How History Keeps the U.S. and Iran on a Collision Course
The United States and Iran are fighting not just because of their differences, but also because of their similarities. Both countries see themselves as exceptional civilizations shaped by religion and sustained by a sense of victimhood. Each believes it has been repeatedly wronged by the other and is therefore acting defensively. This mutual narrative has become one of the most powerful forces shaping U.S.–Iran relations.
Both nations interpret the relationship through different historical starting points. Because their memories of the conflict begin at different moments, each country tells a story in which it is primarily the victim and the other the aggressor.
The American Narrative
Many Americans view the conflict as beginning with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis, when Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held 52 Americans for 444 days. The crisis severed diplomatic relations and cemented Iran’s image in the United States as a hostile revolutionary state.
In this narrative, Iran subsequently became a destabilizing actor that supports militant groups and threatens American allies in the Middle East. From Washington’s perspective, sanctions, military pressure, and containment policies are defensive responses to an ideological regime that defines itself in opposition to the United States (but is not a physical threat to the homeland.)
The Iranian Narrative
Iran’s narrative usually begins earlier, with the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Mossadegh, a populist figure, had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company after it refused to allow Iran to audit its books. The CIA and Britain’s MI6 supported a coup that removed him from power and restored the Shah, who fled to Italy at the outbreak of unrest.
For many Iranians, this event demonstrates that the United States was willing to overthrow Iran’s democratic government to protect its geopolitical interests and control Iran’s patrimony. The Shah’s subsequent rule, which was described by Amnesty International as having “the highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid mechanism of civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief,” reinforced the belief that the United States sought to dominate Iran’s politics and economy.
Other events deepened this perception, including U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, the 1988 shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655 that killed 290 civilians, and decades of economic sanctions.
From Tehran’s perspective, the United States appears as an imperial power determined either to control Iran or to overthrow its government.
The Power of Victim Narratives
Mutual victim narratives reinforce the conflict. Each side interprets its own actions as defensive and the others as aggressive. Sanctions, proxy warfare, missile programs, and military strikes are all framed as necessary responses to the other side’s hostility.
Because both countries believe they have been repeatedly wronged, trust is extremely low.
Diplomatic openings are fragile because leaders on both sides expect deception or betrayal. Compromise can appear politically dangerous, since concessions may be interpreted domestically as surrender.
This dynamic creates a self-reinforcing cycle. One side takes a coercive step; the other interprets it as confirmation of its victim narrative and retaliates; both sides then feel further justified in their actions.
In short, each country believes it is playing defense.
Key Events That Reinforced the Cycle
Several major events since 1953 have reinforced these mutual narratives and deepened the conflict.
The 1953 Coup
The CIA and MI6 supported the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh after he nationalized Iran’s oil industry. For Iran, the coup demonstrated that the United States would intervene to control the country’s resources and political direction. American policymakers at the time largely saw the operation as a Cold War measure intended to prevent possible Soviet influence.
Today, the coup receives little attention in American discussions of U.S.–Iran relations, which often begin with the 1979 revolution.
The Iranian Revolution (1979)
The revolution overthrew the U.S.-backed Shah and established the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Many Iranians saw the revolution as liberation from dictatorship and foreign influence. In the United States, however, the fall of the Shah marked the loss of a key regional ally and the emergence of a hostile revolutionary regime.
The Hostage Crisis (1979–1981)
Relations deteriorated sharply when Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. Americans viewed the crisis as a violation of international law and a national humiliation that influenced the 1980 presidential election. Many Iranians justified the seizure to prevent another foreign-backed coup.
Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed in 1980.
The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)
When Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran, the United States eventually tilted toward Baghdad. Washington provided economic assistance, dual-use technology, military intelligence, and other support.
In Iran, this reinforced the belief that the United States was backing an aggressor. Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces, which killed or wounded 50,000, strengthened the perception that Western powers tolerated attacks on Iran. American policymakers, however, largely saw their support for Iraq as a way to prevent Iranian revolutionary expansion in the region.
Iran Air Flight 655 (1988)
In July 1988, a U.S. Navy cruiser shot down an Iranian passenger aircraft, killing 290 civilians. Iran viewed the incident as reckless or deliberate killing of civilians, particularly because the ship was later revealed to have been operating in Iranian territorial waters. The United States described the event as a tragic mistake during a tense naval confrontation.
The “Axis of Evil” Speech (2002)
In 2002, President George W. Bush labeled Iran part of an “Axis of Evil” alongside Iraq and North Korea. The statement reflected American concerns about Iran’s support for militant groups and its suspected pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In Iran, however, the speech angered both reformists and hardliners, especially because Tehran had recently cooperated with the United States against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Post 9/11 Cooperation and the Missed Opportunity (2003)
After the September 11 attacks, Iran quietly assisted the United States in operations against the Taliban. In May 2003, Tehran sent Washington a proposal through the Swiss ambassador outlining a possible comprehensive settlement of disputes between the two countries.
Iran signaled willingness to provide nuclear transparency, cooperate against terrorism, pressure Hezbollah to become a political organization primarily, and accept the Arab League framework for a two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians. In return, Iran sought sanctions relief, security guarantees, and recognition of its regional interests.
Washington did not pursue the proposal, in part because many officials believed Iran’s revolutionary government might soon weaken or collapse.
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The Nuclear Agreement (2015)
In July 2015, the United States, Iran, and several world powers reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. Iran saw the agreement as evidence that diplomacy could improve relations with the West. Critics in the United States argued that the deal did not sufficiently restrict Iran’s regional activities.
U.S. Withdrawal from the JCPOA (2018)
In 2018, the United States withdrew from the agreement and reimposed sanctions. In Iran the decision reinforced the belief that Washington could not be trusted to honor international agreements. Supporters of the withdrawal in the United States argued that the deal was inadequate (then-presidential candidate Donald Trump called it "the worst deal ever negotiated") and strengthened Iran’s regional influence.
Trump’s abandonment of the JCPOA probably reminded Iran of its bad investment in the Eurodif uranium enrichment consortium based in France. The Shah’s government invested $1.18 billion for 10 percent of the project, but Europe reneged on deliveries of nuclear fuel after the Shah was ousted, and Iran was repaid its investment in 1991 after a court battle.
The Killing of Qasem Soleimani (2020)
In January 2020, the United States killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, a senior commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, in a drone strike in Baghdad, Iraq. Washington justified the strike as a response to attacks on American personnel in the region, though the extent of Iran’s involvement is credibly disputed. In Iran, the assassination was widely viewed as the illegal killing of a national figure and a major escalation in the conflict.
It was Soleimani who had suggested a reconsideration of “our relationship with the Americans” before he was undercut by Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech. Soleimani was carrying an Iranian response to a message from Saudi Arabia that Iraq had relayed. According to Iraq’s prime minister, Adel Abdul Mahdi, Trump asked him to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which likely fed Iranian suspicions that Trump used diplomacy as a distraction from a looming attack. (Not the only time, as we have since learned.)
The U.S.-Israeli attacks (2025, 2026)
In June 2025, Israel attacked Iran, killing Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists, amid diplomatic dismissions and, days later, the U.S. attacked Iranian nuclear facilities and “obliterated” the nuclear program in Trump’s words. Iran counterattacked, and days later, the U.S. brokered a cease-fire that was requested by Israel.
In February 2026, the U.S. and Israel again attacked Iran as diplomatic discussions were underway, killing Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Iran responded with missile strikes against Israel and U.S. military installations in the region, and one day later Trump signaled interest in a cease-fire. Iran replied, ‘nothing doing” and pressed the attack. Trump then hinted at introducing ground troops and hinted the U.S. might use Iranian Kurdish militias to topple the government. Trump then demanded Iran’s “unconditional surrender.”
At the time of the February attack, Iran was not planning to strike U.S. forces in the region, as was admitted by the Pentagon after hostilities began, and it was offering concessions that were “objectively better” than the JCPOA, which Trump renounced in 2018, most likely because it was secured by his hated predecessor, Barack Obama, not because it was deficient.
A Long Shadow of Conflict
Over the decades, the confrontation has included proxy conflicts, sanctions, covert operations, and occasional direct military clashes. Events ranging from attacks on American facilities in Lebanon in the 1980s to cyber operations, sanctions, and regional proxy struggles have reinforced the adversarial relationship.
The quiet and not-so-quiet war included the bombing of the Marine barracks and the American embassy in Beirut, Lebanon (1983); kidnapping and killing of a CIA station chief in Beirut (1984); Operating Praying Mantis, U.S. attacks on Iran oil facilities (1988); abandonment of the Iran-Conoco deal to develop offshore oil fields (1995); the Khobar Towers bombing (1996), assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists (since 2010, likely at the hand of Israel and the Mojahedin-e-Khalq but likely with approval by the U.S.), and U.S. sanctions against Iran (1979-2026).
Despite periodic attempts at diplomacy and the election of reformist presidents, each new crisis tends to reinforce the historical narratives both sides already believe. And while each side has legitimate grievances about the other, Iran and America can take some helpful steps on their own: Iranians can stop the “Death to America” rants that just make it easier for the War Party and Israel, and Americans can crack open a history book to learn the “root causes” of the current conflict are the 1953 coup and the Pahlavi regime that was installed by Washington.
The ongoing war between the U.S./Israel, and Iran will eventually end, but in the meantime, it will feed the fires of mistrust between Tehran and Washington, making ending the conflict harder than starting it.
Conclusion
The U.S.–Iran conflict persists not only because of strategic disagreements but also because both countries interpret their toxic relationship through narratives of grievance and self-defense. If each side sees itself primarily as the victim, compromise will continue to be risky. Without a shift in these underlying narratives, periods of diplomacy will remain fragile and temporary.
By James Durso for Oilprice.com
