The globalization paradox: Why trade war is self-sabotaging

By Hui Fan | chinadaily.com.cn | Updated: 2025-05-19 

The Apple Inc logo is seen hanging at the entrance to the Apple store on 5th Avenue in Manhattan, New York, the US on Oct 16, 2019. [Photo/Agencies]

In the heart of Cupertino, Apple engineers are scrambling to redesign the iPhone 17. Why? US semiconductor tariffs have ignited a fire under production costs.

But here's the kicker: your smartphone is a United Nations of tech, with its brain born in California, its face crafted in the Republic of Korea, and its body assembled in China. This intricate web of international collaboration is the hallmark of globalization, a system that has driven economic growth and innovation for decades.

But now, this delicate balance is under threat.

In April 2025, the US government imposed "reciprocal tariffs" on nearly all trading partners, with rates on Chinese goods soaring up to 145 percent—the highest in a century. Despite optimistic signals from China-US trade talks in Geneva, the damage to global trade may already be irreversible.

According to Bloomberg, global supply chain costs have surged by 40 percent. The WTO has issued a stern warning that US tariffs could shrink global trade by 1.5 percent in 2025, with North American exports plummeting by a staggering 12.6 percent.

The rampant politicization and weaponization of tariffs by the US, though cut back to some extent, is challenging the very principles of globalization.

The champion of globalization is now breaking it

After the WWII, the US engineered the Bretton Woods system and WTO to institutionalize free trade, cleverly embedding its economic dominance into multilateral trade rules.

This system fueled unprecedented growth: US GDP tripled from $10 trillion in 2000 to $27 trillion in 2023, while multinational giants like Exon and Apple thrived on global supply chains.

Yet today, Washington is dismantling the system it built. The reason? The rise of China and other developing nations has eroded US dominance, sparking a political backlash. Faced with pressure—particularly over Rust Belt job losses—American politicians have scapegoated globalization, casting China as a "free rider" gaming the system.

However, this narrative overlooks deeper structural flaws. Automation and corporate offshoring—not trade—have displaced workers, while tax policies favor capital over labor. The Fed reports that median household wealth stagnated for decades even as corporate profits hit records. With elites capturing the gains of globalization, wealth inequality has soared, with the wealthiest 1 percent holding 30.8 percent of US net wealth as of 2024.

Tariffs won't fix the real problems

The US obsession with trade deficits and "Made in America" is even more misguided.

Washington fixates on deficits in trade in goods while ignoring a $295 billion surplus in trade in services in 2024—up 283 percent since 2000.
Efforts to revive US manufacturing also face steep challenges. American blue-collar wages remain far higher than China's, while decades of offshoring have left supply chains deeply entrenched overseas.

Tariffs backfire by raising production costs, accelerating corporate relocation to Mexico or Vietnam. The result would only be a self-inflicted isolation from global value chains.

The world moves on

As the US retreats, others are redefining and empowering globalization.
According to the World Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by China has reduced global trade costs by 1.8 percent, boosting global incomes by up to 2.9 percent. China also grants zero tariffs to all least-developed partners and pioneers cross-border digital currency payments across 18 nations.

The Global South is emphasizing shared growth—a vision aligned with globalization's original promise. The BRICS New Development Bank has funded numerous infrastructure projects in developing countries, such as the metro project in Mumbai, India, that are transforming urban mobility and driving regional growth. The African Continental Free Trade Area aims to create a single continental market for goods and services, poised to significantly boost intra-African trade.

Fade or adapt

History's verdict is clear: no nation can isolate itself from the tide of globalization.

As US ports languish under tariff-induced logjams, Shenzhen's Yantian Harbor bustles with ships carrying Chinese EVs bound for smart factories in Saudi Arabia and Brazil built under the BRI framework.

This duality captures globalization's crossroads: Should one cling to unilateral protectionism or embrace shared prosperity? Be part of this transformation or fade into irrelevance? The path forward lies not in futile resistance, but in adapting to economic realities and competing through innovation.

Globalization will continue. The choice rests with each individual nation.

Hui Fan is a Beijing-based observer of international affairs. The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

If you have a specific expertise, or would like to share your thought about our stories, then send us your writings at opinion@chinadaily.com.cn, and comment@chinadaily.com.cn.

ESSAY: HOW A DREAM WAS TRANSFORMED

Masood Lohar 

Published May 18, 2025 

DAWN

A 19th century painting depicting Guru Nanak wearing a chola (robe) with Perso-Arabic inscriptions | Wikimedia Commons

Long before sectarian lines hardened across the Indian Subcontinent, a mystic named Guru Nanak emerged from the village of Talwandi (now Nankana Sahib, Pakistan) with a message that transcended religious boundaries.

Born on 15 April 1469 into a Hindu family, Guru Nanak was deeply influenced not only by Bhakti [devotional worship] traditions, but also by the Islamic monotheism that surrounded him. His spiritual vision gave birth to Sikhism — not as a break from Hinduism or Islam, but as a bridge that hoped to connect them.

Guru Nanak’s teachings — delivered through poetry, music and profound silence — echoed equally in temples, mosques and khanqahs [Sufi lodges]. At the heart of his message is the concept of Ik Onkar (There is but one God), closely resonating with the Islamic principle of Tauhid (oneness of God).

Guru Nanak’s respect for Islamic figures was neither rhetorical nor superficial. There are verses extolling the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), with his reverence extending beyond words. Tradition holds that Guru Nanak undertook pilgrimages to Makkah, Madina, Baghdad and Najaf, engaging with Muslim scholars and Sufi mystics. The Chola Sahib, a robe still preserved by his family, bears embroidered Quranic verses and names of Allah, reflecting his deep engagement with Islamic spirituality.

Born from Sufi and Bhakti traditions, Sikhism was India’s great interfaith experiment… until persecution and betrayals turned it into a warrior tradition

This interfaith spirit was further embodied when Guru Arjan Dev, the fifth Sikh Guru, invited Sufi saint Hazrat Mian Mir to lay the foundation of the Harmandir Sahib (Golden Temple) in 1588 — a powerful symbol of communal harmony.

However, this harmony did not survive the shifting political landscape of the Mughal Empire.

From Akbar’s Tolerance to Mughal Orthodoxy

Under Mughal Emperor Akbar (reigned 1556–1605), a brief window of religious openness flourished. Akbar encouraged interfaith dialogue, invited scholars of diverse backgrounds to his court, and even included Sikh representatives. His establishment of the Ibadat Khana [house of worship] at Fatehpur Sikri brought together thinkers from Hindu, Jain, Zoroastrian, Christian and Muslim traditions. Akbar’s policy of Sulh-i-Kul [universal peace] reflected a syncretic spirit rarely seen among contemporary rulers.

However, this pluralistic ethos began to unravel under his successors, particularly Jahangir and Aurangzeb, who were influenced by a rising tide of orthodox Sunni revivalism. A key intellectual figure behind this shift was Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), also known as Mujaddid Alf-i-Thani — the “Reformer of the Second Millennium” in Islamic tradition. Sirhindi’s influence marked a major turning point in the ideological landscape of the Mughal Empire.

Sirhindi not only denounced the syncretic and inclusive religious experiments of Akbar’s court, but also challenged the metaphysical foundations of dominant Sufi thought. He took aim at the philosophy of Wahdat-ul-Wujood [unity of being], famously articulated by Andalusian Sufi Ibn al-Arabi (1165–1240), which posits that all existence is a manifestation of God’s being. In its more liberal interpretations, this view had allowed space for interreligious respect and mystical inclusivity.

In response, Sirhindi proposed Wahdat-ul-Shuhood [unity of witnessing] — a stricter formulation which emphasised the transcendence of God and denied that created beings shared in Divine essence. While still rooted in Sufi tradition, this new doctrine reasserted theological boundaries, placing Islam in firm doctrinal opposition to other faiths and to the syncretic spirituality promoted during Akbar’s reign.

Sirhindi claimed that he had “given a new life to the deen [religion]”, casting himself as the guardian of Islam against the dilution of its core principles. His letters, known as the Maktubat, circulated widely among the Mughal elite and influenced state policy, encouraging a return to Shariah-based governance and a suppression of heterodox practices. This orthodox turn significantly shaped the attitudes of Mughal rulers, laying the groundwork for the persecution of non-Sunni and non-Muslim communities, including Sikhs.

The First Crack

In 1606, Guru Arjan Dev, who had compiled the Adi Granth (the precursor to the Guru Granth Sahib, Sikhism’s holy book) incorporating hymns from Hindu, Sikh and Muslim mystics such as Baba Farid, was arrested under Mughal Emperor Jahangir’s orders.

Viewed with suspicion for his inclusive approach and growing influence, he was subjected to horrific torture at Lahore Fort: made to sit on a burning plate while hot sand was poured over him. According to Sikh traditions, Guru Arjan Dev remained immersed in meditation despite the agony. Allowed to bathe in the Ravi River, he disappeared into its waters — thus becoming the first Sikh martyr.

This event marked a turning point. His son, Guru Hargobind, responded by adopting military symbols, donning two swords representing miri [temporal authority] and piri [spiritual authority], initiating Sikhism’s martial transformation.

Under Aurangzeb, the rift between Sikhs and the Mughal state widened irreparably. In 1675, Guru Tegh Bahadur, the ninth Guru, was approached by Kashmiri Pandits seeking jizya [religious tax] concessions, who asked him to intercede on their behalf with the emperor, according to Sikh traditions.

At the Mughal court in Delhi, Guru Tegh Bahadur was mocked and asked to perform a miracle to prove his spiritual authority or convert to Islam. When he refused, he was executed by beheading in Delhi.

The Birth of the Khalsa

The oppression reached its peak during the time of Guru Gobind Singh (1666–1708). In 1699, he institutionalised the Khalsa, a brotherhood of warrior-saints devoted to defending righteousness and justice. This transformation was a direct response to Mughal aggression.

Aurangzeb’s betrayal of promises led to a tragic siege at Anandpur Sahib. After agreeing to grant safe passage, the Mughals attacked Guru Gobind Singh’s entourage. His mother and two young sons were captured and killed, and the Guru himself was forced into battles and exile.

In a letter known as the Zafarnama, Guru Gobind Singh condemned Aurangzeb’s duplicity in Persian verse. A translation by Indian diplomat and author Navtej Sarna reads:

“I have no faith in your oath, even if sworn by God—
For He is One, and your words are hollow.
I place no trust in your courts or ministers—
All are liars, and your promises false.”

The execution of his father, the betrayal of sacred promises, and the murder of his family pushed Guru Gobind Singh to shift Sikhism firmly into a martial path of self-defence and resistance.

A Legacy of Coexistence and Conflict

The arc from Guru Nanak’s inclusive message to Guru Gobind Singh’s martial reformation reflects not a departure from his founding ideals, but a response to historical injustice and persecution. From reverence for Islamic monotheism to resistance against religious coercion, Sikhism’s journey through the Mughal period is a testament to both spiritual dialogue and the cost of broken promises.

Even in confrontation, Guru Nanak’s original vision — of a world where truth, humility and justice transcend religious boundaries — remains at the heart of Sikh philosophy. Yet, in a complex twist of history, the one who was born a Hindu and led both Hindus and others toward the worship of one God — Tauheed, as understood in Islam — ultimately saw his legacy diverted by later generations.

What seemingly began as a call to dissolve religious identities in Divine oneness gradually hardened into a separate identity. In seeking to defend the faith, many strayed from the universal spirit that Baba Nanak had so boldly embodied, inadvertently obscuring the very essence he once awakened.

The writer is an activist and founder of the Clifton Urban Forest, Karachi. X: @masoodlohar

Published in Dawn, EOS, May 18th, 2025

Meditating Dollars

In turning into a global business juggernaut, yoga has lost its deeper purpose, argues Aliya Agha.

Aurora Magazine
Updated 02 May, 2025 

DAWN

For centuries, yoga was practised in the Indian Subcontinent as both an art and a science of life; a path to self-mastery and spiritual awakening. Legendary yogi, Bellur Krishnamachar Sundararaja Iyengar, famously described yoga as “Life’s music – the rhythm of the body, the melody of the mind, and the harmony of the soul – create the symphony of life.”

1. Yoga’s Beginnings: The earliest traces of yoga date to over 5,000 years ago to the ancient city of Mohenjodaro in Sindh. References in the ancient texts mention meditation, breath-work and self-realisation as central to human life. Originally, yoga was an exclusive practice reserved for the elite – royalty, warriors and priests – and was largely inaccessible to women or ordinary people. This exclusivity began to dissolve in the early 20th century under the patronage of the Mysore Palace (which played a crucial role in the development of modern yoga), when visionary teacher Tirumalai Krishnamacharya opened the palace doors to commoners, foreigners and women. Among his early students was Indra Devi, a Russian aristocrat, who with the support of the Maharajah of Mysore, became the first woman to teach in Mysore and later introduced yoga to Russia, the US and South America. In this way, yoga’s journey from a guarded spiritual discipline to a practice embraced worldwide began.

2. The Rise of Modern Styles: Yoga’s first serious brush with Western audiences began when travellers, artists and philosophers in the early 20th century encountered this exotic practice in India. By the late 1900s, yoga was hailed in the West as a panacea for physical ailments, mental stress and spiritual emptiness. Recognising the West’s growing fascination with Eastern practices, Indian yogis adapted yoga to meet modern sensibilities. Krishnamacharya, revered as the ‘father of modern yoga,’ led this transformation by creating Vinyasa Yoga, a dynamic, breath-led practice. His student, Iyengar, emphasised precision and alignment and in the process developed Iyengar Yoga. Bikram Choudhury popularised Hot Yoga, later branded as Bikram Yoga (which gained worldwide fame and controversy). Together, these pioneers reimagined ancient yoga, shaping it into a global phenomenon that continues to evolve today as a ‘wellness movement’. Books like Light on Yoga by Iyengar, translated into 23 languages, with over three million copies sold and Robin Sharma’s The Monk Who Sold His Ferrari (over four million copies sold), further cemented yoga as a mainstream pursuit of personal growth, mindfulness and healing.

3. From Ancient Art to a Billion-Dollar Business: No longer confined to ascetic retreats or temple courtyards, yoga was reimagined in sleek studios, digital platforms and corporate wellness programmes, moulded to fit the lifestyles of people seeking physical vitality and mental reprieve. While yoga’s essence remains rooted in centuries-old traditions, its expression has evolved to cater to the pragmatic needs of an ever accelerating world.

Today, the global yoga market is valued at $115.43 billion, with forecasts predicting it will soar further (Expert Market Research, 2024). In the US alone, more than 36 million people practise yoga regularly, fuelling a massive demand for yoga gear, online platforms, and luxury retreats. Brands like Lululemon have capitalised on this demand, generating $9.62 billion in revenue in 2023 through the sale of sleek, high-end yoga apparel (Statista, 2023). Today, yoga is a lifestyle brand, complete with celebrity endorsements, $200 designer yoga mats, and exclusive wellness getaways. Major corporations and tech start-ups have joined the movement, integrating corporate yoga programmes, AI-guided apps and virtual classes in their offerings, transforming ancient yogic wisdom into a cutting-edge business model. This explosive growth has sparked debate, with critics arguing that yoga’s philosophical and spiritual essence has been reduced to a fashionable fitness trend that emphasises appearance over
inner growth.



4. From Lineage to Modern Training: Traditionally, yoga was passed down through lifelong mentorship, where students dedicated years (often decades) to learning under the careful guidance of a guru. This relationship was more than that of a teacher and student; it was a bond rooted in trust and spiritual growth, focused on physical mastery as well as on the philosophies that underpinned the practice. At the heart of this tradition was seva, or selfless service – a commitment to using one’s personal growth to benefit others. However, this centuries old system has been replaced by a commercialised, fast-track approach, influenced by Western models of certification. Today, the American Yoga Alliance (AYA) – the dominant authority regulating yoga teaching worldwide – sets standardised criteria that allow students to become certified yoga teachers in a few weeks. What once required a lifetime of discipline and spiritual dedication can now be ‘mastered’ through condensed training programmes.

5. The New Yoga Culture: Yoga’s rapid commercialisation has given rise to a wave of innovative and hybrid styles, designed to appeal to modern audiences – but not without controversy. Forms such as Power Yoga and Aerial Yoga have been crafted to attract younger, fitness-focused practitioners, making yoga trendy, accessible and marketable. Yet, while these adaptations have broadened yoga’s reach, they have sparked debates about authenticity.

Furthering transformation is seen in the explosive growth of the online and virtual yoga market, projected to reach $59.23 billion by 2027 (Exercise.com). The rise of AI-driven yoga apps, virtual classes, and personalised digital platforms has not only made yoga more accessible to millions, it has enlarged the customer base exponentially, turning yoga into a global business juggernaut. Yoga studios, in particular, have emerged as one of the most profitable business models in the fitness and wellness industry, mainly because they require minimal investment in equipment or technology. Unlike gyms, which depend on expensive machinery and ongoing maintenance, a yoga studio typically needs nothing more than yoga mats, simple props and an uncluttered, calm space – making it a low-cost, high-return enterprise. Becoming a certified yoga teacher is quicker and more cost-effective than many other fitness professions. Teacher training courses, starting from 200 hours for beginners to 500 hours for advanced levels, can be completed within a few weeks or a few months. Despite the relatively low investment in training, the earning potential for yoga teachers is one of the highest in the fitness industry. In the US, yoga teachers earn $70 per hour on average,
with top-tier instructors commanding as much as $150 per hour for
private sessions.

Yoga retreats and wellness tourism have grown into one of the most lucrative sectors of the global yoga industry, valued at approximately $191.97 billion in 2023, growing at a CAGR of 5.8%. For many wellness seekers, the idea of traveling to exotic destinations like Bali, Costa Rica or India for a transformative experience is incredibly appealing – a chance to combine personal growth with the beauty of a tropical escape. This trend is growing in Pakistan, although an underdeveloped tourist infrastructure is a big hurdle in its surge. As appealing as these retreats may seem, there are realities to consider, as many of them operate without any formal inspection or accountability, leading to substandard teaching and questionable certifications. For people considering investing in a yoga teacher training or a retreat abroad, it is important to look beyond the stunning beaches and Instagram-worthy locations and carefully research the credibility and ethics of the schools.

Yoga today represents a business model that combines low start-up costs, fast-track certifications, and high earning potential, making it extremely attractive to entrepreneurs and wellness professionals. However, a crucial question is, whether by turning yoga into a profitable, scalable business, are we also losing sight of its deeper purpose – the inward journey for healing, self awareness and spiritual growth?

Aliya Agha is a master yogi and founder of the first yoga academy in Pakistan. aliya@aliyaagha.com

PAKISTAN

Linguistic diversity

Umer A. Ranjha 

Published May 17, 2025

DAWN

The writer is a judicial law clerk to the senior puisne judge at the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

“LANGUAGE is not religion. It is a yardstick to measure the civilisational march of a community and its people.” With these words, the Indian supreme court, in its recent judgement ‘Mrs Varshatai vs State of Maharashtra’, reaffirmed a crucial constitutional principle: linguistic diversity is essential to national unity. By striking down a move to exclude Urdu signage from public spaces, the court underscored that every language spoken by citizens is part of the nation’s shared heritage and deserves recognition, respect, and constitutional protection.

This judgement offers an important lesson for Pakistan’s constitutional development. Stressing that the purpose of language is communication, not exclusion, the court warned against using language as a tool of marginalisation. India’s experience, where multiple states officially recognise various languages alongside Hindi, illustrates that linguistic pluralism fortifies democratic unity rather than weakening it. Pakistan’s own history reveals a similar truth; its national identity has always been shaped by linguistic diversity, not uniformity.

Recognising this, our constitutional framework balances national unity with regional expression. Article 251 of the Constitution mandates the promotion of Urdu as the national language while explicitly allowing the continued use and development of provincial languages. Article 28 guarantees every citizen, group, or community the right to preserve and promote their distinct language, script, and culture.

In ‘Muhammad Kowkab Iqbal vs Government of Pakistan’ (2015), then chief justice Jawwad S. Khawaja affirmed that the Constitution envisions promoting Urdu alongside the protection of regional languages. Yet judicial discourse has primarily emphasised the promotion of Urdu, giving insufficient attention to the broader constitutional promise of linguistic equality. In a multilingual society like ours, this promise demands not merely formal acknowledgement but active realisation.

History offers a sobering reminder of the costs of linguistic exclusion. The Bengali language movement of the early 1950s, born from demands to recognise Bengali as a state language, demonstrates how ignoring linguistic plurality can threaten national cohesion. As Dr Ayesha Jalal notes in The Struggle for Pakistan, the early marginalisation of linguistic and cultural identities alienated the majority, laying the foundations for eventual division. Our experience underscores that internal exclusion poses a graver threat to unity than external adversaries. Language, therefore, lies at the very centre of national identity.

It falls to the courts to breathe life into Article 28.

A commitment to constitutionalism must embrace the pluralistic realities of Pakistan’s society. Moving beyond rigid conceptions of national identity requires recognising and protecting the multiplicity of languages, cultures, and histories that coexist in the country. Article 28 must not be relegated to a symbolic status but be treated as a substantive, enforceable right necessary for preserving the nation’s cultural fabric.

The consequences of neglecting linguistic rights extend far beyond cultural loss. Barriers to language access obstruct rights such as access to justice, education, and equality, safeguarded under Articles 9, 25, and 25A. Linguistic human rights scholar Tove Skutnabb-Kangas characterises linguistic exclusion as a form of systemic disenfranchisement. In Pakistan, safeguarding all mother tongues is not simply a matter of cultural preservation; it is a constitutional obligation tied to the dignity and equality of all citizens.

Constitutions, like ‘living trees’, must grow and adapt to meet the evolving needs of society. It therefore falls to both the Sup­reme Court and the high courts to breathe life into Article 28, and interpret it as a positive and enforceable right, requiring the state to take af­­firmative measures to protect and promote minority and regional languages. Such an interpretation would not constitute judicial overreach, but rather a faithful realisation of constitutional principles. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already recognised in its 2015 judgement that the right to

language is directly linked to the realisation of various fundamental rights protected by the Constitution, especially the right to dignity and equality. Extending constitutional protection to all linguistic communities is a necessary continuation of that vision.

As Faiz Ahmed Faiz wrote, “Bol ke lab azaad hain tere” (Speak for your lips are free). Article 28, therefore, is not a ceremonial promise, it is a binding constitutional guarantee owed to every citizen who speaks Sindhi, Pashto, Punjabi, Balochi, Seraiki, Brahui, and the many other languages that together weave Pakistan’s cultural tapestry. To honour the Constitution is to honour all voices spoken within its borders. By fully enforcing linguistic rights, the courts can ensure that no language, no culture, and no citizen is ever left unheard again.

Published in Dawn, May 17th, 2025

Politics of hate

Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) that stood the test of time for 65 years is under severe strain.

Aisha Khan 

Published May 19, 2025 

DAWN

The writer is head of the Civil Society Coalition for Climate Change.


THE Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) that stood the test of time for 65 years is under severe strain.

Many things have changed since it was assiduously crafted with the help of the World Bank in 1960.

While the treaty provides a dispute-resolution mechanism that has been used in the past to address complaints, this time the issue has taken a sordid turn. At the heart of the matter are two things most responsible for the current impasse — i) demographic changes that are outstripping supply with shrinking resources and rising demand, ii) the emergence of politics of hate and division fuelling religious nationalism to fan public sentiment.

The post-Cold War attempt to create a rules-based international order is under assault from a rising wave of populist demagoguery. The inciting rhetoric takes different shapes and forms, but the message of punitive action remains the same.

Now it is the heft of nations that determines acceptance or rejection of its unilateral actions by the global community. The arbitrary suspension of the IWT is part of this wider malaise. Nations are now looking increasingly inward, taking a more distributive approach to negotiations and using muscular diplomacy to assert their agenda.

The IWT has a past history of invoking the dispute-resolution clause.

The issues between the two countries are no longer merely about territorial disputes but have taken a more insidious turn.

In 2007, the dispute resolution process over India’s design of the Baglihar hydroelectric plant on the Chenab was addressed by a neutral expert to determine the freeboard of India’s proposed dam.

In 2013, the Court of Arbitration rendered a decision on India’s diversion of a tributary of the Jhelum for the Kishenganga hydroelectric project. India was allowed to divert water for the Kishenganga project while maintaining a minimum specified storage in the reservoir and minimum release of nine cubic metres of water per second down river into the Jhelum tributary.

However, trouble started brewing in 2016 following the unresolved technical differences with regard to the Kishenganga hydroelectric project and India’s announcement of starting the Ratle hydroelectric project on the Chenab.

