Wednesday, February 25, 2026

U.S. Energy Dominance Push Collides with EU Methane Rules

  • U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright urged the IEA to refocus on energy security over climate goals, as Washington pushes to expand oil and LNG exports.

  • Europe’s methane and sustainability regulations threaten U.S. LNG trade, with exporters warning that strict emissions reporting rules could act as trade barriers.

  • The EU faces a growing dilemma between net-zero ambitions and energy security, as rising LNG dependence and industrial strain increase pressure to ease climate regulations.

Last week, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright called on the International Energy Agency to stop fixating on climate change and instead return to its original focus on energy security. The call came in the context of plans by the U.S. federal government to significantly increase the amount of oil and gas the country exports—plans for energy dominance. Europe is the top destination for these plans, and it may have to ditch its net-zero plans as well if it wants energy security.

“We’ve gotten off track on energy ... it has gotten so ridiculously out of whack that it has driven deindustrialisation and made our countries geopolitically weaker,” Secretary Wright said during the IEA’s ministerial meeting last week. He also said that the IEA’s scenarios for the energy system of the future were unrealistic—something the U.S. has said before, prompting the IEA to bring back its Current Policies Scenario. The organization had previously abandoned that scenario—which reflects physical reality—in favor of the Net-Zero Scenario and the Stated Policies Scenario, all of which predict a significant and steep decline in the demand for hydrocarbons.

This decline, however, has yet to materialize, including in top net-zero investing nations such as China, the UK, Germany, and other European countries that have prioritized emission reduction over economic growth. The European Union’s imports of liquefied natural gas specifically, are running at a record, and this record is about to be broken this year yet again. With the EU’s gas in stock at just 30%, demand for replenishment would be greater than in the last four years—and most of that gas will come from the United States. But there is a problem.

In line with its focus on emission reduction, the European Union two years ago adopted a methane regulation aimed at reducing not only the EU’s own emissions of the greenhouse gas but also forcing countries outside the EU that do business with the bloc to cut their emissions as well. The regulation, starting this year, extends to all energy suppliers to the EU—and these suppliers are the opposite of happy about it.

The United States emerged as the biggest supplier of liquefied gas to the EU after 2022. Indeed, to secure the energy dominance from his agenda, President Trump negotiated a trade deal with the EU’s Ursula von der Leyen that involved a commitment to buy $750 billion worth of U.S. energy commodities over three years. But that cannot happen with the methane directive, which imposes expensive methane emission tracking, monitoring, verifying, and reporting obligations on energy exporters to the EU.

Qatar, which is the second-largest LNG supplier to the EU, complained about the direction several times, ultimately spelling it out: if the EU is so concerned about methane emissions, they should look for some other source of LNG because Qatar would stop selling to the bloc. The U.S. also warned the regulation was unwelcome, with Secretary Wright saying it was impossible to implement and describing it as “a critical non-tariff trade barrier that imposes an undue burden on U.S. exporters and our trade relationship.” The U.S. demanded an exemption from the regulation until 2035, but the EU’s energy commissioner took a tough stance, saying the regulation will remain in place for all—at least for the time being. Because energy security does matter more than net-zero plans.

The European Union’s appetite for liquefied natural gas soared sharply after the decimation of the Russian pipeline supply. Despite all the net-zero plans of all the European governments, industries, and households still needed reliable energy—even as it became increasingly expensive, causing that deindustrialization that Secretary Wright has noted repeatedly as an unwelcome outcome of energy transition efforts. The cost of energy is already causing certain stirrings in political circles in Europe, with signals emerging that decision-makers may yield to pressure to bring costs down by lightening the emission regulation load—and helping the United States advance its energy dominance agenda.

In addition to the methane directive, the EU central government would have to scrap two other directives as well if it wants to continue buying U.S. liquefied gas and crude oil. The corporate sustainability due diligence directive, or CCDDD, and the corporate sustainability reporting directive, or CSRD, both put a myriad of reporting requirements on companies from outside the EU, spanning issues from human rights abuse to, once again, emissions. The financial burden that these additional requirements would place on companies would not be met with any enthusiasm.

