South Sudan Deploys Troops to Secure Heglig Oil Field
South Sudan has moved troops into Sudan’s Heglig oil field under what it calls a tripartite agreement with Sudan’s two warring factions. The move is a rare arrangement aimed at shielding critical oil infrastructure as fighting escalates across West Kordofan.
South Sudan’s army chief of staff, Paul Nang, appeared in a video address from Heglig, saying South Sudanese forces entered the field following an agreement between President Salva Kiir, Sudanese Armed Forces leader Abdelfattah El Burhan, and Rapid Support Forces commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Under the deal, both Sudanese factions are to withdraw from the area, allowing South Sudanese troops to secure oil installations and prevent sabotage.
Nang said the deployment is strictly limited to protecting infrastructure and that South Sudanese forces will not take part in military operations inside Sudan. The objective, he said, is to “completely neutralise” the oil field as a combat zone, even as battles intensify elsewhere in the region.
Heglig matters far more to Juba than to Khartoum. The field hosts a central processing facility capable of handling about 130,000 barrels per day of South Sudanese crude, which is exported via pipelines running through Sudan to Port Sudan. South Sudan resumed oil exports through Sudan in January after a near year-long suspension.
While Sudanese economists say the loss of Heglig has limited impact on Sudan’s finances, South Sudan has far less room for disruption.
Production at Heglig has already fallen sharply, from about 65,000 barrels per day to roughly 20,000 since fighting between the SAF and RSF erupted in April 2023. The outlook darkened further this week when China National Petroleum Corporation confirmed it had withdrawn from Sudan after three decades, citing deteriorating security in West Kordofan.
By Julianne Geiger for Oilprice.com
The Struggle for Sudan’s Oil Corridor
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary bloc that broke from the Sudanese army and now dominates most of Sudan’s western belt, has moved on the Balila facility in West Kordofan, and it is already affecting the energy corridor. Balila feeds directly into the GNPOC line carrying South Sudan’s Dar blend to Port Sudan, and operators now acknowledge disruptions along the corridor. South Sudan’s budget rests almost entirely on these flows. Any interruption tightens the margin immediately. By taking Balila, the RSF has positioned itself on top of some prime infrastructure that affects both Sudan and South Sudan at a moment when neither can absorb further shocks.
The RSF is likely to hold the area. It controls the rural belts linking West Kordofan to Darfur, giving it reliable logistics and manpower. It does not need to run the field. It only needs to control movement and decide whether crude flows. The group has done this for years at gold sites. It secures the perimeter, controls access, and imposes its own rule, while leaving technical operations to others. Balila will be handled the same way. Operators pulling non-essential staff is the first sign of how exposed the corridor now is.
The timing overlaps with a quiet U.S.–Saudi attempt to stabilize the political track before state institutions deteriorate further. Washington wants Riyadh to set the terms; Riyadh wants U.S. cover for a settlement that sidelines factions it views as too close to the UAE. Abu Dhabi continues to back the RSF and shows no interest in easing off while the group is advancing. This leaves a narrow space where each actor is trying to influence outcomes without triggering a direct clash.
Riyadh is focused on keeping the pipeline corridor functioning and preventing a wider breakdown that would jeopardize Port Sudan. U.S. envoys are telling counterparts that Washington will not support or fund a settlement reached with the RSF sitting on the country’s main revenue assets. Neither actor is preparing to escalate, but both are working to limit an RSF path to uncontested control of Sudan’s export system.
The RSF understands this environment quite well. Taking Balila shows it can alter the facts faster than diplomatic tracks can adjust, and the early signs of reduced flows reinforce the point. It signals to Riyadh and Washington that negotiations cannot bypass RSF interests and signals to Abu Dhabi that its backing is yielding results. Unless one of the major sponsors shifts position, the RSF will likely hold the corridor long enough to force its terms into whatever political structure emerges next.
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