Tuesday, July 22, 2025

Amnesty report: Israeli attack on Iran ’s Evin prison

Iran: Deliberate Israeli attack on Tehran’s Evin prison must be investigated as a war crime – new evidence


Satellite imagery (left) from 30 June reveals two locations (shown with yellow circles) where munitions likely landed. Geolocated photos and videos (right) show that the vehicle entrance gate collapsed. The clinic’s interior was significantly damaged

Amnesty International UK

Press release

Video footage, satellite imagery, and eyewitness accounts reveal extensive civilian casualties and destruction

According to Iranian authorities, at least 80 civilians - 79 men and women and a five-year-old boy - were killed

Israeli military quickly claimed responsibility for the attack - senior officials boasted about it online

‘The evidence establishes reasonable grounds to believe that the Israeli military brazenly and deliberately attacked civilian buildings’ - Erika Guevara Rosas

The Israeli military’s deliberate air strikes on Evin prison in Tehran on 23 June constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law and must be criminally investigated as war crimes, Amnesty International said today following a detailed investigation. 

Verified video footage, satellite imagery, and interviews with eyewitnesses, prisoners’ families and human rights defenders indicate that the Israeli military carried out multiple air strikes on Evin prison, killing and injuring scores of civilians and causing extensive damage and destruction in at least six locations across the prison complex.

The attack occurred during the working day and prison visiting hours, when many parts of Evin prison were packed with civilians. At the time, the prison reportedly held between 1,500 and 2,000 detainees, including arbitrarily detained human rights defenders, protesters, political dissidents, persecuted religious minorities, and dual or foreign nationals often used as diplomatic leverage. Hundreds of civilians were also present within the complex. Hours after the strike, the Israeli military confirmed the attack, with senior officials publicly boasting about it on social media. According to Iranian authorities, at least 80 civilians - 79 men and women and a five-year-old boy - were killed.

Under international humanitarian law, a prison or place of detention is presumed a civilian object and there is no credible evidence in this case that Evin prison constituted a lawful military objective. 

Erika Guevara Rosas, Amnesty International’s Senior Director for Research, Advocacy, Policy and Campaigns, said:

“The evidence establishes reasonable grounds to believe that the Israeli military brazenly and deliberately attacked civilian buildings. Directing attacks at civilian objects is strictly prohibited under international humanitarian law. Carrying out such attacks knowingly and deliberately constitutes a war crime.

“The Israeli forces should have known that any air strikes against Evin prison could result in significant civilian harm. Prosecution authorities around the world must ensure that all those responsible for this deadly attack are brought to justice, including through use of the principle of universal jurisdiction. The Iranian authorities must also grant the International Criminal Court jurisdiction over all Rome Statute crimes committed on or perpetrated from its territory.”

Scores of civilians killed and injured  

Between 11am to 12pm Tehran time on 23 June, Israeli air strikes hit multiple locations over 500 metres apart inside Evin prison, destroying or damaging numerous buildings and other structures within the prison complex, as well as nearby residential buildings outside it.  

An overview of Evin prison, with the exterior walled perimeter marked in orange. The six yellow circles highlight areas with the most significant destruction, indicating these were the locations where the munitions landed. The blasts and resulting damage extended beyond the six areas. 

A map of Evin prison indicating building names or functions based on Amnesty’s interviews with former prisoners. 

Evin prison is located in a populated area with residential buildings to its east and south. A nearby resident described the scene following the attack to Amnesty: 

“I suddenly heard a terrible sound. I looked out of the window and realised that smoke and dust were rising from Evin prison. Both the sound of the explosion and the appearance of the dust and smoke were horrific... I had thought our home would be safe [as] we are near a prison... I couldn’t believe it.” 

The authorities have so far named 57 civilians who were killed in the attack including five female social workers13 young men performing mandatory national service as prison guards or administrators, and 36 other prison staff – 30 men and six women – and the child of one of the social workers. After drawing public criticism for failing to disclose the identities of prisoners, their relatives and nearby residents who were killed, the authorities published a report on 14 July revealing two names: a nearby resident – Mehrangiz Imanpour – and a woman volunteering to help raise funds for debt prisoners – Hasti Mohammadi.

