Thursday, September 03, 2026

Pete Hegseth: Militarism’s Ideologue

The Secretary of Defense mistakes rhetoric for strategy.

by | Sep 1, 2026 | Antiwar.com

Reality doesn’t always line up with our wishes. For Pete Hegseth, this lesson has been learned the hard way. Six months into his war with Iran, top military officials are warning the Secretary of Defense that prolonged fighting would be “unsustainable,” according to new reporting from The Washington Post.

These officials are echoing sentiments that have been repeated for months within the administration. Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had advised the White House before the conflict that a large-scale military confrontation with Iran posed serious risks, particularly because of the U.S.’ depleted munitions stockpiles and a lack of support from regional partners.

Rather than heed these warnings, Washington foreign policy elites chose to proceed with a reckless disregard for the facts, guided by an ideological drive to reshape the world in our image – or, perhaps more accurately, Israel’s. Pete Hegseth is one such ideologue, as demonstrated by his rhetorical record throughout the conflict.

The administration’s entire approach to this war has been stylistically Hegsethian. The tirades against the press, the administration’s unceasing – and undue – confidence, and the rigorous enforcement of a strict narrative are all hallmarks of Pete Hegseth’s brutish approach, rather than the calculated strategy one may expect to see from Marco Rubio or JD Vance.

Hegseth’s style plays to the instincts of an older generation of Republican voters, one which believes that to even question the military is to commit a grave offense. Older cohorts of conservatives – which tend to be the Republican Party’s most consistent base –  are fervently supportive of the war.

As soon as the first bombs were dropped, the narrative was enforced. The case for war was not an intellectually rigorous one, but this is a common feature of government propaganda. It primarily exists not to convince the American public to support a policy, but to emotionally manipulate them. To this end, the war’s initiators must act with a level of bravado and confidence capable of convincing the average person that “this person knows what he’s doing.” It doesn’t mean he does, however. This distortion has been perfectly embodied by the rocky past six months at Hegseth’s Pentagon.

Hegseth has built a reputation for his aggressive style. During press conferences in the Iran war’s early stage, he made a habit out of using emotionally charged language to evoke an “us vs. them” mentality within Americans. On March 2, Hegseth called this war “our retribution,” saying “the regime who chanted ‘death to America’ and ‘death to Israel’ was gifted death from America, and death from Israel.” In a press conference a few days later, Hegseth seemed to fetishize violence, describing the U.S. operation as “death and destruction from the sky, all day long.”

In a display of his grotesque lust for power, Hegseth also said “we are punching them while they’re down, which is exactly how it should be.”

There has been a severe shortage of seriousness from this administration in its messaging on this conflict. In a 60 Minutes appearance just days after the war was launched, Hegseth shrugged off concerns about the risks of this engagement, saying “nobody’s putting us in danger.” He followed this dismissive statement with an even more unsettling one, threatening that “the only ones that need to be worried right now are Iranians that think they’re going to live.”

Devoid of any substance, Hegseth’s statements amount to little more than letters to Santa. He is essentially “making a wish” and pretending it’s a sound assessment of military reality. Yes, troops were and continue to be in danger. Due to a shortage of defensive munitions, U.S. troops at bases across the Middle East have been placed at greater risk of being hit by Iranian missiles. 18 American troops have been killed since the war began.

In another outburst, Hegseth scolded Rep. John Garamendi (D-CA) in an April 29 congressional hearing for daring to question the war’s length. “Shame on you,” Hegseth said.

“The way you stain the troops,” he went on, “calling this a quagmire two months in… handing propaganda to our enemies.” Hegseth urged that “statements like that are reckless to our troops.”

“Who are you cheering for here?”

Behind the aggressive diction is a man without a plan. Accusing others of wrongdoing – for simply questioning his policy, mind you – helps deflect from the fact that he launched a war that has been an unmitigated disaster. It wouldn’t be a Washington crisis without the routine unwillingness to aim critique inward. The blame must always be shifted – no matter how illogically – to those who opposed the policy. Consider John McCain angrily telling Ron Paul “let us win” in 2008, implying that Paul’s anti-war advocacy had somehow contributed to the failures of the Iraq War.

