By Marílio Wane
March 21, 2025
Source: Africa Is A Country
On the eve of celebrating the 50th anniversary of its independence on June 25, 1975, Mozambique is going through a political and human rights crisis that is unprecedented in its young history as a nation. The anniversary coincides with the that of other former Portuguese colonies in Africa—Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau (which became independent in 1973), and São Tomé and Príncipe (which became independent in 1975)—since the historical liberation processes took place in parallel and articulated fashion, in the face of the struggle against a common enemy. This synchronicity prompts a series of reflections on the countries’ experiences over the last five decades. Objectively, the assessment is not positive, given that these countries are among the world’s most impoverished nations, as shown by various social and economic indicators. In addition, these countries are afflicted by acute political crises marked by their populations’ weariness with the vicissitudes of the current regimes, especially in Mozambique, whose case is paradigmatic of an even greater problem on the continent.
In the wake of the major geopolitical transformations taking place in the main centers of global power, political movements have emerged on the African continent that challenge the regimes installed after independence. Many characterize these as struggles for a “second independence,” in the sense that the movements for liberation from the European colonial yoke, which began in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, became distorted over time, degenerating into oppressive and authoritarian regimes. This has led to a crisis of representation based on the widespread perception that African political elites have hijacked their respective state apparatuses to satisfy private interests and keep themselves in power. Even more aggravating is the idea that these elites have allied themselves with their former European colonizers, as well as with other foreign players, becoming the local counterpart to a logic of neocolonial domination.
Certainly, the most eloquent example of this phenomenon is the case of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a recently founded mutual defense pact between the countries of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. This is a coordinated action with the manifest aim of eliminating French influence in the region, resulting from colonialism and previously abetted by the local political elites, who were deposed by military coups. To this end, the leaders of the movement expelled French military bases (and even embassies, in some cases) and redirected dividends from the exploitation of mineral resources to the respective national treasuries. Even more emblematic of the movement’s aims was its unilateral decision to leave ECOWAS, the regional cooperation bloc, on the grounds that it was an organization manipulated by the West under the leadership of Nigeria.
Across the continent, emerging movements challenge the status quo, characterized by demands for emancipation, participation, and greater social inclusion. Each in its own way, these movements express new correlations of forces resulting from their internal and regional social dynamics in interaction with broader geopolitical transformations. As a result, their success or failure will depend on factors such as the solidity of institutions, the degree of organization of civil society, and above all, how the regimes in power will react to a whole set of relatively unprecedented situations in African countries since their independence. Let’s see how the current political crisis in Mozambique fits into this context.
From controversial elections to a “parallel government”
Since the results of the general elections on October 9 were announced, a wave of demonstrations and civil protests has swept Mozambique, challenging what is seen as electoral fraud in favor of the Frelimo party, which has been in power since independence. On October 24, the electoral bodies gave victory to Daniel Chapo, the ruling candidate, with 70.61 percent of the votes, against 20.37 percent for the runner-up, Venâncio Mondlane, supported by the newly created Podemos party. However, the electoral process was marred by numerous allegations of irregularities, from the registration process to the voting itself. In fact, since the first multiparty elections in 1994, accusations of fraud have been recurrent and widely documented, with the determining factor being the fact that Frelimo has almost absolute control over state institutions, including the electoral and judicial bodies. However, this time, due to the sheer volume of accusations, the challenge came not only from the opposition but also from various sectors of civil society and even the international community (especially the European Union).
The fact is that after the official announcement of the results, the main opposition candidate called on the population to demonstrate in protest and obtained great support for his cause, above all because of widespread dissatisfaction with deteriorating living conditions in the country. The brutal murders of Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe, activists from the Podemos party, which took place in circumstances that have yet to be clarified, further aggravated public indignation. Against this backdrop and having been harshly and disproportionately repressed by the authorities, the demonstrations escalated from marches in the streets to more drastic actions. Over the last three months, the country has witnessed episodes of genuine popular revolt and civil disobedience, such as the interruption of access routes, activities at ports, airports, and borders, and the destruction of infrastructure (especially police stations and headquarters of the ruling party), leaving the country in a state of anomie bordering on ungovernability.
Tensions peaked in the last week of 2024 after the Constitutional Council validated the election results, which were widely contested at various levels. During this phase of the demonstrations, acts of popular revolt increased and police repression intensified, to the point that civil society organizations filed accusations against security authorities to international bodies on the grounds of serious human rights violations and crimes against humanity. As 2025 began, with the expected confirmation of Frelimo’s victory, the inauguration ceremony for the new president was also marked by strong popular protests and disproportionate police repression, resulting in arrests and even deaths.
