Shadows Over The Durand Line: South Asia’s Borders On Fire – Analysis

Detail of Durand Line Border Between Afghanistan And Pakistan. Credit: CIA World Factbook

November 8, 2025
By Islomkhon Gafarov, Shakhzodbek Makhmudov and Firdavs Azimkulov

In October, renewed armed clashes erupted between Afghanistan and Pakistan, sparking serious concern both within the region and beyond. This escalation is particularly alarming given that both countries occupy pivotal positions in the political and economic architecture of Eurasia, linking South and Central Asia with the broader Middle East.

In this context, the deterioration of relations between Kabul and Islamabad carries significant implications for regional stability and international security. The emergence of this conflict is rooted in several interrelated factors.

The Terrorism Factor

Pakistan has accused Afghanistan for providing support to the terrorist organization Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Kabul, however, has officially rejected these allegations, insisting that it offers no assistance to the group. According to Pakistani sources, TTP militants carried out over hundred terrorist attacks across Pakistan over the past year, resulting in the deaths of approximately 500 civilians, 311 soldiers, and 73 police officers. The organization advocates for the establishment of a religious state, arguing that modern Pakistan, despite its formal status as an Islamic Republic, remains based on the British legal framework and therefore is not fully “Islamic”. Reports indicate that TTP operates primarily in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while maintaining bases in the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktika, Nangarhar, and Kunar. These conditions have fueled recurring border clashes between the two countries. Although similar incidents occurred last year, their frequency and intensity have markedly increased in the current one.

The India Factor

At the onset of the conflict, Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi participated in the “Moscow Format” consultations in the Russian Federation and subsequently paid a six-day official visit to India. It was during this period that the armed clashes began, leading to speculation that Pakistan perceived Kabul’s rapprochement with New Delhi as a direct threat to its strategic interests. During the visit, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar announced India’s intention to upgrade its current technical mission in Kabul to a full-fledged embassy, while Afghanistan expressed readiness to establish a diplomatic mission in New Delhi. To support the statement, India also confirmed its willingness to officially receive a new Afghan ambassador and his credentials. According to several experts, India has effectively initiated a process toward the formal recognition of the current Afghan government and may become, after Russia, the second major power to do so. Such a development could significantly alter the geopolitical configuration of South Asia, strengthening India’s regional influence while weakening Pakistan’s position. For Islamabad, Afghanistan has long represented a form of “strategic depth” – a geopolitical buffer zone intended to provide support in its enduring rivalry with India. The loss of this depth would markedly complicate Pakistan’s strategic posture. Furthermore, Pakistani officials have alleged that Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan receives backing not only from Afghanistan but also from India, which, they claim, uses the group as a tool to exert pressure on Pakistan – accusations New Delhi has categorically denied. Apparently, India is using this situation to its sake. Official New Delhi appears to view the Taliban government as a “spatial structure” that allows it to gain additional leverage over Pakistan’s “strategic depth”. Furthermore, there a still controversaries between New Delhi and Kabul perspectives on state governance and human right, which makes this diplomatic “boost” between countries based on mutual interests rather than shared values.

 

The U.S. Factor

Shortly before the conflict escalated, US President Donald Trump reportedly demanded access to Bagram Air Base, but Afghan authorities flatly rejected the request. Shortly thereafter, a nationwide internet shutdown occurred in Afghanistan. Following this, Pakistani representatives held an official meeting with the US delegation at the UN General Assembly. These events fueled suspicions among Afghan observers that Washington may be indirectly involved in escalating tensions between Kabul and Islamabad.

The Mutual Respect Factor

Pakistan played a decisive role in bringing the Taliban to power, both during their first rule (1996–2001) and again in 2021. Islamabad therefore expected the current Afghan government to officially recognize the Durand Line as the legitimate border between the two states. However, no Afghan administration – including the present one – has ever recognized this boundary. In response, Pakistan has refrained from granting formal diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government. This mutual non-recognition undermines trust and places both countries in a state of political limbo, heightening the risk of further deterioration in their bilateral relations. Ultimately, the roots of the conflict appear to lie in more abstract notions such as mutual respect and national dignity, rather than solely in material or territorial disputes. Thus, the Taliban is persistently trying to demonstrate that they now rule the country and are independent from Pakistan. However, Pakistan, based on its principles, believes otherwise. Pakistan still views Afghanistan under Taliban rule not as a sovereign actor, but as a controlled movement. This is evidenced by a X post statement by Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, in which he stated that Pakistan does not need to use even a small portion of its arsenal to completely destroy the Taliban regime.


Developments on the Ground

The escalation unfolded in a strikingly different manner compared to previous incidents. Whereas Pakistan had earlier confined its strikes to the Afghan border provinces of Khost, Paktika, Nangarhar, and Kunar, this time the attack was directed at Kabul itself – a move laden with political symbolism. Utilizing an F-16 fighter jet, the Pakistani military carried out a precision airstrike on a vehicle traveling through one of the central districts of the Afghan capital. According to intelligence sources, the intended target was Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Noor Wali Mehsud. However, Mehsud survived, and subsequent reports suggested that he was later sighted on Pakistani soil.