Amnesty had already verified the name of Mehrangiz Imanpour, as well as the names of one prisoner, Masoud Behbahani, a prisoner’s relative, Leila Jafarzadeh, and a passerby Aliasghar Pazouki, who were also killed. 

Israeli officials’ self-incriminating admissions  

Within hours of the attack, senior Israeli officials boasted about it on social media, framing it as a “targeted strike” against a “symbol of oppression for the Iranian people.” 

Israel’s Defence Minister, Israel Katz, said on X that Israeli forces were attacking with “unprecedented force regime targets and government repression bodies in the heart of Tehran including…Evin prison”. 

Minutes later, Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Sa'ar posted on X: “We warned Iran time and again: stop targeting civilians! They continued, including this morning. Our response: [Long live freedom…].” Alongside this post was a video purporting to show CCTV footage of the prison gate being blown up. Analysis of the video by Amnesty indicates the footage was digitally manipulated likely using an old photograph of the prison gate. The video was first posted on Persian-language Telegram channels, but Amnesty could not trace its original source. 

Later the same day, the Israeli military confirmed in a statement that they had carried out “a targeted strike” on “the notorious Evin prison”. The statement appeared to justify the attack by saying that “enemies of the regime” were held and tortured there and alleging that “intelligence operations against the State of Israel, including counter espionage” were carried out in the prison. However, the interrogation of detainees accused of spying for Israel or the presence of intelligence officials within the prison compound would not render the penal facility itself a legitimate military objective under international humanitarian law. 

Entrance gate and prosecution office in the south

In the south of the prison, the main entrance gate, along with the adjoining wall and the visitor information building to the east of the gate were destroyed. The building to the west of the gate and the adjoining Shahid Moghaddas prosecution office were extensively damaged. Further inside the southern part of the prison, the car park and a building next to the quarantine section were damaged.

Before and after: false-colour, near infrared satellite imagery from 10 April and 30 June reveal the destruction in four distinct locations in the south and central parts of Evin prison where munitions likely landed (shown with yellow circles) and signs of burning (visible in near-infrared in dark black hues) in many areas, likely from vehicles that caught fire and spread to buildings in the area.  

An informed source told Amnesty that a woman named Leila Jafarzadeh, 35, was killed while visiting the prosecution office to post bail in order to secure the release of her imprisoned husband.

The destruction of the entrance gate and its surroundings was captured in a verified video showing rescue workers carrying at least one injured person on a stretcher amid scenes of destruction and extensive rubble on the ground. 

Footage published by state media and verified by Amnesty also shows structural damage to the prosecution office’s walls and building framework, indicating that the force of the blast penetrated deep into the building. 

Satellite imagery from 30 June reveals a location (shown with a yellow circle) where munitions likely landed. Ground images (right) geolocated to the north and south areas of the southern entrance gate show major destruction. 

Administrative building and quarantine section housing prisoners  

Deeper inside the southern area of the prison, the administrative building and a smaller adjoining building which, according to a former prisoner, contained an office of the prison’s security force called the Protection Cohort, were significantly impacted, while several nearby structures were destroyed. 

Satellite imagery from 30 June shows significant damage to part of the roof on the west side of the Protection Cohort building. Satellite imagery further shows that to the east of the building, an internal gate, perimeter wall and two small structures – likely guard posts – were all destroyed in the strike. 

The two identified locations are consistent with the analysis of video footage and information received from two former prisoners of conscience Atena Daemi and Hossein Razagh.  

Verified videos also depict destroyed windows, collapsed walls and extensive rubble on both the western and eastern sides of the administrative building. The first floor appears to be largely obliterated, with missing structural walls visible in multiple sections. 