Ultimately, it would be a choice between net zero and economic survival for the EU. The two have proven time and again to be not simply incompatible but at odds with each other, as noted by various U.S. officials and evidenced by growth trends in the U.S. and top European economies such as Germany and the UK. America’s top gas client would have to decide whether it wants to have functioning economies or net zero emissions, and America itself seems eager to force it to make the right decision.

By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com

 

Renewables Top 25% of U.S. Power as Coal’s Grip Collapses

In 2025, the share of renewables in U.S. electricity generation has surpassed 25 percent.

Over the course of the past 20 years, their share has continuously risen from just 8.6 percent in 2007.

At the same time, as Statista's Kathraina Buchholz details in the infographic below, coal in electricity generation fell from a share of 49 percent to just 16.4 percent last year.

Infographic: Renewables Now Make up 1/4 of U.S. Electricity Generation | Statista

You will find more infographics at Statista

While Trump administration's policies regarding renewable energy and greenhouse gases have yet to show their full effect, experts believe that the sector's strong growth as well as efficiency and cost improvements will cause it to expand further – albeit slower – despite some government funding losses and the end of emission limits.

In 2022, more electricity was generated from renewable sources in the U.S. for the first time over the course of one year than from coal.

That year, renewable energy sources created more than 900 terawatt-hours of electric power in the country compared to a little over 800 that came from coal.

On a global scale, this change happened last year as renewables outweighed coal electricity generation in the second half of 2025.

Up until 2007, coal accounted for more than 2,000 terawatt hours of electricity in the U.S. before the figure started to declined as regulations around fossil fuels - limits on carbon-intensity and the emissions of toxic elements like mercury - tightened. Electricity generation from natural gas gained pace as a result since it produces somewhat less CO2. To reach the emission goals associated with the net zero age, however, the U.S. would have to continue growing carbon-neutral electricity sources like wind and solar, which have been on a steady upwards climb in the new millennium and are now the second biggest source of electric power in the country.

Looking not only at electricity but energy use as a whole, renewables have a longer way to go in the U.S. and globally.

Here, renewable energy made up only 9 percent in 2023 as energy sources outside of electricity - most notably petroleum in the form of gasoline - are added to the mix.

By Zerohedge.com

Clean Energy Markets Face a Volatile Year Despite Record Global Investment

  • Global renewable energy investment reached a record high in 2025, primarily driven by growth in offshore wind and small-scale solar, especially in developing markets.

  • The United States experienced its biggest quarterly drop in clean energy investing in nearly a decade, largely due to the end of a Biden-era EV tax credit that led to $65 billion in EV sector write-offs.

  • A market correction is anticipated for 2026, with a potential resurgence in private equity dealmaking, fueled in part by increasing power demand from artificial-intelligence data centers.

It’s been a volatile year for clean energy markets. Despite major policy shifts impacting green industries, global renewable energy investment hit a record high in 2025. A closer look at last year’s figures reveals a high level of ambivalence in the marketplace, with a sharp drop in clean energy investments in the United States in the last corner, but a surprising resurgence of clean energy dealmaking over the same time frame.

The electric vehicles sector, in particular, is already showing signs of sharp contraction after the Trump administration ended a Biden-era EV tax credit last fall. Globally, EV manufacturers have registered a combined $65 billion in write-offs since the $7,500 U.S. federal tax credit was rolled back in September, with major automakers like Ford and Stellantis reporting hefty losses and EV program cancellations. In the United States, the drop in electric vehicle sales was the primary driver of the biggest quarterly drop in clean energy investing that the country has seen in almost a decade. 

