In Taiwan’s ever pugnacious political debate, few orthodoxies are quite as deeply embedded by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the conviction that alignment with the United States is both natural and the only real way to counter Chinese takeover threats.
From defence procurement to television news bulletins, American primacy is treated less as a choice than as an inevitability to which there is no alternative. Yet this instinctive deference which at times can border on cultural self-effacement, risks leaving Taiwan both economically constrained and intellectually diminished at the exact moment it needs to demonstrate clear and effective resilience.
The island’s security relationship with the United States is indispensable. In that there is no real dispute. The Taiwan Relations Act coupled to arms sales and high-level visits have long provided a deterrent in the face of mounting pressure from China. Few serious observers would ever argue that Taipei can realistically afford to distance itself from Washington. However, as has become increasingly evident in recent years, dependence is not the same as strategy, and cap-doffing deference is not the same as agency.
In Taiwanese cultural and in particular media spheres, Americanisation often goes unquestioned. For local radio stations, “foreign news” means developments in Washington rather than in Warsaw, Pretoria or Singapore. European elections and African trade blocs barely register and major Latin American political shifts in recent months rarely make the cut - unless of course seen through US eyes. The result across the nation is a dangerous narrowing of the world the neighbours in the Philippines, Japan and South Korea get to see.
This has consequences. Taiwan is not merely a frontline in the ongoing US-China rivalry even if it has been played this way in US media. Taiwan is a vibrant society with its own multilayered history, shaped by numerous forms of Indigenous culture, early Spanish and Dutch efforts at colonialism, Qing Dynasty rule in some areas, a 50-year period of Japanese control into the mid-20th Century, as well as post-war authoritarianism.
Yet public discourse can appear disproportionately animated by US culture wars, US electoral cycles and US policy fashions. Foreign sports coverage on local media essentially means stateside NBA or Major League baseball coverage. In falling so deeply for the belief that working with the US on defence requires the full-on adoption of all things American, Taiwan is overlooking its own distinct strengths – not least its technological prowess and democratic evolution.
This imbalance is most acute in defence policy. Taiwan has spent billions of dollars on American hardware which include F-16 upgrades to missile systems and tanks. Yet, while these purchases send political signals to China, and ensure at least a degree of interoperability with US forces should the time ever come, they also reflect a slave-like belief that Taiwan must tether itself to Washington’s industrial base and timelines. In doing so, military purchases from across the Pacific are more designed for US expeditionary warfare, rather than an island nation living under threat of attack by a much bigger neighbour across the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing has had many decades to study US military hardware, as well as doctrine. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is well aware of American air, naval and missile capabilities. There is little on the Taiwanese defence manifesto the Chinese have not prepared to face many times over.
It would be wholly naïve to assume that weapons publicly debated in the US Congress and showcased in American export catalogues are a mystery to Chinese military planners.
In knock-on effect, the belief that runways would not be among the first Chinese targets in any conflict scenario as part of moves to cripple Taiwan’s air force before it can take off would be gullibility personified. Conventional aircraft in wartime are some of the easiest to ground.
But Taipei’s aviation investments do not reflect this weak spot. Instead, the island’s mountainous terrain could be an asset in developing dispersed, hardened and vertical or short take-off and landing (VSTOL) capabilities. The experience of the United Kingdom with its former Harrier fleet (retired in 2010) in the 1982 Falklands War, and even India’s now-retired naval Harriers (2016), offer lessons in operating from austere environments.
As such, rather than relying overwhelmingly on conventional runways and imported and outdated F-16 fighter jets that first went into service in the 1970s, upgrades notwithstanding – Taiwan could and should invest more heavily in indigenous research and development tailored to its own unique geography. A modern VSTOL capability - whether through adaptation with the US, UK, Japan or Italy who all operate the F-35B – a VSTOL capable modern aircraft – or simply domestic innovation, would prove a huge complication to Chinese targeting calculations. So too would a greater emphasis on drones, mobile missile batteries and decentralised command structures which to some extent are being brought into play sources indicate.
Of course, funding such a shift requires political courage at home. At present, Taiwan’s tax burden remains comparatively low when held up alongside other countries, and fuel prices are often politically massaged to avoid public backlash. But if national survival is truly at stake, then petrol should be priced at realistic market levels, and land and property taxes reformed to reflect soaring urban values. Taiwan as a society that expects security without sacrifice risks discovering the limits of external guarantees.
In addition, diversification should extend beyond current military doctrine and to this end, Taiwan is making progress. As of early 2026, Taipei's unofficial and official ties stretch far beyond Washington with Taipei maintaining diplomatic relations with a small but symbolically significant group of states, and significant economic even if technically unofficial links with major economies across Europe and Asia.
Yet too often are these relationships framed as supplements to, rather than pillars worthy of standing alongside, the American connection.
Taiwan under the DPP has the scope for much more structured military interaction with European partners including spheres such as joint training and intelligence-sharing. But is the government of President William Lai willing to move even slightly away from US influence in defence sector spending? European states have long grappled with hybrid warfare and energy coercion – most recently as a close neighbour to the conflict in Ukraine. These are all issues that resonate with Taiwan’s experience as regards China, and a much broader web of security relationships would signal to all that Taiwan’s defence is not simply a bilateral financial favour to the US.
Taiwan must recognise that the nation’s fate cannot rest solely on the electoral calendar of a foreign power. US politics is highly volatile – never more so than now with commitments that have seemed ironclad under one administration now being questioned under the Trump White House.
A Taiwan that raises the revenue necessary for its own defence, works to develop systems suited to its hard to penetrate terrain and takes steps to nurture its own distinct cultural voice will be a more formidable partner – and a harder target for China to knock out.
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