Rethinking The ‘Middle East’: A Case For ‘West Asia’ – Analysis

 March 14, 2025  

By Dr. Kamal Azari

The term “Middle East” has long been used to define the region encompassing countries such as Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. However, this designation is geographically imprecise and deeply embedded in colonialist discourse.

Originating from a Eurocentric gaze, the name does not reflect how the region identifies itself but rather how it has been perceived by external powers—primarily European imperialists and later American geopolitical strategists. The term reinforces outdated power structures that have historically marginalized indigenous perspectives in favor of Western dominance.

A more accurate and decolonized term, “West Asia,” better represents the region’s geographic placement and serves as a necessary corrective to the colonial legacy that has shaped its modern identity. Examining similar geographical renaming efforts and the role of European racialized geography in history demonstrates why this change is not merely semantic but a vital act of historical justice. Furthermore, the philosophy of Political Mehr, rooted in Persian and Zoroastrian traditions of justice and compassion, offers an alternative lens through which the region can redefine itself—not as a subject of European narratives but as an independent and self-actualizing force.

The Colonial Origins of “Middle East” and “Near East”

Both “Middle East” and “Near East” are products of European colonialism and military strategy. The term “Near East” first gained prominence in the 19th century, primarily within British diplomatic and military discourse. The British Foreign Office and colonial administrators used “Near East” to describe the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, and parts of the Eastern Mediterranean. The logic behind this term was entirely Eurocentric—it described regions that were “near” to Britain in contrast to the “Far East,” which referred to China, Japan, and Southeast Asia.

The term “Near East” was especially dominant in British imperial discourse during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Britain was deeply involved in managing the crumbling Ottoman Empire and maintaining control over Egypt, a key territory due to the Suez Canal’s strategic importance. The Near East was a construct that served British interests in mapping their imperial domains. As historian Roger Adelson explains, “The Near East was always a British concern, not because of its peoples or cultures, but because of its function in the great imperial chessboard of the 19th century.” (Adelson, 1995, p. 62).

However, by the early 20th century, as Britain’s focus shifted towards securing oil supplies and managing new colonial acquisitions after World War I, a new term was needed to describe its increasing strategic concerns in Persia, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula. This shift was facilitated by Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American naval strategist who introduced the term “Middle East” in a 1902 article. Mahan described the Gulf region and Iran as the “Middle East,” emphasizing its geopolitical importance for controlling trade and naval dominance (Mahan, 1902, p. 273). This term was later adopted and institutionalized by Winston Churchill and other British officials, particularly in reference to British military bases in the region.

By the mid-20th century, “Middle East” replaced “Near East” in British and American geopolitical discourse, largely due to the rise of oil politics, Cold War strategy, and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The shift reflected not a change in the region’s nature but rather the changing interests of Western powers. The United States, particularly, found the “Middle East” useful as it engaged in Cold War interventions and sought to maintain dominance over oil-rich states.

European Racial Geography and the Imposition of Arbitrary Regional Names

The transition from “Near East” to “Middle East” is an example of European racialized geography. Regions were named and categorized based on their strategic importance to imperial powers rather than any Indigenous identities. This was part of a broader racial mapping of the world, where non-European regions were viewed through hierarchical classifications.

For example, 19th-century British anthropologists and geographers divided the world into “civilized” and “uncivilized” regions, with terms like “Near East” and “Far East” corresponding to Britain’s strategic concerns. Just as Africa was long referred to as the “Dark Continent” in Western discourse—implying an absence of civilization—the “Near East” and “Middle East” constructs reinforced a racial and cultural hierarchy in which Europe remained the center of civilization. At the same time, Asia and Africa were peripheral spaces defined by their distance and utility to European interests (Said, 1978, p. 49).

Similarly, the British referred to India as the “Jewel in the Crown” of the Empire, yet paradoxically classified it as part of the “East” despite being geographically south of Britain. These inconsistencies highlight how colonial geography was never about objective descriptions but rather about projecting power and influence.