While clean energy investing was strong overall in 2025 in the United States, reaching a record annual high of $277 billion, the numbers for the fourth quarter are grim. A reported $8 billion in clean energy projects were scrapped, and just $3 billion worth of new projects announced. “That means the pipeline of new investment is shrinking,” Hannah Hess, associate director of climate and energy for the Rhodium group, recently told nonpartisan news outlet Semafor. “Usually, even when we see quarterly fluctuations, from a zoomed-out view we continue to see sustained momentum. That’s no longer true.”

And the EV investing and clean energy investing drop is likely to continue as the Trump administration ramps up its climate policy rollbacks. Earlier this month, the administration delivered “one of the single largest deregulatory actions in U.S. history” when it ended the 2009 law classifying carbon dioxide as a threat to public health, kneecapping regulators’ ability to set emissions caps.

However, Bloomberg reports that there are signs of a coming resurgence in private equity dealmaking in the clean energy sector after a year characterized by extreme policy uncertainty. Last year saw a plummet in clean energy acquisitions, with a more-than 50 percent year-on-year contraction. In fact, numbers dipped down to 2013 levels, effectively erasing over a decade of growth. 

But there are several reasons that we can expect a market correction in 2026. “Power demand from artificial-intelligence data centers continues to boost investment in renewables, with US data-center electricity consumption projected to triple by 2035 from 2024 levels,” Bloomberg reports. “At the same time, last year’s slowdown has forced developers and asset owners to reassess valuations.” While dealmaking is on the rise, the sector has a whole lot of ground to recover.

While clean energy investing in the United States fell 36 percent from the second half of 2024 in response to the rapidly shifting policy landscape, global numbers are looking stronger than ever. Worldwide, investments in creating new renewable energy production capacity reached a record $386 billion in the first half of 2025. This growth was primarily driven by offshore wind and small-scale solar development.

Markets in the developing world are showing huge growth in terms of clean energy deployment and electric vehicle adoption. As it has become an affordable and accessible option, small-scale solar has boomed in resource-constrained economies like Pakistan and much of sub-Saharan Africa.

“Markets with supportive revenue mechanisms have maintained momentum on renewable energy investment,” says Meredith Annex, Head of Clean Power at BloombergNEF. “Whereas projects in markets where revenue certainty is shifting, particularly when it’s down to large swings in policy as in the US or mainland China, are seeing a boom-bust cycle ahead of those changes.”

By Haley Zaremba for Oilprice.com 


First Solar Sees Record 2025 Profit, Guides Steady 2026 Sales


First Solar reported record 2025 earnings and set 2026 guidance projecting up to $5.2 billion in sales, underpinned by U.S. manufacturing expansion and federal production tax credits.

First Solar, Inc. posted net sales of $5.2 billion for 2025, up from $4.2 billion in 2024, as third-party module volumes climbed 24% year-on-year. Fourth-quarter sales reached $1.7 billion, modestly higher than the prior quarter on stronger module shipments.

Net income for the year rose to $1.53 billion, or $14.21 per diluted share, compared with $12.02 per share in 2024. In the fourth quarter alone, the company earned $4.84 per diluted share. Operating income for the year increased to nearly $1.6 billion, while gross profit expanded to $2.12 billion.

The U.S.-headquartered thin-film solar manufacturer ended 2025 with a gross cash balance of $2.9 billion and a net cash position of $2.4 billion, up sharply from $1.5 billion at the end of the third quarter. The increase was driven largely by proceeds from the sale of advanced manufacturing production tax credits under Section 45X of the Inflation Reduction Act framework, as well as operating cash flow, partially offset by capital spending on its Louisiana facility.

Adjusted EBITDA for 2025 came in at $2.36 billion, compared with EBITDA of $2.07 billion, reflecting addbacks for foreign exchange impacts, tax credit monetization discounts, start-up costs, and other items.

Looking ahead, First Solar guided 2026 net sales in a range of $4.9 billion to $5.2 billion, with module volumes between 17.0 GW and 18.2 GW. The company expects adjusted EBITDA of $2.6 billion to $2.8 billion and capital expenditures of $800 million to $1.0 billion. Year-end 2026 net cash is projected between $1.7 billion and $2.3 billion.

Gross margin guidance for 2026 is set at $2.4 billion to $2.6 billion, assuming between $2.10 billion and $2.19 billion in Section 45X tax credits and factoring in underutilization costs and production start-up expenses. First-quarter 2026 adjusted EBITDA is forecast at $400 million to $500 million, supported by anticipated tax credit generation of up to $400 million.

The outlook assumes continuity in the current U.S. policy environment, including trade measures and the implementation of the Inflation Reduction Act as amended in 2025. Management flagged the importance of permitting timelines and the ability to monetize tax credits as key variables.

Strategically, 2025 marked a milestone year with the commissioning of a new Louisiana manufacturing plant and a decision to establish an additional facility in South Carolina, reinforcing First Solar’s positioning as the largest U.S.-based photovoltaic manufacturer. Unlike many global competitors reliant on crystalline silicon supply chains centered in Asia, First Solar produces cadmium telluride thin-film modules through a vertically integrated domestic process.

The results come amid persistent global solar module oversupply and pricing pressure, particularly from Chinese manufacturers, while U.S. trade remedies and domestic content incentives continue to reshape supply chains. First Solar’s emphasis on pricing certainty and long-term contracted volumes has differentiated it in a volatile market environment.

With a strengthened balance sheet, rising earnings, and substantial embedded tax credit support, First Solar enters 2026 with financial flexibility as it continues expanding U.S. manufacturing capacity in a policy landscape still largely supportive of domestic clean energy production.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

Lamborghini Scraps Lanzador as EV Supercar Demand Fizzles

  • Major U.S. and European automakers are scaling back EV ambitions as demand weakens, with Lamborghini scrapping its all-electric Lanzador and reaffirming combustion and hybrid models due to limited customer interest.

  • Several legacy carmakers including Ford, GM, Volkswagen, Mercedes, Volvo, Honda, and others have delayed, reduced, or canceled EV investments.

  • The retreat reflects slowing EV adoption and broader policy shifts in the West, as automakers respond to weaker market demand and reassess aggressive electrification timelines.

Big legacy U.S. and European automakers are frantically dialing back their electric vehicle bets, scaling back once-hyped roadmaps to full electrification as demand for these vehicles implodes.

The latest automaker to reverse course is not a mass-market sedan or SUV maker, but a luxury supercar brand: Lamborghini.

CEO Stephan Winkelmann told the UK's The Sunday Times that he has ended plans to build EVs, saying customers are not seeking quiet supercars and that demand has collapsed.

Winkelmann said that EV development risked becoming "an expensive hobby" for the car company. He stated that the previously announced all-electric concept car, Lanzador, will no longer be part of its future lineup of supercars.

He noted that the "acceptance curve" for EVs in Lamborghini's target market was flattening and "close to zero."

Winkelmann said the Lanzador will be replaced by a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle. He added that the Italian carmaker will produce internal combustion engines "for as long as possible."

"EVs, in their current form, struggle to deliver this specific emotional connection," Winkelmann explained, pointing out that customers who buy luxury cars seek the sound of a roaring engine.

The slower path toward full electrification, or in some cases partial electrification, is not just a Lamborghini story or limited to the luxury auto market. There has also been a sharp reversal by mass-market automakers over the last six months or so, as they dial back EV ambitions or entirely scrap their electrification plans:

The pivot by Western automakers comes as the West dials back on "climate crisis" policies, which have crushed manufacturing bases from Germany to the U.S. Midwest.

By Zerohedge.com

 

Carbon Credits Helped Power the “100% Clean” Olympic Winter Games

  • Enel powered the Winter Olympics with “100% low-carbon electricity,” but relied partly on carbon credits.

  • Carbon offsets allow companies to claim clean energy use without physically consuming only renewables.

  • Enel plans €53 billion in investments through 2028, including €20 billion for wind and solar.

The Winter Olympics are over, but their energy supplier, Enel, is rightly proud of the feat it pulled off: 100% low-carbon electricity supply for the games. But there is a twist. That 100% was only possible thanks to one thing: carbon credits.

The energy major reported it was supplying 85 GW of electricity to the Olympics and Paralympics, yet not all of those gigawatts came from wind and solar installations. Some of them did, but the rest came from baseload generation facilities, “cleaned up” with so-called “guarantee of origin” certificates.

Every GO certificate corresponds to 1 MWh of electricity produced from low-carbon sources except nuclear. The electricity itself is not necessarily supplied to the buyer of the certificates. The certificates are there to prove it was generated, theoretically offsetting the high-carbon electricity that the buyer had to use to ensure supply reliability.

Enel this week announced it was going to spend some 53 billion euros in fresh investments between this year and 2028, of which 20 billion was on wind and solar growth. The goal of the company is to add some 15 GW of new capacity, mainly in Europe. It seems Enel would rather generate its own low-carbon electricity than buy certificates—and there is a good reason for this.

Related: Russia's Dark Oil Web Exposed in Major UK Sanctions Escalation

Carbon certificates, or carbon credits, or carbon offsets all amount to the same idea: buying a modern version of a Medieval indulgence to clean up, in the modern case, your energy supply track record. Indeed, the operators of wind and solar installations make good business selling such certificates to other companies, including Big Tech, which, until about last year, was willing to pay anything to such operators to be able to show its investors that almost all of its electricity comes from low-carbon generation, even though that is not, in physical reality, the case.

In addition to wind and solar certificates, there have been a multitude of projects promising to offset a certain amount of emissions through, for example, tree-planting or nature conservation. Carbon offsets were viewed as a promising new market set to grow substantially amid the global transition push—until investigations revealed that there was little substance to the claims made by carbon offsetters.

The revelations made by these investigations cooled the enthusiasm about carbon offsets, tightened oversight and accountability standards, and shrank the offsets market. To add insult to injury, climate activists themselves are against offsets. Their argument is that buying carbon certificates does not lead to actual, physical reduction in the consumption of crude oil and natural gas, and they are absolutely right, which is what makes the analogy with indulgences so accurate.

Just how difficult it is to power everything with just wind and solar—literally, not with certificates—becomes clear from Enel’s very own annual report. In it, the company boasted that as much as 66% of the electricity it generated in 2025 came from low-carbon sources—but half of that was hydropower, 17% was geothermal, and only 10% came from wind and solar. Hydropower is, of course, very low-carbon, but it is rarely in the spotlight, unlike wind and solar, which attract most of the investments and sell most of the certificates, not least because in Europe, there is now a political push against new hydropower and even for the dismantling of existing facilities to restore rivers.

Enel this week said it had struck a deal to acquire 830 MW in wind and solar capacity in the United States. One might argue that buying wind and solar in the United States right now is a bit risky, to put it mildly, but Enel has prioritized expanding specifically its wind and solar asset portfolio. Perhaps this has nothing at all to do with carbon certificates. Perhaps it does have something to do with it. The fact of these certificates, however, is more proof that the vision of a 100% wind and solar grid with some hydro and nuclear for diversity’s sake remains unrealistic.

By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com

 

Trump Slaps 126% Tariff on Indian Solar Panels in Escalating Trade Fight

President Trump announced a massive new tariff hit on India, saying imports of solar panels to the United States would be subject to tariffs of 126%.

The move was motivated by the discovery that India was subsidizing its solar panel industry at the same rate of 126%. Laos and Indonesia were also targeted with import tariffs corresponding to the subsidy rates both governments provided for their respective solar industries. The tariffs follow a trade case brought to the Department of Commerce by the U.S. solar panel industry.

A fact sheet published on the Commerce Department’s website shows that U.S. imports of solar panels from India had surged from $83.86 million in 2022 to $792.65 million in 2024, amid a squeeze on Chinese solar panel imports and industry sensitivity to prices.

Bloomberg reported that India, Indonesia, and Laos together accounted for 57% of all solar panel imports into the United States in the first half of last year. The value of those combined imports was $4.5 billion.

The U.S. solar equipment manufacturing industry has been on a quest to curb imports of cheap Asian products for years. Asian solar panels two years ago brought global prices down by 50% over just 12 months, hitting $0.10 per watt, the Financial Times reported in 2024.

The U.S. solar industry was also being subsidized during the Biden administration, but at nowhere near comparable rates. Pressure from solar panel manufacturers led to a tariff move against Chinese panel exports just as India was accelerating its own solar panel-making efforts.

“American manufacturers are investing billions of dollars to rebuild domestic capacity and create good-paying jobs. Those investments cannot succeed if unfairly traded imports are allowed to distort the market,” the lead attorney for the Alliance for American Solar Manufacturing and Trade said, as quoted by Reuters, in comments on the tariff news.

By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com


Indian Refiners Pivot From Russian to Venezuelan Crude


Reliance Industries has bought its first cargo of Venezuelan crude since 2023 from Chevron, Reuters has reported, citing shipping data, amid growing appetite from Indian refiners for non-Russian oil supply.

That appetite was prompted by U.S. pressure on the Indian government to reduce its imports of Russian crude—or face higher tariffs. Reliance Industries, India’s largest refiner, received a license to buy and sell Venezuelan crude from the United States federal government earlier this month. Reliance was the biggest single buyer of Russian crude oi in India before the latest U.S. sanctions, which specifically targeted its biggest supplier, Rosneft.

According to the data, Reliance bought a cargo of Boscan crude, currently en route to its destination on the Ottoman Sincerity Suezmax tanker. This is the first cargo of Boscan to be sold in six years as well, the report noted. Reliance had also snapped another cargo of 2 million barrels of Venezuelan crude from Vitol, to be delivered next month. The Indian company was also looking for direct deals with Venezuela’s PDVSA, unnamed sources told Reuters.

At least three Very Large Crude Carriers are scheduled to load at Venezuela’s Jose port next month, the Reuters sources said. The tankers were chartered by Vitol and Trafigura - the commodity majors that were granted a license to deal in Venezuelan oil.

Earlier this month, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said that oil sales from Venezuela, under the control of the United States for over a month now, are set to bring $5 billion over the next few months.

“Sales today are over a billion dollars, and in fact, we have sort of short-term agreements over the next few months that will bring in another $5 billion,” Secretary Wright said in the interview during a historic visit to Venezuela to meet with the interim President Delcy Rodríguez.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

How the EU Could Unlock 22 Trillion Cubic Feet of Barents Gas


  • A clearer, more narrowly defined European Union Arctic policy could allow for increased production of Norway’s Barents Sea gas, offering a nearby, lower-emission supply alternative to global liquefied natural gas (LNG).

  • The Barents Sea holds an estimated 3.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent of natural gas, but converting this resource into deliverable supply depends on securing infrastructure like new export capacity.

  • To balance supply needs with climate goals, any eligibility for Barents development should be tied to measurable standards for methane and CO? intensity, electrification, and strong environmental safeguards.

A rethink of the European Union’s (EU) Arctic policy could keep Norway’s Barents Sea gas in play in the 2030s, offering Europe a nearby, low-emission supply option as its reliance on the global liquefied natural gas market grows, according to new Rystad Energy research and analysis. The European Commission is reviewing its 2021 Arctic policy and has opened a public consultation through 16 March 2026. With Barents projects typically needing five to 10 years to move from discovery to steady output, the signal the EU sends now will determine whether additional volumes from already-open Norwegian acreage are ready for the mid-2030s, or whether Europe will lean even more heavily on global LNG in the next decade.

Rystad Energy’s analysis suggests that the EU could boost production in the Barents Sea by drawing a clearer boundary, both geographically and operationally, without necessarily weakening its climate stance. By defining the “Arctic” scope more narrowly and tying any eligibility to explicit emissions and environmental requirements, the EU could avoid treating Norway’s already-open Barents acreage the same as frontier areas. The approach would still be contested among environmental groups, and it wouldn’t change the underlying trade-offs around Arctic drilling, but it could influence how buyers and policymakers weigh supply options during the 2030s. In Rystad Energy’s base case scenario for the EU27 plus the UK, Norway supplies about 20-30% of gas demand through 2050, with LNG rising from 30% to 50% during the same period, increasing Europe’s exposure to global markets.

The resource base is substantial, but converting it into deliverable supply is less than straightforward. The parts of the Barents Sea already open to exploration, according to Norwegian Offshore Directorate estimates, hold around 3.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe) of natural gas, or about 22 trillion cubic feet. Rystad Energy estimates producing fields and projects expected to be sanctioned by 2030 will contribute combined output of roughly 2.25 billion boe through 2050. Additional output beyond that would likely depend on new discoveries, coordinated development across multiple fields and, crucially, export capacity.

Infrastructure is a significant swing factor and could limit long-term scalability. A 2023 study by Gassco and the Norwegian Offshore Directorate found that new Barents export capacity can be socio-economically profitable if sufficient volumes are proven. Today, the region’s main outlet is Hammerfest LNG, an export terminal in the far north, but it remains largely tied to the Snøhvit field, which limits flexibility to absorb any new volumes. A pipeline connection south into the Norwegian Sea network is one potential route, but it would require enough scale and synchronized timelines across projects to be financeable.

Lead times in the Barents Sea are long, so clear policies matter. If the EU sets clear definitions and requires data-backed verification, it can keep near-term supply options open without blurring its climate standards.

Tore Guldbrandsøy, Partner and Oil & Gas Analyst at Rystad Energy

Emissions are one of the key points policymakers are considering during this review period, and this will directly impact how buyers view and compare future Barents gas supply to other sources. Norway’s upstream production is among the lowest-emitting globally, and gas delivered by pipeline from Norway generally ranks as a lower-emissions option for Europe. At Snøhvit, carbon dioxide (CO?) removed from the produced gas is already reinjected offshore, and planned electrification of the Snøhvit–Hammerfest LNG facilities is expected to cut the project’s carbon footprint further. Environmental critics note that lower emissions intensity doesn’t change the fact that burning gas adds CO? to the atmosphere, but methane leakage and carbon intensity are increasingly used in policy and procurement to distinguish between remaining sources of supply during the transition.

Opening the door completely is not a realistic option for the EU, but a well-structured framework with tight definitions and standards could keep sensitive northern Barents areas off-limits, while explicitly distinguishing already-open Norwegian zones from frontier areas. Any eligibility could be linked to measurable thresholds for methane and CO? intensity, deadlines for ending routine flaring, electrification and CO? management where feasible, and independent verification with transparent reporting.

Other environmental safeguards beyond emissions are also crucial: protection for sensitive ecosystems, seasonal operating limits, and structured consultation with Sámi, coastal communities and fisheries. Demand risk is also a factor for the bloc to consider. If EU gas consumption falls faster than expected, more frequent policy reviews could limit the risk of stranded resources, for example, by tightening eligibility or reassessing whether additional infrastructure still makes sense.

Europe is going to be comparing marginal gas supplies more than adding large new ones. Using lifecycle emissions and methane performance as decision criteria won’t settle the broader climate debate, but it does steer remaining demand toward the lower-impact end of the barrel. A clearly defined and structured Arctic policy can help move the EU in that direction.

Emil Varré Sandøy, Vice President for Oil & Gas Research at Rystad Energy

By Rystad Energy