on Wednesday that the administration would raise the levies to the 15 per cent limit this week.

The Democratic states and other critics say the president can’t use Section 122 as a replacement for the defunct tariffs to combat the trade deficit.

The Section 122 provision is aimed at what it calls “fundamental international payments problems.” At issue is whether that wording covers trade deficits, the gap between what the U.S. sells other countries and what it buys from them.

Section 122 arose from the financial crises that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s when the U.S. dollar was tied to gold. Other countries were dumping dollars in exchange for gold at a set rate, risking a collapse of the U.S. currency and chaos in financial markets. But the dollar is no longer linked to gold, so critics say Section 122 is obsolete.

Awkwardly for Trump, his own Justice Department argued in a court filing last year that the president needed to invoke the emergency powers act because Section 122 did “not have any obvious application” in fighting trade deficits, which it called “conceptually distinct” from balance-of-payment issues.

Trump slams U.S. Supreme Court's 'very unfortunate ruling' on tariffs

Still, some legal analysts say the Trump administration has a stronger case this time.

“The legal reality is that courts will likely provide President Trump substantially more deference regarding Section 122 than they did to his previous tariffs under IEEPA,” Peter Harrell, visiting scholar at Georgetown University’s Institute of International Economic Law, wrote in a commentary Wednesday.

The specialized Court of International Trade in New York, which will hear the states’ lawsuit, wrote last year in its own decision striking down the emergency-powers tariffs that Trump didn’t need them because Section 122 was available to combat trade deficits.

Trump does have other legal authorities he can use to impose tariffs, and some have already survived court tests. Duties that Trump imposed on Chinese imports during his first term under Section 301 of the same 1974 trade act are still in place.

Also joining the lawsuit are the attorneys general of Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and the governors of Kentucky and Pennsylvania.

Lindsay Whitehurst And Paul Wiseman, The Associated Press

Judge orders refunds after U.S. Supreme Court strikes down Trump’s tariffs

By The Canadian Press
March 05, 2026 

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during an event to announce new tariffs in the Rose Garden at the White House, April 2, 2025, in Washington. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, File)

WASHINGTON -- A judge with the U.S. Court of International Trade on Wednesday ordered refunds for companies that paid tariffs that were later struck down by the United States Supreme Court.

In a 6-3 ruling last month, America’s top court concluded it was not legal for U.S. President Donald Trump to use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, better known as IEEPA, for his sweeping and erratic “Liberation Day” tariffs and fentanyl-related duties on Canada, Mexico and China.

The conservative-led court found that the U.S. Constitution “very clearly” gives Congress power over taxes and tariffs.

The Supreme Court ruling did not say whether there should be refunds, leaving companies that paid the duties to sue the federal government.

In Wednesday’s decision in the New York trade court, Judge Richard Eaton said all importers who paid IEEPA duties are “entitled to the benefit” of the Supreme Court’s decision.


Eaton was ruling specifically on a case brought by Atmus Filtration, a filtration company in Tennessee, but said he will be the only judge to hear cases about refunds.

Eaton ordered the Trump administration to finalize import paperwork without charging companies the IEEPA tariffs. If goods are past that process, U.S. Customs and Border Protection will have to recalculate them without the tariffs, Eaton said.

The Liberty Justice Center, which represented five American small businesses that pushed back on Trump’s tariffs, said the decision made it clear that all importers of record hit by IEEPA duties are entitled to refunds.

“This decision is an important step toward ensuring that businesses can recover the money they were forced to pay under tariffs the Supreme Court has now confirmed were imposed without legal authority,” the centre said in a statement on social media.

A coalition of more than 1,000 small businesses called it a victory and called on the Trump administration to act swiftly. Dan Anthony, executive director of the We Pay the Tariffs coalition, said “now the ball is in the government’s court and small businesses are concerned they will drag this out further.”

“American small businesses have waited long enough,” Anthony said in a news release. “A full, fast, and automatic refund process is what these businesses are owed and anything less is unacceptable.”

The White House has not yet responded to a request for comment. It’s unclear if the Trump administration will appeal the order or take other action to slow down the process.

Trump had warned that the Supreme Court’s decision would have catastrophic consequences for the country. After the top court’s decision came down, he said the question of refunds would get “litigated over for the next two years.”

The government had collected more than US$130 billion from the tariffs by mid-December, according to the Penn Wharton Budget Model.

In a court filing Wednesday ahead of the decision, the Trump administration indicated interest would be included if refunds are ordered.

Brandon Lord, a senior official in U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s trade office, wrote that “in accordance with applicable law, any validated refund of IEEPA duties would include interest.”


Lord indicated refunds could take some time because the department “still requires a review period to ensure no violation of other customs laws and no other duties, taxes or fees are owed.”

Some Canadian companies will be waiting on refunds but Canada had largely been shielded by the IEEPA tariffs due to a carveout under the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement on trade, known as CUSMA.

Trump declared an emergency at the northern border related to the flow of fentanyl last year in order to use IEEPA to hit Canada with 35 per cent tariffs. Those duties didn’t apply to goods compliant under CUSMA.

Trump replaced his IEEPA tariffs last week with a 10 per cent worldwide tariff using Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act. That duty can only increase to 15 per cent and it will expire after 150 days unless Congress votes to extend it.

That global tariff also does not apply to CUSMA-compliant goods.

Additionally, Canada is being hammered by Trump’s sector-specific tariffs on industries like steel, aluminum, automobiles, lumber and cabinets.

By Kelly Geraldine Malone

This report by The Canadian Press was first published March 4, 2026.

With files from The Associated Press

 World Nuclear News

Mini drones used to explore Fukushima 3 reactor

Friday, 6 March 2026

Tokyo Electric Power Company has begun its internal investigation of Fukushima Daiichi unit 3's primary containment vessel, using palm-sized micro-drones.
 

(Image: TEPCO)

Tokyo Electric Power Co (Tepco) said the investigation would take approximately two weeks and investigate the conditions inside the reactor as well as the access route for planned fuel debris retrieval, saying "we will continue to move forward safely and steadily with this task".

Air tightness has to be maintained at all times - see Tepco diagram below for more details - and each of the two drones flew for about 8 minutes.

The drones used are 13 centimetres by 12 centimetres, weigh 95 grams including battery, and have cameras and LED lights.

According to the plans, there will be initial flights to determine the range of radio communications in new flight areas, followed by the next stage of flights to obtain footage and then flights for detailed investigations. 

According to The Asahi Shimbun, the plan for the drones to make an entire circuit inside the vessel was shortened because of poor communications. It quoted Akira Ono, president of Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Co, as saying: "There may be mist reducing visibility at times. We will make safety our top priority when deciding whether to continue the investigation."

Background

On 11 March 2011 a major earthquake struck Japan. It was followed by a 15-metre tsunami which disabled the power supply and cooling of three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and all three cores largely melted in the first three days. In units 1 to 3, the fuel and the metal cladding that formed the outer jacket of the fuel rods melted during the accident, then re-solidified as fuel debris. Unit 4 does not contain any used fuel or fuel debris as it had already been defuelled before the accident.

There is an estimated total of 880 tonnes of fuel debris in units 1-3. To reduce the risk from this fuel debris, preparations are under way for retrieving it from the reactors.

Tepco succeeded in extracting small samples of fuel debris from the unit 2 reactor in November 2024 and in April 2025. It reportedly concluded after studying the specific removal method that it would take around 12 to 15 years just to prepare for the work. There is a fair amount of uncertainty about the distribution of fuel debris in each of the reactors and decommissioning process is expected to continue into the second half of the century.

Nuclear included in Japan-Canada strategic roadmap

Monday, 9 March 2026

Enhanced cooperation in the area of clean energy, including small modular reactors, is one of the areas highlighted in the Canada-Japan Comprehensive Strategic Roadmap.
 

(Image: Japan's PM's office)

Details of the bilateral strategic agreement and roadmap were outlined during a visit to Japan by Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney (see picture above).

The roadmap says that "recognising the importance of energy security and food security in an era of heightened geopolitical uncertainty" the two countries will "enhance cooperation on clean energy technologies, including nuclear technologies, (particularly small modular reactors), hydrogen and its derivatives, carbon capture, utilisation, and storage, renewables, and energy-efficient industrial processes".

Carney said: "Japan is a trusted partner and a global leader in innovation, technology, and advanced manufacturing. Together, we are strengthening our economic security, securing resilient supply chains in critical minerals and clean energy, and deepening security and defence cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific."

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said: "Canada is an important partner for Japan in advancing cooperation in the field of economic security ... Canada’s abundant natural resources and Japan’s technological capabilities are complementary, and concrete projects involving companies from both countries are steadily progressing. For example, production at LNG Canada, which is of great significance for Japan’s energy security, began last year, and construction of a small modular reactor - the first of its kind in the G7 - also began in Ontario. In addition, projects related to critical minerals such as graphite are under way."