At the inauguration, public participation was isolated and suppressed, supposedly for security reasons. From a symbolic point of view, the ceremony epitomized the notorious disconnection between the once liberating party and Mozambican society. By contrast, Venâncio Mondlane’s triumphant return to the country the week before was greeted with popular acclaim in the streets of the country’s capital. Since October, Mondlane had gone into self-exile, allegedly for his own safety. It was from his exile that the officially defeated candidate called for and organized the demonstrations, which included work stoppages and, especially, the nonpayment of road fares, among other actions. Many demonstrations led to violence and various tensions, generating an atmosphere of generalized confusion for which both parties were blamed. Controversies aside, the fact is that the demonstrations called for by the opposition gained massive popular support, in visible contrast to the officially established authority of the regime.
Taking advantage of the vacuum in the popularity of the sworn-in president, Mondlane proclaimed himself President of the Republic via social networks, from “where” he does most of his mobilization work. This communication strategy has been one of the main factors behind his popular support, especially among the huge youth population, plagued by unemployment, absolute poverty, violence, and low expectations for the future. In fact, as various Mozambican social analysts have said, these are the fundamental causes of popular discontent, with the electoral crisis appearing as the tip of the iceberg of deeper problems. In this sense, various sectors of society have called for an initiative to promote an inclusive dialogue between the new government and the opposition, which has not happened, thus postponing a solution to the crisis.
It is precisely through social media that Mondlane has instituted a kind of “parallel government,” issuing “presidential decrees” based on agendas that are widely supported by a large part of the population and, on the other hand, contradict the government’s decisions and policies. This situation of ambiguity has resulted in several episodes of social tension that are expected to worsen over the next few years, with no prospect of reduction and a high risk of growing out of control and becoming violent, as has already been observed. According to data published by the Decide Electoral Platform (a civil society organization that has been monitoring the latest electoral processes), 353 deaths have been recorded since the demonstrations began in October, with the majority, 91 percent, being lethal shootings by the police. According to the organization, if this situation of “two governments” continues, the tendency is for social unrest to increase, leading to more deaths and violent clashes.
Problems and solutions in the neighborhood
The environment of uncertainty in Mozambique is paradigmatic of a broader context on the continent, namely, contestation against political regimes that were consolidated decades ago, after the dawn of African independence. At a regional level, the prompt support provided by Frelimo’s closest historical allies, such as the ANC (South Africa), MPLA (Angola), ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe), and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania), who recognized the electoral victory of their “comrades” even before the final official validation, is quite symptomatic. It’s no coincidence that some of these countries are facing similar problems at home: In last year’s elections, Nelson Mandela’s historic ANC was forced to form a government of “national unity” with the Democratic Alliance (DA), the party that represents the white segment of the population; this situation stems from the growing unpopularity of the party that fought apartheid and has ruled the country since 1994. In Angola, meanwhile, there is enormous concern on the part of the regime about the potential contamination effect that the situation in Mozambique could generate locally, given the parallels between the two countries’ histories.
As a counterpoint, Botswana held elections that put an end to 58 years of rule by the BDP party, which had been in power since its independence in 1966. This case attracted attention precisely because it was a point outside the curve, in which the transition took place smoothly. This perhaps reflects the fact that Botswana is recognized as one of the most prosperous countries in Africa, registering positive economic growth rates and good positions in the HDI ranking by the continent’s standards. Despite being a country of little strategic relevance in the region, Botswana’s example holds important lessons for its neighbors, especially from the point of view of political stability and socioeconomic development.
Finally, for Mozambique and its counterparts in the PALOP (Portuguese-speaking African countries), the 50th anniversary of independence could serve as a moment of reflection that provides useful lessons for overcoming the difficult living conditions to which the overwhelming majority of their inhabitants are subjected. In the cases of Mozambique and Angola, one-party systems survived the establishment of liberal democracy, resulting in a kind of “multipartyism without democracy,” in which almost absolute control over all institutions and spheres of public life persists. As the Mozambican case suggests, the excessive concentration of power on the part of the liberation parties and movements, whose legitimacy is anchored in past anticolonial struggles, can become the main factor of instability and an obstacle to development. As a result, the various protest movements all over the continent point to internal solutions in the form of strengthening civil society and mechanisms aimed at greater inclusion of various actors and sectors of society in decision-making processes. Only in this way will everyone be able to truly participate in the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of independence.