An image published by state media and verified by Amnesty shows what appears to be a crater inside the west side of the administrative building showing the first floor collapsed downward. 

According to a state media report on 6 July, at least nine women, one man and a child were killed in the administrative building. Shargh Daily and Hammihan, two prominent newspapers in Iran, named three of the victims in reports published on 25 June and 1 July, respectively. They included social worker Zahra Ebadi, 52, who was killed along with her five-year-old son, Mehrad Kheiri; and an administrative staff member, Hamid Ranjbari, 40. 

Satellite imagery (left) from 30 June reveals two locations (shown with yellow circles) where munitions likely landed. Ground images (right) show extensive damage to the administrative building. 

Analysis of a verified video footage also shows that the quarantine section housing newly admitted prisoners, located near the administrative building, also sustained damage. 

Medical clinic, kitchen and sections housing prisoners in the central part 

In the central part of the prison, the medical clinic, central kitchen, section 4 housing male prisoners, section 209 which consists of solitary confinement cells where female and male prisoners are detained by the Minister of Intelligence, and the women’s section were extensively damaged. 

Satellite imagery shows significant damage to structures adjacent to the medical clinic, while verified videos reveal damage to the clinic from the blast and burning cars.  

A verified video shows the outside of the medical clinic covered in black soot and black smoke billowing from the windows. Another video shows significant destruction inside, with shattered windows, beds and medical equipment overturned and extensive rubble. 

Satellite imagery (left) from 30 June reveals two locations (shown with yellow circles) where munitions likely landed. Geolocated photos and videos (right) show that the vehicle entrance gate collapsed. The clinic’s interior was significantly damaged, with walls and windows blown out, while the exterior shows severe fire damage and smoke.  

The verified video evidence supports accounts from human rights defenders Narges Mohammadi and Sepideh Gholian, both based in Iran, who told Amnesty that multiple eyewitnesses in Evin prison described to them extensive damage to the medical clinic.

Narges Mohammadi said that male prisoners in section 4, which is opposite the medical clinic, informed her the prison’s ambulance was destroyed, an account supported by video showing nearby vehicles reduced to wreckage. She also said the prisoners told her they witnessed an individual with extensive burns on their body walking out of the medical clinic and collapsing on the ground. 

Two prisoners - Abolfazl Ghodiani and Mehdi Mahmoudian – who survived the Evin prison attack and were transferred to Greater Tehran Penitentiary wrote in a letter from inside prison, which was published online on 1 July: 

“Evin prison shook with several consecutive explosions. Two or three blasts occurred near Section 4 and when prisoners exited the section’s door, they saw the medical clinic burning… Prisoners recovered the bodies of around 15-20 people, including medical clinic personnel, prisoners, warehouse staff, guards and agents from beneath the rubble.” 

Saeedeh Makarem, a doctor volunteering in Evin prison who was injured, including with burns, described in a series of posts on Instagram in July how prisoners helped her: 

“They dragged me to the corner of the wall. I was half-conscious. They brought me water and a blanket, put a splint in my leg, wiped the blood from my face… They could have left, but they didn’t… They saved me.” 

Political dissident Hossein Razagh also told Amnesty that section 4 prisoners described to him how prisoners were thrown against the walls due to the force of the blast and sustained head and face injuries. 

These testimonies are corroborated by a verified video showing extensive damage to the front parts of sections 4 and 209. External doors and windows of sections 4 and 209 appear to have been shattered, with parts of the roof structure collapsed and large piles of rubble visible in the road. Multiple vehicles are destroyed and burned out, with black smoke damage on the surrounding building walls, indicating some of the fire may have originated from the cars. Satellite imagery from 30 June shows the burned buildings and black scorch marks from the cars. The blast also appears to have affected the roof of the prison kitchen and damaged its windows. 

According to Amnesty’s research, the blast also affected section 209 staff offices, trapping some agents and guards under the rubble. Authorities have provided no information about the fate and whereabouts of prisoners held in solitary confinement in section 209, raising concerns about possible deaths or injuries. 