In their joint statement the two leaders said "we believe the new Comprehensive Strategic Roadmap will serve as an effective guide for ongoing collaboration, enhancing our joint resilience in the face of new challenges and opportunities".

About 15% of Canada's electricity comes from nuclear power, with 17 reactors, mostly in Ontario, providing 12.7 GWe of power capacity. It also has plans to build both new large-scale nuclear capacity and small modular reactors. Japan has 33 operable reactors with a capacity of 31.7 GWe. Of these, 15 reactors have restarted since 2011 and 10 are currently in the process of restart approval. The country's current goal is, with more reactor restarts, for nuclear to generate 20% of Japan's electricity by 2030.

Rook I uranium project gets construction approval

Friday, 6 March 2026

NexGen Energy has received the final regulatory approval for the Rook I uranium project in northern Saskatchewan, and will begin construction later this year.
 

(Image: NexGen)

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) decision to issue the Licence to Prepare Site and Construct the proposed uranium mine and mill came 14 business days after the conclusion of the last part of the regulator's two-part hearing process. The licence - which is valid until 31 March 2036 - covers site preparation and construction activities under Canada's Nuclear Safety and Control Act: operation of the facility would need NexGen to submit another licence application which would be subject to a future licensing hearing and decision.

Rook I is described by NexGen as the largest development-stage uranium project in Canada. Centred on the Arrow deposit, a high-grade uranium deposit discovered by the company in 2014, the project is in the southern Athabasca Basin, about 155 km north of the town of La Loche. The project is situated on Treaty 8 territory, the Homeland of the Métis, and is within territories of the Denesųłiné, Cree, and Métis.

The Arrow deposit has a resource estimate of 357 million pounds U3O8 (137,319 tU) in the measured and indicated mineral resources category, grading 3.10% U3O8. Probable mineral reserves have been estimated at 240 million pounds U3O8, grading 2.37% U3O8. A 2021 NI 43-101 feasibility study for the project envisages production of up to 14 million kilograms of U3O8 annually for 24 years.

The project received environmental approval from the Province of Saskatchewan in November 2023, and, with all approvals now secured, NexGen said it is set to begin construction. A final investment decision has already been made, and the team, procurement, engineering, vendors, contractors and capital are in place to commence construction activities with advanced site and shaft sinking preparation. Construction will officially begin in this summer, the company said, and construction is expected to take four years to complete.

NexGen founder and CEO Leigh Curyer said the CNSC's approval "represents one of the most rigorous and comprehensive regulatory processes undertaken for a resource project globally" and, as well as acknowledging NexGen's team, expressed the company's "sincere gratitude" to its Indigenous Nation partners, local communities, Premier Scott Moe and the Government of Saskatchewan, Government partners, regulatory bodies, and stakeholders who have contributed to the advancement of the project over the past decade.

"The world is changing fast, and NexGen's Rook I is now ready to be a significant contributor to global requirements for nuclear energy and Canada's role as an energy superpower. As global demand for reliable, clean, baseload nuclear energy continues to accelerate at an unprecedented pace, uranium is the critical fuel for powering industrial electrification and the digital infrastructure of tomorrow. Simply put, energy is the key to our global growth," Curyer said.

In February, Reuters reported that NexGen had held preliminary talks with data centre providers about securing finance for a new mine. Speaking to investors in NexGen's fourth quarter conference call on 4 March - one day before the CNSC announcement - Curyer said the first 12 months of construction is expected to cost around CAD300 million (USD219 million). NexGen is well funded to begin construction thanks to already completed equity raises and offtake agreements. Further offtake agreements are already in advanced negotiation, with contracts expected to be announced this year, he said, but the start of construction or production will not be dependent on those new contracts being in place.

"We know exactly what we're doing every day of that 48-month process, who's doing it, who's responsible for it within NextGen," Curyer said. "And as I said, once we're in that basement rock, the highest risk around cost and schedule has been mitigated."

Curyer told investors the company would issue a detailed construction timeline once the licensing process had concluded.

Korean partnership to consider use of HTGRs

Monday, 9 March 2026

The Korea Chemical Industry Association and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute have signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in studying the deployment of high-temperature gas-cooled reactors in the petrochemical industry.
 

(Image: Korea Chemical Industry Association)

High-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) are Generation IV, graphite-moderated, helium-cooled reactors (typically 100–600+ MWt) that use TRISO-coated fuel to achieve high outlet temperatures (700°C-1,000°C). They offer enhanced safety through passive heat removal, preventing core meltdowns, and are designed for industrial process heat, hydrogen production, and electricity generation.

