Monday, December 15, 2025

Morgan’s Dinner With Fuentes



 December 15, 2025

Screengrab of Piers Morgan’s interview with Nick Fuentes on Uncensored.

The fascist types are frequently called hysterical. No matter how their attitude is arrived at, their hysterical behavior fulfills a certain function. Though they actually resemble their listeners in most respects, they differ from them in an important one: they know no inhibitions in expressing themselves. They function vicariously for their inarticulate listeners by doing and saying what the latter would like to, but either cannot or dare not. They violate the taboos which middle-class society has put upon any expressive behavior on the part of the normal, matter-of-fact-citizen. One may say that some of the effect of fascist propaganda is achieved by this breakthrough. The fascist agitators are taken seriously because they risk making fools of themselves… Hitler was liked, not in spite of his cheap antics, but just because of them, because of his false tones and his clowning.

– Theodor Adorno

Nick Fuentes is very funny. The other night he continually cracked jokes and mugged for the camera while running circles around a befuddled and overmatched Piers Morgan. Watching the interview brought to mind the 2016 GOP primary debates, in which Trump mauled traditional politicians such as Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio, who could only feebly respond with an anachronistic political vocabulary and the dated optics of “decency” and “maturity.” Perhaps Morgan thought it was the 1980s and he was Jerry Springer or Geraldo, and that, like them, he could browbeat his Nazi guest with the reliable backing of editing crews and a disapproving audience.

Of course, those episodes take on a different meaning in light of today’s ascendant fascism. The infamous Geraldo skinhead fight, for example, is today populated with YouTube comments siding with the Nazis. Using the old skinhead script (“I’m not anti-Black, I’m pro-white!”) and having honed his skills in a lifetime of online debate, Fuentes ceded no formal advantage to Morgan’s live one-on-one format and repeatedly exposed a stark political divide expressed in generational terms, with Morgan’s “boomer” lectures sounding as out of touch as an aging parent who insists that you can make it if you just work hard and have the right attitude.

Indeed, this is why liberals shouldn’t debate fascists. Every time Morgan responded to Fuentes’ racism and sexism with guilt tripping and personal appeals, it reinforced Fuentes’ main point that he and his millions of followers, like rebellious teenagers who have permanently tuned out their hectoring father, no longer give a damn.

There is, of course, a way to repudiate racism and sexism, but it is a political-economic one that identifies these ideologies’ origins and uses within the context of capitalist class warfare. In distinguishing reality from appearance, the correct critique ultimately emphasizes not that racism and sexism are offensive but that, as incorrect explanations of social reality, they are fundamentally stupid.

Committed to preserving capitalism, liberals’ default reliance on the shopworn and hypocritical morality of political correctness, tolerance, and kindness was never built to last. When someone like Morgan, who is wholly implicated in the sundry miseries of the present, invokes it, it leaves estranged and miserable youth like Fuentes’s followers in stitches, further fueling the iconoclastic zeal with which they seek to forcibly restore what they believe has been taken from them. One can think of the Freikorps’ revolt against the fathers who “betrayed” them, like a serial killer, the violence begins close to home.

While their discussion of Fuentes’ visceral hatred of women, which is right out of Klaus Theweleit’s Male Fantasies, helped expose the misogyny that is at the core of fascism, Morgan and Fuentes’ discussion of the Nazi Holocaust illustrated the ultimate futility of the interview. Following a clip of Fuentes cracking jokes concerning the genocide’s death toll, Morgan responded: “I just find it extraordinary that you would think the Holocaust could ever be something that we could joke about.”

A smirking Fuentes mirthfully replied: “Why? Too soon?”

Morgan later attempted to pin Fuentes by asking, “So you concede that six million Jews died in the Holocaust?” “Oh, it’s at least six million, but it could be 100 times more than that,” mocked Fuentes, with Morgan oblivious to the fact that his guest was speaking a different political language and scoring yet another joke at his expense.