Political Mehr: An Alternative Vision for West Asia

The term “Middle East” does not merely impose an inaccurate geographical label—it also frames the region within a narrative of conflict, colonial dependency, and Western strategic interests. Renaming the region as “West Asia” would serve not only as an act of decolonization but also as a step toward reclaiming its political philosophy, heritage, and agency. In this regard, the concept of Political Mehr offers an alternative framework for understanding the region’s governance, community, and international relations.

Mehr, a fundamental concept in Persian philosophy, embodies compassion, justice, and collective well-being. In the context of governance, Political Mehr proposes a model that prioritizes participatory democracy, social equity, and the protection of communal wealth—principles that stand in stark contrast to the extractive, imperial models imposed by Western powers over the past century. The renaming of the region as West Asia aligns with this philosophy, as it reorients the region toward its historical traditions rather than perpetuating foreign-imposed identities.

Much like the transition from “Near East” to “Middle East” served Western geopolitical interests, the continued use of “Middle East” reinforces divisive, adversarial politics, portraying the region as inherently unstable and conflict-ridden. A shift toward “West Asia,” however, could signal a new era of regional unity and cooperative governance rooted in the indigenous values of Mehr rather than in Western frameworks of control and intervention.

The Case for “West Asia” as a Decolonized Term

In contrast to the arbitrary and colonial logic behind “Middle East” and “Near East,” the term “West Asia” provides a geographically precise and neutral designation. Most international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), now use “West Asia” instead of “Middle East”, acknowledging its alignment with actual continental divisions.

Using “West Asia” rather than “Middle East” offers several key advantages:

1. Geographical Accuracy – The region is part of Asia, and its correct placement is in the western part of the continent. Unlike “Middle East,” which is based on a European point of reference, “West Asia” accurately describes the region is location.
2. Rejection of Colonial Terminology – Just as countries like Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) and Myanmar (formerly Burma) reclaimed their indigenous names, using “West Asia” allows the region to shed a name imposed by colonial rulers.
3. Emphasizing Indigenous Identity – By removing European-imposed distinctions, the region’s people can reclaim their identity on their terms rather than through Western geopolitical frameworks.

Toward a More Just and Accurate Geographic Terminology

Renaming the “Middle East” to “West Asia” is not merely a technical correction—it is a philosophical and political realignment. It acknowledges the region’s true place in the world, liberates it from Eurocentric frameworks and allows it to embrace its traditions, including the philosophy of Political Mehr. In doing so, it offers a vision for a future where West Asia is no longer seen through a Western strategic lens but through its values of justice, compassion, and shared prosperity.

Dr. Kamal Azari is a political scientist, author, and advocate for democratic reform in Iran. With a Ph.D. in Comparative Politics from Fordham University and an M.S. in Engineering from NYU, he has dedicated his career to political and economic research, focusing on community-driven governance and democratic transitions.

 

End Of Unipolarity: A Chance For Change – OpEd

 March 15, 2025  

By Graham Peebles

Global conflict and uncertainty are nothing new, but since the 2008/09 economic crash, they have worsened exponentially. The arrival of President Trump has dramatically exacerbated the situation, turning turbulence into chaos and anxiety into fear.

Governments and institutions are reeling after just seven weeks of Trump, his vice president J.D. Vance, and Elon “Chainsaw” Musk—figures so extreme they make Trump seem moderate by comparison.

It is impossible to keep track of the carnage (executive orders alone – 73 signed in the first 30 days). The strategy appears to be to overwhelm everyone – the Democrats (who appear shell shocked), foreign governments, the media, and the public, so nobody will notice the details. Since 20 January, a barrage of barbaric policy decisions and executive lunacy has flowed from the Oval Office, often involving actions that shatter tradition, flout the law, and violate the Constitution.

A new world order and shifting alliances are in the air. Could the storm being unleashed by Trump and Co. inadvertently lead to positive structural and systemic change?