This degree of blame-shifting is not usually a side-effect of victory. In Hegseth’s case, it is the result of having been trapped in a state of denial from beginning to end. First came the denial that there was any chance the Iranian regime would survive, and the assumption that his cartoonishly optimistic predictions would not come back to bite him. Now comes the denial that this disaster had anything to do with the decisions he personally made.

One of the war hawks’ fundamental miscalculations is that power equals strategy. As has been demonstrated in Iran, bombing can become ineffective, and Hegseth’s bellicose remarks alone cannot change that. Bravado and bluster are no substitute for rational thinking. In situations this dire, we are in desperate need of cool heads who can see reality clearly. Ideological militarists – guided by ghastly rhetoric rather than a coherent strategy – have led us down a bad path. We would be wise to acknowledge reality before it smacks us in the face.

Nolan Denaro is a political analyst, writer, and host of “The Quest For Clarity” podcast, available on YouTube and Spotify. He is a columnist at Antiwar.com, and his work has been published by Responsible Statecraft, the Libertarian Institute, The Daily Caller, and the Ludwig von Mises Institute. He writes on U.S. foreign policy, economics, and current events, with a particular focus on war and imperialism. He writes opinion pieces on his Substack, and you can follow him on X @nolandenaro. Nolan can be reached for correspondence at nolansdenaro@icloud.com.

The Iran War’s Costly Cycle of Retaliation

Each U.S. strike may impose costs on Tehran while creating new commitments for Washington.

by | Sep 3, 2026 |Antiwar.com

On August 30, U.S. forces struck two Iranian missile launchers on Larak Island near the Strait of Hormuz, saying the systems posed a threat to shipping. Iran answered by launching ballistic missiles at U.S. forces in Jordan. The exchange revived a seemingly simple question: What is the next response supposed to change? In the war with Iran, the relationship between military action and political results is neither linear nor predictable. A strike may destroy a target while changing Tehran’s calculations and triggering costs elsewhere. For Washington, the issue is therefore not simply choosing the next target, but determining whether each action moves the United States closer to a political objective or merely creates the conditions for another round.

The problem lies in the gap between the geography of an attack and the geography of its consequences. The United States can choose where to apply force, but it cannot exercise the same control over where it will bear the resulting cost. An attack in Iran can lead to pressure on U.S. forces elsewhere in the region, threats to partners and allies, disruption of shipping, and higher energy costs. Recent fighting around the Strait of Hormuz has shown how quickly military exchanges can spill into maritime traffic and oil markets. A limited operation can therefore acquire a reach far beyond its initial target.

That does not mean Washington should avoid using force. Deterrence without the ability to impose costs has little credibility, and failing to respond can also carry risks. If Tehran concludes that U.S. threats will not be enforced, it may judge further action to be less costly. The real choice is not between “responding” and “not responding,” but between responses that serve a defined political purpose and those that simply sustain the cycle. A credible response must impose a meaningful cost while avoiding a situation in which Washington has to strike again merely to prove the credibility of the previous strike.

This is why the meaning of “response” becomes more complicated once force is used. If Washington attacks to restore deterrence, success depends not only on the damage inflicted on Iran but on what Tehran does afterward and what new obligations the United States assumes. If Iran retaliates against U.S. forces, threatens allied infrastructure, or disrupts vital regional routes, Washington’s next decision becomes less independent. Force protection, allied defense, and freedom of navigation all enter the calculation. Each mission may be defensible on its own, but together they can create commitments that were not part of the original objective.

The costs of conflict are therefore generated well beyond the battlefield. Greater threats to U.S. personnel require more protection and readiness. Greater risks to partners increase pressure for additional security support. Insecurity along shipping routes can raise the costs of trade and energy. Even if Washington retains the operational upper hand, it may simultaneously enlarge the strategic responsibilities it must carry. Tactical success can be measured by whether a target was destroyed; strategic success must be measured by whether the United States emerges safer, with more freedom of action and fewer – not more – obligations.

That distinction also makes the definition of victory more demanding. Destroying a military target is an operational achievement. But if preserving the result requires more deployments, a higher state of alert, and broader protection of regional interests, the military gain has not necessarily become a strategic one. Deterrence is not measured only by the intensity of a strike. It succeeds when the adversary’s calculations change enough that further force becomes less necessary. If each operation requires another operation to validate the previous one, American power can become a mechanism for perpetuating the conflict rather than ending it.