Morgan is far too interested in ratings to recall that there is no engaging with a Holocaust denier (or, for that matter, deniers of other atrocities, including climate change) since the very acceptance of a debate in which there are two legitimate opposing sides already grants the denier, who seeks above all to mystify reality and our ability to understand it, victory. Similarly, fascists deploy an incommensurable language in which “truth claims” are either cunningly deployed or else dismissed as naive or irrelevant, the prima facie unacceptable notions of “beta cucks” like Morgan.

One can, presumably, strategically score points off of fascists for the benefit of the audience. Morgan might have noted that there have been many times –contra Fuentes’ complaints that there has been no “debate”–in which the claims of Holocaust deniers have been torn to shreds, such as during David Irving’s failed libel suit against Deborah Lipstadt.

Meanwhile, Morgan should have avoided making the patently false claim that the Holocaust has never been politicized. If only he had remembered that Norman Finkelstein, who has written a whole book on the subject, has been a guest on his show, he might have preserved an ounce of his credibility. Unsurprisingly, these are not terribly erudite individuals. But erudition was never the point in an exchange between a host seeking to preserve an increasingly intolerable world and a guest seeking to replace it with one that would be horrifyingly worse.

Joshua Sperber teaches political science and history. He is the author of Consumer Management in the Internet AgeHe can be reached at jsperber4@gmail.com  

Why Are American Troops Still Dying in Syria?

by  | Dec 15, 2025 | ANTIWAR.COM

On December 13, 2025, two U.S. soldiers and a civilian interpreter were killed near Palmyra, Syria. According to a Pentagon statement, a lone Islamic State (ISIS) gunman disguised as a shepherd opened fire on a joint U.S.–Syrian patrol, killing three and wounding three before Syrian troops shot him dead. Donald Trump responded with characteristic fury; he promised “very serious retaliation” and said Syria’s new president Ahmed al‑Sharaa was “devastated” by the attack. Yet the promise to end America’s “forever wars” has been part of his pitch since 2016, and U.S. troops remain.

The withdrawal that never happened

Trump first told Americans he had “won against ISIS” in December 2018 and ordered U.S. troops home. In reality, Pentagon and congressional pressure kept about half of the roughly 2,000 troops in place. Less than a year later he issued another withdrawal order, but officials left 90 percent of the force to “guard oil fields.” Reports noted that the mission quickly shifted from defeating ISIS to protecting oil; roughly 500 troops stayed behind to keep oil fields from falling into jihadist hands.

Behind the scenes, U.S. officials were playing “shell games.” James Jeffrey, Trump’s envoy for Syria, later admitted they deliberately misled the president about troop numbers. “We were always playing shell games to not make clear to our leadership how many troops we had there,” he confessed. Though Trump publicly agreed to keep only 200–400 troops, the actual number was “a lot more than” that. Journalists eventually learned that roughly 900 U.S. troops remained.

The Pentagon continued to slow‑roll civilian orders after Trump returned to office in 2025. In December 2024 the Defense Department quietly acknowledged there were about 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria – roughly 1,100 more than the 900 “core” personnel previously reported. Officials explained that these extra soldiers were “temporary rotational forces” deployed to meet fluid mission requirements. The new U.S. envoy, Thomas Barrack, announced plans to close most of the eight bases and consolidate operations in Hasakah province. Yet by November 2025 Reuters reported that the Pentagon intended to halve the troop presence to 1,000 and establish a new base at Damascus’ airport – a sign that numbers change on paper while the boots stay.

From jihadist to head of state

Understanding why American troops are still in Syria requires grappling with the identity of its new president. Ahmed Hussein al‑Sharaa – better known as Abu Mohammed al‑Julani – joined al‑Qaeda in Iraq and later founded the al‑Nusra Front. After splitting from al‑Qaeda the group rebranded as Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS), which the United Nations and United States still classify as a terrorist organisation. In late 2024 HTS swept across Syria, toppling Bashar al‑Assad’s government and ending the thirteen‑year civil war. By January 2025 its leader proclaimed himself interim president and adopted the name Ahmed al‑Sharaa. Despite the rebranding, the Congressional Research Service notes that both HTS and Sharaa remain on U.N. sanctions lists.

Trump embraced Sharaa as an ally. In May 2025 he met the Syrian leader in Riyadh and praised him as a “tough” leader. The following November he welcomed Sharaa to the White House – the first visit by a Syrian head of state since 1946 – and told reporters he was doing “a very good job.” Commentators recalled that only a few years earlier Americans would have balked at a president welcoming a former al‑Qaeda commander. The meeting delivered what Sharaa craved: legitimacy.

Mission creep and local entanglements

While Trump lavished praise on Sharaa, the U.S. mission became ever more confused. The December 13 ambush occurred near the al‑Tanf garrison, a long‑standing U.S. base in Homs province where special forces train the Syrian Free Army (SFA). Across Deir ez‑Zor and Hasakah provinces, U.S. soldiers partner with the Kurdish‑led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and remnants of the SFA, providing intelligence, air support and training. These units have been vital in containing ISIS but also drag the U.S. deeper into Syrian politics.

Proxy attacks in 2024 prompted a temporary surge from about 900 to roughly 2,000 troops. By March 2025 the United States fielded about 2,000 troops in Syria alongside 2,500 coalition personnel in Iraq. Officials now propose reducing to 1,000 and closing most bases, yet sources say the Pentagon intends to retain an airbase in Damascus – evidence that the mission is evolving rather than ending.

Interventionists warn that Sharaa’s government cannot handle ISIS alone and argue that around 1,000–2,000 U.S. troops are needed because HTS has fought ISIS since 2013 and lacks capacity to manage detention camps and large‑scale operations. A non‑interventionist reading draws the opposite conclusion. Keeping troops in Syria has not prevented attacks on U.S. forces – it has created more targets. ISIS still fields between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters in Syria and Iraq. The deadliest previous attack on U.S. troops in Syria occurred in 2019 when four Americans were killed in Manbij. The December 2025 ambush shows that ISIS cells remain capable of inflicting casualties despite years of occupation. Their ability to conduct hit‑and‑run attacks may be enhanced when American forces are stretched thin or tied down training local militias.

A destabilized country and shifting alliances

The ground realities further undermine the case for staying. After Assad’s fall, the Kurds were pushed from key areas by Turkish‑backed forces. Turkey continues to threaten new incursions and views the SDF as an extension of the PKK, which Ankara and Washington both designate a terrorist organization. Iraq wants U.S. coalition troops to remain at the Ain al‑Assad base because it distrusts the new Syrian authorities, who once fought in Iraq. Meanwhile, Israel and Saudi Arabia see Sharaa’s regime as a potential ally against Iran and are pushing for a U.S.‑brokered security pact. These overlapping agendas have little to do with American security but everything to do with regional geopolitics.

Interventionists also claim the U.S. presence denies ISIS oil revenue. Yet U.S. military officials concede that the group’s main income comes from extortion, smuggling and protection rackets; focusing on oil might even give ISIS a propaganda boon. With U.S. forces spread thin, insurgents can find targets, and militants operate in desert areas beyond Damascus’ control. Some argue American troops deter Iran or Russia, but Iranian units have largely withdrawn and Moscow is preoccupied with Ukraine. The 2024 acknowledgement of 2,000 U.S. troops came amid a budget update. Ultimately the mission persists because the foreign policy establishment cannot imagine letting go – even when Trump issued withdrawal orders, his envoys and generals thwarted them.

Why the deaths will continue

American troops remain in Syria because policymakers refuse to accept that they cannot remake the Middle East. Fifteen years after the U.S. first sent special forces to fight ISIS, the mission has mutated into an open‑ended occupation. Washington justifies its presence by pointing to terrorist remnants, protecting oil, deterring Iran or supporting Israel – interchangeable rationales that ensure there is always a reason to stay. Meanwhile, the Syrian battlefield is littered with shifting alliances, jihadist fragments and nationalist grievances. In that environment, a handful of U.S. personnel become symbolic targets, as the December 13 attack shows.