The strident tone adopted by India after the 2014 elections has continued to grow and alter political thinking with a palpable shift in its relationship dynamics with Pakistan. The already tense bilateral relations came under acute strain after the Pulwama terror attack in India for which it blamed Pakistan (without proof). This also mar­ked the beginning of public statements from India threatening to use water as a weapon to punish Pa­­­kistan for its alleged role in sponsoring terrorism.

The revocation of Article 370 in 2019 stripping Indian-occupied Kashmir of its special status and its sharp rejection by Pakistan further poisoned the chalice.

In 2016 when Pakistan invoked the arbitral process via a Request For Arbitration, the water was already turning from muddy to murky. The RFA outlined seven disputes related to the disputed projects related to design and permissibility of pondage levels, submerged power intakes, low-level sediment outlets, spillway designs, and permissible freeboard intakes. India’s refusal to participate in the arbitral process led to a default appointment procedure for a five-year pause (2016-22) imposed by the World Bank. With heightened levels of animosity and a volley of threats hurled at Pakistan, India decried the ‘illegitimacy’ of the Court of Arbitration via a letter to the World Bank (Dec 21, 2022).

Parallel to this, India requested the appointment of a neutral expert under the Indus treaty. Pakistan’s refusal to participate resulted in the default appointment procedure for the appointment of a neutral expert after a five-year pause. In 2023, the Court of Arbitration issued an award upholding its competence for addressing the matter. In 2025, the neutral expert also issued an award upholding its competence to address the seven points of conflict.

The main problem is not overlapping jurisdictional competencies and their inconsistent outcomes. The real issue is the deepening divide between India and Pakistan. The issues between the two countries are no longer merely about territorial disputes but have taken a more insidious turn. The last 15 years have seen a sharp increase in animosity bordering on intense hatred. This trend has to be curbed.

The tragic and condemnable Pahalgam incide­nt has, once again, ignited passions blinding reason and bringing the two countries to the brink of war. The unilateral suspension of the IWT by India is a sign of a new trend that blurs the line between separate incidents and uses a no-holds-barred approach to retaliation. The two countries have a history of bad blood laden with accusations of interference with the intent of fomenting disaffection and destabilsation. Such passionate feelings based on the politics of identity are a dangerous portent for the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

The multilayered dispute resolution mechanism of the fraying IWT must be seen in the context of the fractious geopolitical history of the region marked by its hydrological topography.

The IWT can no longer only be seen through the technical lens of neutral experts. Given the relationship dynamics the intent and ability to do harm needs to be examined by a Court of Arbitration. Judicial interpretation has the provision for taking a broader view while neutral experts are limited by their narrow mandate. Both countries can do more with less water if hate and hostility are not part of the equation.

When the dust has settled, both countries need to embark on a sincere journey of truth and reconciliation. The need for working together has never been greater than it is today.

aisha@csccc.org.pk

Published in Dawn, May 19th, 2025

International law & Indus wars

Sikander Ahmed Shah 

Published May 17, 2025 

 DAWN

The writer is former legal adviser to Pakistan’s foreign ministry, and faculty, Lums Law School.

ON April 23, India unilaterally declared the Indus Waters Treaty to be “in abeyance” — a term neither recognised in treaty law nor found in the IWT itself. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) — the authoritative international agreement on treaty law — instead describes a party’s releasing itself from its treaty obligations as a ‘suspension’.

Treaties such as the IWT are not limited by time, continuing instead in perpetuity under Article 42 of the VCLT. And under Article 57 of the VCLT, a treaty can only be suspended if it allows for such suspension, or with the mutual consent of all contracting parties. The IWT, a multilateral treaty with India, Pakistan and the World Bank as signatories, does not provide for suspension and can unilaterally only be terminated or suspended if a party commits a material breach of treaty as described under Article 60 of the VCLT. India’s accusations of Pakistan’s alleged role in the Pahalgam attack are completely unsubstantiated; but in any event, that attack has no nexus with the scope of the IWT nor — assuming that Pakistan were even hypothetically involved — constitutes a material breach thereof.

The scope of and obligations under the IWT, which Pakistan complies with, principally deal with the allocation and usage of river waters, and incidentally with hydropower generation from them. Any stoppage, restriction, or interference in the flow of waters in rivers allocated to Pakistan under the treaty, including the Chenab, constitutes a clear violation by India of Article III (2) of the IWT, which obligates India to refrain from interfering with the flow of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers.

Apart from these treaty violations, customary law codified in Article 2 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility establishes that conduct in the breach of a state’s international obligations, that is attributable to it, constitutes an internationally wrongful act, thus necessitating the payment of full reparations to affected parties. Violations of a state’s treaty obligations constitute prima facie an internationally wrongful act, as affirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the ‘Phosphates in Morocco’ case and the famous ‘Rainbow Warrior’ arbitration. Thus, India’s interference in the flow of the Chenab river constitutes an internationally wrongful act and also places India in breach of Article 26 of the VCLT, which codifies the principle of pacta sunt servanda — ie, agreements must be honoured. India’s culpability under international law thus obliges it to pay Pakistan reparations for the damage caused by its illegal acts.


India’s interference in the flow of the Chenab constitutes an internationally wrongful act.

Article IX of the IWT provides only two methods of dispute resolution: technical disputes, including engineering issues, are referred to a neutral expert, while treaty violations and questions of its interpretation, which are legal disputes, are referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In the present circumstances, India did not exercise this right, arguably as it knew it stood on shaky legal ground in holding the IWT “in abeyance”.

Though the Simla Agreement, a bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan, emphasises bilateral dispute resolution, it cannot be relied upon to undercut Pakistan’s right to third-party dispute resolution, as India might be interpreting it to do so. The IWT, signed in 1960, predates the Simla Agreement of 1972 by over a decade and, according to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention — as well as customary international law — treaties do not operate retrospectively. Thus, the commitment to promote bilateral dispute resolution under the Simla Agreement does not limit in any way Pakistan’s ability to highlight and prosecute India’s violations of the IWT, including through international fora such as the General Assembly, Security Council and other UN bodies.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) outlined in the ‘Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros’ and ‘Pulp Mills’ cases that states cannot rely on perceived treaty violations or other internationally wrongful acts as a premise to violate their own treaty obligations. Violating another treaty or international legal norm does not entitle a state to suspend its obligations towards the state owed under the treaty concerned; instead, it constitutes a breach of the said treaty for that state.