Image showing the road with Section 209 on one side (left) and the vehicle entrance gate on the opposite side (right). 

Amnesty confirmed through an informed source the name of a prisoner in section 4, Masoud Behbahani, aged 71, who was killed. He suffered a heart attack when the blast threw him onto a chair and several prisoners fell on him. According to the source, instead of transferring him to a hospital, authorities transferred him to Greater Tehran Penitentiary where he died two days later after a second heart attack.

Amnesty also analysed an image taken from inside the women’s section showing visible damage to the ceiling and electrical infrastructure.

Entrance gate, judicial complex, visitors’ building and sections housing prisoners in the north

In the northern part of the prison, as visible in satellite imagery and verified videos, the entrance gate and adjacent wall were destroyed; the front part of the building containing the Shahid Kachouyee judicial complex and visitors’ building were extensively damaged; and two internal walls near sections 240 and 241 housing prisoners were destroyed.

Verified video and photographs also show blast-related damage to nearby high-rise residential buildings and vehicles outside the northern area of Evin prison. One video shows dozens of distressed people in Ahmadpour Street, at least one of whom appears to be injured. 

Before and after false-colour, near infrared imagery from 10 April and 27 June reveals the destruction in two distinct locations where munitions likely landed in the northern part of Evin prison (shown with yellow circles): the internal security walls and road in front of sections 240 and 241 and the north entrance gate in front of the visitation building and Shaheed Kachouyee judicial complex. 

An informed source described to Amnesty how a nearby resident, Mehrangiz Imanpour, a 61-year-old painter who lived in Ahmadpour Street, was killed on her way home. 

Shargh Daily reported that another passerby, Ali Asghar Pazouki, 69, was killed in front of the judicial complex and visitors’ building. State media published videos and photographs which show blast damage in this area.  

Satellite imagery (left) from 30 June reveals a location (shown with a yellow circle) where munitions likely landed. Geolocated images and videos (right) show extensive damage to the exterior and interior of the visitors’ building with windows shattered and parts of the roof and facade collapsed.  

Satellite imagery analysed by Amnesty indicates that a road and two security walls deeper within the northern part of the prison, near a building containing sections 240 and 241, were also destroyed. These sections are known to contain hundreds of solitary confinement cells, but no images showing the condition of the building have emerged and the authorities have not released any information about the fate of prisoners held there.

Amnesty received accounts from prisoners’ families indicating that section 8, near sections 240 and 241, was damaged. Human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh told Amnesty that her arbitrarily imprisoned husband, human rights defender, Reza Khandan, and other prisoners, were injured when rubble was propelled into the courtyard. 

Political dissident Mohammad Nourizad, who was in section 8, called his family while the air strikes were ongoing. A recording of his call was published online on 24 June: 

“They are dropping bombs on us. Some people are injured, the windows have broken, and everyone has scattered... They just hit again. I don’t know, it seems intentional... but bombing a prison is incompatible with any logic or code of conduct...They [prison authorities] closed the doors on us and we have no news.” 

International law and standards 

Under international humanitarian law, direct attacks on civilians and civilian objects are prohibited. Attacks may only be directed at combatants and military objectives. Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.  

Attacking forces have an obligation to do everything feasible to protect civilians including by distinguishing between military targets and civilian objects; verifying whether their intended target is a military objective and cancelling an attack if there is doubt; choosing means and methods of attack that will avoid, or in any event, minimise civilian harm; and providing effective advance warning to civilians unless circumstances do not permit.

Even when targeting a legitimate military objective, an attack must not be carried out which may cause civilian harm that would be disproportionate in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. If distinguishing between civilian objects and military targets is not feasible, the attack must not proceed. 

Governments responsible for violations of international humanitarian law are required to make full reparations for the loss or injury caused. The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law enshrine the duty of states to provide effective remedies, including reparation to victims, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.

Evidence gathered

Amnesty’s Evidence Lab analysed satellite images from before and after the strikes and verified 22 videos and 59 photographs, which show extensive damage and destruction to six areas in the south, central, and northern parts of Evin prison complex. 

Additionally, Amnesty reviewed statements by Israeli and Iranian authorities and interviewed 23 people inside and outside Iran, including seven prisoners’ relatives; a nearby resident who witnessed the attack; two sources with information about two victims killed; two journalists; and 11 former prisoners including dissidents and human rights defenders who received information from prisoners, prisoners’ families, prison staff and emergency services attending the site. Amnesty also obtained from a source the recordings of four telephone calls between four prisoners and their families hours after the attack.

Amnesty sent questions regarding the attack to the Israeli Minister of Defence on 3 July. At the time of publication, no response had been received.

As part of Amnesty’s ongoing investigations into violations of international humanitarian law and other human rights violations in the context of the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Iran, Amnesty will also publish findings relating to attacks by the Iranian authorities against Israel.

Urgent action

Take action to support hundreds of displaced prisoners from Tehran’s Evin Prison, who are currently being held in cruel and inhuman conditions. See Amnesty’s Urgent Action for how to help.

SDF denies US-Turkiye deadline for Syria tie-up

SDF denies US-Turkiye deadline for Syria tie-up
2025-07-21 17:11

Shafaq News – Kurdistan

On Monday, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) denied claims made in the British outlet, Middle East Eye, that the United States and Turkiye had given the group a 30-day deadline to end its integration process with the Syrian government.

In a statement, the SDF described the claims as “baseless” and part of a deliberate attempt to mislead public opinion.

“The information suggesting that negotiations are underway regarding the future of our forces or their restructuring and integration into Syrian government institutions is false,” the statement read.

The Middle East Eye report, citing unnamed “informed sources,” claimed that a meeting was held in Syria last week between US, Turkish officials, and SDF leadership, during which the group was allegedly told to accelerate its merger with Damascus within 30 days.

The report also alleged that some SDF units would not be incorporated into the Syrian army, while others would be disarmed.

Earlier, Syrian transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa and US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack agreed on the need to integrate the SDF units into national institutions to restore full state sovereignty.

Erdogan gov’t accused of hiding a coup report to cover up evidence of false flag operation



Levent Kenez/Stockholm
Nordic Monitor.

Nine years after a coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, the most comprehensive parliamentary investigation into the event remains unpublished, a move critics say was driven by fears that its findings could implicate senior government officials and bolster the legal defenses of those accused of involvement, according to behind-the-scenes accounts that have surfaced in recent years.

Although a parliamentary commission was quickly formed to investigate the attempted coup, the final report was never officially released. Despite the passage of nearly a decade, the Turkish Parliament has yet to issue a formal account of the commission’s findings.

The Turkish government has long blamed the abortive putsch on followers of the Gülen movement, which is inspired by the late Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen and has been targeted by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan since the corruption investigations of December 17-25, 2013, which implicated him while he was serving as prime minister, along with his family members and inner circle.

The Erdogan government refers to the movement as a terrorist organization, though its members deny involvement in the coup attempt and claim the attempted takeover was used as a pretext for an extensive purge of dissidents.
Shortly after the coup attempt, then-chief of general staff Hulusi Akar (L), President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and then-head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Hakan Fidan (R) were photographed in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, during a state visit on November 19, 2016. Erdogan later stated in an interview that MIT had not informed him about the coup attempt in advance.

The government’s unilateral designation of the group as a terrorist organization has not been formally recognized internationally, a reluctance widely attributed to the belief among global actors that the label is politically motivated rather than based on independently verifiable evidence.

According to accounts shared in the Turkish media, the decision to withhold the parliamentary report was made after senior political figures were warned of the potential legal dangers of releasing it. Just before the report was scheduled for publication in 2017, prominent legal experts are said to have visited top ruling party officials, including parliamentary leaders, and advised against making the findings public.

Cover of the unpublished coup report obtained by Nordic Monitor.

