Screenshot of Ukrainian military video showing attack on the Russian Navy large landing ship, the Caesar Kunikov, in the Black Sea near Russia-occupied Crimea on February 14, 2024.
September 21, 2026
By Kayvan Amyot-Ariya
Key Takeaways:
Missiles first. After 2014 Ukraine had little navy. By Feb 2022 it had mines, coastal guns, and few Neptunes—no USVs until 29 Oct 2022. Early hits (Moskva, Saratov, Admiral Essen, Bekh) still pushed Russian ships off the northwest Black Sea and helped reopen Odessa before the July 2022 Grain deal.
USVs stretched range. Port raids at Sevastopol and Novorossiysk (from Nov 2022) did not empty the sea. Author: they plus July 2023 Kerch/Sevastopol strikes made grain inspections less tolerable; most of the fleet, including subs, moved to Novorossiysk by Oct 2023. Ships at berth were easier to find.
Not a safe fleet-in-being. CDS ship counts (Aug 2022–Apr 2025): Russia still massed for Kalibr salvos. Mines and missiles buy littoral denial; USVs buy some control effects—not a surface fight. July 2026 “shadow fleet” hits were mostly tankers. A port in USV range of an enemy coast is no longer automatically safe.
Introduction
Ukraine’s experience of sea denial in the Black Sea has highlighted the potential of Uncrewed Surface Vehicles (USVs) as the striking platform to support land-based systems. While anti-ship missiles and naval mines remain the centerpieces of littoral denial, USVs, particularly when operating in confined spaces, can expand the denial area, and lead long range strikes against fixed or slow moving targets, with potential ramifications for the strategic concept of the fleet-in-being, Corbett’s active inferior force based in the safety of a port. Although these land-based systems can only ever add costs to an adversary’s operations in an area, their joint use can have strategic effects, such as the reopening of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs).
Achieving Basic Denial
In 2019, in the aftermath of the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, which saw the loss of 75% of Ukraine’s naval personnel and 70% of its ships and infrastructure, the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Ukrainian Navy) published a strategy that relied on the concept of a “mosquito fleet.” The fleet would emphasize proactive asymmetric action by a small, modern, and agile force that would be cost-effective for short-range operations. Although the planned expansion until 2035 was not complete by the time war broke out in 2022, progress was made in the first phase of the strategy, which emphasized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage of coastal environments, and basic sea denial investments such as coastal artillery and naval mines.
Therefore, when Russian forces declared a navigation prohibition zone on February 24, 2022, in the northwest Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, the Ukrainian Navy had no submarines, a minimal surface fleet, and a land-based system designed to prevent immediate amphibious landings. They thus began deploying mines to prevent coastal landings, but otherwise suffered heavy losses as most of their warships were either sunk, damaged, or scuttled, including the fleet’s flagship, the Hetman Sahaidachny.
The most potent land-based weapon in Ukraine’s arsenal, its Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), were only available in short supply. Indeed, the Ukrainian Navy had only obtained its first Neptune’s in 2021, and had few in service at the war’s outset. Furthermore, although USVs are now ubiquitous with the war in the Black Sea, it is important to recall that these were not a factor for the first few months, only being developed over the summer of 2022, and being effectively used for the first time in the October 29, 2022 attack on the port of Sevastopol.
Regardless of these material shortcomings, the Ukrainian Navy successfully hit over a dozen boats and ships from February to October 2022, by relying on its prewar stockpiles and early allied donations. Although most of the sinkings used Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to target small Raptor-Class patrol boats, several vessels of higher tonnage, including the famous cruiser Moskva, were damaged or sunk in this period by using anti-ship missiles or mines.
Even if it is possible that the Moskva was only sunk due to lack of Russian preparation, the effect of the strikes remains the same. In conjunction with missile strikes against the Saratov landing ship, the Admiral Essen Frigate, and later the Spasatel Vasiliy Bekh Rescue Tug, the Russian Navy was forced to operate its warships from a significant standoff distance, lest they be at high risk of attack by land-based ASCMs. These early successes also helped spur allied donations of Harpoon ASCMs in the following months, which only solidified Ukraine’s littoral defenses.
These effects forced the Russian Navy to reduce its resupply operations to Snake Island and led to the eventual withdrawal of the Russian garrison on July 30, which reopened Ukrainian SLOCs around Odessa. The easing of Russia’s blockade was formalized in this period by the signing of the Black Sea Grain initiative on July 22, months prior to the first USV strike.