From a non‑interventionist perspective, the solution is simple. America should end its military presence in Syria and let regional actors solve their own problems. This does not mean abandoning diplomacy; Washington can support humanitarian relief and encourage negotiations without soldiers on the ground. But the current strategy – keeping a small force exposed to insurgent attacks while partnering with a former al‑Qaeda commander who remains on a terrorist sanctions list – is morally indefensible. As long as U.S. leaders cling to an ill‑defined mission in Syria, American troops will continue to die for reasons that have nothing to do with defending the United States.

Alan Mosley is a historian, jazz musician, policy researcher for the Tenth Amendment Center, and host of It’s Too Late, “The #1 Late Night Show in America (NOT hosted by a Communist)!” New episodes debut every Wednesday night at 9ET across all major platforms; just search “AlanMosleyTV” or “It’s Too Late with Alan Mosley.”

Antiwar.com, Afghanistan, Michael Hastings, and Me

by Kelley Beaucar Vlahos | Dec 15, 2025 | ANTIWAR.COM


In 2009, I got a call from Eric Garris, founder and editor of Antiwar.com. Would I consider writing a column for the website? As a reporter who covered politics for Fox News, hardly a bastion of skepticism during the second Bush administration, I gratefully agreed. My first of some 350 articles for the next five years talked about how the fad of counterinsurgency had taken over Washington, making mindless disciples of everyone in the national security state and slobbering media.

The columns I wrote for Antiwar echo like dark relics from wars most Americans have left far behind: birth defects in Fallujah, “bacha bazi boys” in Afghanistan, the flying Kagans everywhere, and those shiny COINdinistas in Washington, D.C.

These stories may be hard to find at first, given that Google search has reduced browsing to a bulletin board of approved news sources on any given subject, and war is especially proscribed. As such, the history of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror is at risk of becoming a largely sanitized cautionary tale: the government exploited our fears of 9/11, lied, overreached, blew up the world, and we lost. Of course, all of that is true, but none of the texture, the daily failures and follies, the people who made it happen and how, the media handmaidens and the martyrs of the trade, the atrocities and war crimes — they make up that tapestry, and without it all true understanding is lost.

But it is all there if you know how to look for it— three decades worth — thanks to Antiwar.com. I am proud to have been part of that during the most desperate years for the War Party, which was resolved to keep U.S. forces rotating into combat, the money flowing, and the American people on board. With daily dispatches and searing criticism, and under the guidance of Garris and co-founder Justin Raimondo, Antiwar played a critical role in giving readers the tools they needed to explore their skepticism, ask questions. Not soon enough, the mainstream media could not ignore what tenacious news gatherers and analysts had reported all along — that the war in Afghanistan was unwinnable and the “Surge” in Iraq was just a convenient way to get the U.S. out with face, damming the millions of Iraqis left suffering behind.

In those days, the mainstream press operated in the shadow of a furious establishment Borg. With few exceptions, they deferred and sucked up to, genuflected, and jock-sniffed their way into the good graces of the military and the imperial court. In many ways, they had no choice — the embed program (reporters sanctioned to cover the war inside Iraq and Afghanistan) was designed for obedient media only, guaranteeing coverage largely aligned with the mission. Only now are we getting the full scope of what our military did in Afghanistan and Iraq, nearly 25 years later.

Not surprisingly, when freelance reporter Michael Hastings transgressed this code of the courtier, the peacocks of the Washington news establishment unleashed a professional righteous anger on him that should have been reserved, but wasn’t, for the crimes of the U.S. government, like say, Abu Ghraib.

But Hastings had committed one of the highest sins among the elite corps, he did not protect his sources from themselves. He traveled through Europe and Afghanistan in 2010 for several weeks with the commander of U.S. forces, General Stanley McChrystal, and his hard-charging special operations staff who had cheekily taken to calling themselves “Team America.” They took Hastings into their confidence, drank hard, bragged, boasted, and inadvertently exposed to him the lie of the just and “winning” war that the American people had sent their sons and daughters to fight.

McChrystal was fired after his nasty comments about Obama and Vice President Obama were reported in a profile Hastings wrote for Rolling Stone on June 8, 2010. But the real dark stuff was reserved for his book, The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America’s War in Afghanistan, which was published in 2012.

As I wrote in my Antiwar review of The Operators:

For their part, the men surrounding the general should have been more with it. Getting “totally shitfaced” in front of a Rolling Stone reporter — one who is clearly staying sober throughout all of it, with his trusty notebook and tape recorder always at hand — turned out to be deadly for their careers. If this were a MTV “Behind the Music” documentary, Paris would have been the dramatic turning point in the demise of the band.

And McChrystal, was he so dizzy up there on Mount Olympus that he couldn’t see the folly in saying things like “bite me” in reference to Vice President Joe Biden, or in calling the war in Afghanistan “very questionable” in the presence of a reporter whose magazine all but demands by reputation that he come back with something edgy and subversive?

These answers may never really be known. Even Hastings questioned it. “I’d seen another side of (McChrystal’s) personality. I didn’t quite know why they had shown it to me,” he wrote, noting that, after covering the war since 2005, he had never heard such high-ranking officers badmouth such high-ranking civilians before — at least in front of journalists. “The wars had been going on for nearly ten years, and it had clearly taken its toll… McChrystal appeared to present a new kind of military elite, a member of the warrior class that had lost touch with the civilian world.”

“Or maybe the side I had been shown was there all along, and no one else had decided to write about it,” he surmised.

McChrystal’s firing exposed how screwed up the wartime Fourth Estate’s priorities had become. Where were the Neil Sheehans and David Halberstams, who as reporters in Saigon in the early 1960s went after government officials hammer and tongs when they thought they were being lied to in the lead-up to the Vietnam War? They would have rushed to Hastings, called him one of their own, and defended him.

Instead, you had two-time Pulitzer Prize winner John Burns exclaiming in an interview shortly after McChrystal was fired, “I think it’s very unfortunate that it has impacted, and will impact so adversely, on what had been pretty good military/media relations.”

Lara Logan, who was then with CBS and pumping up the soldiers and contractors she traveled with so hard I called her the military’s “secret weapon”, told CNN derisively: “Michael Hastings has never served his country the way Gen. McChrystal has.”

Hastings knew their number.

“Famous journalists would say they heard these kinds of things all the time, but never reported them… it didn’t seem to make a difference that I hadn’t violated any agreement with McChrystal. The unwritten rule I’d broken was a simple one: You really weren’t supposed to write honestly about people in power.”

Therein lies the reason the war went on for 20 years in a nutshell. I recall this because I got a chance to exchange a few emails during this time with Hastings before he was killed in a fiery car crash at the age of 33, just a year after his book was published. He was thankful for the Antiwar review and for coming to his defense against the jackals (many of whom I suspect were more than a titch jealous).

A canary in the coal mine, Hastings would not live to read how hundreds of government officials secretly told the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) that they knew the war was a farce from the start. Their testimonies would be the subject of a FOIA request and later the 2019 “Afghanistan Papers” by Craig Whitlock, who would win awards for his reporting, and lead to a movie, BodyGuard of Lies. Hastings would never see the amazing reporting by infantry veteran Seth Harp, who traced an unaccountable, violent, criminal ecosystem roiling the special forces world at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, back to McCrystal’s JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) in the war.

No one in the media says the war was worth it now because reporters like Hastings made it alright to say so. Antiwar made it alright to question and deny the military and the U.S. government our unconditional trust in their self-serving narratives. They didn’t win awards, but they deserve them.

Maybe medals too. Certainly for bravery under fire: Antiwar was once under an FBI investigation, suspected of being a potential “threat to national security” during the early days of the Patriot Act. I wrote about that too. More recently, Antiwar was pulled into the dragnet of “disinformation” crackdowns and smear campaigns amid the Democrats’ Russiagate hysteria.

My greatest thrill is watching the continuity of energy and bravery at Antiwar under the younger editors — Dave DeCamp and Kyle Anzalone — and the meteoric success of Scott Horton, who replaced Justin’s role as editorial director when he passed away from cancer in 2019. Unfortunately, the War Party has not learned from its hubris and mistakes, has absolutely no humility, and is on a continuing death march, dragging the nation with it.

Fortunately, Antiwar has only flourished, and the memory of Hastings and other brilliant canaries can serve, not as dark echoes, but as inspiring lights leading a new generation of dedicated readers and fans.

Congratulations on your 30th!



Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute. She was a regular news writer and reporter for Antiwar.com from 2009 to 2014. She served for three years as Executive Editor of the The American Conservative magazine, where she had been reporting and publishing regular articles on national security, civil liberties, foreign policy, veterans, and Washington politics since 2007. From 2013 to 2017, Vlahos served as director of social media and online editor at WTOP News in Washington, D.C. She also spent 15 years as an online political reporter for Fox News at the channel’s Washington D.C. bureau, as well as Washington correspondent for Homeland Security Today magazine.

‘Workers in China have never truly fallen silent’: An interview with Workers’ Labor Bulletin activists


Chinese workers labour production line

The Workers’ Labor Bulletin: Focusing on Today’s Working People (工劳快讯:关注当代打工人) seeks to highlight how workers keep Chinese society running, while pointing out why they remain the biggest victims of social injustice. Amid what they describe as a powerless situation, where workers remain “voiceless and invisible”, WLB seeks to bring workers’ stories to light, so that they can better understand each other's plight and unite across professions, genders, and ethnicities.

In the following interview, WLB members respond to questions from Serhii Shlyapnikov for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, addressing their work and the situation of China’s labour force today.

Could you explain the aims and tasks of Workers’ Labor Bulletin?

WLB was created in 2022. At the start, our aim was quite simple: to gather various forms of information related to Chinese workers, including news reports, articles and more. Later, we began editing this scattered content into a bi-weekly newsletter. After that, we started writing our own articles and conducting interviews.1

How did this project come about? Why did you decide to create a project about workers?

It was born out of a sense of helplessness. In China, any activism directly related to workers faces heavy restrictions and offline communities focusing on labour issues have been forcibly disbanded, one after another. So, we turned towards online-based approaches.

As for why we focus on workers, it is because we see this as our responsibility. In this highly developed capitalist world, Chinese workers and the labour they contribute sustain a significant part of the global circulation of information and goods.

Yet despite the high degree of material development and rapid economic growth, workers’ living conditions have not improved proportionately, and only a very small portion of the value they create returns to them. This is deeply unfair.

Furthermore, beyond the blue-collar frontline workers people usually notice, many young white-collar workers in China are also trapped in a situation where they cannot pursue the kind of life they aspire to. They either fall into passive unemployment or drift among various companies accumulating frustration.

We needed to find a path that could allow workers to truly unite, reclaim their dignity, and make China and the world understand that it is labour that creates the world, and labourers are capable of imagining and building different futures.

How do you carry out responsibilities within the project?

We are a fully volunteer-based community. Everyone contributes using their free time outside of work or school hours. We hope to preserve this mode of operation.

How has the self-identity of workers in Guangdong, especially those in the electronics industry, changed over the past ten years?

This is a difficult question to answer. To provide a direct account of how workers’ self-identity has changed is very challenging, and we have not yet thoroughly engaged with this topic.

Still, from certain shifts in popular vocabulary, you can observe some changes. For example, terms like “pick up the bucket and run” and “lying flat” first became popular among electronics factory workers.2

Another example: in many of the large electronics factories, the number of regular full-time workers has been declining, and young workers increasingly have no desire to become regular employees. Why? Perhaps young workers can no longer accept the idea of spending their whole lives on the assembly line.

This does not necessarily signify resistance, but it does suggest a kind of rejection of the worker identity. Yet this rejection is also forced, because such work neither provides a decent working environment nor offers any hope or prospects.

It is difficult for me to say how these workers view themselves. I can only say that young workers today are highly heterogeneous, which makes it very hard to directly determine their ideology, self-identity or the possibilities that class consciousness might emerge.