“They said the facts, allegations and documentation in the report could later backfire on you,” journalist Barış Pehlivan revealed despite his opposition to the Gülen movement during a nationally broadcast television appearance in 2021. “A published parliamentary report could support legal cases abroad and damage Turkey’s position internationally. Their advice was: Don’t officially print the report.”

That behind-the-scenes warning, according to the same broadcast, prompted the shelving of the document despite months of work and extensive hearings. Selçuk Özdağ, the vice chair of the commission, confirmed these claims, stating that the political leadership was indeed cautioned and influenced by legal concerns.

A moment from the parliamentary commission meeting on December 15, 2016. Selçuk Özdağ is on the left wearing a white shirt.

Following the end of İsmail Kahraman’s term as speaker of parliament, it emerged that the final report had not been archived or formally submitted in accordance with parliamentary procedure. His successor, Mustafa Åžentop, confirmed that no valid report had been entered into the records of the parliament.

“In line with parliamentary bylaws, a report must be agreed upon by the commission and submitted officially,” Åžentop said in a public statement. “There is no report that meets these criteria. Therefore, no official commission report exists on the July 15 events.”

However, documentation and testimony from multiple opposition members of the commission tell a different story. They say a draft was prepared, circulated and even sent to the speaker’s office in July 2017.

The lack of an official archive record, critics argue, is a deliberate maneuver designed to erase the report from institutional memory and avoid public scrutiny.

The commission held 22 meetings for a total of 142 hours, during which it heard testimony from representatives of 94 institutions and 50 individuals. Members also conducted on-site inspections at key locations, including the Grand Yazıcı Hotel in Marmaris, where President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was initially reported to have narrowly escaped capture, a claim that was later contested, and the Bosporus Bridge in Istanbul, where dozens were killed during clashes.

Over the course of its work, the parliamentary commission generated multiple iterations of its findings. The first version, a 936-page draft, was leaked to the press in December 2016, revealing extensive testimony and preliminary assessments. Months later, in May 2017, a revised 639-page draft was circulated internally to gather dissenting views from minority members of the commission. What was believed to be the final version, comprising 1,097 pages, was reportedly delivered to the Office of the Speaker on July 12, 2017, just days before the commission’s mandate expired.

According to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), the first version contained serious investigative material and reflected a genuine effort to uncover the truth. The second, shorter version removed significant content, raising suspicions of political interference. The final version, the CHP claims, included politically motivated accusations and excluded dissenting opinions submitted by opposition members.

Excerpt from the opposition dissent note submitted by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) on the coup investigation report:


One controversial section added in the final version accused then-CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of having close ties to the network blamed for the coup, an assertion denied by the party and never proven in court.

“The government’s aim was never to investigate the coup,” a CHP document said. “The goal was to weaponize the narrative and silence critics.”

Notably, two of the most central figures of the July 15 events, then-chief of general staff Hulusi Akar and then-National Intelligence Organization (MİT) director Hakan Fidan, were not called to testify before the commission. This omission, despite repeated opposition requests, has been one of the main sources of controversy.

Observers believe their testimony could have shed light on early warnings, response strategies and potentially conflicting accounts of what unfolded that night. Their absence has led many to question the credibility and completeness of the commission’s work.

The official account states that only 8,651 military members took part in the coup, corresponding to 1.5 percent of the Turkish Armed Forces. Of those, 1,761 were conscripts and 1,214 were military cadets. Given that some 150 generals and thousands of lower-ranking officers were sentenced on coup charges, military experts find it odd that such a small number of troops allegedly participated. Many believe it was a false-flag operation Erdogan used to purge his opponents within the military and consolidate power.

By branding the coup as a wide-ranging conspiracy, the government justified mass arrests, constitutional amendments and the imposition of a two-year state of emergency. Critics say this period marked the beginning of a new era of authoritarian rule in Turkey, characterized by the erosion of judicial independence, freedom of expression and political pluralism.