The Korea Chemical Industry Association and Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) said they signed the MoU to "establish a foundation for mutual technological cooperation related to high-temperature gas reactors capable of supplying high-temperature process heat to strengthen the competitiveness of the chemical industry". They added: "As a carbon-free energy source, [the HTGR] is considered a key alternative for achieving carbon neutrality in the domestic petrochemical industry."

Through the MoU, the two organisations agreed to establish a practical technology cooperation ecosystem to achieve carbon neutrality by promoting realistic HTGR designs that reflect the needs of domestic petrochemical companies, and creating opportunities for commercialisation of HTGR-related technologies.

A signing ceremony for the MoU was held on 6 March and was attended by key officials from both organisations, including Eom Chan-Wang, vice chairman of the Korea Chemical Industry Association, and Lim In-cheol, vice president of KAERI.

"The petrochemical industry is a key customer for the high-temperature gas reactor that the institute is promoting," Lim In-Cheol said. "Based on this agreement, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute will build a close network with the domestic petrochemical industry and create a practical technological cooperation ecosystem."

Eom Chan-wang added: "The chemical industry is being required to achieve carbon neutrality in industrial heat energy amid global environmental regulations. Through this business agreement, we will support the establishment of a technology base that can be practically applied to domestic companies, thereby helping them secure global competitiveness."

Studsvik acquires Swedish SMR project development firm

Monday, 9 March 2026

Swedish nuclear technical services provider Studsvik has announced its acquisition of small modular reactor project development company Kärnfull Next, expanding its role from supporting the world's existing nuclear fleet into the development of new nuclear projects.
 

(Image: Studsvik)

The enterprise value of Kärnfull Next - which specialises in technology-agnostic small modular reactor (SMR) project development - in the transaction is about EUR6.5 million (USD7.5 million) on a cash-free, debt-free, basis. EUR3 million will be paid in cash and EUR3.5 million in newly issued Studsvik shares at closing. Additional consideration of up to EUR2 million in shares may be payable through staged payments to 2029, alongside performance-based earn-outs of up to EUR14 million linked to the successful development and sale of project development companies.

Subject to customary conditions and regulatory approvals, the transaction is expected to close during the second quarter of 2026.

"The move marks a strategic step as governments and industry increasingly turn to nuclear power to support energy security, electrification, and net-zero ambitions," Studsvik said. "By adding project development capability, Studsvik will now be able to support nuclear projects from their earliest stages through to operation and decommissioning ... the company is expected to announce further partnerships that demonstrate how this expanded capability will be applied in practice."

"Together, Studsvik and Kärnfull Next will build a truly integrated nuclear services platform - and establish Studsvik as the home for entrepreneurial ambition in nuclear," said Daniel Aegerter, founder and CEO of Armada Investment AG and the largest shareholder in Studsvik.

Studsvik AB President and CEO Karl Thedéen added: "Kärnfull Next's project development expertise combined with Studsvik's unrivalled technical capabilities creates a compelling platform for growth."

Under the agreement, Kärnfull Next founders Christian Sjölander and John Ahlberg will join Studsvik's executive team. "Together, we will accelerate Studsvik's transformation into a truly integrated nuclear services champion," they said.

In 2023, Studsvik signed a memorandum of understanding with Kärnfull Next to investigate the possibility of constructing and operating SMRs on the Studsvik industrial site near Nyköping on Sweden's east coast. Studsvik said the site is in a strategic location and houses the company's broad expertise in nuclear technology, including fuel and materials technology, reactor analysis software and fuel optimisation, decommissioning and radiation protection services as well as technical solutions for handling, conditioning and volume reduction of radioactive waste.

In March 2022, Kärnfull Next signed a memorandum of understanding with GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy on the deployment of the BWRX-300 in Sweden.

Kärnfull Next has been conducting site selection and feasibility studies in several municipalities in Sweden since 2022. By establishing multiple SMR parks as part of the same programme, the company expects to achieve economies of scale in terms of technology selection, construction partners, power purchase agreements and financing partners. In February last year, the company secured land rights for the project to build a power plant based on SMRs in the municipality of Valdemarsvik in Östergötland county in southeastern Sweden.

Oklo, Centrus explore advanced nuclear fuel joint venture

Monday, 9 March 2026

Centrus Energy and Oklo have announced discussions on a joint venture "focused on deconversion services for high-assay low-enriched uranium and the advancement of related fuel-cycle technologies and supply chains".
 