This is how mission creep often develops. It rarely begins with a formal decision to enter a long war. More often, a sequence of individually limited steps accumulates: a strike to answer a threat, a deployment to protect forces, support for an ally, and another operation to secure shipping or other vital interests. The U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan showed how missions can expand beyond their original purpose without a single moment when the enlarged commitment is clearly announced. Each step may appear reasonable by itself; together they can produce a mission that did not exist at the outset. The cost is not only greater expenditure, but reduced freedom to disengage.

The Iran war makes that danger sharper because the two sides are vulnerable in different ways. The United States possesses far greater striking power, but it also maintains forces, bases, partnerships, and economic interests across the region that require protection. Iran does not need to match U.S. firepower directly to impose costs. It can distribute pressure across different points and force Washington to defend several interests at once. That does not amount to Iranian military superiority. It means military superiority does not translate automatically into political control. The United States may inflict greater damage while spending more resources and attention managing the consequences.

Washington’s hardest test, then, is not whether it can deliver the next blow. It is whether it can identify the point at which deterrence has been restored and further operations are no longer necessary. The United States must be able to defend its forces and interests, support allies, and respond to direct threats. But each action should be tied to a clear answer to four questions: What behavior is Washington trying to change? What cost is sufficient to change it? What additional commitments could the response create? And at what point does the mission end?

The final measure of success is not whether Washington can impose still more pressure on Iran; it can. It is whether that power can produce an endpoint rather than another obligation to respond. If every attack requires another attack to preserve the credibility of the last one, the United States may continue winning tactically while accumulating greater costs, commitments, and constraints. In this kind of war, victory is not simply the ability to strike harder. It is the ability to use force in a way that changes the adversary’s behavior while preserving the freedom to stop using it.

The Definition of Insanity

by | Sep 2, 2026 | 

Albert Einstein is credited with saying, “the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” Whether he actually said it or not, the definition stands.

This definition also very well describes the Trump Administration’s war with Iran. According to media reports, President Trump was cajoled by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that this would be an “easy war,” like Venezuela. Just assassinate the Iranian leadership, he promised, and the regime change would bring in a pro-America regime in Iran.

The CIA disagreed with the assessment, but Trump went with Netanyahu and the rest is history.

The “decapitation strikes” did not change leadership in Iran. As was the case in the US after the 9/11 attacks, the people rallied around the flag. The new leadership was less interested in a compromise than their murdered predecessors.

So the bombing began. Weeks of bombing. But that didn’t work – it only depleted our already-low weapons supplies.

Then “diplomacy” was substituted for bombs and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by both sides. The US side immediately broke the agreement by attempting to open a new ship corridor by force and the bombs started flying again.

For the past month the bombs stopped only to start up last weekend, with a US strike on an Iranian island. This was followed again by multiple Iranian strikes on US bases in the region.

Bombs then diplomacy, bombs then diplomacy. President Trump has told us dozens of times that us the war is over, and we have won, but no one believes it any longer. He claims that the US completely controls the Strait of Hormuz while the shipping corridors are empty.

The US military has been stretched to the breaking point. US sailors and Marines endured a record-breaking deployment with terrible conditions aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln and other ships at sea. But this past weekend we saw the most telling sign of a military pushing back against orders that make no sense. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll resigned his position, reportedly due to disagreements with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth over the toll the war is taking on military readiness. Driscoll follows several high-ranking US Army officials who have resigned. It seems clear that US Military leadership does not believe in the mission.

Maybe President Trump should listen to them instead of his “War” Secretary Pete Hegseth?

Doing the same thing and expecting different results may be the definition of insanity, but another definition might be starting a war halfway across the globe against a country that has neither attacked nor threatened you. Insanity might be starting a war based on the self-serving lies of a foreign leader who just happens to benefit from the fighting. Insanity might be further depleting the US arsenal of missiles and other weapons after years of proxy war against Russia through Ukraine. Insanity might be burdening future generations with a national debt of $40 trillion and climbing.

It is time for some very difficult decisions to be made. This war will not be won with more bombing, and the Iranians no longer trust us as negotiating partners after broken agreements and false claims. The only course of action is to pack up and come home. Let the people of the region solve their own problems.

Ron Paul is a former Republican congressman from Texas. He was the 1988 Libertarian Party candidate for president.



The West Bank’s Ultra-Apartheid (and the Collusive International Silence)


Gaza showed the genocidal face of Israel’s expulsive strategy. In the West Bank, the same objective is realized with incremental escalation. The ultimate goal is the same – the final expulsion of the Palestinians.

by | Sep 3, 2026 |Antiwar.com

Today, the West Bank is a nightmare of vicious settlement expansion, land seizure, economic strangulation, settler violence and forced displacement.

With the collusion of the Israeli military and police, the Israeli-occupied territories are effectively ruled by the Messianic far-right settlers who see their mob-like racist pogroms of Palestinians as a divine step to Final Redemption.

The ongoing year has accelerated the process from settlement expansion toward territorial consolidation and displacement. The scale is stark.

Displacement becomes systematic

By August 10, the UN reported 76 Palestinians killed in the West Bank, including 18 children; about 3,800 Palestinians had been displaced during 2026 through settler violence, demolitions and evictions, nearly half children.

More than 1,430 settler incidents had been recorded, affecting roughly 260 Palestinian communities.

The crucial point is not simply Jewish settler violence but its geographical and economic function. Settler attacks increasingly target homes, agricultural land, livestock, water and electricity infrastructure.

In a recent podcast, Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, a far-right extremist who believes in Jewish racial supremacy, urged Israelis to kill “30 to 40” Palestinians in Gaza every night. He also supports aggressive, lethal actions against Palestinians in the West Bank, applying a similarly hardline approach through legislative, judicial, and security policies.

These statements no longer reflect a “lunatic fringe,” as often portrayed by the media in the West. They reflect the brutal repression of Palestinians that’s now the new normal. OCHA reports that displacement caused by demolitions, settler violence and access restrictions has averaged 17 Palestinians a day in 2026; twice the average of the preceding three years.

Since 2023, 127 communities have experienced full or partial displacement; 47 have been completely emptied.

The economic damage compounds the demographic pressure. UNCTAD estimates that West Bank GDP contracted 17% in 2024, while cumulative unrealized Palestinian GDP from occupation-related restrictions between 2000–24 reached $170.8 billion – about 17 times 2024 West Bank GDP.

The settlement economy in Area C and East Jerusalem, by contrast, generated an estimated $53 billion in 2024.

Great conjuncture

Right before Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, I warned about an impending war, as the status quo was approaching a boiling point in Gaza. After all, it was the 50-year anniversary of the Yom Kippur War.

In The Fall of Israel (2024), I used the term great conjuncture to refer to structural forces that account for a series of cumulative disasters in the Middle East, starting with the waves of Palestinian expulsions since the 1940s.

Second, it refers to the aggressive expansion of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. The rise of the Messianic far-right has fostered settler militarization accelerating anti-Arab pogroms in the West Bank, which is being annexed into Israel.

Third, the great conjuncture is fueled by a half century of failed American diplomacy in the Middle East. The Fall of Israel showed how the US-Israeli ties moved from hedging and choosing sides to partnership and eventually a symbiosis. These are not ties that bind, but ties that blind. They account for 50 years of military destabilization in the region and U.S. complicity to genocidal atrocities, even ecocide – both in Gaza and Lebanon.

Finally, instead of fostering peace in the region, America’s massive military aid to Israel has amplified Israel’s parallel securitization degrading its economy, politics and military. Washington has provided at least $22 billion in direct military aid to Israel, alongside up to $12 billion spent on related U.S. military operations in the region, since October 7, 2023. From Gaza and beyond, Israeli authorities and security forces have deliberately targeted Palestinians and Palestinian children.

These four structural forces feed on each other forming a vicious cycle, thereby intensifying and broadening regional escalation. When I extended the argument into a book, these views were still seen largely as marginal. Today, things have dramatically changed. Even the bipartisan consensus over the U.S.-Israel ties has collapsed.

