Monday, July 31, 2023

The Violence of Our Imaginations: War, Women, Nation

This content was originally written for an undergraduate or Master's program. It is published as part of our mission to showcase peer-leading papers written by students during their studies. This work can be used for background reading and research, but should not be cited as an expert source or used in place of scholarly articles/books.

In 1971, multiple wars broke out in East Pakistan: a civil war between East and West Pakistan, with East Pakistan aiming to create a separate nation-state of Bangladesh, an internal war between the Bengali and Urdu-speaking populations of East Pakistan, and an international war between India and Pakistan. The war ended on 16th December 1971 with the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. While these wars are well documented in history, one that has gone by relatively undocumented in formal history is the gender war that broke out against the women of East Pakistan (Saikia 3). In less than nine months, 200,000-400,000 women were raped, and tens of thousands were forcibly impregnated (Takai 193). After the war ended, the newly elected government of Bangladesh eulogised the women victims of rape by giving them the title of Birangona, i.e., brave women, and launched a rehabilitation programme for them (Saikia 64). While these are the statistics for one ethno-nationalist war, evidence for similar gendered wars being waged on women’s bodies can be found for almost all of them — what explains the pervasive nature of sexual violence during ethno-nationalist wars?

Through this paper, I aim to analyse the relationship between using motherhood as the dominant image through which women are symbolised in nationalist projects and the violence perpetrated against them during and in the aftermath of ethno-nationalist wars. I argue that the imagined position of women as reproducers of a nation and markers of its cultural boundaries leads to the violation of their bodily autonomy being interpreted as a transgression of the collective’s boundaries and hence, forms an essential motivation behind the wide-scale perpetration of sexual violence during ethno-nationalist wars. I move on to show that in the aftermath of war, the state recasts women into the same positions as mothers to further its nationalist agendas. To do so, it re-narrativises women’s experiences while simultaneously silencing the voices of individual women that pose a challenge to this narrative. This shapes a distinct form of epistemic violence against women in which they are stripped of their agency to share their own experiences. I study this relationship between the position of women in nationalist discourses and the violence against them through the case study of the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971.

Masculine Nation, Feminine Boundaries

Since the late eighteenth century, nation-states have formed the dominant mode of organising society. While the definition of a nation has been widely contested, the existing literature can be divided into two categories — first which seeks to define a nation in civic and political terms, and second, which seeks to define it in ethnic, religious and cultural terms. In the former imagination, a nation is defined as a group of territorially bound people governed by the same law and represented by the same legislature (Brubaker 7). In the latter, a nation is conceptualised as a group of people united by their shared history, descent, culture and language, coming together to organise themselves into governable units (Brubaker 12). In both definitions, nations are conceptualised as membership and territorial units.

Theorists of nations and nationalisms agree on another feature of nation-states – all nations are exclusionary by nature, and therefore, the imagination of the nationalist self is closely tied to that of the other. Benedict Anderson puts forth the argument that nations are imagined as “inherently limited” — even the most prominent nations have well-defined boundaries of both their territory and members, beyond which lie other nations and their members (Anderson 7). Boundaries are constructed to divide people into the categories of us and them and stretch them across generations. A variety of political, legal and cultural discourses are employed to build these boundaries of national groups — and it is in the representation and reproduction of such limitations that the role of women becomes visible in otherwise male-dominated nationalist projects.

In primordialist theories, nations are often imagined as extensions of family and kinship relations. In such imaginations, the role of women is understood in the context of familial relations as mothers, daughters and sisters. They are seen to symbolise the family’s and, by extension of it, the nation’s honour and are shown as needing protection by their male counterparts. In non-primordialist theories, women have either been completely ignored or relegated strictly to the private realm. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias argue that nationalist discourses construct the role of women in two crucial ways, first, as symbols of national culture and honour (Yuval-Davis 17). Second, by virtue of their ability to bear children, they are viewed as biological producers of the nation and transmitters of its culture (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 7). In doing so, nationalist discourses construct women as the “embodiments of the boundaries of ethnic and national groups” (Yuval-Davis 1, 18). The depiction of women as symbols of national and cultural honour and boundaries, combined with their exclusion from the active body which shapes the nationalist vision, pushes women towards an object rather than a subject position (ibid. 19). As the construction of women as biological producers and embodiments of ethnic boundaries of a nation is ideologically compatible with women’s position as mothers, it breaks down the public/private dichotomy within which women are typically situated. As a result, the imagination of women as nationalist mothers and embodiments of ethnic boundaries becomes acceptable and the dominant form of imagination and national mobilisation in both primordialist and non-primordialist theories of nations.

During the War

Through this section, I aim to analyse how the aforementioned imagination of women as markers and reproducers of the national collective’s boundaries in nationalist discourses shapes the violence perpetrated against them during ethno-nationalist wars. In particular, through the case of the Bangladesh Liberation War, I will focus on two forms of gendered violence perpetrated against women during ethno-nationalist wars — wartime rape and forced impregnation.

Wartime Rape

Ethno-nationalist conflicts, irrespective of their geographical location, root causes, scale and form, have one feature in common — the widespread use of rape against women of the communities involved in the conflict (Peltola 5). The scale and pervasiveness of this form of rape in wars is evident from the coining of the term wartime rape. Jonathan Gotschall defines wartime rape as “the distinct pattern of rape by soldiers at rates that are much increased over rates of rape that prevail in peacetime” (Gotschall 129). He argues that the perpetration of wartime rape differs from rape during peacetime on three fronts: scale, nature and motivation. The scale is at least 300%-400% more than in times of peace, women of all age groups are targeted, mutilation of body parts is common, and at least a part of the motivation is external to individual desire and sexual gratification. Therefore, it is crucial to understand its perpetration as a separate category, as a decisive tactic of war rather than as incidental to the conflict. Strategic rape theory does exactly this. The theory posits that rape is a tactic, a conscious and planned military policy that soldiers perpetrate in service of larger strategic objectives of the war (ibid. 131).