(Image: Oklo)

The joint venture's activities would take place at Centrus's Piketon site in southern Ohio, which is also near Oklo's planned 1.2 GW power campus.

According to the announcement from the two companies "the potential joint venture would aim to enable an integrated and efficient coupling of uranium enrichment and deconversion to improve efficiency and costs through co-location and expand domestic advanced nuclear fuel capacity to serve Oklo's needs and broader US nuclear deployment".

Deconversion is the step when enriched uranium is converted into a different chemical form, such as uranium oxide or uranium metal, before it is fabricated into fuel.

The two companies believe that having a central hub for deconversion services co-located with high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) enrichment would eliminate the need for each fuel fabrication facility to establish its own deconversion line.

Uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel services provider Centrus's CEO and President, Amir Vexler, said: "We look forward to exploring options to co-locate and scale deconversion services to improve efficiency and support growing demand."

Jacob DeWitte, CEO and co-founder of Oklo, said: "This framework supports deeper discussions with Centrus on potential pathways to expand deconversion capacity, strengthen domestic supply chains, and advance a more efficient fuel cycle model that operates from the same location."

As part of the discussions, the two sides will "explore opportunities for potential coordination of regulatory and R&D activities, including joint engagement with US federal agencies to propose solutions that support co-location of deconversion and enrichment services".

In January Meta said it would support Oklo's project to develop a 1.2 GW power campus in Pike County, Ohio, by prepaying for power and providing funding to advance project certainty for Oklo's sodium-cooled Aurora powerhouse deployment.

The same month, the US Department of Energy awarded Centrus Energy's American Centrifuge Operating  USD900 million of funding to provide uranium enrichment services. Centrus said that it intended to leverage the  funding to support its multi-billion dollar expansion in Piketon, which - as well as producing HALEU - will also include additional LEU production to serve commercial utilities and the existing reactor fleet.

Decommissioning of Finnish research reactor completed

Friday, 6 March 2026

Finland's Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority has declared that the site of the country's first nuclear reactor is no longer classified as a nuclear facility following the dismantling of the Finnish Reactor 1 in Espoo.
 

The FiR1 research reactor (Image: Fortum)

The Finnish Reactor 1 (FiR1) water-cooled, pool-type TRIGA Mark II research reactor was commissioned by the Helsinki University of Technology in 1962. The reactor was originally built for research and education and was later also used for isotope production and radiotherapy. Operational responsibility for the reactor was transferred to the VTT Technical Research Centre in 1971. Although licensed to operate until 2023, VTT decided in 2012 to stop the use of FiR1 for financial reasons. The reactor - with a thermal capacity of 250 kW - ran for the last time on 30 June 2015. In 2017, VTT submitted an application for permission from the Council of State to decommission the reactor, which was granted in June 2021.

In February 2021, partially used irradiated fuel from the reactor was transported to the USA for use in a TRIGA Mark I research reactor operated by the US Geological Survey in Denver, Colorado. The USGS required additional fuel to continue operating its reactor, but the production of suitable fuel had been suspended for several years.

The dismantling of the FiR1 reactor and the management of nuclear waste were carried out by VTT in cooperation with Fortum between 2023 and 2025.

The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) supervised the planning and execution of the decommissioning from the beginning. The supervision ended last December when STUK decided to release the research reactor from regulatory control. After the decision, the research reactor is no longer considered a nuclear facility. The dismantled reactor area and premises in Otaniemi, Espoo, do not differ in any way from the surrounding area in terms of radiation safety, it said. The building can now be repurposed.

At the same time as FiR1 was released from regulatory control, STUK also released VTT's materials research laboratory, located in the same building, from oversight. The research laboratory had conducted studies on radioactive materials since the 1970s. The operation and decommissioning of the FiR1 research reactor were regulated by nuclear energy legislation, whereas the laboratory's activities were governed by the radiation act. The decommissioning of the laboratory was also subject to the radiation act and was carried out by VTT alongside the decommissioning of FiR1.

VTT delivered the radioactive waste generated from the dismantling and decontamination of the laboratory to Fortum for disposal at the repository located at the Loviisa nuclear power plant, just as with the reactor's waste. Before releasing the laboratory from oversight, STUK confirmed that the premises were free of radioactive contamination.

FiR1 is the first nuclear reactor to be decommissioned in Finland. The decommissioning of the country's nuclear power plants is not expected in the immediate future, but Finland is currently reforming its nuclear energy legislation and the complementary STUK regulations.