But this erosion came only after Gaza has been obliterated and ethnic cleansing escalates in the West Bank with the tacit blessing of the international community.

Ethnic cleansing from Gaza to the West Bank

In the Israeli occupied territories, ethnic expulsion has not been an accidental by-product but a recurring political mechanism. From Labor’s post-1967 Allon Plan through the Likud era and the Messianic far right, its logic has been cumulative as it has sought to

  • acquire territory;
  • fragment Palestinian space;
  • make Palestinian economic and social life increasingly unviable;
  • if massacres don’t suffice, use genocidal atrocities;
  • expand Jewish civilian presence;
  • and eventually convert temporary occupation into permanent sovereignty.

The objective is not simply “security,” nor even the exploitation of Palestinian labor, but the Judaization of territory and prevention of a sovereign Palestine.

The Palestinian expulsions are intimately linked to both ideology and political economy. Land, subsidized settlements, real estate and state resources create constituencies that benefit materially from Palestinian dispossession.

Gaza became the extreme version: bombardment, destruction of housing and infrastructure, displacement and proposals for population “transfer” created conditions in which Palestinians were physically removed and territory becomes available for redevelopment or settlement.

In the West Bank, the mechanism used to be more incremental: settlement outposts, land seizures, demolition orders, restrictions on building and movement, settler violence and pressure on herding communities.

In the absence of international penalties, sanctions and blockades, settlers have been dramatically emboldened. They avoid one spectacular expulsion but seek to make the remaining Palestinian communities progressively untenable.

Their goal is the “Judaization” of Palestine – death by a thousands cuts.

Apartheid and “ultra-apartheid”

Not only has Israel evolved into an apartheid state. It is practicing ultra-apartheid.

Classical South African apartheid was brutally exploitative but effectively accommodationist. White minority rule sought to preserve racial hierarchy, segregate the black majority, deny political rights and extract cheap labor. The system needed the black population to remain economically useful. As a result, black South Africans’ income relative to whites actually rose during apartheid, from 8.6% to 13.5% between 1948 and 1994.

Israel’s system goes “beyond” apartheid. Palestinians are subjected to differentiated legal systems, military rule, checkpoints, territorial fragmentation, restricted mobility and unequal access to land and resources, while Jewish settlers in the occupied territory fall under Israeli civilian law.

The occupied territories consequently resemble South African Bantustans: fragmented enclaves, walls, restricted mobility and economic dependence.

But the decisive difference is the end-state. Israeli apartheid is not designed indefinitely to contain and exploit a Palestinian population. It is an interim instrument for displacement and dispossession. Segregation reduces Palestinian territorial, economic and political viability while expanding Jewish settlement.

That distinction also explains why the West Bank is strategically more important than it may appear. Fragmentation is not merely a condition; it is the mechanism by which territorial annexation becomes politically and physically irreversible. Hence the Israeli “ultra-apartheid”: that is, apartheid plus an expulsive logic.

What makes Israeli ultra-apartheid different is its ultimate purpose: ethnic expulsions, even genocidal atrocities. It sees Palestinian labor as a redundant surplus that will eventually have to be expunged or decimated.

And it is ultra-apartheid – first in Gaza and now in the West Bank – that the international community is witnessing yet trying to ignore.

Smotrich’s “Decisive Plan” for Gaza

Meanwhile, the political machinery has moved toward annexation. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s control over the Civil Administration, land declarations and settlement approvals institutionalize de facto annexation.

As documented by The Fall of Israel two years ago, Smotrich is executing a decade-old plan. In 2017, when he was still a young Knesset member, he presented his “Decisive Plan” in closed religious Zionist circles. It represented an endgame of sorts for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The plan portrayed the conflict as devoid of any reconciliation. It rejected partition. It shunned any idea of a Palestinian state, or even Palestinian presence. Smotrich envisioned a singular state from the sea to the river, for one nation only: the Jewish people. True to his beliefs, he built on biblical allegories, which to him were no allegories at all:

When Joshua entered the land, he sent three letters to its inhabitants: Those who want to accept [our rule] will accept; those who want to leave, will leave; those who want to fight, will fight…

When they have no hope and no outlook, they will leave, just as they left in 1948.