Notes from the first meeting of the parliamentary commission:


Opposition parties were not silent during the commission’s investigation. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) in its official note declared that the commission’s final output “did not aim to shed light on the coup but rather to legitimize the government’s version of events.”

“The final report fell far short of answering pressing questions,” the party said in its note. “The commission bent the facts to reinforce a single political thesis. The declared state of emergency has since institutionalized a level of lawlessness that resembles the very coup it claimed to resist.”

The HDP noted that, rather than promoting reconciliation and clarity, the government’s response deepened social divisions and fostered an atmosphere of fear and suppression.

Despite repeated calls from lawmakers, journalists and civil society, the July 15 commission report remains buried, if not entirely erased. Parliament has refused to revisit the issue, and no serious attempt has been made to republish or investigate the report’s findings.

Meanwhile, according to data published by the state-run Anadolu news agency on July 14, 2025, a total of 390,354 individuals have been detained in post-coup investigations as of July 2025. Of these, 113,837 have been arrested on suspicion of participating in the uprising or belonging to banned organizations.




Ankara likens Somalia to Syria, using military power to enhance its economic influence




Levent Kenez/Stockholm
NORDIC MONITOR

Turkey is intensifying its political, economic and military involvement in Somalia, with a recent debate in the Turkish Parliament drawing a deliberate parallel between the country’s approach to the Horn of Africa and its long-term strategy in Syria: establishing security and enabling Turkish business to follow.

During a meeting of parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee on July 17, Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yılmaz highlighted the multi-layered nature of Turkey’s engagement with Somalia, emphasizing the “special nature” of bilateral ties grounded in shared history and growing mutual interests.

Yılmaz compared Turkey’s engagement in Somalia to its approach in Syria, noting that once cooperation with a country advances and security is established, the environment naturally opens up to Turkish business. “Once a country ensures security in a partner state, the field naturally opens up to Turkish businesspeople,” Yılmaz told members of the committee.

Since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then prime minister, made a visit to Mogadishu in 2011, Turkey has emerged as Somalia’s most visible foreign partner, operating across sectors ranging from defense and health care to infrastructure and finance.
Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yılmaz

Turkey operates its largest military training base abroad in Somalia, the Anatolia Barracks in Mogadishu, which has trained more than 15,000 Somali troops since its inauguration in 2017. The base is central to Somalia’s ongoing fight against the al-Qaeda-linked militant group al-Shabab, Yılmaz said.

In tandem with security cooperation, Turkey has backed development projects by means of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), supported humanitarian relief through the Turkish Red Crescent and provided medical services via a teaching and research hospital in Mogadishu.

At the core of the current parliamentary discussion is a bilateral agreement under which each country allocates land for the other’s embassy. Under the terms of the deal, Turkey will construct a new chancery and residence for the Somali Embassy in Ankara on a 4,918-square-meter plot of land in the Incek diplomatic enclave. This follows Somalia’s prior grant of more than 61,000 square meters of land in Mogadishu, now home to Turkey’s largest embassy compound abroad.

The agreement, formally titled “Protocol on the Mutual Allocation of Plots for Diplomatic Missions,” was signed in 2019 but only reached the committee in July 2025 for parliamentary ratification. While some lawmakers expressed concern over the lack of specific cost estimates and clarity on procedures for tenders, Yılmaz and senior diplomats insisted the arrangement was based on mutual benefit.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud at the presidential palace on July 11 in Ankara. The two leaders last met on April 12 in Antalya, Turkey.

Refik Ali Onaner, director general for North and East Africa at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, noted that Turkey had already received a substantial return in diplomatic presence and strategic influence. “The compound in Mogadishu not only enhances Turkey’s visibility in the region but has become a regional diplomatic and operational hub,” he said.

The deal is structured as a non-monetary aid agreement, with Turkey providing the land and overseeing the construction of Somalia’s new embassy. Critics on the committee raised questions about cost transparency, potential favoritism in the awarding of contracts and whether such investments provide measurable returns to Turkish taxpayers.

Committee member Utku Çakırözer asked why such significant financial commitments were being made during a time of national austerity, pointing to recent government-wide calls for budgetary restraint. “We are not only giving the land but also constructing the building,” he said. “We don’t know the cost, nor do we know who will build it. Shouldn’t this be subject to stricter scrutiny?”

Yılmaz defended the initiative as part of a long-term strategy. “This isn’t a typical bilateral relationship,” he said. “It’s a relationship built on a strategic alliance, and it positions Turkey as a key actor in the stabilization of the Horn of Africa.”

Several lawmakers raised questions about oversight. Çakırözer and fellow lawmaker Yunus Emre both asked about the legal mechanisms available should Somalia fail to honor the diplomatic agreement or misuse the property provided. Ministry officials responded that all disputes would be resolved amicably and without recourse to international courts, a standard clause in bilateral agreements of this kind.

Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu, Somalia, is managed and operated by a Turkish company under a controversial contract signed in 2013, facilitated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Onaner clarified that the Turkish side retained control over any future transfer or sale of the compound, stressing that the land could only be used for diplomatic purposes and could not be transferred without Turkey’s explicit permission.

Another point of contention was the total financial commitment made by Turkey to Somalia since 2011. Onaner estimated that aid and assistance have surpassed $1 billion, including a $3.5 million payment to cover Somalia’s debt to the International Monetary Fund as well as significant humanitarian aid.

According to claims in the Turkish media, much of the aid sent to Somalia is actually used to make payments to companies close to Erdogan that are doing business in Somalia. In other words, under the guise of official aid, a mechanism is operating that effectively finances pro-Erdogan businessmen. This situation has sparked criticism suggesting that behind Turkey’s economic and military presence in Somalia lies a hidden agenda to channel resources to certain interest groups beyond the stated support to the country.

Turkey’s trade volume with Somalia reached $426 million in 2023 but dropped to $384 million in 2024, according to ministry figures. Despite the decline, Turkey remains the leading foreign investor in Somalia, with Turkish companies managing both the Port of Mogadishu and Aden Adde International Airport.

Critics remain wary. “We say this relationship is special,” Çakırözer said, “but has Somalia reciprocated in areas important to us, such as recognizing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?”  

A military school graduation ceremony was held by the Somali Turkish Task Force Command at the Anatolia Barracks in Mogadishu on July 13.

Supporters, however, argue that the long-term returns of Turkish engagement in Somalia — political, economic and symbolic — outweigh short-term costs. Ruling party lawmaker Derya Bakbak said the reason Somalia trusts Turkey more than other countries is clear. Turkey has a clean record, free from the stain of colonialism. Wherever Turkey goes, it brings justice, development and sincerity. This trust is strengthened by their shared history, faith and cultural ties. The steps taken in Somalia are not just a matter between two countries but also a reflection of Turkey’s vision to become a global power.

Nordic Monitor previously published the full text of a wide-ranging hydrocarbons agreement between Turkey and Somalia following its submission to the Turkish Parliament for ratification on April 22. The release of the document provided the first detailed insight into the scope, terms and strategic intentions behind Ankara’s deepening energy and defense partnership with Mogadishu. According to the agreement, Turkey has secured sweeping operational and financial privileges.

In 2022 United Nations investigators concluded that Turkey violated international sanctions on Somalia by supplying armed drones without notifying or obtaining approval from the UN. According to the Panel of Experts on Somalia, which monitors the conflict under the relevant UN Security Council resolution, Turkey violated the UN arms embargo by delivering armed Bayraktar drones manufactured by a company owned by the family of President Erdogan.

Confidential intelligence obtained by the UN investigators revealed that Turkey delivered Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu on December 6, 2021, via two Airbus A400M military cargo planes operated by the Turkish air force. However, the Turkish government failed to request an exemption from the UN before the shipment, despite the Security Council resolution explicitly requiring such clearance prior to any arms delivery to Somalia.