Kai Hämäläinen, a principal advisor at STUK, said the lessons learned from dismantling the FiR1 research reactor and supervising the process have been valuable in this work. "Until now, the law and regulations have not described the final stages of a nuclear facility's life cycle and the technical requirements for decommissioning in much detail. The experience gained has now been used in drafting the new law and in writing STUK's regulations," he said.

GBE-N granted licence to generate electricity

Friday, 6 March 2026

Great British Energy - Nuclear has been granted an electricity generating licence - required by all electricity generating companies - by the UK's gas and electricity markets regulator Ofgem.
 

How a Rolls-Royce SMR might look (Image: Rolls-Royce SMR)

Gaining such a licence, Great British Energy - Nuclear (GBE-N) said, represents "a landmark moment" in its mission to deliver Europe's first small modular reactors (SMRs). "Acquiring a generation licence is one of the first in a chain of approvals needed to construct and operate power infrastructure in the UK. Having this certification means Ofgem deems GBE-N to be a qualified, well-run organisation, which is capable of meeting national safety standards in electricity generation."

"This milestone reflects the dedication and expertise of our team, whose efforts in technical planning and rigorous compliance have enabled us to meet Ofgem's high standards," said Simon Bowen, Chair of GBE-N. "Our newly secured licence empowers us to contribute significantly to the country's energy security, bolstering grid resilience, and decarbonising our economy. This is another proof-point that we are delivering new nuclear at pace and with focus."

The UK government launched GBE-N in 2023 as an arms-length body that will be responsible for driving the delivery of new nuclear projects, with the aim of increasing the share of nuclear in the UK's electricity mix from the current 15% to 25% by 2050.

In June last year, Rolls-Royce SMR was selected as the UK government's preferred technology for the country's first SMR project. A final investment decision is expected to be taken in 2029.

In November, the government announced that Wylfa on the island of Anglesey, North Wales, will host three Rolls-Royce small modular reactors. It said the site - where a Magnox plant is being decommissioned - could potentially host up to eight SMRs.

GBE-N will start activity on the site this year with the aim for Wylfa's SMRs to be supplying power to the grid from the mid-2030s.

The Rolls-Royce SMR is a 470 MWe design based on a small pressurised water reactor. It will provide consistent baseload generation for at least 60 years. Ninety percent of the SMR - measuring about 16 metres by 4 metres - will be built in factory conditions, limiting activity on-site primarily to assembly of pre-fabricated, pre-tested, modules which significantly reduces project risk and has the potential to drastically shorten build schedules.

Alongside the announcement that SMRs would be built at Wylfa, the government announced that GBE-N had been tasked with identifying suitable sites that could potentially host further large-scale reactor projects beyond the current deployments at Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C. GBE-N will report back by Autumn 2026 on potential sites to inform future decisions in the next Spending Review and beyond. The Energy Secretary has requested this includes sites across the UK, including Scotland.

Haiyang 3 completes cold tests

Friday, 6 March 2026

Cold functional tests have been completed at unit 3 of the Haiyang nuclear power plant in China's Shandong province, State Power Investment Corporation has announced.
 

(Image: SPIC)

Such tests are carried out to confirm whether components and systems important to safety are properly installed and ready to operate in a cold condition. The main purpose of cold functional tests is to verify the leak-tightness of the primary circuit and components - such as pressure vessels, pipelines and valves of both the nuclear and conventional islands - and to clean the main circulation pipes. The tests mark the first time the reactor systems are operated together with the auxiliary systems.

"The cold test confirmed that the four main coolant pumps and their domestically produced frequency converters of Unit 3 are operating normally, the primary loop pressure boundary integrity is good, the pressure-bearing performance meets standards, and the installation quality of related system equipment is excellent," State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) said. "The test was a success on the first attempt."

Completion of the cold tests lays "a solid foundation for subsequent key milestones such as hot functional testing and reactor fuel loading, as well as high-quality commissioning," it added.

Hot functional tests involve increasing the temperature of the reactor coolant system and carrying out comprehensive tests to ensure that coolant circuits and safety systems are operating as they should. Carried out before the loading of nuclear fuel, such testing simulates the thermal working conditions of the power plant and verifies that nuclear island and conventional equipment and systems meet design requirements.

The construction of two new reactors at each of the Sanmen, Haiyang and Lufeng sites was approved by China's State Council in April 2021. The approvals were for Sanmen units 3 and 4, Haiyang 3 and 4 and units 5 and 6 of the Lufeng plant. The Sanmen and Haiyang plants are already home to two Westinghouse AP1000 units each, and two CAP1000 units - the Chinese version of the AP1000 - were approved for Phase II (units 3 and 4) of each plant.