Since October 7, Smotrich has championed his not-so-voluntary population transfer. The logic is simple: Eliminate the adversary, resolve the dilemma.

The approaching October 2026 Israeli election sharpens the incentive. The Knesset has dissolved and campaigning is underway. Today, four in ten Jewish Israelis favor full West Bank annexation and 55% want all settlements retained under Israeli sovereignty. That’s Netanyahu’s legacy.

As Israel approaches its October 2026 election, the question is no longer whether the occupation is becoming permanent, but whether the West Bank is being progressively emptied of Palestinians to make annexation irreversible.

The electoral center of gravity is not moving toward Palestinian statehood. It is moving further away from any reconciliation – with longstanding U.S. support.

Three West Bank scenarios

In the current status quo, there are three plausible future trajectories.

Accelerated annexation and “silent transfer” (most likely).
The present trajectory continues settlements expand, outposts become normalized, Area C is progressively absorbed into Israel, Palestinian construction remains restricted, and settler violence – mostly tolerated and inadequately restrained by the state – pushes vulnerable Bedouin and farming communities out.

There need be no formal annexation declaration. Facts on the ground accomplish the same result.

The UN’s 2026 reports verify the mechanism operating. Violence, demolition, restricted access, economic strangulation and displacement reinforce one another. The October election could strengthen this trajectory if Netanyahu requires the far right to construct another governing coalition.

Scenario II – Managed containment, not peace. A centrist or more pragmatic coalition emerges after the election and faces heavy U.S., European and Arab pressure. It slows settlement expansion, restrains the most provocative settler actions and restores some Palestinian economic access – but avoids dismantling the settlement architecture or recognizing full Palestinian sovereignty.

This would resemble a renovated Allon-plan/Bantustan model: Palestinian enclaves with limited autonomy surrounded by Israeli-controlled territory.

This could stabilize the system but only temporarily without resolving its underlying contradiction. But it would also set the stage for annexation by a subsequent conservative cabinet.

Scenario III – Rupture and international reversal. A major escalation – mass displacement, annexation, renewed Palestinian uprising, regional war, or a severe Israeli political crisis – could finally make the status quo untenable.

International recognition of Palestinian sovereignty, sanctions against settlement activity, economic pressure and an externally imposed political framework could halt territorial consolidation.

This is the least likely short-term scenario, but potentially the only route to reversing the trajectory.

The conflict can no longer be solved by Israeli-Palestinian bargaining alone. The asymmetry of power has made meaningful external intervention indispensable.

Bottom line: Gaza shows what happens when the expulsive logic is pursued through overwhelming military force. The West Bank is demonstrating a presumably more subdued version: settlement, fragmentation, coercion, economic pressure and incremental displacement.

The decisive question after the October election is therefore less whether Israel will “annex” the West Bank formally than how much of it can be absorbed – and how many Palestinians can be induced or forced to leave or decimated in new genocidal atrocities – before the process becomes irreversible. 

The original commentary was published by Informed Comment (US) on Aug 30, 2026

Dr. Dan Steinbock is an internationally recognized visionary of the multipolar world and the founder of Difference Group. He has served at the India, China and America Institute (US), Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more, see https://www.differencegroup.net 


Qusra Is Just a Warning: Israel’s Blueprint for the West Bank

by | Aug 31, 2026 | 

If you want to understand the bleak future awaiting the occupied West Bank, do not look away. Just pay attention to the events unfolding in the small Palestinian town of Qusra, south of Nablus.

The story of the future of the West Bank begins here.

While much of the media is treating reports emerging from the area as simply another episode of “settler violence,” it is not. Qusra represents something far more consequential: a glimpse into the new Plan Dalet that Israel has in store for Palestinians.

Plan Dalet was the military blueprint through which Zionist forces conquered much of historic Palestine, village by village, during the Nakba.

The plan did not suddenly emerge in 1948. It built on military schemes dating back to 1945, developing into a strategy for conquering Palestinian towns and villages, destroying communities and expelling their inhabitants.

The significance of this history today is not merely symbolic. The Nakba was a process, implemented in stages. So, too, is the annexation of the West Bank.

