By Alexander Taranov
On December 6, 2024, during a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State in Minsk, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the deployment of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (Kremlin.ru, December 6, 2024).
This deployment is planned for the second half of 2025 on Belarusian territory. As in the case of the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, this decision was purportedly made in response to a request from Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (Belta.by, January 26). Putin justified his decision by referencing Russia’s obligations under the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the Union State, positioning it as a measure to ensure Belarus’s security against potential North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aggression (see EDM, February 12, 13).
In March 2023, Lukashenka mentioned the possibility of Russian strategic missile systems being placed in Belarus. He stated that discussions were ongoing with the Kremlin regarding the potential deployment of Russian strategic nuclear weapons, specifically the RT-2PM2 Topol-M ground-based missile systems (GBMS) (President of the Republic of Belarus, March 31, 2023). In April 2023, Belarusian Armed Forces undertook first measures to restore and modernize Soviet-era infrastructure in Brest oblast, specifically the launch sites for the RT-2PM Topol GBMS (Telegram/@modmilby, April 23, 2023; (Telegram/@Hajun_BY, April 24, 2023).
Belarusian officials have indicated that Minsk still lacks complete information about the specific parameters and plan of Russia’s deployment of the Oreshnik missile system (MS) in Belarus. For instance, Lukashenka instructed the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus to facilitate the deployment of the Russian Oreshnik MS in the country and carefully plan its combat use. According to Chief Major General Pavel Muraveiko, however, the Belarusian side has not been informed about the number of Oreshnik MS launchers that Russia will deploy in Belarus. Only the President of Russia knows this (Belta.by, December 12, 2024).
Representatives of the top military-political leadership are addressing public concerns about this decision, which increases military dependence on Russia and affects Belarus’s sovereignty. In response, Lukashenka denied that Belarus is losing sovereignty to Russia. Contrary to his latest moves, he specifically stated that there is no “Russian occupation” of Belarus and that such a situation will not occur as long as he remains the leader of the country (Reform.news, December 10, 2024; see EDM, February 12, 13).
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus, Colonel Sergei Lagodzyuk, explains the decision to deploy the Oreshnik MS as a response to the deployment of similar U.S. medium-range weapons in Europe, the militarization of the region, Russia’s war against Ukraine, as well as an information campaign “launched against Belarus to discredit the authorities and the leadership of the country to create conditions for the emergence or provocation of conflicts” ( Belta.by, December 12, 2024). The military-political leadership of Belarus believes that the MSs will produce a deterrent effect, such as nuclear weapons already on Belarusian territory, and will become a serious obstacle to potential aggression from NATO (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, December 7, 2024).
The commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Sergei Karakaev, explained that the Russian military command is only working on a decision to create new formations of the Strategic Missile Forces for a new medium-range missile system (TASS, December 16, 2024). The Oreshnik MS will be part of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Armed Forces (RAF). In the event of deployment on the territory of Belarus, these systems will also be subordinate to the Main Staff of the RAF Strategic Missile Forces and/or the Joint Command of the Regional Troops Grouping (RTG) of Russia and Belarus, in which the Russian side dominates in the decision-making process, and the Belarusian side only has the right to an advisory vote (see EDM, February 3, 13).
Lukashenka himself claims that, by agreement with Moscow, the military-political leadership of Belarus will select the targets for strikes with the Oreshnik MS (Belta.by, December 10, 2024; see EDM, February 3). He also stated that the military of the RAF will only service and carry out launches on certain targets, while and until Russian specialists train Belarusian military personnel (Belta.by, December 12, 2024). He also publicly confirmed the involvement of Belarus in the creation of this system, in particular the provision of chassis for its launchers manufactured by the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant, or MZKT. In his words, Belarus needs “only missiles” from Russia, and Belarus will allegedly create the chassis and launchers itself (Belta.by, December 10, 2024). Specifically, in the first nine months of 2024, MZKT sent 36 railcars with equipment and components to the Federal Research and Production Center “Titan-Barricady” (Volgograd), one of co-producers of the Oreshnik MS (Telegram/@Hajun_BY, November 22, 2024).
Some Russian military experts estimate that it is preferable to launch the Oreshnik IRBMs from locations in Belarus that are protected from a direct disarming strike. The areas around the cities of Mogilev and Bobruisk in Mogilev oblast are considered suitable for its deployment due to adequate forests, low population density, existing airfields, roads, railways, air defense coverage, and proximity to the Russian border. Consequently, it will be challenging for U.S. ATACMS to target these locations. Deploying the Oreshnik IRBM further west, however, could be risky, as the missiles would become vulnerable to enemy air defense systems during their initial flight trajectory. According to Russian military experts, 8–12 launchers of Oreshnik MS can be placed at two sites, which is equivalent to a full-fledged missile regiment of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (Topcor.ru, December 17, 2024).