On the eve of celebrating the 50th anniversary of its independence on June 25, 1975, Mozambique is going through a political and human rights crisis that is unprecedented in its young history as a nation. The anniversary coincides with the that of other former Portuguese colonies in Africa—Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau (which became independent in 1973), and São Tomé and Príncipe (which became independent in 1975)—since the historical liberation processes took place in parallel and articulated fashion, in the face of the struggle against a common enemy. This synchronicity prompts a series of reflections on the countries’ experiences over the last five decades. Objectively, the assessment is not positive, given that these countries are among the world’s most impoverished nations, as shown by various social and economic indicators. In addition, these countries are afflicted by acute political crises marked by their populations’ weariness with the vicissitudes of the current regimes, especially in Mozambique, whose case is paradigmatic of an even greater problem on the continent.
In the wake of the major geopolitical transformations taking place in the main centers of global power, political movements have emerged on the African continent that challenge the regimes installed after independence. Many characterize these as struggles for a “second independence,” in the sense that the movements for liberation from the European colonial yoke, which began in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, became distorted over time, degenerating into oppressive and authoritarian regimes. This has led to a crisis of representation based on the widespread perception that African political elites have hijacked their respective state apparatuses to satisfy private interests and keep themselves in power. Even more aggravating is the idea that these elites have allied themselves with their former European colonizers, as well as with other foreign players, becoming the local counterpart to a logic of neocolonial domination.
Certainly, the most eloquent example of this phenomenon is the case of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a recently founded mutual defense pact between the countries of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. This is a coordinated action with the manifest aim of eliminating French influence in the region, resulting from colonialism and previously abetted by the local political elites, who were deposed by military coups. To this end, the leaders of the movement expelled French military bases (and even embassies, in some cases) and redirected dividends from the exploitation of mineral resources to the respective national treasuries. Even more emblematic of the movement’s aims was its unilateral decision to leave ECOWAS, the regional cooperation bloc, on the grounds that it was an organization manipulated by the West under the leadership of Nigeria.
Across the continent, emerging movements challenge the status quo, characterized by demands for emancipation, participation, and greater social inclusion. Each in its own way, these movements express new correlations of forces resulting from their internal and regional social dynamics in interaction with broader geopolitical transformations. As a result, their success or failure will depend on factors such as the solidity of institutions, the degree of organization of civil society, and above all, how the regimes in power will react to a whole set of relatively unprecedented situations in African countries since their independence. Let’s see how the current political crisis in Mozambique fits into this context.
From controversial elections to a “parallel government”
Since the results of the general elections on October 9 were announced, a wave of demonstrations and civil protests has swept Mozambique, challenging what is seen as electoral fraud in favor of the Frelimo party, which has been in power since independence. On October 24, the electoral bodies gave victory to Daniel Chapo, the ruling candidate, with 70.61 percent of the votes, against 20.37 percent for the runner-up, Venâncio Mondlane, supported by the newly created Podemos party. However, the electoral process was marred by numerous allegations of irregularities, from the registration process to the voting itself. In fact, since the first multiparty elections in 1994, accusations of fraud have been recurrent and widely documented, with the determining factor being the fact that Frelimo has almost absolute control over state institutions, including the electoral and judicial bodies. However, this time, due to the sheer volume of accusations, the challenge came not only from the opposition but also from various sectors of civil society and even the international community (especially the European Union).
The fact is that after the official announcement of the results, the main opposition candidate called on the population to demonstrate in protest and obtained great support for his cause, above all because of widespread dissatisfaction with deteriorating living conditions in the country. The brutal murders of Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe, activists from the Podemos party, which took place in circumstances that have yet to be clarified, further aggravated public indignation. Against this backdrop and having been harshly and disproportionately repressed by the authorities, the demonstrations escalated from marches in the streets to more drastic actions. Over the last three months, the country has witnessed episodes of genuine popular revolt and civil disobedience, such as the interruption of access routes, activities at ports, airports, and borders, and the destruction of infrastructure (especially police stations and headquarters of the ruling party), leaving the country in a state of anomie bordering on ungovernability.
Tensions peaked in the last week of 2024 after the Constitutional Council validated the election results, which were widely contested at various levels. During this phase of the demonstrations, acts of popular revolt increased and police repression intensified, to the point that civil society organizations filed accusations against security authorities to international bodies on the grounds of serious human rights violations and crimes against humanity. As 2025 began, with the expected confirmation of Frelimo’s victory, the inauguration ceremony for the new president was also marked by strong popular protests and disproportionate police repression, resulting in arrests and even deaths.
At the inauguration, public participation was isolated and suppressed, supposedly for security reasons. From a symbolic point of view, the ceremony epitomized the notorious disconnection between the once liberating party and Mozambican society. By contrast, Venâncio Mondlane’s triumphant return to the country the week before was greeted with popular acclaim in the streets of the country’s capital. Since October, Mondlane had gone into self-exile, allegedly for his own safety. It was from his exile that the officially defeated candidate called for and organized the demonstrations, which included work stoppages and, especially, the nonpayment of road fares, among other actions. Many demonstrations led to violence and various tensions, generating an atmosphere of generalized confusion for which both parties were blamed. Controversies aside, the fact is that the demonstrations called for by the opposition gained massive popular support, in visible contrast to the officially established authority of the regime.
Taking advantage of the vacuum in the popularity of the sworn-in president, Mondlane proclaimed himself President of the Republic via social networks, from “where” he does most of his mobilization work. This communication strategy has been one of the main factors behind his popular support, especially among the huge youth population, plagued by unemployment, absolute poverty, violence, and low expectations for the future. In fact, as various Mozambican social analysts have said, these are the fundamental causes of popular discontent, with the electoral crisis appearing as the tip of the iceberg of deeper problems. In this sense, various sectors of society have called for an initiative to promote an inclusive dialogue between the new government and the opposition, which has not happened, thus postponing a solution to the crisis.
It is precisely through social media that Mondlane has instituted a kind of “parallel government,” issuing “presidential decrees” based on agendas that are widely supported by a large part of the population and, on the other hand, contradict the government’s decisions and policies. This situation of ambiguity has resulted in several episodes of social tension that are expected to worsen over the next few years, with no prospect of reduction and a high risk of growing out of control and becoming violent, as has already been observed. According to data published by the Decide Electoral Platform (a civil society organization that has been monitoring the latest electoral processes), 353 deaths have been recorded since the demonstrations began in October, with the majority, 91 percent, being lethal shootings by the police. According to the organization, if this situation of “two governments” continues, the tendency is for social unrest to increase, leading to more deaths and violent clashes.
Problems and solutions in the neighborhood
The environment of uncertainty in Mozambique is paradigmatic of a broader context on the continent, namely, contestation against political regimes that were consolidated decades ago, after the dawn of African independence. At a regional level, the prompt support provided by Frelimo’s closest historical allies, such as the ANC (South Africa), MPLA (Angola), ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe), and Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania), who recognized the electoral victory of their “comrades” even before the final official validation, is quite symptomatic. It’s no coincidence that some of these countries are facing similar problems at home: In last year’s elections, Nelson Mandela’s historic ANC was forced to form a government of “national unity” with the Democratic Alliance (DA), the party that represents the white segment of the population; this situation stems from the growing unpopularity of the party that fought apartheid and has ruled the country since 1994. In Angola, meanwhile, there is enormous concern on the part of the regime about the potential contamination effect that the situation in Mozambique could generate locally, given the parallels between the two countries’ histories.
As a counterpoint, Botswana held elections that put an end to 58 years of rule by the BDP party, which had been in power since its independence in 1966. This case attracted attention precisely because it was a point outside the curve, in which the transition took place smoothly. This perhaps reflects the fact that Botswana is recognized as one of the most prosperous countries in Africa, registering positive economic growth rates and good positions in the HDI ranking by the continent’s standards. Despite being a country of little strategic relevance in the region, Botswana’s example holds important lessons for its neighbors, especially from the point of view of political stability and socioeconomic development.
Finally, for Mozambique and its counterparts in the PALOP (Portuguese-speaking African countries), the 50th anniversary of independence could serve as a moment of reflection that provides useful lessons for overcoming the difficult living conditions to which the overwhelming majority of their inhabitants are subjected. In the cases of Mozambique and Angola, one-party systems survived the establishment of liberal democracy, resulting in a kind of “multipartyism without democracy,” in which almost absolute control over all institutions and spheres of public life persists. As the Mozambican case suggests, the excessive concentration of power on the part of the liberation parties and movements, whose legitimacy is anchored in past anticolonial struggles, can become the main factor of instability and an obstacle to development. As a result, the various protest movements all over the continent point to internal solutions in the form of strengthening civil society and mechanisms aimed at greater inclusion of various actors and sectors of society in decision-making processes. Only in this way will everyone be able to truly participate in the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of independence.