Global Disruption

The dominant global structure since the Second World War has been one of U.S. unipolarity, marked by global domination in which America has faced no significant competition or threat from other states. It is from this position—one that, in the American context, has bred increasing levels of paranoia—that Trump speaks when he says the U.S. will “have” Gaza, based on American authority.

Trump appears intent on breaking everything, destabilizing global institutions, and shattering long-held ideals like global unity, shared prosperity, and a “one world” vision. Such concepts are being abandoned as international bodies are attacked and long-standing rules of global exchange are dismantled.

At the stroke of a chunky black pen, the U.S. was formally withdrawn from several United Nations bodies, including the World Health Organization (its largest donor), the Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and UNRWA, the UN agency supporting Palestinians. The World Trade Organization (WTO) also faces threats due to Trump’s aggressive tariff policies.

A review of U.S. involvement in UNESCO (the UN’s educational, scientific, and cultural agency) and U.S. funding for the United Nations itself has been ordered. Citing ‘the wild disparities in levels of funding among different countries,’ White House staff secretary Will Scharf explained that the decision was also a protest against ‘anti-American bias’ within UN agencies, though no specific examples of such prejudice were provided.

Old alliances are hanging by a thread; the Palestinians’ right to a homeland has been swept aside, with ethnic cleansing of Gaza openly touted, and Israel given free rein to be even more barbaric—if such a thing is even possible. Aid organizations have been decimated, Europe and Ukraine are criticized, and Russia and Putin receive accolades. Canada and Greenland are eyed as potential U.S. states, and Trump wants to reclaim the Panama Canal and transform Gaza into a Palestinian-free Mediterranean resort under ‘American authority.

Whatever disruptive actions Trump takes, others can—and potentially will—mimic, particularly other far-right leaders. This is especially troubling in relation to the Paris Agreement and global support for United Nations agencies. The UN is entirely reliant on member states for funding to carry out its life-saving work. Should nations begin to argue over their contributions and withhold payments, the valuable work the UN is doing around the world would be threatened

The Trump Storm has thrown governments and organizations worldwide into turmoil, and after 70 years of U.S. hegemony, during which Western geopolitics and global affairs have overwhelmingly been designed and administered from Washington—often with disastrous consequences—there is talk of a new world order.

It is not, however, a visionary, hopeful new world based on unifying principles and the oneness of humanity. Instead, it’s yet another divisive model rooted in power, ideology, and global dominance: Will China take over? Will Russia seek to expand its territory? What role will Europe play? Is the Trans-Atlantic Alliance shattered? And so on.

The conversation centers around uncertainty, security, and defense capabilities. It’s more of the same unimaginative, duplicitous rhetoric we’ve heard for decades—a shocking reflection of the appalling quality of leaders currently in office, the corrupt nature of politics, and the extent to which the military-industrial complex and the corporate world hold sway.

A Vision for Fundamental Change

What is needed is not a new old world order, but a creative reimagining of civilization—a shift in values and ideals that shapes new and just systems and cultivates principles of goodness—cooperation, sharing, tolerance, and understanding.

Gradual yet fundamental change that moves beyond manipulating existing patterns to establish a global order based on social justice and freedom; only this will lead to peace.

While far-reaching reforms designed to bring about such change could, in principle, be introduced without the total destruction of existing systems, those in power—both political and corporate—having benefited the most, are determined to maintain the status quo, regardless of the consequences for society and the natural world. This leads to the rather depressing conclusion that only a seismic downfall will enable the changes billions of people around the world long for.

Graham Peebles is an independent writer and charity worker. He set up The Create Trust in 2005 and has run education projects in India, Sri Lanka and Ethiopia where he lived for two years working with acutely disadvantaged children and conducting teacher training programmes. Website: https://grahampeebles.org/

Kra Canal: The Impossible Dream Of Southeast Asia Shipping – Analysis

Map of possible plans for the Thai (Kra) Canal. Author: Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa), CIA World Factbook, Wikipedia Commons

 March 15, 2025  

By Geopolitical Monitor

By Paulo Aguiar

The idea of the Kra Canal has been a topic of discussion for centuries, as the promise of an alternative route between the Andaman Sea and Gulf of Thailand could revolutionize shipping and reshape regional geopolitics. While the project has never come to fruition, its potential impact keeps it in strategic conversations, particularly in light of China’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As of now, Thailand has opted for a different path, but debates over the canal’s feasibility and geopolitical consequences remain very much alive.

Historical Background

 The concept of the Kra Canal dates back to 1677 when Thai King Narai commissioned French engineer de Lamar to survey the Kra Isthmus for a possible canal. At the time, the idea was not to connect the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea but rather to establish a navigable waterway between Songkhla and Marid (now Myanmar). De Lamar’s assessment concluded that the mountainous terrain, dense jungles, and the technological limitations of the era rendered the project unfeasible. The immense effort required to dig through the isthmus using 17th-century engineering methods made construction virtually impossible, leading to its abandonment.

In the 19th century, as European colonial powers expanded their influence in Southeast Asia, the concept of the Kra Canal resurfaced. The British, who controlled key maritime trade routes through Singapore and the Strait of Malacca, viewed any alternative shipping channel with suspicion. They feared that a canal through Thailand would weaken Singapore’s strategic importance and threaten British dominance in regional trade. Meanwhile, France, eager to strengthen its presence in Indochina, saw the canal as a way to establish a stronger foothold in the region and counterbalance British influence. However, the Siamese government, wary of foreign intervention and territorial disputes, strategically resisted both British and French involvement. By carefully balancing diplomatic relations with European powers while preserving its sovereignty, Siam managed to prevent any progress on the canal during this period.

Kra Canal in the Contemporary Context

 The Kra Canal attracted renewed interest in 1972 when an American firm, Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton (TAMS), proposed a 102-km-long canal connecting Satun to Songkhla. This proposal was driven by the need for an alternative shipping route to alleviate congestion in the Malacca Strait and provide a more direct maritime passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The plan involvedadvanced engineering techniques of the time, envisioning a deep-water canal capable of handling large cargo vessels and oil tankers. However, with a projected cost of $5.6 billion and a projected 10–12 year construction period, the Thai government ultimately rejected the plan. Concerns included the massive financial burden, environmental impact, and the risk of regional instability, particularly stemming from foreign influence and internal security challenges.

More recently, China has become increasingly interested in reviving the project as part of its Maritime Silk Road initiative, a key component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2015, an MoU was signed between private entities from China and Thailand to explore the feasibility of the canal, highlighting its potential to reshape trade routes and reduce reliance on the Malacca Strait. However, both governments quickly distanced themselves from the agreement, likely due to political sensitivities and opposition from regional players like Singapore and India. The canal never progressed beyond preliminary discussions. As of 2025, Thailand has instead opted to prioritize a $28 billion land bridge project—an overland transport corridor designed to facilitate cargo movement between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea. This alternative aims to achieve similar economic benefits without the political and environmental challenges posed by a canal, making it a more viable and strategically balanced solution.

Geopolitical Stakes

Why the Kra Canal Matters

If constructed, the Kra Canal would provide a strategic alternative to the Strait of Malacca, reducing shipping distances by approximately 1,200 nautical miles. This shortcut would save fuel costs, cut transit times, and ease congestion in the Strait of Malacca, which currently handles nearly 94,000 vessel passages annually. As global trade continues to expand, particularly in energy and container shipping, the demand for efficient and secure maritime routes is higher than ever. The canal would create an additional passage, reducing bottlenecks and alleviating concerns about over-reliance on a single trade route.

China, as the world’s largest trading nation, would stand to benefit immensely by reducing its reliance on the Malacca Strait for energy imports and trade. Currently, approximately 80% of China’s oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait, making it a critical vulnerability in times of geopolitical tensions. Diversifying maritime routes through the Kra Canal could enhance China’s energy security, providing an alternative supply chain for crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from the Middle East and Africa.

