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Friday, April 17, 2026

21st-Century Fascism and the Antichrist

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

One of the most influential interpretations of 20th-century fascism is that fascism was a rebellion against the secularism of the modern era, which proposed a transcendent society both on a practical level (progress) and on a theoretical level (the possibility of transcending all limits). This rebellion led to the return of political religion (religion as a form of temporal power) in various guises as a political factor. This interpretation has been the subject of intense debate, and it is not my intention to analyze that debate. I am interested only in addressing the question of the relationship between fascism and religion. Speaking of fascism of the past and fascism of the future may entail the trap of thinking that there is no fascism in the present. It can also lead one to believe that fascism is a monolithic entity and that, therefore, there is only one type of fascism. Usually, definitions of fascism all refer to fascism as a political regime. I, on the contrary, distinguish between political fascism and social fascism; the former occurs in strictly political relations, and the latter, in social relations.

Fascism and Religion in the 20th Century

The relationship between political fascism in the first half of the 20th century and religion is complex. The secularism of modern society (the separation of church and state) was never complete and operated only in the metropolises, not in the colonies. As both religion and the secular state continued to vie for their place in society, the contradictions and disputes between the two coexisted with convergences, complicities, and mutual exploitations. In the case of Italian fascism, we can say that the sacralization of politics (the veneration of the fascist state, fascist rituals and symbols) signified the emergence of a political, secular, laic religion that came to exist in parallel with traditional religion (the privileged recognition of Catholicism). In 1932, Mussolini, unlike Robespierre, asserted that the fascist state did not have its own theology, but it did have its own morality.

Traditional religion was pragmatically used to reinforce the subjugation of the masses to the political designs of fascism. Conflicts existed and were intense between secular religion and Catholicism in the realm of education, since fascism did not want to relinquish its monopoly on the education of new generations. But the goal was always to abolish the boundaries between the political and religious spheres. None of this was entirely new.

Since the 15th century, movements had emerged to create civic religions, ranging from secret societies (Freemasonry, the Illuminati, Opus Dei) to Jacobinism and positivism. Faith in the nation and in nationalism was a way to combat socialism and contain Catholicism. The revolutionary socialism of the early Mussolini was intended to be more of a belief than a science. As he often said: “Humanity needs a belief.” It was about appealing to an experience of faith in the religion of the Nation. The patriotic religion. Giovanni Gentile argued that fascism had a religious character, “insofar as it takes life seriously,” and “as a movement it arose from the very soul of the nation.” It aimed to create an ethical state.

The sacralization of politics has always involved the sacralization of war, purifying violence: the ultimate sacrifice of body and soul for a sublime cause. Death and resurrection appear transfigured in the cult of martyrs and heroes. The connection between war and the awakening of religious sentiment is as evident in D’Annunzio as it is in Marinetti. In Il Fascio from 1921, it was written: “We are the custodians of a generation that, long ago, transcended the limits of its own historical reality and advances unstoppably toward the future… We are the highest of the high… The Holy Communion of war has molded us all with the same spirit of generous sacrifice.” Fascist belief transcended the natural attachment to life on earth.

In 1932, the Fascist youth newspaper asserted that “a good Fascist is religious.” And in 1930, young university students in Milan established a school of Fascist mysticism centered on the Duce as a living myth. A certain syncretism with Catholicism was evident, and potential conflicts of interpretation were resolved through devotion to the party. The leva fascista was a ritual of initiation for young people similar to “confirmation” in the Catholic Church, through which young people were “consecrated as fascists.” The ceremonies were held in public in every city and included, in addition to the consecration ceremonies, oath-taking ceremonies, the veneration of flags, and the cult of the fallen martyrs. The celebration of the founding of Rome, Rome Day, romanità, and the “Latin spirit” were transformed into archetypal models of the greatness of the fatherland and the “civilization of Italy.”

The various religious elements converged in the struggle against “the triumphant beast of Bolshevism.” The blessing of the gagliardetto, the flag of the fascist “esquadras,” was initially used as a ceremony of redemption for a community that had previously been governed by the socialists. If fascism was a religion, dissidents were “traitors to the faith.” The will of God and the will of the State merged. Traitors were excommunicated, banished from public life. Augusto Turati, party secretary from 1926 to 1930, preached to the youth “the need to believe blindly; to believe in fascism, in the Duce, in the Revolution, just as one believes in God… We accept the Revolution with pride, just as we accept these principles – even if we realize they are wrong, and we accept them without question.” In short, the supreme commandment: “believe, obey, and fight.”

Faith had been transformed into the supreme virtue, and the headquarters of the National Fascist Party were regarded as the “altars of the religion of the Fatherland.” The rejection of rationalism and the adoption of mythical thinking are clearly evident in this passage from a fascist book: “The masses cannot distinguish nuances; they need spirituality, piety, religious principles, and rituals.” The political program was far less important than the belief system, rituals, and symbols. Only in this way could massive, intense, and long-lasting support be guaranteed. The sacralization of violence was linked to the aestheticization of politics, as Walter Benjamin rightly noted: politics as a rupture of civilizational constraints. It was this rupture that led Ezra Pound to feel drawn to fascism. Fascist irrationality is aesthetically reconfigured as spontaneity, intensity, and authenticity. Extreme nonconformity toward the world is the flip side of blind obedience to the fascist leader. Hence, too, ultimately, the misery of the aestheticization of violence, especially when bodies began to be thrown into the crematoria.

Fascism seeps drop by drop into the very heart of democracy

In the post-1945 period, analyses and interpretations of the fascist phenomenon proliferated. A significant school of thought considered fascism a rupture in the historical continuity of European culture, and some viewed it as a social pathology or as an imposition by manipulative minorities lacking a coherent doctrine or ideology. In other words, fascism, being the result of political manipulation, had no genuine social base. Selfish interests or intimidation tactics had created the body of fascism’s followers. The opposing school of thought saw fascism as a continuation of the French Belle Époque and considered that fascism had a highly coherent system of thought.

These interpretations shared two characteristics. On the one hand, they conceived of fascism as a phenomenon of the past—a past that had been irreversibly overcome. On the other hand, they constituted an external view of fascism. They did not analyze the internal experience of fascism – the way it was lived by the populations where it functioned as a political system, or how it was passively accepted or enthusiastically celebrated by those populations. Much less were they interested in the facets of personality or psychic drives that made fascist life a “natural” or “normal” way of living for the vast majorities who actively or passively lived under fascism. How was it possible that Nietzsche or Heidegger were proto-Nazis, and that the combination of evolutionary theory, civilizational cycles, and racist biology led to fusions between Charles Darwin and Oswald Spengler?

More recently, the field of analysis has diversified. Internal interpretations of the fascist way of life have emerged, based on the idea that, while fascism sought to be religious and appealed to the irrational or mythical, pragmatic reasons of self-interest or intimidation were insufficient to explain adherence to fascism. On the other hand, renewed emphasis has been placed on psychoanalytic readings previously advanced by the Frankfurt School, which conceive of fascism as a permanent potentiality of communal life; consequently, it makes no sense to speak of fascism as something historically outdated. It is not a matter of theorizing the return of fascism, but rather of theorizing the continued presence of fascism in different forms and potentialities. In a recent book, Vladimir Safatle eloquently defends this theory in a book titled The Internal Threat: Psychoanalysis of the New Global Fascisms (available in Portuguese).

This analytical shift has a very clear sociopolitical rationale: the global rise of far-right political forces that advocate political fascism and, when in power, effectively seek to implement it. Perhaps what best characterizes the present time is the fact that liberal democracy is being used more and more frequently to enable anti-democratic fascists to come to power. These are politicians who are democratically elected but who, once elected, do not exercise power democratically. It is fascism seeping drop by drop into the very heart of democracy. The phenomenon is not new. It happened with Hitler after the 1932 elections. But the intensity with which it is occurring causes the quantity to transform into a new quality. The greater intensity of drip-feed political fascism feeds on the interstitial growth of another type of fascism: social fascism.

Social fascism is the entire system of social relations characterized by extreme power inequality, in which the stronger party holds a veto over the weaker party’s opportunities for life and survival. It consists of situations where people or groups are at the mercy of unilateral powers, without rights or legal defense, even if they formally live in a democracy. It is extreme social exclusion, abysmal exclusion, where human life is devalued by the logic of the market and power. Unlike political fascism, social fascism is pluralistic. I distinguish five forms of social fascism:

1. contractual fascism, in which the weaker party has no choice but to accept the conditions imposed by the stronger party, however unjust they may be, on pain of not surviving;

2. social apartheid fascism, in which excluded populations live in ghettos – urban areas that are not urbanized – and are at the mercy of all kinds of violence;

3. parastatal fascism, in which state violence is subcontracted to paramilitary groups, organized crime, and militias that commit the most extreme violence against populations with impunity;

4. financial fascism, in which powerful sectors of financial capital manipulate the state to, through usurious interest rates, extract a significant portion of the workers’ wages and to engineer permanent crises that justify the theft of the middle classes’ savings or the expropriation of assets pledged as collateral for debts;

5. insecurity fascism, which consists of using situations of extreme insecurity—accidents, extreme weather events, etc. – for which insurance policies do not exist or are inaccessible, and in which the protective intervention of the state is absent.

The intensification of these different forms of social fascism is largely due to neoliberalism as the dominant form of global capitalism. The gradual intensification of fascism aims to create the conditions for a new phase of political fascism. There is no determinism in this. There is only one objective, and it is up to democrats not to allow it to materialize

21st-Century Fascism and the Antichrist

Emerging fascism is more extremist in its religious identity than the fascism of the past. Like the latter, it is based on the sacralization of violence and the sanctification of elites, but it feeds on a dystopian vision of the future that crystallizes in the concept of the Antichrist. It is primarily present in the U.S., but its capacity for dissemination is enormous. Through the idea of the Antichrist, neo-fascism (or neo-Nazism) exacerbates its Christian identity and conceives of present-day society as a life-and-death struggle between Good and Evil where there is no room for negotiations or ceasefires, but only surrender and the extermination of the loser. Society is in a state of perpetual civil war, and its future is the apocalypse unless it is saved by racially and religiously supremacist states equipped with cutting-edge technologies for controlling populations.

On the religious front, there are significant differences between 20th-century fascism and 21st-century fascism. 20th-century fascism created a secular religion but maintained a relationship of cooperation and tension with traditional religion that presupposed the latter’s relative autonomy. 21st-century fascism takes its Christian identitarianism to the extreme and seeks to absorb the traditional religion closest to it: Pentecostal evangelical movements. The fusion between the political and religious spheres is now much more intense, if not total.

Twentieth-century fascism was based on the idea of a better future society, so much so that socialism was originally present in both Mussolini’s and Hitler’s convictions. In contrast, 21st-century fascism is dystopian and apocalyptic, and thus the Antichrist is not only communism and socialism; it is also democracy itself and the kind of coexistence it promotes, leading to the stagnation of technological progress, which is the only path to redemption. The politics of hatred that sustains civil war knows no political adversaries; it knows only enemies to be eliminated.

Given its apocalyptic nature, it is no surprise that 21st-century fascism, unlike 20th-century fascism, is promoted by sectors of the elite – generally the wealthiest, the billionaires, of whom Peter Thiel is a paradigmatic example. While for 20th-century fascism democracy was merely a decadent regime, for 21st-century fascism democracy, like human rights, is the embodiment of Evil. So too is the ecological struggle or any demand that places obstacles in the way of the infinite accumulation of wealth and the technology upon which it depends.

The relationship between 21st-century fascism and Zionism deserves special consideration. 20th-century fascism was anti-Semitic, understood as a radical racist policy against the Jewish people whose extermination it proclaimed and actively sought. Zionism, understood as the aspiration to create a Jewish state, was at that time a minority view among Jews. It found greater acceptance among Russian Jews and those from Eastern Europe (the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Poland). The Zionist organizations of the time sought and reached agreements with the Nazis, particularly regarding the relocation of Jews to Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel (agreements that, incidentally, met with little success among the Jewish people).

Shortly after World War II, many Jewish intellectuals drew attention to the danger of Zionism and to the similarities between Zionist methods and those of fascism and Nazism. In 1948, Albert Einstein and Hannah Arendt signed the famous letter to the New York Times, highlighting such similarities in the case of Menachem Begin’s party, today known as Likud.

Extremist Zionists, currently dominant in the Israeli government, share with fundamentalist evangelical Christians the idea of the apocalypse based on the same biblical readings, particularly the Book of Daniel (Dan 7-12) and the Apocalypse of John in the New Testament. Hence the emergence of Christian Zionism, which has greatly strengthened the global fascist movement of this century.

The Antichrist is, as Robert Fuller states, an American obsession. The fight against the Antichrist is today personified in the figure of billionaire Peter Thiel, founder of PayPal and Palantir, whose artificial intelligence was apparently responsible for the deaths of the Iranian ayatollahs and the 208 children, elementary school students at the Shadjareh Tayyebeh School in the city of Minab, Iran.

Peter Thiel, without any theological training, travels the world denouncing as manifestations of the Antichrist leading to the final apocalypse all those political achievements for which we have fought over the last two hundred years to restore a modicum of dignity to the classes and social groups excluded by capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy: a minimally redistributive state, through social policies (public health, housing, and education); democracy as a system of peaceful coexistence and a means of curbing the “excesses” of capitalism; human rights and the struggle for human dignity in societies where the prosperity of a few is achieved at the cost of the dehumanization of many; ecological struggles to build a new relationship with nature that allows for the reconstruction of natural cycles of vital regeneration. All of this is anathema that stands in the way of the salvation that only the intelligent technology of AI can bring. The existential threats are not climate change, the atomic threat, the nuclear threat, or the threat of AI. The existential threats come from resistance to the full development of these “advances.” All of this is a manifestation of an anti-Messiah, the triumphant beast of the end times.

The new promised land is Silicon Valley, theorized with reference to Carl Schmitt and, in a distorted and perverse way, to René Girard (the theory of the scapegoat and imitation as the flip side of rivalry). The new Antichrist is the entire historical accumulation of knowledge, organization, and struggle that has been warning of the existential risks humanity and planet Earth face if nothing is done to curb social, historical, environmental, racial, and sexual injustice; if democracy cannot defend itself against anti-democrats; if imperial will replaces international law; if war, genocide, and the plundering of resources are the only means of “resolving” conflicts. For the fascists of the Antichrist, all this historical accumulation of the last two hundred years is a training ground of stagnation that impedes the only possible redemption, technological redemption.

The fascism of the Antichrist and the extremist identitarianism—both Christian and Zionist—on which it is founded, are nonetheless manifestations of Eurocentric thought, which should come as no surprise since every civilization contains “its own” barbarism. And in true European fashion, the “laboratory” experiments of this fascism begin outside the Eurocentric metropolises, in Western Asia (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Iran, and Lebanon), but one never knows where they end. After all, wasn’t the genocide of the Herero and Namaqua peoples of Namibia carried out by the Germans between 1904 and 1908 a rehearsal for the Holocaust of the Jews in Europe?Email

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Boaventura de Sousa Santos is the emeritus professor of sociology at the University of Coimbra in Portugal. His most recent book is Decolonizing the University: The Challenge of Deep Cognitive Justice.

Sunday, March 01, 2020

How Christian nationalism is driving American politics

February 29, 2020 By Paul Rosenberg, Salon

LONG READ

In early 2018, after a year of confusion over why Donald Trump had been elected, Clemson sociologist Andrew Whitehead and two colleagues provided compelling evidence — which I wrote about here — that “voting for Trump was, at least for many Americans, a symbolic defense of the United States’ perceived Christian heritage.” That is, it represented “Christian nationalism,” even when controlling for other popular explanations such as “economic dissatisfaction, sexism, anti-black prejudice, anti-Muslim refugee attitudes, and anti-immigrant sentiment.” The puzzle of why white evangelicals voted for Trump so overwhelmingly turned out to have a simple explanation: It wasn’t their religion that he championed — Trump is conspicuously not a person of faith — but rather its place in society.

Now, Whitehead and one of those colleagues, University of Oklahoma sociologist Samuel Perry, have a new book taking their research approach much further: “Taking America Back for God: Christian Nationalism in the United States.” Donald Trump doesn’t figure as a central subject in the book, but then, he doesn’t have to. By exploring and explaining the power of Christian nationalism, Whitehead and Perry provide one of the best perspectives possible on the 2020 race, and the larger forces that will continue to polarize America for some time to come.

Significantly, the authors explore Christian nationalism’s influence on society as a whole — not just on those who embrace it, but on those across the whole spectrum, from adherents to opponents — while not forgetting how extreme its animating vision is. They cite Corey Robin’s “The Reactionary Mind” and Jason Stanley’s “How Fascism Works,” for example, in making the point that while “Christian nationalism seeks to preserve or reinstitute boundaries in the public sphere,” its believers are “most desperate” to influence “Americans’ private worlds,” as is true of “all reactionary movements.”
This is both an extremely timely book and one that’s likely to shape our self-understanding as a nation for generations to come. I recently interviewed Andrew Whitehead by phone. This transcript has been edited for clarity and length.

Your book is about “Christian nationalism.” Let’s start with explaining what you mean by that.

When we talk about Christian nationalism, we identify it as a cultural framework that is all about trying to advocate for a fusion between Christianity, as they define it, and American civic life. This Christianity is something more than just orthodox Christian belief — it contains and overlaps with a number of other things. It operates like a signal to those that hear it, to a certain population, to say “people like us,” which is generally white, native-born, culturally Christian. So it intertwines not only with narratives about the Christian heritage of the United States, but also different traditions and symbols and value systems, and really is a fusion of these identities, put together to create what they see as the “ideal” America.

As you note in your introduction, there’s a large literature on Christian nationalism, including another book coming out next week, Katherine Stewart’s “The Power Worshippers.” What’s distinctive and different about your approach, both in terms of methodology and purpose?

What we’re doing that really hasn’t been done before is quantifying and empirically defining Christian nationalism. “The Power Worshippers” by Katherine Stewart is amazing, and really a great journalistic look at who’s pulling the levers, and who these power worshipers are. But what we do is we gather data from thousands of Americans through surveys, and then we interview them. What we’re trying to do is empirically show this ideology and cultural framework of Christian nationalism: How does it affect and influence the views of all Americans, their beliefs, their values, their behaviors? There really hasn’t been a sustained, empirical examination of this cultural framework and that’s what our book does.

In your introduction you lay out three main arguments. First, you argue that “understanding Christian nationalism, its content and its consequences, is essential for understanding much of the polarization in American popular discourse.” Your analysis doesn’t just look at supporters of Christian nationalism, but those with a broad range of perspectives, which you characterize in four broad groups. I’d like to ask about each of them, starting with those you call “Ambassadors.” What is distinctive or characteristic of them?

Ambassadors are those Americans who most strongly embrace Christian nationalism. We ask a series of questions of Americans and then we combine their responses across the six questions, and we are able to measure the strength with which they either embrace or reject Christian nationalism. Ambassadors are those who strongly agree with a series of questions like, “Do you believe that the United States or the federal government should advocate Christian values?” Or, “Should we allow the display of religious symbols in public spaces?” The more Americans agree with those, they score highly on our scale, and those Americans we call Ambassadors. So they are the ones that would want to see religious symbols in public spaces, they would want to see the government advocate for Christian values, declare the U.S. a Christian nation. They believe that the success of the United States is part of God’s plan, so they would be those who most strongly embrace this idea of the U.S. as a Christian nation and would want to see Christianity privileged in the public sphere.

On the other extreme are those you call “Rejecters.” What’s distinctive or characteristic of them?

Rejecters are those Americans who completely oppose and repudiate any notion of a close relationship between Christianity and American civil society. They’re in some ways a mirror image of Ambassadors, where for them to have a strong civil society, or pluralistic democracy, we should not be privileging any religion in the public sphere. They wouldn’t necessarily say that religion shouldn’t be a part of American life, but that in the halls of power one religion shouldn’t have an upper hand over another. So they wouldn’t want to see Christianity privileged in that sense.

One thing we want to make clear is that these aren’t just non-religious Americans. We show that there are evangelical Protestants who are Rejecters, and we interview them in the book. There are other Americans who are religious, who reject the desire to see Christianity privileged in the public sphere. Now, many Rejecters are pretty non-religious, but not all. So what we’re looking at isn’t just a religious/non-religious divide. It really is a divide about the role that they think Christianity should play in public life. Rejecters would say that while religion is fine to be part of people’s lives, we wouldn’t want to see Christianity privileged in some way.

In between these extremes there are two groups. Those called “Accommodators” are closer to the Ambassadors, but not the same. What’s distinctive or characteristic of them?

Accommodators lean towards accepting this idea of a U.S. civil society that embraces or in some ways might privilege Christianity. So their support is undeniable, but it’s not comprehensive. They would maybe be more equivocal about whether there should be certain religious symbols in public spaces. They might say that Christianity has been important to the history of the U.S., and that it generally is a good thing. But when you ask if other religious groups should be able to also integrate or be a part of it, they will be more open to that, whereas Ambassadors would say that this is a Christian nation, and if you don’t like it you should leave. Accommodators accommodate the “Christian nation” narrative and Christian nationalism, but they wouldn’t necessarily be opposed to other religious groups at least being able to live and operate here. So they are supportive of it, but it isn’t as comprehensive as Ambassadors.

The other in-between group, called “Resisters,” are closer to Rejecters but, again, not the same.

Resisters are more of a mirror image of Accommodators, where they are uncomfortable with the idea of a Christian nation, but not wholly opposed. So they lean towards opposition. They might say that Christianity played an important role in the founding of the United States, but they’re uncomfortable with any idea of trying to privilege Christianity in the public sphere. We find that there are a number of Resisters who are Christians, who think that Christianity can play a positive role in society, but it shouldn’t be held up over any other religious group — that Christians and other religious groups should be able to work alongside one another. So compared to Rejecters, who might say no one religion should have the upper hand, Resisters might still see a positive role that Christianity can play, but they wouldn’t want to see that formalized in any form by government.

You also make the point that these groups cut across all other demographics, although unevenly. One of the most notable findings is that the percentage of Rejecters rises with each succeeding generation, while the number of Ambassadors falls, pointing to a seeming waning of Christian nationalist influence. But there are contrary factors at work as well. Could you explain?

We do find, in other research, that Americans will respond to historical events, and might embrace Christianity as integral to American identity much more strongly. One example is when 9/11 happened. In the late ’90s, a certain number of Americans would say that being Christian was important to being truly American, but after 9/11, when asked that question, a much larger percentage of Americans said that to be truly American you need to be a Christian. So they were responding in some sense to the 9/11 attack on America, trying to identify “Who are we, and what are we all about?” A lot of the rhetoric surrounding that revolved around religion. But we found that 10 years after that event, those levels decreased, back actually below the 1996 levels.

Throughout history Christian nationalism has been a part of our cultural context, but it does wax and wane. Around the Cold War, trying again to identify who we are as Americans, Christianity was put on our coins — “In God we trust” — in this kind of push. Kevin Kruse shows in his book “One Nation Under God” how, in response to the New Deal and fears of creeping socialism, people pushed this idea that we’re a Christian nation. With Jerry Falwell and others, the Moral Majority were responding to the civil rights movement and the gender and sexuality movements of the ’60s and ’70s.

We see this current iteration of Christian nationalism responding to that. If there’s uneasiness or if we’re trying to define who we are, Christianity becomes kind of an easy go-to, to say, “This is what we’ve always been about.” With recent demographic shifts in U.S. society, that is another example, where Donald Trump and others would say that we’re a Christian nation and this is what we’re all about, and others would be willing to hear and embrace that. Even as there are fewer Ambassadors today, Christian nationalism is still a very powerful cultural framework and ideology that will help them define themselves against the outside. It still is a really strong explanatory tool to understand why people see and think the way they do about politics, their own lives and whatever is happening in the world today.

Your second main argument is that “to understand Christian nationalism, it must be examined on its own terms. Christian nationalism is necessarily part of a complex web of ideologies.” What are the main ideological connections that are most salient, politically and statistically?

People usually will try to say, “Is it racism or authoritarianism that really explains these effects?” What we find is that while Christian nationalism does overlap with these different ideologies, like racism or authoritarianism, it has an independent effect. While there are aspects of Christian nationalism where people do want to see a highly ordered society, it isn’t just that desire. There is something about wanting to see Christianity privileged in the public sphere that is an independent influence on how they see the world, or might view the criminal justice system or anything else. And the same with racism, where Christian nationalism is associated with generally prejudiced views towards nonwhite groups. It isn’t just that there’s racism. There’s something about this idea of seeing Christianity privileged in the public sphere that tells us something over and above the other ideologies. So while they’re related, they aren’t one and the same.

It seems like Christian nationalism is something broader than these ideologies it is connected to.

I think it is. I think it tells us something about the nature of this desire to see religion and especially Christianity privileged in the public sphere. It tells us something more about where that came from and why that’s important, and helps to explain why Americans might believe one way versus another.

Finally, your third argument is that “Christian nationalism is not ‘Christianity’ or even ‘religion’ properly speaking,” and indeed that “Christian nationalism often influences Americans’ opinions and behaviors in the exact opposite direction than traditional religious commitment does.” In fact, as one table in your book shows, in virtually all areas of social policy — everything except personal fidelity to religion — the influences are at odds.

It’s a recurring theme we see throughout our book. When we look at different hot-button political wedge issues in the U.S., or we look at views toward nonwhite groups or even non-Christian groups, we find that Christian nationalism encourages people generally to think and believe one way, while once we take that level of Christian nationalism into account, individual Americans who are more religious will actually be moving in the opposite direction.

One example is fear of Muslims. We ask a number of questions about, “Do you feel threatened by Muslims physically?” Or, “Do you think they hold moral values that are less than yours?” The way I explain it is that if you could take a carbon copy of me and the only thing you change — increase or decrease — is my Christian nationalism, then I will be more fearful of Muslims as you increase that. But if you took a carbon copy of me, and my level of Christian nationalism stayed the same level, and all you increased or decreased was my religious practice — as you increase my religious practice, I would actually feel less threatened by Muslims. So these things aren’t one and the same. While many Ambassadors and Accommodators are religious, it isn’t necessarily their religiosity that’s causing them to view immigrants or Muslims or nonwhite minorities this way. It’s their Christian nationalism.

The one topic where we find religious practice and increasing Christian nationalism work similarly is when we talk about gender, homosexuality or transgender rights. We do find that more religious people tend to be less willing to be open toward gay marriage, as an example, even when we account for Christian nationalism.

I’d like you to talk more about that. Why do those views translate from Christian nationalism to religious practice, whereas when it comes to attitudes towards Muslims or people of other races, the same is not true?

Christian nationalism is really focused on creating boundaries between “us” and “them.” This idea of true American identity is white, Protestant, culturally Christian, native-born. So that’s why we see religious practice and Christian nationalism work differently in that sense. But when we’re talking about sexuality, what we see is that for those that are religiously active they’re still seeing and believing that there should be some sort of ordering within gender and sexuality that is in line with what they see as traditional Christian beliefs. So Christian nationalism in the end works in the same direction with religious practice.

We see that same thing in our interviews. Those who were strongly Christian nationalist, who were Ambassadors, they would oppose same-sex marriage really along the lines of trying to protect this Christian nation. They would see it as a threat to America’s Christian nation. But when we talk to Americans who are very religious, but who reject or resist Christian nationalism, they might be opposed to gay marriage, but it isn’t that they want to see it outlawed at the federal level. They would think that it’s against the dictates of their Christian tradition.

I want to ask about two specific examples you discuss, which I think most observers don’t have a good handle on, but make perfect sense in your analysis. The first is a lack of sympathy for black victims of police violence, even in the face of video evidence. What are the reasons behind this lack of sympathy?

What it comes down to is that Christian nationalism is fundamentally about preserving or returning to a mythic society where there are traditional hierarchical relationships — between white and black, or even men and women. The authority structures that are in place are instituted by God, so any claims by minorities — in this case, racial minorities — that there are inequalities, to Christian nationalists and to Ambassadors, they would see that as disingenuous.

What we find is that when it comes to maintaining law and order, Christian nationalists are enthusiastic about that, so they’re basically biased toward seeing and defending fairness in that force that’s used against different people. They’re more likely to think that police treat blacks the same as whites, or that police officers shoot blacks more often because they are inherently more violent. They’re less likely to believe there are inequalities in policing, because to them that authority structure is put in place by God. So that is a little bit more about how Christian nationalism can uphold or encourage white supremacy, or specifically inequality in the criminal justice system.

The second example is attitudes towards guns, epitomized by the Florida legislature after the Parkland shooting, when they responded by overwhelmingly passing a bill requiring the prominent placement of “In God we trust” in all Florida schools. That bill is part of the Christian nationalist agenda pushed by Project Blitz. How does this make sense in terms of Christian nationalism? What’s the logic involved?

For Christian nationalism, for Ambassadors, they would say the real issue with our country when it comes to violence or anything else is that individuals are not Christian or not following the Christian God. So if we’re able, as a country, to encourage Christianity in the public sphere, that will heal a lot of the fracture in our nation, or these issues that make people want to inflict violence on others. They don’t see where larger structural changes like limiting access to guns might change it, because they say — and you hear this over and over — that if somebody couldn’t use a gun, they would use something else. But we can’t just outlaw evil, it is always going to be with us, violence is always going to be with us. So the only way to reduce violence is through encouraging Christianity overall.

Another reason they would oppose gun control is because they view the Constitution — and, by default, the Second Amendment — as ordained by the Christian God. So, to oppose the Second Amendment right to bear arms, they would say, is to oppose what God has instituted for this nation. The only way to heal our country is through encouraging Christianity, not limiting access to guns.

One thing that stood out for me was that Rejecters stand alone in seeing Christian nationalism as a threat — not spelled out as such, but in terms of those who support it. This seems problematic to me, if understandable. Could you talk about that?

We show that Rejecters are the only ones that are more likely to feel that threat or to be afraid of conservative Christians. The other groups are no different from one another. Even Resisters might see some room for Christianity to play a role in the public sphere. What is important to underscore is that Christian nationalism as a framework isn’t just equal to conservative Christians, or religious people, but is something different, and we find that it’s present across both the religious and non-religious groups and socio-demographic categories. So Americans in a lot of different places will embrace this, to different levels, and it can have profound impacts on how they might view policing of religious minorities or immigration or other issues.

Finally, what’s the most important question I didn’t ask? And what’s the answer?

A point I would want to make is that Christian nationalism has serious implications for two areas. One is American civil society, about upholding a pluralistic democracy. Christian nationalism, we find over and over again, doesn’t encourage an ability to compromise or to work together across differences or to find a common way that we can all agree on. For them it’s more and more about trying to defend a particular version of religion in the public sphere. So it’s really difficult to have a pluralistic democracy, which should be founded on compromise, when increasingly Christian nationalists desire their way or nothing. So that has deep implications for our democracy.

It also has serious implications for the American Christian church. With Christian nationalism in many ways subsuming common Christian traditions and symbols to its own ends, that really can go against the dictates of orthodox Christianity, like loving your enemy or your neighbors, or equality across all races and ethnicities. To the extent people are interested in or are trying to live out the dictates of the Christian scriptures, in many ways Christian nationalism is wholly opposed to them.

So for those who are interested in defending a pluralistic, democratic society, non-religious Americans can find common cause with those Christians who reject Christian nationalism, because they are focused on trying to ensure religious freedom for all or to live in harmony with their neighbors. One example is the Baptist Joint Committee [For Religious Liberty] or Christians Against Christian Nationalism. Non-religious or secular Americans who don’t want to see Christianity privileged in the public sphere can in some cases seek common cause with those who may be devoted to the Christian faith, but reject Christian nationalism.

Thursday, May 07, 2026

We Are Watching the Rise of Democratic Fascism

Source: Jacobin

“American fascism would . . . be correspondingly democratic in the American fashion.”

— Bertolt Brecht, Journals

At the end of last year, Donald Trump deployed more than two thousand Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents to Minneapolis and St Paul, essentially occupying the Twin Cities and making his previous deployments of the National Guard to Washington, DC, and other Democrat-run cities look like a neighborhood patrol in comparison. Agents hunted down and arrested some three thousand migrants and murdered Reneé Good and Alex Pretti, two US citizens who had joined protests against the operation.

The blitz in Minneapolis made it clear that Trump intended for ICE to function not just as an authoritarian police force with an outsize budget, but as his own political militia. This was evident not least in ICE’s blatant unprofessionalism, with agents often wearing casual clothing and receiving only minimal training, while purposefully and repeatedly undermining local governments and police departments. But it was also meant to be a spectacle: a public display of cruelty toward migrants that simultaneously demonstrated the limits of peaceful protest to his opponents. Even the podcaster Joe Rogan compared ICE to the Gestapo.

Though Rogan’s analogy may have been flawed, it hints at the more fundamental issue of the nature of the Trump administration. During his first term, that question appeared to be settled. Despite his noxious rhetoric, Trump’s track record in office was more or less what could be expected from a Republican president, and with his loss in 2020, it seemed US politics would largely return to normal. That is, until January 6, 2021, when a mob whipped up by Trump’s conspiracy-mongering about a stolen election stormed the Capitol in an attempt to prevent the peaceful transition of power. By then, it should have become clear that Trump was more than just another populist with authoritarian leanings. But was he, then, a fascist?

Historical fascism first came to power some hundred years prior to January 6, in October 1922, when Benito Mussolini led fifty thousand Blackshirts and seized power in the March on Rome (or rather, compelled conservative elites to hand power to him). The storming of the Capitol was obviously not the March on Rome. Trump never explicitly called on anyone to seize anything, and when his supporters finally managed to make it into the building, they mostly milled around and took selfies.

It was a carnivalesque event featuring a wild hodgepodge of protagonists — far-right militiamen, QAnon followers, Tea Party activists, bikers, gamers, manosphere cosplayers — orchestrated through social media but organized only to a limited extent. In that sense, January 6 was symptomatic of a broader trend: today’s far right is not vertically integrated but effectively decentralized, functioning more like a swarm than a combat formation. Moreover, it exhibits a dangerous banality: unlike its twentieth-century predecessors, it plays out in line with the rules of electoral democracy and within our everyday lives. Fascist propaganda is practically ubiquitous on social media platforms like X and increasingly prominent in pop culture. In Spain, a remix of the Falangist hymn “Cara al Sol” topped the Spotify charts, while in Germany, rich kids and skinheads alike delight in chanting xenophobic slogans to the beat of Italian DJ Gigi D’Agostino’s Eurodance hit, “L’amour toujours.” The fascism of today dances to the tune of democracy.

What Is — and What Isn’t — Fascist?

Even during Trump’s first term, debates raged around the extent to which his rule constituted a new form of fascism. While progressives and liberals tended to apply the label quite, well, liberally, critics emphasized that many vital elements of historical fascism were simply not present under Trump. Voices on the left in particular emphasized the roots of Trump’s politics in American democracy and its continuities with the country’s settler-colonial origins.

Fascism is a drastic, historically charged word that is often used merely to provoke a moralistic reaction. In analytical terms, however, it is entirely appropriate to treat fascism as something that is not — or is no longer — exclusively historical. A tsunami of political regression is sweeping across the Western world, and episodes of violence are on the rise, whether shootings of Black Lives Matter activists, the storming of the Capitol, the right-wing riots in the UK, or death threats against politicians in provincial Germany. A slew of parties whose politics go much further than the illiberal authoritarianism of a Viktor Orbán are now within striking distance of power. In eastern Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) — whose far-right current dreams of “system change,” meaning an end to parliamentary democracy — is polling at 40 percent.Fascism is a drastic, historically charged word that is often used merely to provoke a moralistic reaction.

That by no means implies that all right-wingers are fascists. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Kamala Harris repeatedly called Trump a fascist. What she really meant was that he was an autocrat. The same is true of philosopher Jason Stanley, for whom the United States is already fascist — which is obviously not the case. While the Democrats may be an incompetent, feckless opposition, they are neither outlawed nor persecuted. Militias are not dragging Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez off to the camps. Stanley applies the term to all ultranationalist movements in which the nation is represented by a single leader. By doing so, he loses sight of fascism’s specific characteristics. He also regards the American South during slavery as a form of fascism. Surely, any system that denies a group of people equal rights and subjects them to forced labor is profoundly unjust, but American slave-owning democracy guaranteed free elections, the separation of powers, and comprehensive civil rights for the white majority — things that would be inconceivable in a fascist society. Furthermore, Stanley blurs the distinction between social movement and political regime, lumping together all ultranationalisms regardless of how they emerge or whether they exercise power.

In Germany, many now deploy the term from a gradualist perspective, describing a “fascization” synonymous with the radicalization of neoliberalism or even bourgeois society as a whole. But by expanding the concept of fascism into a catchall category applicable to a wide range of historical injustices, we lose the ability to develop a clear, specific analysis of the present. We also risk underestimating the transformative nature of fascist forces by blurring the qualitative difference between democratic authoritarianism and fascism. After all, just as many deportations were carried out under Barack Obama and Joe Biden, but only Trump turns them into a public spectacle for his supporters to relish.

Neither Tragedy Nor Farce

If the concept of fascism is to be applied to the present day, it must first be placed in historical context. Despite certain similarities in program and style, what is referred to as fascism today is not the same as Nazism, a mass movement based on a virulently racist ideology combining ethnonationalist propaganda with violent pogroms. Nor is fascism returning as a tool to crush the workers’ movement in an era of acute class struggle.

Historically, fascism refers to a specific form of the extreme right during the interwar period characterized by a cult of the leader, organized street violence, dictatorship, and a drive to eliminate all opponents and enemies of the people whether real or imagined. Against this backdrop, authoritarian governments are not necessarily fascist: Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán may have sought to transform their countries into explicitly illiberal democracies, but they are not dictators.Contemporary far-right currents exhibit more differences from than similarities to historical fascism, while imperialism and colonialism today take on a distinctly different form.

Contemporary far-right currents exhibit more differences from than similarities to historical fascism, while imperialism and colonialism today take on a distinctly different form. For one thing, the European and Atlantic powers are not at war with each other. And while recent wars for geopolitical dominance such as in Afghanistan or the Middle East have certainly produced a lot of veterans, their numbers pale in comparison to the masses of surplus men who found themselves discarded and alienated from mainstream society after World War I.

The sociopolitical and economic conditions are also different. The 2008 financial crisis gave right-wing forces renewed momentum, but today’s economic crises and the associated social fallout are not comparable to the 1930s, when mass unemployment ate away at people’s sense of purpose and clouded their judgment. Today central banks and governments regularly intervene to mitigate crises. The stock market has reached new highs in recent years, and, much unlike the Great Depression, the United States neared full employment during Trump’s first term. By the same token, we have inflation, but no hyperinflation, and instead of a powerful socialist alternative vying for power, our current historical moment is characterized by a profoundly weak left. In this respect, the 2020s are certainly not a repeat of the 1920s and 1930s — neither as tragedy, nor as farce.

Fascism’s Counter-Modernity

The new fascism can thus only be understood within its own historical context. Trump’s authoritarianism reflects an American society that is still shaped by the legacy of slavery, and in which inequality, racism, and violence condition public life far more distinctly than in Europe. Nativism plays a role, as does white supremacy. In Europe, by contrast, far-right parties tend to mobilize a kind of state-oriented nationalism that seeks to combat alleged threats to national unity.

One of the main driving forces behind historical fascism was the fight against social equality, which explains to a large extent its determination to annihilate the social democratic and communist movements. Though the fascists may not have been direct agents of capital enlisted to save capitalism, as Joseph Stalin’s Comintern claimed, fascism would nevertheless have been inconceivable without the support of sections of big capital. Nor was it an irrational movement of sinister seducers and the seduced, as earlier scholarship on fascism claimed. Nevertheless, as Max Horkheimer famously said, “Whoever is not willing to talk about capitalism should also keep quiet about fascism” — for capitalism and fascism are both systems that naturalize inequality.Contemporary fascism, we argue, is rooted in a specific structure of feeling found in modern societies: the quest for a different kind of modernity.

Contemporary fascism, we argue, is rooted in a specific structure of feeling found in modern societies: the quest for a different kind of modernity. Modern society claims to oppose natural hierarchies and allow reason and rationality to triumph over faith and superstition. It seeks to subjugate nature to humanity, yet simultaneously acknowledges humanity’s natural finitude and limitations. The central promise of modern society, however — that of social integration through upward mobility — no longer holds. The specter of social decline has led to a kind of generalized negativity. Liberal modernity has thus brought forth a destructiveness directed against itself: a new fascism that offers destruction as a means of healing.

Fascism proves attractive in times of rapid social change not least because it fosters a collective narcissistic identification. Every angry and disoriented individual can merge with the community of the nation, which in turn is demarcated from individualistic, multicultural society. The various factions of this community are united by the destructive rebellion against liberal democracy and the desire to restore social hierarchies.

That is why fascism neither was nor is opposed to modernity in the strict sense. In fact, it exhibits many facets of modernity, such as in the way it deals with technology or the economy. Fascism, then, strives not for anti-modernity, but rather an alternative counter-modernity: a mythic order that promises ethos and stability in contrast to the cold rationalities and fluid, crisis-ridden nature of modern bourgeois society. Moreover, it sees itself as an eternal order defined by greatness, in which even the individual can attain such greatness (Peter Thiel or Elon Musk come to mind).

The Oxford historian Roger Griffin developed an influential definition of fascism in the early 1990s. In his view, fascism is a revolutionary movement with a “mythic core,” an imaginary of the nation and its rebirth as a form of “populist ultranationalism.” Fascism always required a national myth about the past in order to turn it toward the future. For fascism was not merely about restoring a bygone utopia, but also about the fantasy of a grand future — a narcissistic identification with the nation to which world-historical greatness was ascribed. Here, one is reminded of the Nazis’ feverish hallucinations of a “thousand-year Reich”.

The Joy of Violence

Fascism scholar Robert Paxton goes beyond Griffin’s ideological dimension on one crucial point, emphasizing the element of practice. According to Paxton, fascism is a “form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity.” Unity, strength, and purity are achieved through exclusion and violence directed against political opponents and minorities. Violence is a defining feature of fascism, but it carries far more significance: it is affective, redemptive, liberating, a means of transgression as well as transcendence through which one becomes one with oneself. Violence also plays a role in the myth of the nation as victim, just as one is oneself a victim of elites, external threats, and foreigners.There was no room for individualism in historical fascist thought: society consisted of regiments and divisions, not individuals.

There was thus no room for individualism in historical fascist thought: society consisted of regiments and divisions, not individuals. Historical fascism understood itself as the total integration of all social life. Economically, fascism was also a means of renewing capitalism — a capitalism purged of class struggle, its place taken by the national community. The fascist movement purges the nation of its opponents for the sake of transcendence. Everything that stands in the way of its rebirth must be destroyed. Fascism therefore always involved the existence of militias, in which the energies of fascist men can be unleashed according to “rhythm, intoxication, compulsion, and woe,” according to “marching, stamping, climbing, chasing, thrusting, and triumphing,” as the German sociologist Klaus Theweleit once put it.

Italian historian Enzo Traverso summed up the conceptual problem at the heart of our debate in his book The New Faces of Fascism: “In short, the concept of fascism seems both inappropriate and indispensable for understanding this new reality.” What we are dealing with, according to Traverso, is neither a return of the old fascism nor something completely different and new, but rather a hybrid, heterogeneous political movement that draws on the politically restorative imagination of the past, but whose future remains unclear. When asked whether Trump is a fascist, the analysis is binary: either he is or he is not, or one checks off a list of characteristics to see whether enough criteria are met. This perspective is far too static, taking too little account of the dynamics and evolution of the radical right.

A Democratic Fascism?

The original fascists wore the fascist label with pride. This began to change after the crimes of the Holocaust came to light, prompting Theodor W. Adorno to comment on the transformation of the far-right parties’ relationship to democracy: “Openly anti-democratic aspects are removed. On the contrary: they constantly invoke true democracy and accuse the others of being anti-democratic.” It is in this sense that we propose the term democratic fascism to describe the far right emerging today.The concept of democratic fascism appears contradictory, since fascism as a political regime was the negation of democracy.

At first glance, the concept of democratic fascism appears contradictory, since fascism as a political regime was the negation of democracy. But in the simplistic, catchphrase-driven use of the term, too little attention is paid to the process through which fascism emerges and comes to power within the democratic order, in order to destroy it later on. In Germany, only a few weeks passed between Adolf Hitler’s lawful election and the Enabling Act. In Italy, it took Mussolini three years to establish a full-fledged dictatorship.

The concept of democratic fascism thus reflects the fact that fascism today manifests itself in a contradictory and ambiguous situation. The Trump administration is not a fascist regime, and Germany does not face a fascist putsch. Far-right extremists can achieve certain goals even within a democracy. Despite all their differences, however, historical and contemporary fascist forces share a very similar self-image: they see themselves as national revolutionaries. This was most clearly articulated by Heritage Foundation President Kevin Roberts, who told supporters, “We are in the process of the second American revolution, which will remain bloodless if the left allows it to be.”

The contemporary fascist movement sees itself as renewing democracy with the ultimate aim of undermining it. At least for now, dictatorship is not on the agenda. Thus, the core of democratic fascism is its ambivalent relationship to democracy. Unlike historical fascists, who consistently and openly declared their intent to destroy parliamentarism, democratic fascists (even if they occasionally flirt with monarchist fantasies) seek only to strip democracy of its liberal institutions.