The Advent of USVs
On October 29 in Sevastopol, and on November 18 in Novorossiysk, USVs proved their range and potential danger by attacking Russian ships at port. Although these attacks did not sink any ships, they did successfully hit several vessels, including the Admiral Makarov Frigate, which forced the Russian fleet to take additional defensive precautions.
The many limitations of USVs notwithstanding, they were an integral part of the expansion of the Ukrainian sea denial range. Some have even suggested that the shift in the naval balance that longer range USV strikes provided may have served as a reason for Ukraine’s strikes on Sevastopol and the Kerch bridge in July 2023, just days before the Grain Initiative was set to renew. Although the Grain Initiative had allowed Ukrainian ships to pass without being attacked, Russian ships were allowed to inspect, monitor, and delay Ukrainian commercial vessels, which was a hindrance that no longer needed to be tolerated. This would mean that the uncrewed platforms successfully extended the gains that anti-ship missiles had achieved, and protected the SLOCs to Odessa, in a similar manner to a degree of sea control.
The lethality of the Ukrainian Navy’s new long-distance strike capabilities was also a likely cause of the October 2023 transition of large parts of the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, including nearly all submarine operations. The known position of ships at port generally allowed USVs to strike at long ranges, as they did not require real-time targeting information or to waste fuel looking for targets. These realities would repeat themselves in 2025 and 2026 as the port of Novorossiysk itself became a recurring target of USVs.
Was the Russian Navy Truly Denied?
Mines, missiles, and uncrewed systems can hinder a fleet’s willingness to operate within an area but can not decisively face it in the same way a surface fleet would. Fundamentally, if a fleet enters an area within range of enemy ASCMs, knowing the risks and facing them regardless, has it been denied? Perhaps, it has. It has likely been forced to forgo many smaller operations due to cost-benefit analysis, and has only massed when necessary, and even then, at considerable risk. This is precisely the trend that can be observed in the graph below, mapping the number of Russian ships and boats at sea during a large part of the conflict.
The above graph was created by manually compiling the Daily Reports by the Centre for Defence Strategies such as this one, and tracking the number of ships mentioned in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. The assembled dataset covers August 2022 to April 2025. The graph tracks ships and boats, as patrol boats are frequently sighted as part of the ships on duty, particularly in the early stages of the war.
The primary take-away from the graph appears to be that although Ukrainian denial expanded and generally reduced Russia’s seagoing presence, the Russian Navy maintained the ability to mobilize its fleet when needed and fire its own massed sea-launched Kalibr missile salvos, as it did in November and December 2024. Therefore, it is important to remember that a fleet that has restricted its operations at sea due to increased threats in a denial environment, nonetheless often retains the ability to mass if it accepts the risk.
Moreover, the safety of Ukrainian SLOCs to Odessa can easily be overstated. Despite the increased distance at which the Russian Navy is compelled to operate, it can still target Ukrainian shipping at a distance if it so chooses, and its very presence imposes additional costs on Ukrainian commerce. Nonetheless, the object of denial is to dissuade operations within an area and not the sinking of enemy ships nor the safe escort of commercial vessels. The former being achieved by mines and missiles, and the later, partially so by USVs, the Ukrainian denial experience can serve as a reference for similar confined sea denial planning, such as in the North Sea.
The primary take-away from the graph appears to be that although Ukrainian denial expanded and generally reduced Russia’s seagoing presence, the Russian Navy maintained the ability to mobilize its fleet when needed and fire its own massed sea-launched Kalibr missile salvos, as it did in November and December 2024. Therefore, it is important to remember that a fleet that has restricted its operations at sea due to increased threats in a denial environment, nonetheless often retains the ability to mass if it accepts the risk.
Moreover, the safety of Ukrainian SLOCs to Odessa can easily be overstated. Despite the increased distance at which the Russian Navy is compelled to operate, it can still target Ukrainian shipping at a distance if it so chooses, and its very presence imposes additional costs on Ukrainian commerce. Nonetheless, the object of denial is to dissuade operations within an area and not the sinking of enemy ships nor the safe escort of commercial vessels. The former being achieved by mines and missiles, and the later, partially so by USVs, the Ukrainian denial experience can serve as a reference for similar confined sea denial planning, such as in the North Sea.