The first safety-related concrete was poured for the nuclear island of Haiyang unit 3 in July 2022, and in March the outer steel dome of the nuclear island containment building was hoisted into place. Construction of Haiyang 4 began in April last year. The planned construction period for Haiyang 3 and 4 was 56 months, with the two units scheduled to be fully operational in 2027.

Cold functional tests were completed at unit 3 of the Sanmen plant last month.

US establishes Nuclear Energy Launch Pad

Friday, 6 March 2026

The US Department of Energy and the National Reactor Innovation Center are setting up a Nuclear Energy Launch Pad designed to "promote the rapid development and implementation of advanced nuclear technologies by private industry".
 

(Image: INL)

The Nuclear Energy Launch Pad is intended to build on the Department of Energy (DOE) Reactor Pilot Program - which has 11 projects accepted and a target for three reactors to reach criticality by 4 July - and its Fuel Line Pilot Program, which has had 9 projects accepted and aims to establish a domestic nuclear fuel supply chain for testing new reactors.

The DOE plans to transition the pilot programmes' new and future applicants to the Launch Pad "and expand beyond authorisation to include the testing and operation necessary to scale first-of-a-kind technologies toward widescale commercial deployment. This integrated approach ensures continuity from initial pilot authorisation through extended operational validation, reducing the risk and timelines for advanced reactors and other advanced nuclear facility commercialisation".

There will be two pathways running: the Launch Pad Idaho National Laboratory, which will cover more than 2,000 acres, with eligible projects including advanced reactors, fuel fabrication, recycling, enrichment and other innovations; and Launch Pad USA, which will offer the ability to authorise the operation of nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities outside of Idaho National Laboratory.

The DOE will not be providing funding for successful applicants but will be providing resources. Rian Bahran, DOE deputy assistant secretary for Nuclear Reactors, said: "Through this initiative, developers can access infrastructure, expertise, and services essential for the siting, construction, and operation of their nuclear facilities."

Idaho National Laboratory Director John Wagner called it "a significant evolution in the ecosystem for advancing nuclear technologies from concept to deployment" that "offers nuclear developers something unprecedented: An 890-square-mile federal site with more than 75 years of reactor testing experience, existing infrastructure, direct access to national nuclear expertise and streamlined regulatory pathways - all enabling developers to move from demonstration to deployment at the pace America's energy security demands".

The initial request for applications "is expected in the next few months" and it will be an annual process. Applications already submitted to the DOE's pilot programmes may be transferred to the Launch Pad and will not need to reapply. 

More details can be found here.

NRC issues construction permit for first Natrium plant

Thursday, 5 March 2026

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved a construction permit for TerraPower's Kemmerer unit 1 project - the first such permit for a commercial-scale non-light water reactor in the country for four decades.
 

How a Natrium plant might look, with the nuclear island on the right and the energy island on the left (Image: Natrium)

The technology

The Bill Gates-chaired company's Natrium 345 MWe sodium-cooled fast reactor has a molten-salt-based energy storage system which allows it to temporarily boost output to 500 MWe when needed, enabling the plant to follow daily electric load changes and integrate seamlessly with fluctuating renewable resources.

The licensing process

TerraPower submitted its construction permit application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in March 2024 and it was docketed by the NRC and the formal review began in May 2024. The NRC established an initial 27-month review schedule, however the review was completed in 18 months after a streamlined mandatory hearing process.

TerraPower began non-nuclear construction for the Kemmerer, Wyoming, plant in June 2024, and expects the project - which is near a retiring coal plant - to be complete in 2030. It is being developed through the US Department of Energy's Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program.

The NRC said it was the first commercial reactor approved for construction for nearly a decade and the first non-light water reactor in more than 40 years: "This is a historic step forward for advanced nuclear energy in the United States and reflects our commitment to delivering timely, predictable decisions grounded in a rigorous and independent safety review," said NRC Chairman Ho Nieh.

TerraPower's President and CEO, Chris Levesque, said: "Today is a historic day for the United States' nuclear industry. This is the first commercial-scale, advanced nuclear plant to receive this permit. Our team has worked relentlessly for over 4 years with the NRC staff to get to this moment. We had extensive pre-application engagement with the NRC; and we submitted a robust and thorough construction permit application almost 2 years ago. We have spent thousands of manpower hours working to achieve this momentous accomplishment."

What’s next?

Levesque said: "We plan to start construction on the Natrium plant in the coming weeks and look forward to bringing the first Natrium reactor and energy storage system to market in the great state of Wyoming."

The NRC said that TerraPower subsidiary US SFR Owner would need to submit a separate operating licence application which would need NRC approval before the facility could operate.

Last month, social media giant Meta announced that its future nuclear energy plans included funding to support the development in the USA of up to eight Natrium sodium fast reactors - two new units capable of generating up to 690 MW of firm power with delivery as early as 2032, plus the rights for energy from up to six other Natrium units capable of producing 2.1 GW and targeted for delivery by 2035.

The Natrium reactor is a TerraPower and GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy technology. Last month it was accepted into the UK's Generic Design Assessment process.

Largest module installed at second Lufeng unit

Monday, 2 March 2026

The CA20 module - measuring about 20 metres in length, 14 metres in width and with a height of 21 metres - has been hoisted into place at the second unit of the Lufeng nuclear power plant in Guangdong province.
 

(Image: CNNC)

The 'super module' was hoisted into place on 1 March, China National Nuclear Corporation construction subsidiary CNNC 23 Engineering Co Ltd announced.

(Image: CNNC)

The cuboid-shaped CA20 module - weighing more than 1,000 tonnes - consists of 32 wall modules and 39 floor modules. It will comprise plant and equipment for used fuel storage, transmission, the heat exchanger and waste collection, among other things.

(Image: CNNC)

The proposed construction of four 1250 MWe CAP1000 reactors (units 1-4) at the Lufeng site was approved by China's National Development and Reform Commission in September 2014. However, the construction of units 1 and 2 did not receive State Council approval until 19 August 2024. The first safety-related concrete for the nuclear island of unit 1 was poured on 24 February last year, with that of unit 2 following in December. Approval for units 3 and 4 is still pending. The CAP1000 design is the Chinese version of the Westinghouse AP1000.

The construction of Hualong One reactors as units 5 and 6 at the Lufeng plant was approved by the State Council in April 2022. First concrete for unit 5 was poured on 8 September 2022, with that for unit 6 following on 26 August 2023. Units 5 and 6 are expected to be connected to the grid in 2028 and 2029, respectively.

According to China General Nuclear, once all six units are in operation, the Lufeng plant will generate about 52 TWh, which will reduce standard coal consumption by almost 16 million tonnes and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by more than 42 million tonnes.

ABS & HD Hyundai to Advance Nuclear-Powered Electric Propulsion Systems

(L-R): Matthew Mueller, ABS Vice President, Regional Business Development, Hak-mu Shim, HD HSHI Executive Vice President & Byung-hun Kwon, HD KSOE Executive Vice President

Published Mar 9, 2026 11:44 AM by The Maritime Executive

[By: ABS]

ABS, HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering (HD KSOE) and HD Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries (HD HSHI) signed a joint development project (JDP) for the “Conceptual Design of a Nuclear-Powered Electric Propulsion System.”

The agreement forms a framework to assess the technical feasibility of a nuclear-powered electric propulsion system specific to a 16K TEU container ship.

“This project represents an important step in exploring the potential of a nuclear-powered electric propulsion system for container vessels. By combining HD Hyundai’s shipbuilding expertise with ABS’ deep engineering experience in maritime safety, we aim to evaluate technologies that can support safer, more efficient and lower-emission operations for the next generation of propulsion solutions,” said Matthew Mueller, ABS Vice President, North Pacific Business Development.

Kwon Byung-hun, Head of the Electrification Center at HD KSOE, said: “In response to the growing demand for eco-friendly ships, we are continuously pursuing the development of electric propulsion systems using nuclear energy—a carbon-free energy source. We will expand our R&D efforts to strengthen our technological competitiveness in nuclear-linked electric propulsion.”

Under the agreement, HD KSOE and HD HSHI will develop the basic design, electrical component specifications and arrangement plans for a nuclear-powered electric propulsion system tailored for container ships.

As the marine and offshore industries refocus on nuclear energy, ABS has worked to support its application at sea as well as a series of advanced development projects with leading companies. ABS released a study examining a potential SMR-powered LNG carrier, available here. The ABS Requirements for Nuclear Power Systems for Marine and Offshore Applications are available for download here. ABS also unveiled the industry’s first comprehensive requirements for floating nuclear power plants. The Pathways to a Low Carbon Future Floating Nuclear Power Plant study is available here. 

The products and services herein described in this press release are not endorsed by The Maritime Executive