The direct strike on Kabul represented both a display of Pakistan’s air superiority and a calculated message of deterrence – signalling its readiness to conduct operations anywhere within Afghanistan. It was the most consequential incident since the 2022 elimination of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The operation was evidently premeditated and relied on advanced intelligence and technological capabilities. During the clashes, Pakistani forces seized several border outposts. Official figures reported 23 Pakistani and approximately 200 Afghan fatalities. These developments have deepened the atmosphere of tension and uncertainty across the region.
Peace Negotiations

Both sides clearly understood that they were not prepared for a full-scale war and, with the assistance of the international community, agreed to pursue negotiations. On October 19, a bilateral agreement was signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Doha. The talks were led by the Ministers of Defense – Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob representing Afghanistan and Khawaja Asif representing Pakistan. This development once again reaffirmed Qatar’s status as a key mediator in resolving Afghan and, more broadly, South Asian conflicts.

In addition to Qatar, Turkiye began to play an increasingly active role in the mediation process, turning the Doha talks into a joint Qatari-Turkish initiative. Turkiye’s involvement in Afghan affairs has a long history: since 2001, it has been part of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, though it refrained from combat operations, focusing instead on humanitarian assistance, logistical support, and the training of Afghan military personnel. Between 2001 and 2021, Turkiye lost only 14 soldiers, most of them in air accidents. Following the October 19 talks, it was announced that the next meeting would take place in Istanbul – a development that once again positioned the city as an important hub of Afghan mediation diplomacy. Under the terms of the agreement, both sides committed to a ceasefire, pledged to refrain from supporting terrorist organizations, and agreed to establish a joint mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the accords.

 
Consequences of the Conflict

First, the crisis has intensified the issue of Afghan refugee deportations from Pakistan. At the time of the conflict, approximately four million Afghans were residing in Pakistan, nearly one and a half million of whom had already been expelled. The military escalation accelerated and further tightened this process. Despite the ceasefire, deportations continue, deepening the humanitarian dimension of the crisis.

Second, bilateral economic relations have deteriorated sharply. Trade between the two countries has been effectively suspended, with Pakistan using economic leverage as a tool of political pressure. In response, Afghanistan may consider restricting the flow of transboundary rivers running toward Pakistan – a move that could serve as a countermeasure and a new source of regional tension.

Third, Pakistan recently signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, providing for mutual support in the event of war. However, despite the conflict with Afghanistan, Riyadh has taken no action, raising doubts about the practical strength of this agreement or suggesting that Saudi Arabia does not regard the Afghan-Pakistani confrontation as a full-fledged war.

Furthermore, the year has seen Pakistan entangled in several high-intensity conflicts – in spring, in Kashmir with India; in summer, in fighting against the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA); and now, in confrontation with both Afghanistan and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. This sequence of crises reflects Islamabad’s growing perception of external threats and its increasing tendency to respond through military rather than diplomatic means.

A fourth and highly significant conclusion concerns Afghanistan’s vulnerability in the domain of air defence. Pakistan managed to assert full control over Afghan airspace, underscoring Kabul’s urgent need to strengthen its defensive capabilities. Afghanistan is likely to seek support from Russia, China or other partners to modernize its air defence systems.

Finally, following the Doha negotiations, former U.S. Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad arrived in Kabul for his third visit since the Taliban’s return to power. He met with Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, signalling renewed U.S. engagement with Afghan affairs, likely in connection with the outcomes of the Doha talks. Washington appears intent on rebalancing its relations with both sides and reviving the traditional “Af-Pak” framework of its regional policy.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s other partners – China and Iran – have maintained a neutral stance, issuing general calls for peace without taking concrete diplomatic action. Although both maintain cordial relations with Kabul and Islamabad, their restraint suggests a gradual decline in their influence over Afghan foreign policy dynamics. Against this backdrop, the heightened activism of Qatar and Turkiye, along with Khalilzad’s visit, points to the emergence of a new phase in Afghanistan’s foreign policy transformation and a broader reconfiguration of power relations across South Asia.

About the authors:

Islomkhon Gafarov is a Political Analyst at the Center for Progressive Reforms. He is specializing in Central and South Asia, as well as the study of Afghanistan. In 2024, he successfully defended his dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Political Science. Before that, he headed the Center for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies at the Institute for Advanced International Studies and taught International Relations Theory and Geopolitics at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy.

Shakhzodbek Makhmudov is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at the University of St Andrews, UK. His broad research interests lie at International Relations Theory, Geopolitics and Regional Politics with the main focus on Central Asia.

Firdavs Azimkulov is an Associated Researcher at the Center for Progressive Reforms, with a specialization in South Asian affairs. He is the author of five scholarly articles and co-founder of the Grand Strategiya UZ platform.

Islomkhon Gafarov is a Political Analyst at the Center for Progressive Reforms. He is specializing in Central and South Asia, as well as the study of Afghanistan. In 2024, he successfully defended his dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Political Science. Before that, he headed the Center for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies at the Institute for Advanced International Studies and taught International Relations Theory and Geopolitics at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy.