[By Megan Jungwiwattanaporn, Tristan Irschlinger, Daniel Skerritt, Andrea Michelson, Zhang Yimo]
Countries across the world spend many billions of dollars every year subsidizing fishing that is environmentally damaging and unsustainable.
After years of tortuous negotiation under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a global deal to reign in these subsidies emerged. The first part of this Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies finally entered into force this month, while a second part remains at the debate stage, held up by disagreements.
With consensus still lacking on crucial details, can these rules actually end subsidies that are contributing to overfishing across the world, and harming food supplies to some of the world’s most vulnerable people?
Dialogue Earth asked five experts for their views.
‘Fish populations finally have a chance to recover’
Megan Jungwiwattanaporn works on reducing harmful fisheries subsidies at The Pew Charitable Trusts
In the mid-1970s, 10% of fish stocks were fished at unsustainable levels. By 2021, that number had almost quadrupled to 37.7%. Subsidy-driven overfishing is depleting fish populations and hurting coastal communities who depend on a healthy ocean for their livelihoods and survival.
With the agreement now legally binding for the two-thirds of WTO member countries who have ratified it, fish populations finally have a chance to begin to recover.
And, as the WTO’s first sustainability-focused agreement, it paves the way for future multilateral treaties that protect the environment, and for broader fisheries reform at regional and country levels.
The agreement is also a step toward meeting one of the targets of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, which 193 countries adopted in 2015. As part of Goal 14, nations committed to reaching an agreement to end harmful fisheries subsidies.
But the work is not finished. Countries must implement the agreement by limiting some of the subsidies they give out that drive harmful practices. And WTO members must still finalize negotiations on additional rules that would end subsidies not included in the agreement: those that contribute to fishing in other countries’ waters and to overfishing and overcapacity, or a fleet’s ability to harvest more fish than is sustainable. Doing this will give fish populations an even better chance to recover.
‘‘Fish 2’ rules could bring even more progress’
Tristan Irschlinger is a senior policy adviser focusing on fisheries subsidies at the International Institute for Sustainable Development
The entry into force of the WTO agreement is a key milestone, and the next challenge will be to put these rules into practice effectively. But the story does not end there. WTO members are also negotiating a further set of rules, known as Fish 2, to make the agreement more comprehensive.
The current agreement, often referred to as Fish 1, targets specific situations where the harmful impacts of subsidies can be the most acute: illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; overfished stocks; and unregulated high seas fisheries. Fish 2 aims to go further and prevent subsidies from contributing to overcapacity and overfishing in the first place. In other words, these further rules seek to better address the deep-seated and pervasive role of subsidies as a driver of unsustainable fishing.
As such, the impact of Fish 2 could be broader than Fish 1.
Talks on these additional rules advanced significantly and came close to conclusion in 2024, but progress has since slowed. It now appears unlikely that a final deal will be reached by the WTO’s 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14; March 2026). Still, the conference could play a critical role in injecting fresh momentum and steering negotiations toward a successful outcome. That should be the focus for WTO members at MC14.
‘Implementation is now key’
Daniel Skerritt is a senior analyst at the conservation NGO Oceana
With the agreement in force, attention turns from negotiation to implementation – at least for now. Starting 15 September, all ratifying members must comply with the Fish 1 rules: ending subsidies for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, fishing of overfished stocks, and unregulated high seas fishing. Equally important, members must now provide more complete and timely information on the scale, distribution and nature of their subsidy programs. This transparency is key to judging the successes – or failures – of Fish 1.
The agreement also empowers members to demand clarity from one another. For example, a country can request details about subsidies that support foreign vessels operating in its waters or ask for the scientific justification behind continued subsidization.
To support developing and least-developed countries, the newly launched Fish Fund will help build capacity for monitoring, reporting and compliance. This fund is important because it requires those providing the most subsidies to shoulder the greatest costs, ensuring the new commitments do not fall disproportionately on those least able to pay.
The clock has also started on the treaty’s four-year sunset clause. During this window, WTO members must agree to the more ambitious Fish 2 package, which is aimed at curbing capacity-enhancing subsidies that drive overfishing worldwide. Unfortunately, geopolitical headwinds have stalled talks and the vacant post of negotiation chair makes rapid progress unlikely. [The most recent chairperson, Iceland’s Einar Gunnarsson, stood down in July.]
Strong leadership from major economies, top subsidizers and coalitions such as the small island developing states and African, Caribbean and Pacific groups will be essential to keep momentum alive and deliver further meaningful reform.
‘This is a unique opportunity for Latin America, and for the ocean’
Andrea Michelson is regional coordinator of the Forum for the Conservation of the Patagonian Sea and Areas of Influence
The entry into force of the agreement marks a milestone on the road to better ocean governance and offers Latin America a unique opportunity to move towards better and necessary responsible management of marine resources.
Harmful subsidies not only endanger biodiversity and ecosystems, many of which are fragile, but also compromise the livelihoods, food security and economic resilience of the world’s most vulnerable coastal communities.
For countries in Latin America with vast coastlines and economies strongly linked to the sea, this is hugely important. On the one hand, it reinforces the role of regulations, transparency, regional commitment and an ecosystem approach. On the other hand, it opens up the possibility of redirecting and channelling financial resources towards responsible fishing and good practices.
Governments in the region must implement the agreement with commitment and dedication to the care of natural environments, coordinating efforts with all actors in the fishing sector, civil society and science. Only through multi-stakeholder engagement will this new regulatory framework translate into healthier, more resilient, equitable and productive oceans for present and future generations.
‘Significant implications for the world’s largest fisheries nation’
Zhang Yimo is the priority project coordinator of WWF China’s sustainable blue economy program
The entry into force of the agreement will have significant implications for China’s fisheries, particularly in enhancing the transparency of the nation’s subsidy policies.
The government has gained considerable experience in reforming fisheries subsidies in recent years. In 2021, it announced the abolition of fuel subsidies for fishing vessels. Instead, a new system was introduced in which only vessels that comply with certain conservation regulations can receive subsidies.
These “fisheries stewardship” subsidies in China still risk contributing to overcapacity and overfishing, according to a WWF report released last year. Under the existing framework, fishing vessel workers are not direct recipients of subsidies, and small-scale fishers receive significantly less support than those in the commercial sector. We recommend including vessel workers as subsidy recipients and ensuring income security for small-scale fishers, along with providing work-transition support for those who need to retire from fishing.
This is a significant year for China’s fisheries sector, as the country joined the Port State Measures Agreement and the WTO agreement, which it accepted in 2023, has come into force. These developments will strengthen China’s role in the global fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.
The WTO agreement coming into force encourages the global community to clarify many outstanding issues of harmful subsidies in fisheries – including who should receive subsidies and how to define overfishing.
This article appears courtesy of Dialogue Earth and may be found in its original form here.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
Open-source vessel tracking would indicate that there are at least six Bermuda-flagged fishing vessels operating in jurisdictions outside of Bermuda – one in Canada, one in Brazil, one in Iran, and three in China. Not one of those vessels is actually registered in Bermuda. In fact, a similar phenomenon is plaguing almost every CARICOM Member and Associate Member State. Foreign fishing vessels, often in areas far from the Caribbean, are using the flag states of the Caribbean region, but none of those vessels are actually registered in the Caribbean. This fraudulent use of the region’s flags is not just about optics – it degrades the reputation of those states, undermines the rule of law, and raises questions of state responsibility. It also means that perpetrators of illegal fishing in other parts of the world may be trading on the reputation of the Caribbean states in order to carry out their activities with impunity.
The preponderance of these illegitimately flagged vessels is in East Asia, with the overwhelming majority in China, and secondarily, Vietnam. In recent months, maritime news has been filled with stories of the “Dark Fleet” or “Shadow Fleet,” and now the unregistered “Renegade Fleet.” There are countless stories about sanctioned vessels and their flag-hopping to avoid accountability. However, this is a different phenomenon altogether. Fishing vessels are usually administered by the ministry that governs fishing, but if the state allows for foreign fishing vessels to be flagged into their jurisdiction, the ships are legally required to appear in the state’s flag registry, as well. With different state departments overseeing the grant and registration of fishing licenses and the registration of ships, often with little coordination, it seems that bad actors are taking advantage of a blind spot between two governmental entities that are involved in fishing and ship registration.
Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides that every state in the world – whether coastal or landlocked – the right to determine which vessels are allowed to fly its flag. With that, however, comes a variety of responsibilities to enforce the laws of the flag state onboard that vessel, regardless of where it sails. Outside of port and coastal state jurisdiction, the flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over that vessel, and thus considerable responsibility to ensure that its flagged vessel complies with the provisions of law in its operation and shows due regard to other states at sea. It is for reason of efficiency in enforcement and control by the flag state that Article 91 further clarifies that there must be a “genuine link” between the flag state and the vessel. What we see, in reality, is that there are dozens of vessels appearing to be flying the flag of a state to which they have no link at all and whose laws and responsibilities they have no plan to commit to or comply with. This raises a series of problems.