So far, Trump’s brand of fascism has been more of a form of what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way call “competitive authoritarianism.” There is real competition for political power and elections take place, even if authoritarian incumbents tip the scales of political competition in their favor. The opposition is legal, but the judicial system and the media no longer act independently and undermine political competition. Nevertheless, democratic fascism is based on a fundamentally different conception of democracy than the one we know. It is often grounded in the writings of the German legal scholar Carl Schmitt, the “chief jurist” of the Third Reich who once described the Nazis’ Nuremberg Race Laws as a “constitution of freedom.” Today, Schmitt is one of the central points of reference for Peter Thiel and J. D. Vance.

For Schmitt, democracy was not to be confused with universal suffrage and parliamentary debate — true democracy was the “identity of rulers and ruled.” Democracy, he argued, existed when the general will of the people was expressed in a national leader. This presupposed “a people whose members are similar to one another and who have the will to political existence.” Schmitt made it unmistakably clear what this meant: “Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second — if the need arises — elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.” In democratic fascism, the homogeneity of the general will manifests itself in majoritarianism — the reshaping of democracy in the interests of the “native” majority, who see their very existence as fundamentally threatened by the expansion of minority rights and whose political and social freedoms must therefore be curtailed. Combined with mass deportations, it is essentially a modernized variant of Schmitt’s thinking.

Trump might be building an authoritarian state to target minorities or the opposition, but he wants to scale back the state’s reach in most other areas, whether education or the environment. Whereas the Nazis sought to control and direct “ordinary people” and the business class, Trump’s state seeks to get out of their way. Businessmen should be able to do what they want — make profits — with state support but without state direction. Historical fascism was an unbridled behemoth, as Franz Neumann called it, a state of lawlessness. Today’s fascism is more like a joint venture in a deregulated state that neither environmental regulations nor antidiscrimination laws can stop. Instead of the total integration promised by historical fascism, democratic fascism is more like a radicalization of neoliberal disintegration.Democratic fascism is not based on a party following, but on a highly politicized public sphere, a hyperpolitics that forms bonds within affective networks.

Democratic fascism is not based on a party following, but on a highly politicized public sphere, a hyperpolitics that forms bonds within affective networks. It constitutes a polymorphous political spectrum unmoored from any rigid set of characteristics. Republicans who have converted to Trump supporters, MAGA enthusiasts, libertarian authoritarians from Silicon Valley, Evangelical Christians, Proud Boys, and angry Tea Party supporters have formed an alliance under Trump’s leadership, but each follows its own logic. If there is such a thing as a common denominator, it is that they are all anti-egalitarian, anti-cosmopolitan, and exclusionary.

In this regard, democratic fascism is obsessively focused on its enemies, while envisioning a modernized form of the nation. Democratic fascists want to roll back the liberalization of personal lifestyles but have no problem with open homosexuality, provided it reproduces social hierarchies. Their attacks on trans people are directed against the non-binary that undermines such hierarchies.

Racism, too, has different layers. Population policy is a key instrument of national governance: the goal is to reduce “low-IQ,” “garbage” migration, as Trump puts it, but not to create a homogeneous national community. When it comes to gender relations, the Right around Trump is strongly femonationalist, attacking abortion rights and promoting traditional family models, but not fundamentally questioning women’s participation in the workforce or political decision-making.

Trump, the Resentment Entrepreneur

Though the new fascism also refers to a mythical national past, it only partially imagines something like a transcendent order. Instead, it is more a kind of restorative origin myth. Donald Trump’s slogan, “Make America Great Again,” is about restoring something: America is to be great again. The new empire has become profane and secular — we want an empire that rules the world, but one that is great on its own.

A broad spectrum of fantasies of order can be found within MAGA’s intellectual milieu, ranging from monarchical market economies with a CEO as emperor, private cities and private states, to dark utopias of technological singularity and colonizing Mars. Trump’s visions of the future, by contrast, appear quite down-to-earth. Transgressive fantasies are found only in memes or hallucinatory AI-generated clips in which he appears alternately as a Roman emperor, a vengeful and punishing superhero, or a golden statue in an ethnically cleansed Gaza.

Neofascists are also less concerned with molecularly restructuring the entire society into a national body: there is no intention to create a comprehensive totalitarian state that dictates politics, the economy, and daily life, despite bans on gender-neutral language, restrictions on abortion rights, and the persecution of Palestine solidarity. Neofascism is about the restoration of a neo-authoritarian hierarchical society, rather than the creation of a totalitarian state.

Trump is not (yet) a dictator, nor is he a fascist of the classical school who promises transcendence and salvation. He comes across more like a vulgar mafia boss. But his political style, as Christopher Browning described it, is fascist: “The inflammatory rallies; the incessant mongering of fear, grievance, and victimization; the casual endorsement of violence; the pervasive embrace of conspiracy theories; the performative cruelty; the feral instinct for targeting marginalized and vulnerable minorities; and the cult of personality.” The fascist spectrum necessarily includes flirting with what the sociologist Michael Mann once called “moralized violence,” used to justify said violence as necessary, legitimate, and right.

The fascist style can also be observed in the AfD, where provincial party leader Björn Höcke gleefully quotes the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, who in 2016 spoke of “well-tempered cruelty” when outlining his vision for European migration policy. From a global perspective, both democratic and historical fascism are in many respects aesthetically and affectively oriented. The pioneering thinker of the German New Right, Armin Mohler, once summed this up succinctly: Fascist rhetoric is not about logical connections, but rather about “setting a certain tone, creating a climate, evoking associations.”

Thus far, liberals have tried to stop Trump and other far-right radicals with lawfare. This strategy was bound to fail. First, under capitalism, the balance of forces is reflected in the legal system, and Trump represents the class of property owners. Secondly — and much more importantly — fascism is an affective atmosphere. Trump was able to gain power by addressing a structure of feeling, a profound alienation from capitalist modernity. He is the perfect resentment entrepreneur, both as a producer and as a representative. The Left has not yet found an effective, durable response to him. Still, people are more resilient than we might fear. The resistance to ICE in Minneapolis was so effective in part because it dispelled the American right’s narrative: multiethnic communities demonstrated more cohesion than the right-wing prophets of apocalyptic social decline could ever have imagined.

Translation by Loren Balhorn.


Carolin Amlinger is a sociologist of literature and research associate at the Department of Linguistics and Literary Studies at the University of Basel. She is coauthor of Offended Freedom: The Rise of Libertarian Authoritarianism.

Oliver Nachtwey is a professor of sociology at the University of Basel. He is coauthor of Offended Freedom: The Rise of Libertarian Authoritarianism.

Loren Balhorn is editor in chief of Jacobin’s German-language edition.

This article was originally published by Jacobin; please consider supporting the original publication, and read the original version at the link above.Email

Carolin Amlinger is a sociologist of literature and research associate at the Department of Linguistics and Literary Studies at the University of Basel. She is coauthor of Offended Freedom: The Rise of Libertarian Authoritarianism.