Another potential site for the deployment of the Oreshnik MS may be the village of Cheretyanka in Gomel oblast, where the abandoned base of the 369th missile regiment of the Strategic Missile Forces was located during Soviet times. A delegation of the RTG Joint Command visited it in June 2022 with an unclear inspection. In Soviet times, the RSD-10 Pioneer missile system and the RT-2PM Topol strategic missile system were based on it. Near and on the base’s territory, there is all the necessary infrastructure, including a platform for unloading nuclear missiles, a railway, boiler houses, barracks and warehouses, although in poor condition (Telegram/@Hajun_BY, June 12, 2022). Considering these infrastructural requirements for the deployment, it can be assumed that in Mogilev oblast, Oreshnik can be placed in areas between Chausy, Krichev and Cherikov, on one hand, as well as Krichev, Bykhov, and Kirovsky, on the other. This deployment seems to be based on the assumption that Ukraine will not strike these targets. Practically, however, the Ukrainian Armed Forces can easily destroy Oreshnik IRBMs in those areas (The Kyiv Independent, November 24, 2024).
Lukashenka confirmed on December 26 that he wants to receive 10 units of the Oreshnik IRBM from Russia and deploy them closer to the Smolensk oblast of Russia, which borders Belarus (Reform.news, December 26, 2024, January 26). References to Russia’s neighboring regions likely concern Russian Strategic Missile Forces’ combat duty crews operating in Belarus, frequently changing routes and positions. Permanent deployment points may appear in Russia’s Smolensk oblast, while temporary deployment points could be set up in Belarus’s Mogilev and Gomel oblasts.
The deployment of the Oreshnik IRBMs, even in the Mogilev oblast, does not guarantee bypassing the U.S./NATO missile defense systems in Redzikowo, Poland and Deveselu, Romania in the SM-3 Block IIA version (NATO, July 10, 2024). The direct distance from Mogilev to these facilities is 850 kilometers (530 miles) and 1,170 kilometers (730 miles), respectively. There is only one military scenario for using the Oreshnik IRBMs from the territory of Belarus. This scenario involves the preemptive destruction of U.S./NATO missile defense bases in Poland and Romania as a result of a massive missile attack and/or the use of tactical nuclear weapons to destroy them. After that, the Oreshnik IRBMs can be used from the territory of Belarus against targets in Europe without the threat of interception by missile defense systems. Such a scenario is possible if Russian leadership designs plans for a vertical escalation of the conflict with Ukraine to a regional war with NATO in the European theater of war.
For this reason, Russia plans to expand the tactical nuclear weapon carrier supply to Belarus. In particular, since June 2024, two new hangars have been built on the territory of military unit No 12147 in Osipovichi—where the 465th Missile Brigade of the Armed Forces of Belarus is located—for the new Iskander-M operational-tactical missile systems. In size and appearance, the hangars are similar to those shelters for the MS, built here two years ago (Svaboda.org, June 7, 2024). The missile brigade itself is located 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) from one of the alleged locations for Russian tactical nuclear weapons in the Balshaya Garozha village on the territory of the 1405th Artillery Ammunition Base (see EDM, April 30, 2024). Each of the hangars can accommodate 12 combat vehicles. In February 2024, Lukashenka mentioned that there were already two battalions of the Iskander-M MS in Belarus (RIA Novosti, February 20, 2024). Construction activities testify that a new missile brigade armed with the Iskander-M MS will be formed in Belarus. In this case, the total number of tactical nuclear weapon carrier launchers will reach 12 units in the near future in the missile brigade (Belarusinfocus.pro, June 9, 2024).
At the same time, the Russian military-industrial complex is already modifying missiles for this system with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) (Militaryrussia.ru, July 24, 2024). In this regard, Putin also mentioned Belarus regarding additional deliveries of long-range missile weapons and speculated about Russia’s right to supply similar weapons to the West’s opponents (TASS, June 7, 2024).
By the end of 2025, Russia will additionally deploy missile systems with a maximum range of 1,000 to 6,000 kilometers (621 to 3,728 miles) on the territory of Belarus. It is not ruled out that an additional batch of Iskander-M as well as Oreshnik missile systems will also arrive in Belarus in connection with preparations for the Zapad-2025 strategic maneuvers and will remain permanently there, as it happened after the Soyuznaya Reshimost-2022 exercise (Interfax.ru, May 10, 2022; see EDM, November 7, November 18, 2024).
The deployment of such systems so close to NATO’s eastern flank, a potential theater of operations, indicates that Russia and Belarus are preparing for scenarios of preemptive missile strikes against critical, military and logistical infrastructure in Europe both in conventional and nuclear versions. Investments in advanced missile defense and long-range strike capabilities by Ukraine and NATO could mitigate the threats coming from Russian missile systems’ deployment in Belarus.
- About the author: Alexander Taranov is an expert on Russian military and nuclear affairs.
- Source: This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue
