THE GRIFT
Why Central Asia Matters on Trump’s “Board of Peace”
- Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined Trump’s Board of Peace to contribute diplomatic credibility and regional mediation experience.
- Uzbekistan brings reform-driven diplomacy and credibility among non-aligned states.
- Kazakhstan contributes multivector diplomatic expertise and economic insight.
The presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan attended the inaugural meeting of US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace in Washington, DC on 19 February 2026. The Board has been promoted as the tool to rebuild the Gaza Strip, so why were two Central Asian republics in attendance?
In an era when global institutions are strained, and geopolitical competition is intensifying, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have emerged as unlikely but valuable contributors to the US President Donald Trump’s signature project now that the Abraham Accords have been sidelined by Israel’s attack on the Gaza Strip. Their participation reflects not only regional aspirations but also a quiet diplomatic maturity that often goes unnoticed in Washington, which, since the 9/11 attacks, appears to have forgotten how to listen. If the project is to amount to more than branding, it will be due in no small part to the disciplined, pragmatic engagement of Central Asia—especially Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan’s contribution stands out because of the transformation the country has undergone since its independence in 1991. Its leadership has pursued a foreign policy rooted in de-escalation, regional cooperation, and sovereign independence—principles that align directly with any peace-focused initiative seeking real results rather than symbolic gestures. For years, Central Asia was framed as a zone of rivalry among great powers. Today, Uzbekistan has rebranded it as a zone of dialogue, proving that geography need not be destiny.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Tashkent’s persistent push for intra-regional cooperation. The country has been instrumental in reducing historical tensions within Central Asia, promoting new economic links, and mediating disputes that previously had no neutral sponsor. For Trump’s Board, which positions itself as a venue for unconventional diplomacy and as an alternative to the United Nations, Uzbekistan offers not only rhetorical support but a tested model of conflict de-risking. Its experience facilitating cross-border water agreements, green energy cooperation, and transport connectivity, and resolving border disputes, provides a governance template that can be applied to troubled regions far beyond Central Asia.
Uzbekistan also brings something Washington often undervalues and currently lacks: credibility among non-aligned states. In a world where U.S. initiatives often face well-earned skepticism, Uzbekistan can act as a balancing voice—supportive of stability but independent enough to be trusted by governments unwilling to be seen as extensions of American policy. This allows the Board to widen its diplomatic reach without triggering the backlash that often accompanies overt Western mediation. In short, Uzbekistan helps make the Board’s outreach more usable.
Moreover, Tashkent’s domestic reforms strengthen its standing as a partner in peace-related initiatives. Economic liberalization, anti-corruption initiatives, and cautious political opening have given the country a reformist image, and with that comes a measure of soft power. By participating in the Board, Uzbekistan signals that peace is inseparable from development and that states seeking stability must also deliver opportunity to their citizens. It’s a message that resonates far more strongly when spoken by a country that began its reforms from a tough baseline and continues to manage them without external templates.
Kazakhstan’s role is also significant and complementary. Where Uzbekistan brings regional mediation experience and reform credibility, Kazakhstan contributes institutional know-how rooted in decades of multivector diplomacy. Astana has long positioned itself as a venue for dialogue, hosting Syria peace talks, nuclear non-proliferation discussions, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) initiatives. Its diplomatic corps is seasoned and technically adept, and comfortable navigating between rival powers. For Trump’s Board, this means access to a well-developed infrastructure of negotiators, analysts, and conflict-resolution specialists.
Kazakhstan also offers a macroeconomic perspective. As a major energy exporter and key actor in Eurasian logistics, it brings to the Board an understanding of how disputes over transit, pipelines, and trade corridors can escalate or be managed. A peace initiative ignoring the economic dimension is rarely successful; Kazakhstan ensures that the Board keeps the interplay between security and commerce front and center.
Yet, despite Kazakhstan’s importance, the driving energy may ultimately come from Tashkent. Uzbekistan sits at the geographic and psychological heart of Central Asia. Its population, cultural weight, and renewed outward posture allow it to mobilize regional cooperation in ways that no external actor can. When Uzbekistan leans into diplomacy, its neighbors tend to follow—an effect the Board can leverage to build multiparty coalitions for conflict reduction. And, the day before the Board convened, Trump and Uzbekistan’s president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, signed an agreement to give the US greater access to Uzbekistan’s critical minerals.
Central Asia’s growing strategic relevance also amplifies the value of both countries. As global trade routes shift, energy markets evolve, and competition between major powers intensifies, stable intermediaries become indispensable. A peace forum that includes Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan gains access to a corridor connecting South Asia, China, Russia, and the Middle East. Their insights into cross-border infrastructure, sanctions navigation, and regional security architectures are not theoretical—they are lived experience.
Critics may argue that Trump’s Board of Peace is more showpiece than institution, but that critique loses force when substantial contributors bring their own agendas of stability, development, and connectivity. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan do not join such initiatives casually and will not sacrifice their credibility if the Board becomes an adjunct of the US State Department. Their participation is itself a signal that a platform has the potential to be more than a political ornament.
Ultimately, the success of the Board depends on whether it can integrate practical regional experience rather than relying solely on Washington’s worldview. (And Trump’s personal challenge will be to consider the Central Asian leaders’ views if they conflict with advice from his unofficial envoys or family members.) Here, Uzbekistan’s role is indispensable. A peace initiative that ignores frontline experience tends toward abstraction; one that incorporates Uzbekistan’s grounded, regionally tested diplomacy gains operational depth. As global politics enters a more fragmented and multipolar stage, such depth is not optional—it is essential.
By elevating Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan within the Board of Peace, Trump’s initiative does more than expand its membership. It taps into a reservoir of pragmatic diplomacy that has already been proven in one of the world’s most complex neighborhoods. If peace is to be more than a slogan, Central Asia—led by Uzbekistan’s increasingly confident voice—may be the partner the Board most needs.
By James Durso for Oilprice.com
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