For the states whose flags are being exploited in this fashion, there is a need to be proactive in clarifying to the world that they are not taking responsibility for these vessels, as they are not legitimately registered. There is considerable reputational risk to the Caribbean flag states – and any other states around the world experiencing a similar phenomenon. The optics of association with bad actors, high-risk fishing operators and sanctioned entities may make it look like they are condoning such illicit behavior. States need to make it clear that these vessels – even if they are using mobile maritime service indicator (MMSI) numbers stolen from scrapped vessels that were once legitimately flagged – are not registered and are thus without nationality. Doing so proactively and regularly, rather than after an illegal incident has been announced, makes it easier for flag states to distance themselves from fraudulently flagged vessels undertaking illegal activities early on. The sanction of five tankers fraudulently flagged to Guyana in 2024 by the United States - leading to Guyana’s subsequent denial in defense of its shipping registry - demonstrates the impact of fraudulent flags on innocent flag states if not preemptively rejected. Recently, Saint Maarten has warned against fraudulent flag representations in order to preserve the integrity of its registry. Following this example, more states need to preemptively distance themselves from the vessels fraudulently flying their flag.
If the apparent flag of the vessel is not actually the flag state, there is a chance the vessels could conduct illegal operations with impunity. Vessels without nationality have a loose treatment under international law, requiring states to exercise the right of visit for verification purposes only, with no clear enforcement obligation. The silence on enforcement against such vessels trickle down to coastal states’ policies and laws. Thus, many coastal states around the world, lack legal processes for dealing with vessels without nationality and, at a minimum, are hesitant to take on such cases. This can not only undermine the rule of law, but increase the concerns around open registries - even though this is not an issue of open or closed registries, but the fraudulent appearance of being affiliated with a registry.
Since this issue among fishing vessels is occurring against the backdrop of similarly challenging flagging issues with the shipping industry, several new concerns may also arise. First, the response to this sort of behavior by coastal states may be an attempt to conduct more inspections to confirm registration, and, in so doing, hamper the freedom of navigation in violation of Article 58 of the UNCLOS. This is visible in the Baltic where safety inspections are being used as an antidote to the dark fleet and its propensity for cable-cutting. Fishing vessels transiting to other countries may therefore be stopped more regularly by coastal state navies and coast guards.
Second, the issue of fraudulent flagging may soon present a camouflaged combination of illicit activities - bad actors broadcasting identities as fishing vessels, using registries with which they have no affiliation, while actually operating as cargo vessels, carrying sanctioned or illicit cargo. The layers of confusion around the entities responsible for fishing as distinct from vessel registration and cargo transport may further complicate the situation, giving room for bad actors to avoid detection and interdiction. This further muddies the picture for legitimate maritime activities at a time when they are already under question thanks to the dark, shadow and renegade fleets, as well as the activities of fishing fleets associated with illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.
Finally, it may lead to registries starting to impose more stringent restrictions on vessels, thereby increasing the regulatory burden on fishing vessels to be cross-listed within both the fishing vessel registries and shipping vessel registries of the flag state. From a procedural standpoint, this may signify a regression to more bureaucratic and rigid registration and verification processes, thereby causing administrative delays. Procedural bottlenecks are also likely to have significant economic effects in the long run, especially in regions like the Caribbean, where fishing produces a major part of the economic returns of states in the region. Overall, a ripple effect of distrust and stringency may impact the region’s economy and sustainability.
Ultimately, the maintenance of the rule of law at sea – and thus our global maritime system – requires the collaborative participation of all legitimate actors. The flag state regime on which we rely is under threat, and steps are needed to safeguard its effectiveness. To that end, regional bodies, such as the Caribbean Community’s Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS), may wish to publish regional guidance on this matter, combined with offering a regional statement on behalf of member states to help distance them from the vessels that are fraudulently flying their flag. At the same time, templates of statements should be offered to enable member States make similar public statements that expressly disavow the erring vessels and distance themselves from responsibility for such vessels. In the absence of a clear mechanism for addressing this issue, clear, transparent and unequivocal communication is the only way to try to guard against the harm that can come from high-risk fishing operators fraudulently availing themselves of the flags of Caribbean States.
Dr. Ian Ralby is President of Auxilium Worldwide, a charitable nonprofit that contributes to global harmony with, among other things, dedicated expertise on ocean governance. Dr. Ralby is a recognized expert in maritime law and security with experience in over 100 countries around the world. He is a fellow at the Center for Maritime Strategy and has previously served in various maritime security-related capacities at different government agencies and international organizations.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