China-US Competition

 For China, the Kra Canal would address its “Malacca dilemma“—the vulnerability of its maritime trade routes to potential blockades by rival naval forces, particularly the United States. A hypothetical China-controlled canal would enhance Beijing’s control over its supply chain and maritime security, while boosting its geopolitical influence in the region. Notably, the canal would enable China to establish a stronger presence in the Indian Ocean, allowing the PLA Navy greater operational flexibility and enhancing its ability to protect critical sea lanes.

The United States and its allies, particularly Singapore and India, oppose the canal’s construction owing in large part to these geopolitical considerations. A China-dominated Kra Canal could reduce Singapore’s significance as a shipping hub, potentially diminishing its economic and strategic value. Singapore, which benefits heavily from transshipment fees and trade facilitation, would likely experience economic losses if traffic were diverted to a new canal. India, which has growing concerns over China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean, sees the Kra Canal as another strategic asset that could strengthen China’s maritime footprint near its sphere of influence.

As a countermeasure, Washington is supporting Thailand’s land bridge project, which offers an alternative trade corridor without directly benefiting China’s strategic interests. The land bridge project, consisting of highways, rail networks, and deep-sea ports, provides a non-maritime alternative for trade while maintaining the regional balance of power. The United States has also increased maritime cooperation with Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines to ensure the continued security and open accessibility of the Malacca Strait.

Regional Impacts

For Thailand, the Kra Canal presents both opportunities and challenges. Economically, it could transform the country into a key logistics hub, generating substantial revenue from transit fees, port services, and related industries. By cutting travel distances for major shipping routes, the canal could increase direct investment in Thailand’s maritime infrastructure and create thousands of new jobs in shipping, trade, and logistics. The long-term economic benefits could help Thailand strengthen its position as a regional powerhouse in maritime commerce.

However, from a stability standpoint, the canal threatens to divide Thailand geographically, reinforcing separatist movements in the south. The country has long struggled with separatist tensions in its southern provinces, and a canal physically splitting the nation could exacerbate these internal divisions. There are also concerns about foreign control or heavy foreign investment in the canal project, particularly if China were to play a dominant role in its financing and construction. Such involvement would inevitably spark concerns over sovereignty, with the canal potentially becoming an extension of China’s influence in the region.

Additionally, the project would disrupt existing maritime economies, particularly in Singapore and Malaysia, which have consistently opposed its development due to fears of economic losses. The canal’s success would depend on the extent to which it diverts shipping away from traditional routes. If global shipping companies find it more cost-effective and efficient to use the new passage, Singapore’s role as a regional shipping hub could decline, prompting diplomatic tensions and resistance from ASEAN partners. Given these economic and political complexities, Thailand must carefully weigh its options.

Kra Canal: A Reality Check

Despite its apparent advantages, the Kra Canal comes with a host of economic, environmental, and security concerns. The latest estimated construction cost has ballooned to $30 billion, making financial feasibility a major hurdle. Beyond the initial investment, maintenance costs and the need for continuous dredging due to sediment buildup would add to long-term expenditures. Additionally, securing international financing could be challenging, especially considering the canal’s geopolitical implications and potential opposition from regional powers.

The environmental impact is another major concern. Constructing a canal of this scale would require large-scale excavation, leading to habitat destruction for marine and terrestrial wildlife. The potential for oil spills, increased shipping traffic, and disruptions to local fisheries could have lasting ecological consequences. Moreover, altering water flow between the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand could impact ocean currents, salinity levels, and even regional weather patterns.

Due to these challenges, the Thai government remains cautious, choosing instead to prioritize port expansions and alternative infrastructure projects. The modernization of Laem Chabang and Map Ta Phut ports aims to improve Thailand’s maritime logistics without the risks associated with the Kra Canal. Furthermore, the land bridge initiative offers a feasible alternative to facilitate cargo movement between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea while maintaining national unity and minimizing geopolitical tensions.

• This article was published at Geopolitical Monitor.com

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