Published August 18, 2024
DAWN
Illustration by Abro
From July 30, deadly riots erupted in Britain when three young girls were stabbed to death in a quiet seaside town of the country. Britain’s far-right groups took to the streets when rumours of the murderer being a Muslim asylum-seeker spread, especially from social media platforms such as X. The murderer is actually a Rwandan youth who is a British citizen. But this didn’t stop far-right leaders from milking the rumour.
The riots were largely pitched against Muslims. But this is not the first time this has happened. However, till the 1980s, violence between white far-right groups and non-whites in Britain was often described as “race riots.” In these, far-right gangs fought pitched battles against immigrants from Caribbean countries and from South Asian regions.
It was from the late 1990s onwards that race riots in Britain increasingly began to be seen as violence between far-right groups and Muslims — especially after the 9/11 attacks in the US, and a spate of terrorist attacks by militant Islamists in Britain. Consequently, incidents of Islamophobia, too, witnessed a manifold increase.
Yet, even the roots of anti-Muslim riots in Britain can be found in the history of race riots in the country, despite the fact that the violence then was largely aimed at non-whites and not against Muslims alone. One of the first major ‘race riots’ in Britain took place in 1919. White working class men and soldiers returning from the First World War, began to attack non-whites for ‘usurping’ their jobs. The Chinese community suffered the most in these ‘riots’. It wasn’t religion but race that was the target.
Although far-right groups in the UK have initiated hostile attacks against Muslims for decades, could the recent ‘race riots’ prove to be a tipping point for both the rioters and Muslims in Britain?
This would remain the case across the decades till the 1990s. In a 2016 essay, Palestinian Professor Emeritus at Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium Bichara Khader wrote that immigration was not a serious issue as such in Europe till the mid-1960s. In the 1950s, large numbers of immigrants from Caribbean countries, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa began arriving in various European cities.
As European economies boomed, these immigrants were seen as vital contributors to this boom. It was only when the economies began to contract from the early 1970s that the term “migration problem” gained increased usage. Yet, it was still not linked to a “Muslim problem” as it is today.
The economic turmoil of the 1970s triggered vicious riots. These were explained as ‘race riots’ because they involved white far-right ‘hooligans’ on the one side, and non-whites on the other. The reasons were economic. The far-right accused their governments of allowing non-white immigrants to “steal white jobs.” It really wasn’t a clash of cultures as such — or not yet.
Till the early 1980s, Muslims in Europe were not very exhibitionistic about their faith. For example, their lifestyle in Britain mirrored that of white working class men, who would work all day in factories and then gather in pubs in the evenings for a drink. But, once settled, Muslim men began to marry women from their home countries.
They then brought them to Europe, even though it wasn’t uncommon for some to marry European women as well. According to Khader, most of the women who came as wives were from rural and peri-urban areas of South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. They had been influenced by Islamist social movements that were initiated in their home countries from the mid-1970s. The influence of the wives changed the settlers’ attitude towards their community’s ‘cultural values.’
This attracted an influx of Muslim preachers, who began to set up shop in various European cities, especially in Britain. They were particularly appealing to the second-generation of British Muslims, especially from families that had failed to be fully assimilated by European integration policies.
This generation began to adopt the ideas proliferated by the preachers. The second generation used these to invent an identity for themselves, as Muslims in non-Muslim countries. Consequently, the presence of veiled women and mosques grew. This is when the “migration problem” began to be seen as a “Muslim problem”, triggering episodes of Islamophobia.
The chaadar, niqab and hijab were vigorously promoted by the preachers among the women of Muslim diasporas in the West. Men, too, were encouraged to adopt an “Islamic look” by letting their beards grow. From the 1990s, ‘multiculturalism’ began to be championed by most Western countries.
It was closely linked to the rise of neoliberal economics, which aimed to construct a global, interconnected economy. This meant that a Muslim community (in the West) didn’t have to completely immerse itself in the secular values of the West, as long as it was knitted to an integrated economy and remained productive.
But what happens when such an economy begins to struggle? A publicly asserted cultural identity, especially that of a diaspora, becomes that much harder to be accepted. It often comes under scrutiny, and criticised for being purposely ‘alien’ and even provocative.
After economies in Europe and the US began to come under stress in 2008, the number of complaints against Islamophobia increased. A majority of Muslims, who had adopted the identity that was first formulated by Islamist evangelical groups, found themselves in a quagmire. The way they looked, or publicly practised their faith, had been accepted by a multicultural West, but now this was changing.
The result was the electoral rise of populist far-right groups and the growth of anti-Muslim sentiment. Even though, according to most surveys, this sentiment is not widespread as such, it does get magnified online during riots or when Muslims are actually involved in any violent activity.
It is believed that non-Muslim immigrants in the West have gradually succeeded in pragmatically integrating themselves in the cultures of the countries they are settled in, but the Muslims have not. What’s more, this has been the case even in wealthy Muslim countries. For example, countries such as the UAE have imposed visa curbs on citizens of some Muslim-majority countries who want to work there. The UAE government has complained that workers from these countries are not willing to appreciate UAE laws against certain political and religious activities.
All this is not to suggest that white far-right groups have a point. They are simply using the Muslims as scapegoats, to divert attention from their own miserable failings. For example, Brexit, which was championed by these groups, has rapidly shrunk Britain’s economy and influence. But it is also high time for the Muslims in the West to realise that the zeitgeist of multiculturalism has eroded, and that they should accordingly refigure the way they exhibit their Muslim identity.