What do young workers (between 20–30 years old) think about their future? What kind of people do they hope to become?

This question is closely related to the previous one, and perhaps all the questions are essentially interconnected.

I once heard a Foxconn worker express his frustration to us in the following terms: “The harder you work, the more money you get cheated out of. Not working hard, lying flat, is the only solution.”

He had once wanted to escape the life of an electronics factory worker, so he spent his savings to enrol in a video editing course that cost tens of thousands of yuan. The training school promised he would easily find a job afterward and enter an office as a quasi–white-collar worker.

But near the end of the course, he realised he had been deceived: almost no one from the previous cohort had found work. In fact, the whole thing was a scam, because even university students in the relevant major often struggle to find jobs, let alone someone who trained for only a few months.

Later, he joined a training program to become an excavator operator. But after taking his money, the instructor barely taught him anything. Only after two months did he realise that this line of work requires two to three years of endurance before one can get a decent job, and competition has become increasingly fierce. Essentially, this too was a scam.

His savings were drained and he discovered that all his efforts had produced the opposite result. So he could only lie flat: spending a few months doing nothing, then a few months working in factories, repeating this cycle. He looks for temporary opportunities to earn quick money, wherever they might be, but he no longer hopes for any other possibilities.

Perhaps not all workers think this way. Many young migrant workers still hold out hope and long for a more stable and secure life. But in the repetitive routines of factory life, such hope is gradually crushed. You even find that people lose the ability to think about this question at all — it is too overwhelming, too despairing.

All we can do is record the present moment and the frustrations of daily life. If there are more overtime opportunities this month, then at least their bodies can still be exchanged for a bit of money; that is about all. As for the future, even next month’s overtime is not guaranteed. How can one talk about any future beyond that?

Are there clear differences between the younger and older generations of workers?

Certainly. I believe there are significant differences at the level of consciousness.

The older generation of workers is, of course, not homogeneous, but very often I notice that they have a much higher tolerance for their work. They are willing to accept jobs that are monotonous, without prospects, unchanging and with poor working conditions.

They are also willing to stay in such jobs for long periods, and within that environment may develop a desire to change the workplace or engage in collective struggle. Especially when the factory begins losing orders and is on the verge of shutting down; you often find that in such cases it is the older workers, the ones who have worked there for decades, who initiate resistance.

Even though this is their final act of resistance, it reveals something important: in their struggle, you realise they did not quietly accept all the unreasonable conditions they endured before. When the factory is about to close, they demand a final reckoning with the boss.

But this does not mean the older generation is inherently more hardworking or more willing to endure hardship. That is simply the employer’s one-sided narrative. In reality, older workers live with a constant fear of losing their jobs. As they age, their chances of being re-employed under similar conditions become extremely slim.

Younger workers, by contrast, see more opportunities and a wider world. They can enter factory work at any time (most factories only care about physical condition for general positions and pay little attention to skills or experience). So why should they settle for the job immediately in front of them?

They can leave whenever they want and pursue new directions and opportunities. When food delivery and ride-hailing became viable options, many young workers flooded into these sectors to earn some money. But, ultimately, these opportunities are limited, and they are drying up faster and faster.

Which recent strikes would you consider to have been the most crucial, and why?

If we are talking about recent years, the events that left the deepest impression on me were the Foxconn workers’ uprising in Zhengzhou in 2022, the delivery riders’ strike in Shanwei in 2023, and the 2022 HuoLaLa drivers’ strike.

The Foxconn workers’ strike involved direct physical confrontation with the police and factory security. Their decisiveness and force of action were admirable.

The Shanwei riders’ strike and the Huolala drivers’ strike were both actions by platform labourers, and they demonstrated the possibility that workers can overcome the divisions created by platforms, unite, and confront the larger system.

Are strikes usually spontaneous or do they involve some level of organisation? Do workers in different factories influence one another or “infect” each other’s actions?

In fact, factory boundaries may no longer be as important as they once were. Even within the same factory, if workers do not operate the same machines or are not on the same production line, they may be complete strangers. Even in the lunch rooms of electronics factories, workers may see each other every day without actually knowing one another.

Today, most strikes occur in factories that are on the verge of closure, or take the form of collective actions against platform companies. In the former case, these strikes are essentially the final act of resistance just before the factory shuts down. After the closure, the workers disperse, and it is very difficult for them to return to their original industry (after all, why would a shrinking industry want to hire older workers?).

In the latter case, such actions do indeed have the potential to spread, but it is more accurate to say that workers are already linked together through online tools such as WeChat groups, Douyin, or Kuaishou.

Has there been an event in China that could be described as a “turning point” in workers’ sentiments, after which worker actions became active again?

I believe that worker actions in China have never truly fallen silent, nor have the painful emotions experienced by workers ever been genuinely alleviated. Times are difficult, and we can only keep moving forward with determination.

But there is no need to complain. Even in harsher eras and in more dangerous countries, there have always been many workers and activists striving and fighting.

China Labor Bulletin was recently shut down. It used to be an important source of information on the labour movement. How do you view this event?

We were saddened by this. CLB accomplished important work, even though there were some positions they held that we did not fully agree with. But we respect and are inspired by the work they did.

In the workers’ movement, which do you think is more important: culture or organisation?

This is a very interesting question. I suspect you may be thinking about this from the perspective of traditional organising. This has indeed been the direction that many people engaged in Chinese labour organising often pursued in the past.

But from our experience, and from the actions of some friends, we have come to see that culture, or organisational culture, may need to be addressed earlier than the question of what kind of organisation to build.

If a worker community can cultivate and spread a culture of mutual aid and willingness to step forward, then forming an organisation will not be far off. Conversely, if a community’s culture is shaped by cynicism or world-weariness, then it may be impossible for any meaningful organisation to emerge from within it.

Through what kinds of channels are today’s workers forming a culture that belongs to them? (For example, meme groups, songs, worker literature, etc)

As you mentioned, almost every form of expression exists today. But precisely for that reason, there is no longer a clearly defined form that can be called workers’ culture.

Worker literature and novels about the working class have become things of the past. Young workers today are enthusiastic about gaming and scrolling through Douyin, much like people from other social groups. And in these media, the vast majority are not actually focused on their own labour. So, can we really call this workers’ culture?

Of course, we still see some migrant-worker poets, some workers who have begun publishing their own writings, some who create songs on Douyin and Kuaishou with a strong working-class flavour, and quite a few who compose short rhyming verses on social media to mock the hardships they encounter in working life.

However, I still feel it is difficult to say that a distinct workers’ culture of its own is taking shape. A special kind of culture requires, first, a space that belongs to them, where they can freely say what they want to say and trust one another. I do not think such a space exists yet.

Workers’ culture today is still eruptive and inspiration-driven: it appears everywhere, yet disappears just as easily.

Which films, books, or songs would you recommend to help people understand contemporary Chinese workers’ culture?

I would recommend Sha Ma Te, Wo Ai Ni (We Were Smart), Wang Bing’s Youth Trilogy and
My Poems. There are also some creations by Bilibili users, such as the song I Come from Wanderers’ Mountain — The Autobiography of a Little Cow-Horse Demon.

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    For example: Labor Bulletin, Issue 73, has the headline, “State Firms’ Wage Arrears, Overseas Worker Abuses, Job Market Hardship, and Insurance Deficits,” and features a report on the case of a seriously ill worker in Wenzhou who, after repeated refusals of help from management, jumped from a building, revealing the lethal consequences of employers evading responsibility. The issue also includes stories about the struggles of delivery couriers. - Serhii Shliapnikov

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    “Pick up the bucket and run” is a meme used by electronics factory workers, referring to the simple plastic bucket every new hire receives. Taking the bucket and bolting stands for quitting instantly because conditions are intolerable. “Lying flat” describes young workers’ rejection of overwork and ambition, choosing instead to do the bare minimum to survive. Both phrases point to quiet forms of resistance born from exhaustion and disillusionment. - Serhii Shliapnikov