Once understood as a strategy of war, it is vital to ask what motivates the use of the strategy of rape as opposed to other strategies of mass victimisation of women of the enemy community (such as femicide)? Proponents of strategic rape theory, such as Davis Buss, argue that it is because “rape is a crime against a collectivity” (Buss 150). However, the question remains — what makes it possible for the rape of a woman to be interpreted as a crime against the entire collectivity when no other form of violence perpetrated against an individual is perceived as such? I argue that the public imagination of women as the embodiments of a nation’s borders and honour makes it possible for transgressions of their bodily autonomy to be seen as transgressions of the collective’s boundaries by both sides of the war. It allows for the rape of a woman to be interpreted as the victimisation of an entire community which inflicts irreparable harm to the community’s culture and honour. This forms an essential motivation behind its wide-scale perpetration during ethno-nationalist wars.

Several international treaties have defined rape as ‘a crime against honour’ rather than physical, emotional and psychological torture of the victim (“Practice Relating to”). ‘Whose honour?’ is a question that remains unanswered. The construction of women in nationalist discourses allows wartime rape to denote a crime against the honour of men and nations rather than individual women. As we observed earlier, nationalist discourses imagine women in familial roles of mothers, sisters and daughters and ascribe to men the duty of protecting the women and, consequently, the nation. Nitin Pai notes that this image of men as protectors was severely under attack during the Bangladesh War. The Pakistani Army conducted several “search and destroy” operations in the countryside — this involved the burning down of entire villages, which were viewed as aiding rebel fighters (Pai 4). While the men were killed, the women were victims of what Pai refers to as “hit-and-run rapes” — the raping of women in front of their sons, brothers and fathers, who were forced to helplessly watch the atrocities being perpetrated on the women they were ‘supposed to protect’ (ibid.). As the men failed to defend the ‘honour’ of the women, they were seen as having failed in their primary duty as men and citizens. Therefore, wartime rape is also viewed as an act of emasculating and humiliating the men of the enemy community/nation (Gottschall 131) – and this is what motivates its public nature, i.e. rape of women in front of their male family and community members.

In addition to weaponising nationalist tropes of women as embodiments of a nation’s boundaries, wartime rape also instrumentalises traditional patriarchal tropes of ‘female purity’ and ‘masculine protection’. As the woman has now had sexual relations with the enemy, she is shunned by society, and as the man has failed to protect the woman, he is seen to have failed in his primary duty towards his family and his nation. This destroys the family unit and leads to the breakdown of an entire community (Takai 400, Peltola 25). Therefore, the notion that the rape of individual women can be used to defile a whole nation severely increases women’s vulnerability to sexual violence during ethno-nationalist wars.

Forced Impregnation

An important consequence of wartime rape is forced impregnation. Usually viewed as incidental to wartime rape, I argue that, like wartime rape, forced impregnation is a decisive strategy in ethno-nationalist wars, and the motivation behind its perpetration lies in the imagination of women as biological reproducers of a nation. Closely tied to the dominant position of women as nationalist mothers in discourses of nationalism is the expectation of engaging in sexual relations within the national community and reproducing nationalist sons. However, in most patrilineal societies, the child inherits membership to any group — nation, ethnicity, religion — from the father rather than the mother. This allows for a man to violate not just the bodily autonomy of individual women but also the bloodline of the group as a whole.

Forced impregnation threatens the reproductive autonomy of a community in three ways. First, women’s bodies become sites of “forcibly transferring children of one group to another”, and their sexual violation is motivated to threaten the ethnic and genetic composition, i.e. the bloodline of the warring nation (Takai 400, Fisher 93). Second, victims of forced impregnation may be psychologically traumatised and unable to have other sexual and childbearing experiences with members of their own community (Fischer 93). Third, victims of forced impregnation, especially if they choose to raise the child themselves, may no longer be considered marriageable within society. All three of these factors attack women’s imagined positions as biological reproducers and cultural transmitters of the nation and threaten the survival and further reproduction of ‘ethnically pure’ community members. Due to its severe implications for the psychological, religious and ethnic identity of the group, authors such as Hyun-Kyung and MacKinnon argue rape with the motivation of impregnating the victims is genocidal in nature (Gotschall 132).

The Bangladesh War reflects the employment of such a strategy of forced impregnation. Press reports estimate that 200,000-400,000 women were raped during the war, resulting in 195,000 cases of forced impregnations (Mookherjee, “The Spectral Wound”, 143). The fact that these rapes and resulting impregnations were not incidental to the war but a strategy of it is reflected not just in the scale of violence but also in the discourse employed by its perpetrators. Nayanika Mookherjee notes that while speaking of sexual violence perpetrated during the war, her interviewees would recall the Pakistan Army men saying that even though Bangladesh might be able to secede from Pakistan, “we [they] would leave behind a Pakistani in the womb of every Bengali woman” (ibid. 180). She further states that during the war, Bengali men were seen as being “Indianised/Hinduised” and, therefore, as only being “nominally muslim” by the Pakistani state, and rape was seen as a way to “improve the genes of Bengali muslims”, populate the newly independent nation of Bangladesh with “a breed of pure muslims — Pakistanis” (Mookherjee, “Gendered Embodiments”, 39). Tautologically, its own continued existence is of primary significance to any community. As a result, little is more valuable to a collective than its reproductive ability and autonomy. The nationalist notions of women as biological reproducers of the collective, coupled with the patriarchal assertion that a child inherits their ethnicity from their father, creates a reality where forced impregnation of a woman is seen as threatening the nation’s continued existence. Therefore, forced impregnation is employed as a deliberate war strategy as it is seen to constitute one of the gravest threats an army can pose to its enemy community.

Hence, we observe that rape and forced impregnations are war strategies motivated by manipulating image of women as ‘biological reproducers’ and ‘cultural transmitters’ of a nation.

Aftermath of War

Having analysed how women’s imagined position in nationalist discourses shapes the violence against them during ethno-nationalist wars, I now turn towards exploring this relationship in the aftermath of war. The largescale perpetration of wartime rape had two implications: first, it victimised a significant proportion of the newly independent nation’s female population, and second, it bred the state’s anxiety towards the unborn war babies. As a result, the Bangladeshi state needed to reconcile the identity of women as rape victims and those carrying the enemy’s child with one compatible with its nationalist project. I argue that in order to achieve this reconciliation, the state recast them into the same role of nationalist mothers through a combination of discourse and policy, and in doing so, subjected them to diverse forms of violence. I will focus on epistemic violence in particular, which includes “persistent epistemic exclusion that hinders one’s contribution to knowledge production” (Dotson 1).

Nature, Nation, Mother

Throughout the Liberation War, the nation and nature were both feminised and represented through the figures of “respectable, self-sacrificing mothers” in songs, poems and plays (Mookherjee, “Gendered Embodiments” 45). Such an imagination of nature and nation as ‘motherland’, symbolised through women’s bodies, created a strong link between nature, nation and the symbolic depiction of women as mothers. This collective imagination and equation of nation-nature-mother made it possible for the wartime rape of women to be equated to the ravages of nature and the nation of Bangladesh, by the Pakistani Army, during the war. In the equation, the violence perpetrated on women to that performed on the nation’s land (imagined as a mother) by the same enemy alleviated the position of the raped woman to that of an aggrieved mother.

The gendered atrocities perpetrated during the war were re-narrativised through songs, poems and plays. In all sources studied by Mookherjee, wartime rapes depicted were those of cases of “hit-and-run rapes”, i.e. the rape of a woman in front of her male relatives, and they were symbolised through the ravaging of nature by the Pakistani Army (Mookherjee, “The Spectral Wound” 181). As men were forced to silently witness this atrocity perpetrated on their mothers/sisters/daughters, the re-tellings of war show them to be similarly mute spectators to the ravaging of nature and the nation. As a result, in both cases, they are shown to have failed in their ‘duties’ ‘as men’. This creates an image of relative trauma — the trauma of those being violated (women/nature) is depicted relationally to the ‘trauma’ faced by male witnesses of this violation. The dominant imagery was one of the mother (raped woman and mother nature) being wronged, in pain and calling for her (male) children to protect and avenge her (Mookherjee, “Gendered Embodiments”  42, 44). The focus is moved away from the victim towards the men, and it calls upon the men to avenge their mothers and motherland by participating in the war (while it continued) and then in the nation-building processes of the new Bangladesh. Therefore, by collapsing the image of rape of a woman to the ravaging of feminised nature and nation-aestheticised rape in the public imagination. This reconciled the pictures of the raped woman with a mother — an aggrieved mother calling upon her sons to avenge her, in this case — and she could, once again, be effectively employed as a national symbol encouraging the men to participate in the nationalist project.

This reconciliation and instrumentalisation of women’s experiences for the nationalist project was built on silencing individual women’s experiences. In interviews conducted by Mookherjee and Saikia, several women identified their perpetrators as family members, neighbours, and local and national leaders (Saikia 68, Mookherjee, “Remembering to Forget” 443). However, the instrumentalisation of women’s experience to encourage men to be a part of the nationalist project (by avenging the rapes of their mothers by inflicting harm on the Pakistanis) would not have been possible if the perpetrator had been identified as a local. Hence, the Bangladeshi government strategically claimed that all rapes were perpetrated by the ‘Pakistani enemy’ without providing space for survivors to voice their own experiences. In doing so, it transformed the victims of rape into an abstract number of bodies. Experiences identifying the perpetrator as a ‘local’ were systematically erased and forgotten to maintain a farce of ‘national unity’ and fuel sentiments against the ‘Pakistani enemy’. I discuss the different ways in which women’s individual experiences were silenced towards the end of this section.

Illegitimate and Legitimate Motherhoods

As observed in the earlier section, women forcibly impregnated during the war were seen as carrying the ‘enemy’s child’ and reproducing the enemy population in their home country. This posed a threat to the nationalist state, which cast this form of motherhood as “illegitimate” (Mookherjee, “Available Motherhood”, 350). The unborn war baby became a source of anxiety for the state, which sought to eliminate it by establishing control over women’s bodies and sexuality. This was done by setting up rehabilitation centres for victims of wartime rape. The centres facilitated four roles: abortion and international adoption of ‘war babies’ and marriage and financial sustenance of birangonas (Mookherjee, “Available Motherhood” 342, Saikia 67). Hastily, laws legalising abortion and international adoption were passed in 1971 and repealed as soon as the process was completed (ibid. 347, 349).

The state mandated an abortion programme through the rehabilitation centres, and women were compelled to accept the state’s intervention if they wanted to be included within the new Bangladesh and avail of the centre’s services (ibid.). Women too far into their pregnancy terms were mandated to give away their children for international adoption (Mookherjee,  “Available Motherhood”  342). Abortion and international adoption were seen as methods of not only getting rid of the “Pakistani children” from Bangladesh but also of  “cleansing” the women’s bodies by making them “unavailable” to the emotions of motherhood for an “illegitimate” child (ibid. 339, 348). Both Saikia and Mookherjee note several cases of forced abortions and adoptions — constituting yet another form of violence against women in the aftermath of ethno-nationalist wars. Once they were physically and physiologically expunged of the ‘war-babies’, the centres facilitated their reintegration into society and, specifically, their marriages to Bangladeshi men (ibid. 249). This ensured that the women were instituted within heterosexual marital alliances with men from the same community and could reproduce Bangladeshi children again. As a result, the birangonas were, once again, made available for a “legitimate” form of motherhood and could now occupy the position of nationalist mothers in people’s collective imagination.