Published in Dawn, EOS, August 18th, 2024
From July 30, deadly riots erupted in Britain when three young girls were stabbed to death in a quiet seaside town of the country. Britain’s far-right groups took to the streets when rumours of the murderer being a Muslim asylum-seeker spread, especially from social media platforms such as X. The murderer is actually a Rwandan youth who is a British citizen. But this didn’t stop far-right leaders from milking the rumour.
The riots were largely pitched against Muslims. But this is not the first time this has happened. However, till the 1980s, violence between white far-right groups and non-whites in Britain was often described as “race riots.” In these, far-right gangs fought pitched battles against immigrants from Caribbean countries and from South Asian regions.
It was from the late 1990s onwards that race riots in Britain increasingly began to be seen as violence between far-right groups and Muslims — especially after the 9/11 attacks in the US, and a spate of terrorist attacks by militant Islamists in Britain. Consequently, incidents of Islamophobia, too, witnessed a manifold increase.
Yet, even the roots of anti-Muslim riots in Britain can be found in the history of race riots in the country, despite the fact that the violence then was largely aimed at non-whites and not against Muslims alone. One of the first major ‘race riots’ in Britain took place in 1919. White working class men and soldiers returning from the First World War, began to attack non-whites for ‘usurping’ their jobs. The Chinese community suffered the most in these ‘riots’. It wasn’t religion but race that was the target.
Although far-right groups in the UK have initiated hostile attacks against Muslims for decades, could the recent ‘race riots’ prove to be a tipping point for both the rioters and Muslims in Britain?
This would remain the case across the decades till the 1990s. In a 2016 essay, Palestinian Professor Emeritus at Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium Bichara Khader wrote that immigration was not a serious issue as such in Europe till the mid-1960s. In the 1950s, large numbers of immigrants from Caribbean countries, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa began arriving in various European cities.
As European economies boomed, these immigrants were seen as vital contributors to this boom. It was only when the economies began to contract from the early 1970s that the term “migration problem” gained increased usage. Yet, it was still not linked to a “Muslim problem” as it is today.
The economic turmoil of the 1970s triggered vicious riots. These were explained as ‘race riots’ because they involved white far-right ‘hooligans’ on the one side, and non-whites on the other. The reasons were economic. The far-right accused their governments of allowing non-white immigrants to “steal white jobs.” It really wasn’t a clash of cultures as such — or not yet.
Till the early 1980s, Muslims in Europe were not very exhibitionistic about their faith. For example, their lifestyle in Britain mirrored that of white working class men, who would work all day in factories and then gather in pubs in the evenings for a drink. But, once settled, Muslim men began to marry women from their home countries.
They then brought them to Europe, even though it wasn’t uncommon for some to marry European women as well. According to Khader, most of the women who came as wives were from rural and peri-urban areas of South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. They had been influenced by Islamist social movements that were initiated in their home countries from the mid-1970s. The influence of the wives changed the settlers’ attitude towards their community’s ‘cultural values.’
This attracted an influx of Muslim preachers, who began to set up shop in various European cities, especially in Britain. They were particularly appealing to the second-generation of British Muslims, especially from families that had failed to be fully assimilated by European integration policies.
This generation began to adopt the ideas proliferated by the preachers. The second generation used these to invent an identity for themselves, as Muslims in non-Muslim countries. Consequently, the presence of veiled women and mosques grew. This is when the “migration problem” began to be seen as a “Muslim problem”, triggering episodes of Islamophobia.
The chaadar, niqab and hijab were vigorously promoted by the preachers among the women of Muslim diasporas in the West. Men, too, were encouraged to adopt an “Islamic look” by letting their beards grow. From the 1990s, ‘multiculturalism’ began to be championed by most Western countries.
It was closely linked to the rise of neoliberal economics, which aimed to construct a global, interconnected economy. This meant that a Muslim community (in the West) didn’t have to completely immerse itself in the secular values of the West, as long as it was knitted to an integrated economy and remained productive.
But what happens when such an economy begins to struggle? A publicly asserted cultural identity, especially that of a diaspora, becomes that much harder to be accepted. It often comes under scrutiny, and criticised for being purposely ‘alien’ and even provocative.
After economies in Europe and the US began to come under stress in 2008, the number of complaints against Islamophobia increased. A majority of Muslims, who had adopted the identity that was first formulated by Islamist evangelical groups, found themselves in a quagmire. The way they looked, or publicly practised their faith, had been accepted by a multicultural West, but now this was changing.
The result was the electoral rise of populist far-right groups and the growth of anti-Muslim sentiment. Even though, according to most surveys, this sentiment is not widespread as such, it does get magnified online during riots or when Muslims are actually involved in any violent activity.
It is believed that non-Muslim immigrants in the West have gradually succeeded in pragmatically integrating themselves in the cultures of the countries they are settled in, but the Muslims have not. What’s more, this has been the case even in wealthy Muslim countries. For example, countries such as the UAE have imposed visa curbs on citizens of some Muslim-majority countries who want to work there. The UAE government has complained that workers from these countries are not willing to appreciate UAE laws against certain political and religious activities.
All this is not to suggest that white far-right groups have a point. They are simply using the Muslims as scapegoats, to divert attention from their own miserable failings. For example, Brexit, which was championed by these groups, has rapidly shrunk Britain’s economy and influence. But it is also high time for the Muslims in the West to realise that the zeitgeist of multiculturalism has eroded, and that they should accordingly refigure the way they exhibit their Muslim identity.
Published in Dawn, EOS, August 18th, 2024
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