India’s interference with the Chenab river’s flow is not only a treaty violation, but also a violation of international humanitarian law considering the state of armed conflict between the two nations, as it impedes civilians’ access to water. Article 54 (4) of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug 12, 1949, (AP I) specifically outlaws the impediment of water for the purpose of reprisals.

International law explicitly prohibits the destruction or diversion of natural or ecological resources — such as rivers — for the purpose of reprisals or to achieve military objectives. This is recognised through the principle’s inclusion in the Berlin Rules on Water Resources 2004, which codify customary law on water resources, and is framed as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the AP I.

During the recent military conflagration, India carried out strikes on the Neelam-Jhelum hydropower project, triggering Pakistan’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. To protect its flow of water guaranteed under the IWT, in an armed conflict, Pakistan reserves the right to target Indian dams and dykes on transboundary rivers as a military objective, if it is necessary and proportional, if such works are being used “in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support”, as outlined in Article 56 of AP I, a treaty signed by Pakistan and now mostly considered customary international law.

This permissibility is reinforced considering the ICJ went even further to protect state sovereignty in interpreting Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, as held in its ‘Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, where the court refused to outlaw even the threat or use of nuclear weapons in extreme cases of self-defence, where a state’s political survival faces an existential threat.

India is violating the law of the use of force by threatening Pakistan’s political survival through its weaponisation of dams and barrages, as the Indus system provides 90 per cent of Pakistan’s water.

Published in Dawn, May 17th, 2025

Rehabilitating the treaty

Ali Tauqeer Sheikh 

Published May 16, 2025

DAWN

The writer is a climate change and sustainable development expert.

INDIA has neither suspended nor abrogated the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). It has held it ‘in abeyance’ which is neither a technical nor a legal term in the treaty. The announcement represents a belligerent political action rather than a legal decision. Pakistan’s response therefore has to be primarily crafted in the political realm. The present status has left the door open for the treaty’s rehabilitation. Can Pakistan provide the Modi government a diplomatic opening, or a fig leaf, to engage in a meaningful process to preserve the treaty?

In the immediate term, India will not get extra water, nor will freshwater flows to Pakistan diminish. The engagement process therefore needs a long view. Since maintaining the treaty offers greater advantages to both nations, how can they look back and draw some lessons for future water relations within and outside the treaty?

India’s April 24 letter to Pakistan argued that fundamental changes in circumstances necessitated reassessment of treaty obligations. These changes include altered population demographics, clean energy development imperatives, and cross-border terrorism allegedly impeding India’s full utilisation of treaty rights. For precisely these reasons, the two countries need the treaty more than ever before. None of the listed issues can be addressed unilaterally by either side.

Regrettably, these issues were never formally raised by India in the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) meetings. The negotiators from India and Pakistan, predominantly civil engineers, failed to recognise that climate change was altering the Indus basin hydrology, creating challenges beyond the treaty’s original scope. They failed to utilise Article 7 as a framework through which both nations could have collaboratively addressed the issues without treaty renegotiation.

The Indus basin has experienced unprecedented climate impacts including shifting monsoon patterns, extreme precipitation events and accelerated glacial melt. Water availability has begun to decrease, with projections indicating continuing decline. The IWT employed fixed allocation mechanisms not always suited to hydrological variability while PIC meetings remained infrequent and adversarial rather than collaborative.

Negotiators displayed no desire to study and adopt global best practices in transboundary water management.

Article 7 provided the legal foundation for future cooperation and “optimum development” of the rivers, yet it remained largely unutilised. India never requested the creation of specialised working groups under the PIC focused on climate adaptation and extreme weather response, the energy needs of the two sides or changing demographic trends. A joint climate research agenda examining glacial melt, changing precipitation patterns, and climate impact on water flows would have built mutual understanding of shared challenges.

Likewise, Pakistan never raised the subject of transboundary water terrorism. Not surprisingly, both nations failed to establish real-time coordination mechanisms for flood warnings, drought management and other extreme events. More agile dispute-resolution mechanisms would have prevented the escalation of tensions. The commission never increased the meetings’ frequency beyond the minimum twice yearly for more responsive governance.

The negotiators also did not show any appetite to study and adopt global best practices in transboundary water management. Approximately, 40 per cent of the global population relies on shared water sources, with 70pc of transboundary basin areas governed by treaties. The Ganges Water Treaty between Bangladesh and India, despite its imperfections, offered a regional model with provisions for water-sharing during droughts and a Joint Water Commission mandated to conduct studies on water-sharing, irrigation, and flood control.

The Permanent Joint Technical Commission on the Nile Basin represented another valuable model despite controversies surrounding Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This framework enabled upstream and downstream countries to make recommendations for cooperation in energy generation, dam filling, or water allocations during extraordinary droughts.

Water management experts had identified four key mechanisms that transboundary agreements should incorporate: flexible allocation strategies, specific drought and extreme weather provisions, regular review processes and strong institutional frameworks.

Despite past failures, the door remains open for both countries to rehabilitate the treaty. The World Bank, as the third signatory to the IWT, retains significant potential to facilitate this process. Article IX explicitly designates the World Bank as a potential mediator when differences arise, and this mechanism remains available despite the current tensions. Neither party appears to have informed the World Bank of recent developments. Pakistan need not hold back.

The World Bank’s unique position enables it to facilitate technical dialogues separated from political rhetoric. There is a case for the bank to expand beyond its role of appointing neutral experts or arbitrators, and bring together international experts with experience in successful transboundary water cooperation models like the Danube river basin, which transformed from a contested resource into “an emblem of peace and cooperation in Europe”.

Using the trust fund created when the treaty was signed in 1960, the World Bank can help India and Pakistan undertake studies on implementation experiences from agreements like the Mekong River Commission, which has developed sophisticated joint monitoring protocols for changing flow conditions.

Rather than allowing the treaty to stagnate, India and Pakistan can rehabilitate it through incremental technical cooperation. The World Bank could be requested to facilitate initial technical dialogues on non-controversial aspects of climate impacts, growing regional hydro energy needs, and gradually building momentum for more complex discussions. Article 7 remains the most viable pathway for tackling the issues raised by India without reopening the entire treaty.

There is still an opportunity to establish specialised technical working groups. Protocols for coordinated responses to extreme weather events, following models from other basins, could be developed without altering the treaty’s core structure.

The IWT remains a viable framework for transboundary water cooperation, but its implementation must evolve. By transforming climate challenges into opportunities for technical cooperation, India and Pakistan can ensure water security while potentially rebuilding a foundation for regional stability. The World Bank’s involvement as an honest broker could provide a neutral platform for this technical renaissance, allowing professionals to work beyond political constraints while giving the leadership in both countries space for a face-saving return to cooperative water governance. After all, it is in everyone’s interest to deweaponise regional waters rather than have a dysfunctional treaty parked in indefinite abeyance.

The writer is a climate change and sustainable development expert.

Published in Dawn, May 16th, 2025

SMOKERS’ CORNER: INDIA'S FAILED GAMBIT

Nadeem F. Paracha 

Published May 18, 2025

DAWN 

Illustration by Abro

India will never be the same again. Or at least not like what it has been since Narendra Modi came to power in 2014.

On May 7 and 10, Indian forces were rather confidently subdued by the Pakistani army and air force. On May 7, when the wreckages of India’s highly-touted Rafale fighter jets were discovered, the tone of the Indian government suddenly lowered. That’s when one felt that the May 7 battle was not turning out the way India had hoped.

This war was initiated by India on the assumption that Pakistan was a highly polarised society with an “unpopular army” and an equally unpopular government. Indian strategists were convinced that Pakistan would not be able to withstand an attack by its much larger neighbour with a ‘very popular’ government and superior war machine.

But during the conflict, India — figuratively speaking — was first served a black-eye, and then, on May 10, a bloody nose. It eventually called for a ceasefire mediated by the US. This was first reported by the veteran journalist Nic Robertson on CNN.

India stoked a war expecting a ‘fractured’ Pakistan to crumble. Instead, it was met with unexpected national unity, military pushback and global scrutiny — thus reshaping the regional narrative

Pakistan successfully withstood a major Indian offensive and scored some vital military and diplomatic victories. India, on the other hand, has very little to show for its gambit. Let’s see how India’s infamously loud, jingoistic and fact-free media spins this because, by the evening of May 10, it had started to sound rather disoriented.

One of the most bizarre episodes of the conflict, though, unfolded on Indian TV channels during the night/early morning of May 8/9. For hours, the Indian media kept ‘reporting’ the fall of major Pakistani cities and the country’s government, and the arrest of Pakistan’s military chief. This bewildering tidal wave of fake news kept rising, despite Pakistanis posting videos of complete normality in their country (and, understandably, laughing their heads off). More so, no news outlet outside India reported anything at all about this “sweeping Indian victory.”

One day this episode will (and should) be studied more closely by sociologists (or, for that matter, by psychologists as well). My immediate understanding is that it was a case of a collective fantasy that kept gaining momentum as more and more Indians got sucked into a whirlpool of outright fibs, so much so that they lost all contact with reality.

I guess, the ecstasy and frenzy of those mad hours on Indian media were such that all ability to think rationally and mindfully was sucked out from a lot of Indians — especially middle class Indians, who are Modi’s core constituency. A collective fantasy of the total and absolute destruction of a hated neighbour was played out that night on Indian news channels and on social media. It soon mutated and took the shape of a frenetic ritual.

Most participants of this ritual woke up the next morning with a terrible hangover. Pakistan was still there, as it has always been. The hangover worsened when Pakistan successfully retaliated on May 10 with a barrage of missile strikes. By then, the Indian media and its audience were visibly exhausted. So was the Modi regime. The gambit had failed.

Indeed, Pakistan was/is a polarised society. But it is remarkable the way the country’s many divergent social, economic and political segments almost instantly came together to support the country’s armed forces and government against the Indian offensive. The Indians were not expecting this.

Their understanding of the political situation in Pakistan seems to have been based on an exaggerated perception of the economic and political crisis that Pakistan plunged into in 2022. A perception — which one can now safely claim — was largely formulated by Indian ‘psyop’ (psychological operation) experts on social media through their own ‘trolls’ (pretending to be Pakistani), and through the usual cast of ‘useful idiots’ within Pakistan who readily hitch a ride on any narrative that undermines the “unpopular” armed forces.

This is not to suggest that the narratives in this regard are entirely wrong. Far from it. But they do tend to be exaggerated and are framed to fish for emotions and beliefs that have turned into dogmas. These dogmas are mostly views about Pakistani state institutions and politics. Even though the institutions and the country’s politics have been evolving, their understanding in certain fixed minds seems to have stalled or stopped at some previous point in time. This tendency can be found on the left as well as on the right.



However, many who (I believe) carry this tendency were also openly supportive of the country’s response to Indian hostilities. There were those among them who were clearly struggling, even though they weren’t as vehement in their criticisms as they often are. Most from this segment decided to talk about ‘peace’. Nothing wrong with this, really — but here’s the thing: one is often impressed by the long tradition of anti-war and/or peace marches in Europe and the US. But these marches make sense because they were (and still are) held against one’s own country because its forces have invaded and occupied another country. Think Vietnam, think Iraq, think Afghanistan, think Palestine.

But do you think peaceniks in the US would’ve been singing ‘Give Peace a Chance’ had it been the Vietnamese forces invading the US? Were the Iraqi soldiers singing ‘All We Need is Love’ when facing US troops in Iraq? Of course war can be hell on so many levels. But it wasn’t Pakistan who started the war.

The country’s sovereignty had been breached by a neighbour that has never hidden its desire to break Pakistan into several pieces. Calls for peace had to come from peaceniks in India, the initiator of the war. One just couldn’t expect the Pakistani armed forces and government to pull out acoustic guitars instead of guns and start singing ‘All We Need is Love.’

Perhaps the silliest were many fans of Imran Khan. Some continued their so-called ‘anti-establishment’ tirades, but most, in a rather surreal manner, tried to posit that Pakistan’s victory was somehow dependent on Khan’s release from jail. They didn’t explain how. Take for example the following X post by the official Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) account when India launched its second attack: “Pakistan is under attack. Release Imran Khan now!” To do what? Hold a rally? Organise a dharna? What?

Nevertheless, the Indian government’s reading of present-day Pakistan was exposed as one-dimensional. This understanding became trapped in its own exaggerations and formulations. Even these realities changed with the aggression against Pakistan, surprising the Indians.

Published in Dawn, EOS, May 18th, 2025

INTERVIEW: ‘India Should Never Fight Indecisive ‘Wars’ With Pakistan’

Rashme Sehgal | 16 May 2025

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Bharat Karnad, a well-known security expert, analyses the four-day India-Pakistan conflict.

Image Courtesy: Flickr

Bharat Karnad, Emeritus Professor for National Security Studies, Centre for Policy Research, and Distinguished Fellow at the United Service Institution of India, is a prolific writer and security expert having written several books on India’s nuclear policy. Among the many books is `Staggering Forward: Narendra Modi and India’s Global Ambition’ and `Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet). Edited excerpts of an interview with senior journalist Rashme Sehgal on the hostilities between India and Pakistan after the terror attack on tourists in Pahalgam, Kashmir, on April 22.

Rashme Sehgal: What made US President Donald Trump jump into the recent Indo-Pak fracas? Did he fear the increased escalation leading to a nuclear conflict? US Vice President JD Vance had gone public saying that it ‘was none of our business’, but a day later, we saw US talking to both sides and going public on their claim. Your comments.

Bharat Karnad: Two things may have prompted the US President. One, Trump's proclivity to grab the international spotlight -- this time by jumping into the India-Pakistan tussle as international "peacemaker" and making completely false statements about pressuring the Indian and Pakistani governments to stand down.

Two, India's missile hits on the Nur Khan air base at Chaklala, HQ of the Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan's nuclear secretariat, and even, perhaps, on nuclear storage sites in the Kirana Hills, may have triggered America's overblown fears of a nuclear conflict. 

RS: There were reports in a leading English daily that IAF had hit Kirana Hills in Punjab which provides storage facilities for their nuclear infrastructure, which was subsequently denied.  I have two queries. First, nuclear facilities are built with many safeguards so much so that experts claim these facilities should be able to withstand such a hit (if not direct). Second, Pakistani experts claim nuclear facilities are spread across the country. Your comments.

BK: Yes, nuclear weapon sites are usually in dispersed locations, and they are physically well protected with hardening.  

RS: President Trump in a subsequent tweet claimed it was US intervention that halted this fight and he was willing to mediate in a neutral place to resolve this dispute. Allowing the US to get involved will cease this as a bilateral issue. How will this affect India’s foreign policy?

BK: For over 20 years now, I have been warning in my books and other writings about the perils of getting too friendly with the US. Washington begins by taking you for granted, and takes liberties. When Vance called (Prime Minister) Modi, he should have strongly objected to the US intervention and told him in so many words to "Shut up! Stay out" because it was none of America's business. Modi should then have gone public by saying he had told the US to stop interfering. Instead. S Jaishankar (the foreign minister and the Ministry of External Affairs), as I understand, talked ambiguously about details, such as the proposed "neutral site" for negotiations, etc. So, we have given way on the last point and, diplomatically, once again helped the US to re-hyphenate India and Pakistan that New Delhi had striven so hard over the last 20 years to keep apart.

RS: Given that Indian security forces claimed that we were winning the war, should India have so readily agreed to a ceasefire? Some security analysts claim that India snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Your views?

BK: India certainly had the upper hand -- our missile blows were landing and Pakistan's were being negated by a surprisingly good layered Indian air defence system. The trouble was that other than Muridke and Bahawalpur, the Indian government had no strategic objectives, as I pointed out in my 'Security Wise' Blog of May 7. There were no preparations, for instance, to straighten out the LOC (Line of Control) by capturing the Haji Pir Salient in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir -- the main channel for infiltrating terrorists into the Srinagar Valley. Or to take Skardu, to rationalise the Indian control of the border to the Saltoro Muztagh and the Siachen Glacier. These were doable goals, as I pointed out in my blog post of April 30. So, naturally, there is disappointment.

RS: India decided to teach Pakistan a lesson (post Pahalgam) by attacking terror facilities inside Pakistan. Do you see such an action as a deterrent, given the fact that terrorism remains an integral part of Pakistan’s state policy? If we are indeed creating a new benchmark, then should we not have kept up our attack?

BK: No. But it will make the ISI (Pakistan’s Inter- Services Intelligence) more creative in training and housing the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad extremists now grouped under a new name -- The Resistance Front (TRF)-- make them less visible, less conspicuous.

RS: Both sides are claiming victory, with Pakistan claiming they shot down four of our planes, and the Indian side claiming likewise, but we have refused to provide any details. The result is that the Western media seems to be accepting Pakistan’s version. Your comments?

BK: It is predictable in an indecisive conflict that both sides claim victory! And that's why I have long argued that India should never fight indecisive "wars" with Pakistan. But that's precisely what the Modi regime once again did, and so we have all this crowing by the Pakistani state and media.

RS: During this conflict, Western observers have expressed admiration for the performance of Chinese military technology, citing reports that its J10C fighter jets shot down the French-made Rafale. Your comments on this, as also on how India’s indigenously manufactured weapons performed?

BK: Actually, the Pakistan Air Force had the upper hand, and were more effective in using the military technologies and platforms they have -- the Chinese J-10C multi-role fighter armed with the Chinese PL-15E long range air-to-air missile and the Swedish Saab Erieye Airborne Early-Warning and Control System. This was until Indians began relying majorly on its medium-range attack missiles -- the Brahmos, and on the Russian S-400 layered air defence system to neutralise PAF's offensive air movements.

RS: Modi’s address to the nation, warning that India will not cease to retaliate in full measure if future terrorist activities take place, seems to have had zero impact on Pakistan. Three terrorists were gunned down by security forces in Shopian. How then should we deal with Pakistan?

BK: Had we taken Haji Pir and/or Skardu, the message would have gone across that every Pakistan Army ISI-sponsored terrorist incident in India would result in Pakistan losing significant territory in PoK. It would have been a substantive deterrent and disincentive -- that equation of terrorism leading to loss of PoK territory. But this sort of strong punitive policy requires a powerful political will, which this country has never manifested in its military actions (barring in the 1971 War).  

Rashme Sehgal is an independent journalist. The views expressed are personal.