All records of abortions and international adoptions, including details about the women on whom these procedures were performed/gave away their children for adoption, were burnt by centre workers to facilitate their “smooth assimilation” into society (Mookherjee, “The Spectral Wound” 151). As a result, there is no real-time documentation about the nature of these processes and women’s own consent (or lack thereof) to being a part of them. While on the one hand, the birangonas were once again cast in the roles of nationalist mothers in the public sphere, on the other hand, the experiences of individual women were systematically erased and appropriated (as being voluntary choices) by the state. Therefore, we observe that the state’s construction of an ideal of a birangonas as “cleansed, nationalist mothers” was built on and sustained by the systemic silencing of individual women’s experiences.

Forced Silences

Once “reintegrated into the society”, mostly through marriage alliances, women were also systematically dissuaded from sharing their war or rehabilitation centres experiences. This silencing happened by subjecting those who sought to accept the title of birangona to khota — khota is a Bengali word that refers to scorn that was directed at such women through everyday normative discourses in Bangladesh (Mookherjee, “Remembering to Forget” 434, 435, 438). It did not take long for the term birangona to be twisted into the slur barangona meaning “penetrated”, which is used to denote prostitutes (Saikia 66). Women received compensation when they shared their experiences with news agencies, academics or lawyers (Mookherjee, “Remembering to Forget”, 438). In the state’s rehabilitation programme, women who claimed the status of birangona, either received money and land to sustain themselves or were married off to a Bangladeshi man who was “rewarded” with money for their willingness to “accept and transform” the birangona (Saika 67). As the monetary exchange was involved in all these cases, women who claimed the status of birangona were labelled as barangonas in everyday discourses and were again shunned through the violence of khota. Furthermore, a “true” survivor was constructed to be one who would attempt to conceal their experience of rape, be ashamed of it and refuse to acknowledge or speak about it publicly (Mookherjee, “Remembering to Forget”, 440). Therefore, women who claimed the status of birangona were disbelieved by the locals and seen as opportunistic (ibid.). This meant that in addition to the realm of material evidence, individual women’s experiences were also systematically erased from the realm of discourse.

Through this section, I have shown that in order to recast women into the imagination of nationalist mothers, and symbols of nationalist mobilisation and continuation, the state strips women of their agency and systemically silences and erases their individual experiences. This deliberate strategy to silence the women in order to fit their experiences into a nationally acceptable mould shapes a distinct form of epistemic violence against them in the aftermath of war — one that appropriates and misrepresents women’s experiences and in doing so, denies them the epistemic space for their experience to be acknowledged as history and be a part of the “knowledge” about the war.

Conclusion

Through this paper, I have analysed the relationship between forms of violence perpetrated against women during and in the aftermath of ethno-nationalist wars and their position in nationalist discourses. I have argued that women’s imagined position as reproducers of a nation and markers of its cultural boundaries leads to the violation of their bodily autonomy being interpreted as a transgression of the collective’s boundaries, and in doing so, forms an essential motivation behind the wide-scale perpetration of sexual violence during ethno-nationalist wars. I have then proceeded to analyse this relationship in the aftermath of war and argued that the state subjects women to a distinct form of epistemic violence in efforts to recast them in positions of nationalist mothers. Therefore, throughout the paper, we have observed how the imagination of women in nationalist discourses constitutes them as political signs, as symbols of national honour and boundaries, which shapes the violence against them both during and in the aftermath of war. In doing so, it creates a reality wherein women’s bodies become sites on which wars are waged, and power gets inscribed.

Works Cited:

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Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Harvard University Press, 1996.

Buss, David M., and Neil M. Malamuth. Sex, Power, Conflict Evolutionary and Feminist Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 1996.

Dotson, Kristie. “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.” Social Epistemology, vol. 28, no. 2, 2014, pp. 115–138., doi:10.1080/02691728.2013.782585.

Fisher, Siobhan K. Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocidewww.jstor.org/stable/1372967.

Gottschall, Jonathan. “Explaining Wartime Rape.” The Journal of Sex Research, vol. 41, no. 2, 2004, doi:10.1080/00224490409552221.

Mookherjee, Nayanika. Available Motherhood: Legal Technologies, `State of … 2007, DOI:10.1177/0907568207079213.

Mookherjee, Nayanika. “Gendered Embodiments: Mapping the Body-Politic of the Raped Woman and the Nation in Bangladesh – Nayanika Mookherjee, 2008.” SAGE Journals, 2008, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.fr.9400388.

Mookherjee, Nayanika. ‘Remembering to Forget’: Public Secrecy and Memory of … Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute, 2006, DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9655.2006.00299.x

Mookherjee, Nayanika. The Spectral Wound: Sexual Violence, Public Memories, and the Bangladesh War of 1971. Duke University Press, 2015.

Pai, Nitin. The 1971 East Pakistan Genocide – A Realist Perspectivewww.genocidebangladesh.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/eastpakistangenocide1971-realistperspective1.pdf.

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Saikia, Yasmin. Women, War, and the Making of Bangladesh: Remembering 1971. Duke University Press, 2011.

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Further Reading on E-International Relations

‘Reproductive Slavery to Please Western Rich’: Russian Propaganda Alleges Ukraine Conspiracy

Russia’s “firehose of falsehood” claims that Ukrainian President Zelensky’s government benefits from the war through an elaborate human trafficking operation.


by Pete Shmigel | July 31, 2023
Photo: Ukrinform

Russian propaganda’s “firehose of falsehood” is alleging that the full-scale war is part of a human trafficking conspiracy by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government.

“A living commodity – human trafficking in Ukraine is becoming rampant” is the headline of an article posted on Readovka’s Telegram channel (and then widely shared on other pro-Kremlin or ultra-nationalist Telegram channels).

With minimum regard for logic or coherence, and near total disregard for factuality, Readovka lays out a conspiracy with the following elements in what they refer to as “country 404”:

1. Intentionally creating conditions of “total poverty” in Ukraine by “destroying any social guarantees”;

2. Putting Ukrainian citizens into the position of vulnerability;

3. “Profitably selling Ukrainians to the Western master” for menial work abroad or as soldiers in Western countries’ effort to destroy Russia;

4. Putting Ukrainian women into “reproductive slavery to please the Western rich.”

The Russian online news outlet Readovka was founded in 2011 in Smolensk, as a public page on VKontakte, Russia’s version of Facebook.

By April 2022, it hit the mark of one million subscribers on Telegram and is considered one of the five most cited media in Russia – attesting to the state of journalism today in a country where the distinctions between fact and fantasy have disappeared in Vladimir Putin’s post-truth surreality.

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Kryvyi Rih Missile Attack: Four Dead and 43 Injured in Russian Strike on Zelensky's Hometown


Russian forces launched two missiles at Kryvyi Rih. According to officials, people are still trapped under the rubble and a 10-year-old child is among the dead.

A number of Russian opposition and some Western publications classify Readovka as a pro-Kremlin or ultra-nationalist resource. However, its owner denies this, stating that Readovka “remains in line with independent journalism.”

With regard to the human trafficking conspiracy, Readovka stated: “The current Kyiv authorities have made great efforts to plunge their own citizens into total poverty. In pursuit of a “European future,” the incompetent managers from Bankova [Street – a synecdoche for Ukraine’s Presidential Administration] have hung a credit yoke of unprecedented severity around the country’s neck, almost completely destroying any social guarantees.”

Prior to the Covid-19 epidemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s economy was steadily growing, according to the World Bank. Its export levels had reached record highs.

As of January 2023, retirees in Russia received an average pension of approximately 19.3 thousand Russian rubles, or $236, per month.

Readovka then continued: “The Kyiv regime needs people only in order to profitably sell them to the Western master. Thus, Ukraine agreed to become a ‘ram’ against Russia, leaving the lives of its own soldiers at the disposal of ‘respectable people’ from Brussels, London and Washington.”

The Readovka rant further noted that “the Kyiv government left the population not so many alternatives: to be kidnapped from the streets of their native city and forcibly mobilized into the army, or to become a participant in another scheme of the shadow economy, whether it is the sale of people [into menial work] or reproductive slavery to please the Western rich.”

The Ukrainian military has long relied on volunteers. While Ukrainian has a draft for military registration, it has no forcible conscription for active duty.

“In today’s conditions, in an independent life, a person’s life costs very little, so there is absolutely no reason to be surprised at the growth of the real slave trade on Ukraine’s territory. Considering that Ukraine has no future, the negative slave-owning tendencies will only grow in the future,” Readovka concluded.

Independent polling – such as it is – in Russia continues to show popular support for Russia’s war on Ukraine at between 60 percent to 75 percent.

A recent analysis by the RAND Corporation about the design and operation of Russian propaganda called it a “firehose of falsehood.”

“We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as ‘the firehose of falsehood’ because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages, and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions… Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience,” RAND’s analysts wrote.


Pete Shmigel is an Australian writer. With a background in politics, business, sustainability, the military and mental health, he has been published by the major newspapers in Australia. He helped initiate Lifeline Ukraine.
It’s not just Ukraine. Russia occupies territory in other countries in emerging Europe

July 31, 2023
Marek Grzegorczyk

Opposition in Georgia to cultural and economic ties with Russia has served to remind a global audience that Moscow occupies not just part of Ukraine, but also Georgia and Moldova.

There was much anger in Georgia on July 27 when a Russian cruise liner, the Astoria Grande, docked at the port and seaside resort of Batumi. The vast majority of Georgia’s population, unlike its government, opposes cultural and economic exchanges with Russia while Moscow continues to occupy around 20 per cent of Georgia’s internationally-recognised territory.


Russia’s Odesa attacks recall Serb destruction of Dubrovnik

The ship, which had departed from Sochi in Russia on a circular cruise of the Black Sea which also included stops at Trabzon and Istanbul, was forced leave Batumi by protesters just hours after docking. Some of the Astoria Grande’s passengers had provocatively declared for Georgian television news channels that they had supported Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia.

One went so far as to suggest that Russia had “liberated” Abkhazia, a breakaway region of Georgia on the Black Sea coast, which lies between Sochi and Batumi.

There were further protests against the cruise liner and its passengers when it once again docked in Batumi on July 31, with demonstrators hurling bottles and eggs at buses taking the ship’s passengers on a tour of the city.

For many people outside of Georgia, the protests were a reminder that Russia has not only invaded Ukraine and occupied large parts of its territory: it has in recent memory also occupied two regions of Georgia as well as a slither of land in eastern Moldova. But where are these territories? And how (and why) did Russia occupy them in the first place?
 
Abkhazia


A region of northwestern Georgia, Abkhazia has maintained de facto independence since the end of a civil war in 1993 in which Russia supplied material and logistical support to Abkhazian separatists.

Its government is financially dependent on Russia, which continues to have a military presence in the region and is one of a handful of states that recognises the territory’s independence, first declared in 1993.

Before the 1992-3 war, Georgians made up nearly half of Abkhazia’s population, while less than one-fifth of the population was Abkhaz. As the war progressed, confronted with hundreds of thousands of ethnic Georgians who were unwilling to leave their homes, the Abkhaz separatists implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing to expel the ethnic Georgian population. Around 250,000 Georgians were forcibly removed from their homes: the vast majority have not returned.

Several thousand Russian troops are permanently stationed in the territory, and the Russian state remains influential in Abkhazia’s security apparatus; the territory’s State Security Service (SGB) includes a representative of the Russian government in its leadership.

According to Freedom House, corruption is believed to be extensive and is tolerated by the government, despite promises to combat it. In recent years, Russian officials have voiced concern about the large-scale embezzlement of funds provided by Moscow, but efforts to investigate and punish such malfeasance have been largely ineffective.

More than 70 per cent of Abkhazia’s residents hold Russian passports.
 
South Ossetia

South Ossetia, in northern Georgia, engaged in an armed struggle for secession from 1989 to 1992. As in Abhkazia, the separatists were backed by Russia both politically and militarily.

The conflict remained largely frozen, with South Ossetia de facto independent from Tbilisi, until 2004, when Georgia’s then-president Mikheil Saakashvili vowed to reincorporate all of the country’s separatist territories. In the coastal region of Adjara, which since the early 1990s had been the personal fiefdom of the staunchly pro-Russian Aslan Abashidze, this was achieved peacefully: Abashidze fled into exile (in Moscow) and Adjara—which includes Batumi—now enjoys a great deal of autonomy and is one of the Georgia’s most prosperous regions.

Later in 2004 fighting broke out between Georgian forces and Ossetian separatists around the town of Tskhinvali, but Saakashvili did not force the issue again until 2008, when increased Russian military activity in the region led to new skirmishes.

In August 2008, Saakashvili ordered a full-scale military offensive which initially took control of significant parts of South Ossetia. Russian then declared war on Georgia, claiming some of its “peacekeepers” in the region had been killed. A brief, full-scale ware ensued, in which hundreds were killed and Georgia was heavily defeated: its forces withdrew from South Ossetia (including from areas they had held prior to 2008), and for a brief period Russia occupied the Georgian towns including Gori and Zugdidi.

It was after a ceasefire ended the war on August 26 that Russia recognised the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Many ethnic Georgians were forced to flee the region following the 2008 war. The territory today remains under Russian occupation and almost entirely dependent on Moscow, which exerts a decisive influence over its politics and governance.

Local media and civil society are largely controlled or monitored by the authorities, and the judiciary is subject to political influence and manipulation.

It was reported last year that South Ossetia has sent troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

Transnistria

The conflict between the government of the newly-independent Republic of Moldova and the “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic”, known colloquially as Transnistria, formed by the Russian minority living in a slither of land on the left bank of the Dniester river began in the autumn of 1991.

Unlike the rest of Moldova, Transnistria was never part of Romania (it was incorporated into the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic by the Soviet Union in the 1940s in an attempt to “Russify” the republic).

The separatists were supported by elements of the Russian (previously Soviet) 14th Army, which had long recruited its forces from the region. Fighting intensified in March 1992 and continued throughout the spring and early summer of 1992 until a ceasefire was declared in July 1992. It has largely held since then.

Since achieving de facto independence, internal politics in Transnistria has been dominated by a pro-Russian orientation reflecting Russian support for secession (although Russia does not recognise the territory’s independence).

Minority Rights, which monitors the rights of indigenous people around the world, says that this has been reflected in measures to reduce the public role played by the Romanian language (which Transnistria’s authorities call Moldavian) in the region.

This trend has also included discrimination against ethnic Romanians, including expropriation of land, intimidation of Romanian language teachers, and promotion of the Cyrillic rather than Latin script for the Romanian language

Transnistria’s government and economy are heavily dependent on subsidies from Russia, which maintains a military presence and peacekeeping mission in the territory. Political competition is limited, and the dominant party is aligned with powerful local business interests. Impartiality and pluralism of opinion in media is very limited, and authorities closely control civil society activity.

GEORGIA
Return of cruise ship carrying Russian  passengers sparks new protests in Batumi


July 31, 2023
Source: Meduza

The Georgian coastal city of Batumi saw renewed protests Monday morning against the arrival of the cruise liner Astoria Grande, which was carrying nearly 800 Russian tourists.

According to Georgian media, police tightened security and put up metal barriers at the port. Clashes reportedly broke out between officers and protesters, with multiple people getting arrested.

Blogger Nikolai Levshits said that activists blocked the Astoria Grande’s passengers from exiting the ship and obstructed the path of the bus that was supposed to pick the tourists up from the pier. Protesters reportedly threw bottles and eggs at the vehicle.

The protest was the second one against the Astoria Grande in less than a week. On July 27, demonstrators met cruise passengers with signs featuring messages like “Russia is an occupier” and “Go back to your fucking country,” causing the ship to leave earlier than scheduled.

According to Russian state media, the ship will no longer stop in Batumi in the future
 

‘They’re coming here and telling us we’re the occupiers’ A protest against Russian tourists in a Georgian coastal city ended with their cruise ship leaving ahead of schedule

July 28, 2023
Source: Meduza


On the morning of July 27, the cruise liner Astoria Grande arrived in the Georgian resort town of Batumi. The ship was carrying more than 800 people, most of whom were tourists from Russia.

That evening, when the ship was slated to depart, local protesters gathered at the city’s port. The demonstrators spoke out against Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s strengthening relationship with Georgia, and expressed outrage at the responses some of the passengers gave journalists when asked about Russia’s occupation of parts of Georgia.

“Russia’s not an occupier. What, you think we occupied you? We liberated Abkhazia from you. They asked us for help, so we went in with tanks. I’ve been to Abkhazia, and I saw how all the buildings have broken windows,” said one Russian woman, according to the outlet Novosti Gruzia. “We’re the Soviet Union. We’re a single country,” another Russian passenger reportedly said.

Protesters held signs with messages like “Russian warship, go fuck yourself,” “Abkhazia is Georgia,” “Russia is an occupier,” and “Go back to your fucking country.” Additionally, they carried photos of Abkhazia and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and played the Georgian national anthem, according to the outlet Batumelebi.

“It’s currently 2023, and we know what they did back in 2008,” another protester reportedly told the BBC. “Now they’re doing to Ukraine what they did to us twice in the past. And today there are Georgian heroes fighting and dying in Ukraine! And they’re coming here on vacation and telling us that we’re the occupiers!”

The ship departed the Batumi port earlier than planned, about an hour after the protests began.

Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili voiced support for the protesters. “I’m proud of our people, who peacefully protested against Russia’s newest provocation: a stop by a Russian cruise liner at the port of Batumi in Georgia at the same time that Putin is blocking grain shipments and preventing free navigation in the Black Sea. The security of the Black Sea is vitally important for Georgia, Ukraine, and the European Union,” she wrote on Twitter.



According to the Georgian TV channel Formula, a separate protest against the Russian tourists took place outside the country’s parliament building in Tbilisi around the same time.

Georgian journalists began reporting on the Astoria Grande’s scheduled stop in Batumi several days before it occurred. According to the country’s Maritime Transport Agency, the ship sails under the flag of Palau and is operated by the Turkish cruise company Miray Cruises International. The agency emphasized that the ship’s stop in Batumi was of a commercial nature, that the ship itself is registered in the Seychelles Islands, and that it does not fall under any international sanctions, according to the outlet Ekho Kavkaza.


ISIL claims responsibility for Pakistan terrorist attack


TEHRAN, Jul. 31 (MNA) –The ISIL terrorist group on Monday claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing at a Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) convention in Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on Sunday.


The terrorist group claimed its responsibility for yesterday's deadly terrorist attack through a statement posted on its Telegram account.

The death toll from the deadly explosion in Bajaur, Pakistan rose to 54, with almost half of the victims children, police said on Monday.

A senior official with the counter-terrorism department said that 23 victims were under the age of 18.

Anwar ul Haq, deputy commissioner for the district, confirmed the toll.

SKH/ISN1402050905718

ISIS claims responsibility for Pakistan's political rally suicide bombing that killed over 50

Islamabad, Pakistan 
Edited By: Heena Sharma
Updated: Jul 31, 2023,


Visuals after bombing Photograph:(Reuters)

Islamic State (ISIS) group on Monday claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing at a political rally in Pakistan's northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province the previous day that killed over 50 and injured hundreds more, reported Al Arabiya media portal.

The group said this through a statement posted on its Telegram account.

A devastating explosion occurred during a political event organised by the fundamentalist Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) party on Sunday on the outskirts of Khar, situated in Pakistan's northwest Bajur district, adjacent to the Afghanistan border.

According to AFP quoting Shaukat Abbas, a high-ranking official from the counter-terrorism department, the number of casualties has now risen to 54. He said, among the victims, 23 were under the age of 18.

Viral video captures tragic moment


A video of the horrifying explosion circulating widely on social media captured the moment the suicide bomber detonated the explosive device while innocent attendees stood unsuspectingly nearby.

The video footage reveals followers attentively listening to speeches on the main stage just moments before the sudden explosion. Chaos erupts as the blast goes off, causing panic among the crowd. People at the far end of the tent are seen running for their lives amid the pandemonium.

JUI-F leader mourns

Following the devastating blast, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the leader of the JUI-F party, expressed his "deep sorrow and regret" in a statement issued by his press office. He extended his condolences to the affected families and urged the government to provide the best medical treatment to the injured.

Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif also "strongly condemned" the heinous act of violence and pledged a thorough investigation to bring the perpetrators to justic

In response to the incident, Sharif's office has requested a report from Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government.

Previous bombings


The bombing that occurred on Sunday marked one of the four most severe attacks in northwestern Pakistan since 2014. Back in 2014, a devastating Taliban attack on an army-run school in Peshawar claimed the lives of 147 individuals, with the majority being schoolchildren.

In January, a mosque bombing in Peshawar resulted in the loss of 74 lives. Then, in February, a horrific bombing at a mosque inside a high-security compound housing Peshawar police headquarters caused the death of over 100 people, predominantly policemen.

MR. FREE SPEECH
Musk threatens to sue researchers who documented the rise in hateful tweets

David Klepper, Aug 01 2023

MARCIO JOSE SANCHEZ/AP
Elon Musk, pictured introducing the Model X car at Tesla’s's headquarters, recently rebranded Twitter as X.

X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter, has threatened to sue a group of independent researchers whose research documented an increase in hate speech on the site since it was purchased last year by Elon Musk.

An attorney representing the social media site wrote to the Centre for Countering Digital Hate on July 20 threatening legal action over the nonprofit's research into hate speech and content moderation. The letter alleged that CCDH's research publications seem intended “to harm Twitter’s business by driving advertisers away from the platform with incendiary claims.”

Musk is a self-professed free speech absolutist who has welcomed back white supremacists and election deniers to the platform, which he renamed X earlier this month. But the billionaire has at times proven sensitive about critical speech directed at him or his companies.

The centre is a nonprofit with offices in the US and United Kingdom. It regularly publishes reports on hate speech, extremism or harmful behaviour on social media platforms like X, TikTok or Facebook.

The organisation has published several reports critical of Musk's leadership, detailing an increase in anti-LGBTQ hate speech as well as climate misinformation since his purchase. The letter from X's attorney cited one specific report from June that found the platform failed to remove neo-Nazi and anti-LGBTQ content from verified users that violated the platform’s rules.

In the letter, attorney Alex Spiro questioned the expertise of the researchers and accused the centre of trying to harm X's reputation. The letter also suggested, without evidence, that the centre received funds from some of X's competitors, even though the centre has also published critical reports about TikTok, Facebook and other large platforms.

“CCDH intends to harm Twitter’s business by driving advertisers away from the platform with incendiary claims,” Spiro wrote, using the platform's former name.


HAVEN DALEY/AP
A large, metal "X" sign is seen on top of the downtown building that housed what was once Twitter, now rebranded by its owner, Elon Musk, in San Francisco.

Imran Ahmed, the centre's founder and CEO, told the AP on Monday that his group has never received a similar response from any tech company, despite a history of studying the relationship between social media, hate speech and extremism. He said that typically, the targets of the centre's' criticism have responded by defending their work or promising to address any problems that have been identified.

Ahmed said he worried X’s response to the centre's' work could have a chilling effect if it frightens other researchers away from studying the platform. He said he also worried that other industries could take note of the strategy.

“This is an unprecedented escalation by a social media company against independent researchers. Musk has just declared open war,” Ahmed told the Associated Press. “If Musk succeeds in silencing us other researchers will be next in line.”

Messages left with Spiro and X were not immediately returned Monday.

It's not the first time that Musk has fired back at critics. Last year, he suspended the accounts of several journalists who covered his takeover of Twitter. Another user was permanently banned for using publicly available flight data to track Musk's private plane; Musk had initially pledged to keep the user on the platform but later changed his mind, citing his personal safety. He also threatened to sue the user.

He initially had promised that he would allow any speech on his platform that wasn't illegal. “I hope that even my worst critics remain on Twitter, because that is what free speech means,” Musk wrote in a tweet last year.

X's recent threat of a lawsuit prompted concern from U.S. Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., who said the billionaire was trying to use the threat of legal action to punish a nonprofit group trying to hold a powerful social media platform accountable.

“Instead of attacking them, he should be attacking the increasingly disturbing content on Twitter,” Schiff said in a statement.


Twitter HQ neighbours complain of new flashing ‘X’ sign on roof


San Francisco’s department of building inspection has been denied access to assess the strobing light described as ‘flash of lightning’
US CORRESPONDENT
TELEGRAPH
31 July 2023 • 4:59pm

The illuminated X logo has been installed on the roof of the Twitter headquarters in San Francisco CREDIT: CARLOS BARRIA/REUTERS


Elon Musk has riled up the neighbours of Twitter’s San Francisco headquarters after installing an enormous, flashing X on the roof as part of the company’s rebrand.

City officials are investigating the fixture which was erected last week after the billionaire overhauled the social media app to replace the decade-old blue bird logo with an X.

Those living nearby complained about the pulsing white light, which particularly impacts those in high-rise buildings opposite the HQ.

San Francisco’s department of building inspection has twice attempted to inspect the logo, on Friday and again on Saturday, but were denied access by staff who said the sign was temporary, according to the city’s building complaints tracker.

Neighbours disturbed by the new addition include Christopher Beale, who told CBS News “it’s hard to describe how bright it made the intersection”.
People living nearby in high-rise buildings are not happy about the pulsing white light 
CREDIT: CARLOS BARRIA/REUTERS


He said the strobing light is “like a flash of lightning going off” and said he could not watch a film in the room which faces the building even with the curtains drawn.

Patricia Wallinga, who also lives across the street from the sign, said she thought the lights were “lightning” or a “police siren”.

“I was very confused,” she said.

“This building, it’s largely rent controlled. There are a lot of seniors who live there, I’m sure, I’m absolutely sure that this is a danger especially to them. It’s such a clown show.”



It came after police stopped workers removing the old logo from the side of the building, saying they had not taped off the footpath to keep pedestrians safe.

Replacement letters and symbols require a permit to ensure “consistency with the historic nature of the building”, Patrick Hannan, the spokesman for the department of building inspection, said earlier this week.

He said: “Planning review and approval is also necessary for the installation of this sign. The city is opening a complaint and initiating an investigation.”
X to remain in San Francisco

The building was subject to a separate investigation in December over concerns Mr Musk had built bedrooms for workers.


The rebranding is the latest major change since he bought Twitter in October last year for $44 billion (£34.3 billion).

A 2011 lease specifically bans rooftop and exterior signs, apart from the “blade sign” that previously said “@twitter “, according to the San Francisco Chronicle.

Mr Musk said the company would remain in San Francisco despite offers to move elsewhere.

“Many have offered rich incentives for X (formerly known as Twitter) to move its HQ out of San Francisco”, he wrote on X.

“Moreover, the city is in a doom spiral with one company after another left or leaving. Therefore, they expect X will move too. We will not. You only know who your real friends are when the chips are down. San Francisco, beautiful San Francisco, though others forsake you, we will always be your friend,” he added

The Telegraph has contacted Twitter for comment.


Elon Musk takes a U-turn on Twitter's (now X) permanent dark mode

Elon Musk portrait

Elon Musk has backtracked on his previous decision of having a permanent dark mode for Twitter (now X). The billionaire previously announced that the microblogging platform will only offer support for dark mode in the future.

"This platform will soon only have “dark mode”. It is better in every way," Musk wrote in response to a user post asking whether the verification checkmark would look good in dark mode. For reference, Twitter's dark mode is called Lights Out.

It wasn't long before the X owner took to his official handle and announced that the light theme is here to stay. Musk said that the dark mode will be the default option on the platform but the option to dim the brightness, which makes the background appear dark blue in color, will be kicked out.

"A lot of people have asked to keep light mode, so we will, but the default will be dark and dim will be deleted," he said while responding to another user. While there were lovers of dark mode, many X users came forward to oppose Musk's decision to pull the plug on the light theme.

Aesthetics aside, the dark mode setting can be helpful when using a device at night or in places with less light. It can be easier on the eyes of the users when compared to a traditional setting where black text is displayed on a white background. However, dark mode may cause trouble or discomfort to people with astigmatism and dyslexia.

Twitter theme options

You can change the theme on the Twitter website by clicking on the More button > Settings and Support > Display. It should be noted that existing theme options Default, Dim, and Lights Out were available at the time of writing.

All of this comes after Musk kicked off the rebranding of Twitter to X earlier this week. While the company is already known as X Corp on paper, recent developments saw the demise of the iconic bird logo and a new X.com domain coming into place.

The company also changed its official handle to @X which was taken away from the original owner Gene X Hwang. However, Twitter's rebranding may have some complications as Meta and Microsoft own the "X" trademark for social media and video games respectively.

The new logo appears quite similar to the one used for Xbox and it has taken the bird's place on the app's Android and web version. But curious minds have figured out a way to replace X with the old Twitter logo

Via: Gizmodo