Nor is this merely an intellectual argument. Israeli officials have openly invoked a new Nakba as an intended outcome. In November 2023, Avi Dichter declared: “We are now rolling out the Gaza Nakba,” adding, “Gaza Nakba 2023. That’s how it’ll end.”

True to form, this new Nakba carries many of the characteristics of the old one: coordinated violence, massacres, ethnic cleansing, forced displacement and land confiscation.

The genocide in Gaza represents the zenith of this violence – a more devastating manifestation, but a continuation of the original sin upon which the Israeli state was established.

While all eyes were on Gaza beginning on October 7, 2023, the West Bank was largely ignored, allowing Israel the space to escalate violence in all its forms to levels unseen in decades.

The result has been staggering. Since October 7, 2023, Israeli forces and settlers have killed more than 1,100 Palestinians in the West Bank, including over 240 children, and wounded thousands more. Tens of thousands have been detained, while more than 33,000 Palestinians remain displaced from the Jenin, Tulkarem and Nur Shams refugee camps alone.

Now, back to Qusra.

Beginning on August 9, armed Israeli settlers surrounded three Palestinian homes in the Ras al-Ain area on the outskirts of the town.

They blocked access to the houses, erected tents outside them and cut water and electricity supplies. Families, including young children, were effectively trapped inside.

The Israeli military subsequently declared the surrounding area a closed military zone, restricting access by Palestinians, activists and journalists.

What emerged was not simply settler violence but a division of labor: settlers create the crisis; the army imposes the restrictions; Palestinian movement is curtailed; and the victims themselves are pressured to leave.

And the siege continued. As I write these words, the siege of the Qusra homes has concluded its second week.

Qusra is not incidental to this strategy. Israel has already confiscated its land for the settlement of Migdalim, while nearby outposts including Esh Kodesh have long been associated with attacks and attempts to seize Palestinian agricultural land.

Control of such areas is essential to the larger project of connecting settlement blocs, fragmenting Palestinian territory and transforming Palestinian communities into isolated enclaves.

A few years ago, the Israeli government behaved as though its plan to formally annex large swathes of the West Bank had been placed on hold. Yet, since October 7, annexation has moved from aspiration to obsession – in both words and action.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir oversaw the mass distribution of weapons after October 7, arming thousands of civilian security-squad members with rifles amid an already heavily armed settler population.

Meanwhile, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has systematically worked to transfer powers over the West Bank from military administration to Israeli civilian authorities – one of the clearest institutional mechanisms of annexation.

And now another piece is falling into place: Defense Minister Israel Katz has ordered preparations to transfer law-enforcement responsibility over Israeli settlers in the West Bank from the military to the Israeli police, another critical legal step toward annexation.

The picture is becoming complete: settler militias, government funding, weapons, the army, police, civilian bureaucracies, courts and political decisions originating at the highest levels of the Israeli state.

Seen in this wider context, Qusra becomes a microcosm – and potentially a testing ground – for the mechanisms through which larger-scale annexation can be implemented. These realities echo the past. The Nakba did not simply ‘happen,’ but followed years of planning and incremental military schemes. That is why Qusra matters.

Some governments are warning of accelerating annexation; others sanction individual settlers, as though targeting a few extremists could reverse a blueprint implemented by an entire state apparatus.

Palestinians in the West Bank are fully aware of the challenge awaiting them. Urging the Palestinian Authority, which maintains security coordination with Israel, to suddenly devise a ‘strategy’ is painfully redundant.

But for the rest of us who understand the horrors of the Nakba – and the reverberations of that catastrophe from Deir Yassin to the genocide in Gaza – recognition is no longer enough.

The price of silence is already being paid by every Gazan living among the ruins of the Strip and every Palestinian in the West Bank confronting the violence of settlers and their military partners.

It needs to end now, before Qusra becomes the blueprint for what comes next: today, Qusra; tomorrow, the whole of the West Bank.

Dr. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle. He is the author of six books. His forthcoming book, ‘Before the Flood,’ will be published by Seven Stories Press. His other books include ‘Our Vision for Liberation’, ‘My Father was a Freedom Fighter’ and ‘The Last Earth’. Baroud is a Non-resident Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA). His website is www.ramzybaroud.net