Implications of Active Land-Based Denial at Range
As has been discussed, the Ukrainian Navy has been able to execute long-range USV attacks, especially against ships at port. Its land-based ASCMs successfully pushed back warship operations to a standoff distance of around 100 km and its USVs increasingly targeted its fleet at port. The maps below show the approximate location of hits on Russian ships with over 1,000 full displacement tons and tell the story of these movements, and the precarious position of the fleet at Novorossiysk
The above maps show an estimated location of Russian ships when damaged or destroyed by using an amalgamation of Black Sea News’ database of Russian Losses, Hi Sutton’s Timeline of the Ukraine Invasion at Sea, and various news outlets overlaid over Google Earth screen shots. The ships sailing registered as having been hit, and those which are depicted as sinking are registered as destroyed. A square around the ship represents it as having been at port when struck.
The final map reflects strikes recorded through May 2026; it does not yet incorporate the early July 2026 coordinated strikes against the Russian Shadow Fleet, which were directed at auxiliary and commercial vessels rather than combatants and would not materially alter the pattern depicted.
The trends from these maps can be understood quite clearly. In 2022, the Admiral Essen was struck operating outside Odessa, and the Moskva and Vasily Bekh were hit off Snake Island. These were large ships hit by missile when operating near Ukrainian ISR networks. In 2023, the Russian fleet stopped operating as frequently in the Sea of Azov and pulled back its ships in the Black Sea to a standoff distance. Nonetheless, USVs led attacks against ships at port in Sevastopol, Feodosia, Novorossiysk and even struck the Askold while in preparing for her maiden voyage out of Zaliv Shipyard. It also successfully struck several vessels on the approaches to Sevastopol with Naval mines, damaging three ships. The trend of long-range strikes against ships immobile at or near port continued through to 2026 and highlights the difficulties of defending stationary ships against long-range USV attacks.
The intriguing exception is the 2023 USV hit against the Russian Intelligence ship Ivan Khurs(marked), which was operating in the open sea 400 km away from any Ukrainian coastline. The Russian ship was supposedly monitoring the Turkish Stream pipelines in the area, although, as highlighted by Tayfun Ozberk, it did not have the capacity to defend the pipeline as an intelligence ship and the excessively long-range of the strike remains puzzling. However, it is possible that if the ship truly was operating in the same area to monitor something, whether it be the Turkish Stream pipelines or otherwise, then it may have been operating in a relatively small area for several days in a row, and so potentially making it easier to estimate its position ahead of a USV strike.
The impact of long-range USV strikes are significant. In traditional naval doctrine, the maintenance of a fleet-in-being at port was said to have strategic consequences by tying up enemy forces to monitor it in case the fleet left. This relied heavily on the idea that ships were safe from attack at port, a notion that has not held true for Russian forces in the Black Sea. Indeed, they have been under so much pressure, despite moving their fleet to Novorossiysk that some have suggested the possibility of a withdrawal to the Caspian Sea, which would represent a total withdrawal from the theater, and a tacit acknowledgement that the Black Sea Fleet’s operations would have become a liability rather than net benefit.
Although the figure does not consider the early July 2026 Ukrainian coordinated strikes on the Russian Shadow Fleet, the drawn conclusions remain unchanged. The strikes, which were largely conducted against oil tankers and other non-warships, highlight the effectiveness of high endurance UAVs at hitting moving targets at sea.
Furthermore, the large number of strikes by UAVs, but the absence of sinkings against these large vessels supports the claim that UAVs are primarily effective at destroying small boats, distracting the defences of larger warships, and imposing a cost on other ships operating in the denied space by forcing them to accept a certain risk of damage.
That is not to say that all fleets at port are equally vulnerable, but ports within USV range of an adversary’s coast may increasingly find themselves in a riskier position than in previous conflicts.
Conclusion
Altogether, denial based on land and augmented by USVs can effectively attrite an adversarial force over time and reduce its activities in a contested sea. However, it can not fully prevent it from going to sea and launching sea-launched missile salvoes if it chooses to accept the threat.
As the war in the Black Sea has shown, coastal denial, and the immediate protection of littoral commerce can be achieved by land-based ASCMs in conjunction with naval mines. USVs, having only joined the conflict after immediate denial had been secured, were able to grow the range of Ukraine’s denial system and increasingly act offensively to grant Ukraine some of the benefits of sea control.
The vessels struck by these USVs were primarily at port, and the continued success of strikes against ships at port has had strategic implications for Russia’s dispositions, first forcing the fleet’s move from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, and now a potential complete withdrawal to the Caspian Sea.
About Kayvan Amyot-Ariya
Kayvan Amyot-Ariya is a Strategic Studies student at Concordia University, focusing on maritime security and naval warfare, and has appeared in the Maritime Operations Center (Center for Maritime Strategy). His current primary interest is the tracking and analysis of open-source data on the Russo-Ukrainian War, with a focus on Black Sea naval losses and strike patterns.
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